State Of Washington v. Molla Beyene ( 2017 )


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  • IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASAINGTON
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,
    No. 76041-6-1
    Respondent,
    DIVISION ONE
    V.
    MOLLA BEYENE,                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.                   FILED: October 23, 2017
    PER CURIAM. Molla Beyene appeals the victim penalty assessment
    (VPA) and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)collection fee imposed following his
    conviction for possession of a controlled substance. For the first time on appeal,
    he contends the statutes authorizing these mandatory financial obligations are
    unconstitutional as applied to defendants who do not have the ability or likely
    future ability to pay them. He concedes his contention is not ripe for review
    under our decision in State v. Shelton, 
    194 Wn. App. 660
    , 671-74, 
    378 P.3d 230
    (2016), review denied, 
    187 Wn.2d 1002
    , 
    386 P.3d 1088
    (2017),1 but contends
    Shelton is wrongly decided because it relied on a distinguishable case'-- State v.
    Curry, 
    118 Wn.2d 911
    , 
    829 P.2d 166
     (1992). We adhere to our decision in
    Shelton.
    Regardless of whether Curry is distinguishable in some respect, it still
    supports Shelton's holding that an as applied substantive due process challenge
    1Accord State v. Lewis, 
    194 Wn. App. 709
    , 714-15, 
    379 P.3d 129
    , review denied, 
    186 Wn.2d 1025
    , 
    385 P.3d 118
     (2016).
    No. 76041-6-1/2
    to financial obligations is not ripe until the State attempts to collect them. Curry,
    118 Wn.2d at 917; see also State v. Curry, 
    62 Wn. App. 676
    , 681, 
    814 P.2d 1252
    (1991), aff'd, 
    118 Wn.2d 911
    , 917, 829 P:2d 166 (1992). We adhere to that
    holding in Shelton, which applies equally to DNA and VPA assessments/fees.2
    We also adhere to Shelton's holding that as=applied due process claims cannot
    constitute manifest constitutional error under RAP 2.5(a) until the State seeks to
    enforce collection of the fees or imposes a sanction for failure to pay.3 While this
    court does have discretion to review Beyene's claim under RAP 2.5(a) in the
    absence of manifest constitutional error, the claim is not ripe and Beyene has not
    demonstrated that a significant risk of hardship will result from declining review at
    this time. See Shelton, 194 Wn. App. at 670; State v. Cates, 
    183 Wn.2d 531
    ,
    536, 
    354 P.3d 832
    (2015).
    Finally, even if Beyene's contentions were ripe for review and could be
    raised for the first time on appeal, they would fail under State v. Seward, 
    196 Wn. App. 579
    , 
    384 P.3d 620
    (2016), review denied, 
    188 Wn.2d 1015
    , 
    396 P.3d 349
    (2017)(imposition of VPA, DNA collection fee, and criminal filing fee prior to any
    2 State v. Tyler, 
    195 Wn. App. 385
    , 404 n.11, 
    382 P.3d 699
    (2016)(applying Shelton to
    mandatory VPA and rejecting argument that RCW 10.01.160(3) applies to mandatory
    financial obligations).
    3 Shelton, at 672-73(RAP 2.5(a)(3) bars challenge to VPA, DNA fee and filing fee for the
    first time on appeal because the claimed error is not "manifest" "[L]nW the State attempts
    to enforce collection of the... fee or impose sanctions for failure to pay."); accord
    Lewis, 194 Wn. App. at 715.
    2
    No. 76041-6-1/3
    individualized determination of ability to pay is rationally related to a legitimate
    state interest).
    Affirmed.
    For the court:
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 76041-6

Filed Date: 10/23/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021