In Re The Dep Of N.a., John Ackah, App v. Dshs ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Dependency )
of N.A., ) No. 76420-9-1
)
A Minor Child. ) (Consolidated with
) No. 76494-2-1, No. 76520-5-1,
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) & No. 76521-3-1)
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND )
HEALTH SERVICES, ) DIVISION ONE
)
Respondent. )
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
John Ackah, )
)
Appellant, )
)
Druche Mason, )
)
Appellant. ) FILED: January 22, 2018
)
LEACH, J. — John Ackah and Druche Mason appeal from the order denying
their guardianship petition and terminating their parental rights to their son, N.A. But
the parents have failed to demonstrate the trial court applied the wrong standard of
proof in rejecting their guardianship petition. The record also shows the court
considered all statutory factors applicable to incarcerated parents when terminating
Ackah's parental rights. And because both parents expressly conceded the State
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had established three of the statutory termination factors, the court's failure to enter
corresponding findings of fact does not warrant reversal or remand. We affirm.
FACTS
Ackah and Mason are the parents of N.A., who was born on September 10,
2014. At the time of N.A.'s birth, Mason was 17 years old and a dependent youth.
Ackah was incarcerated. Renee Harris is N.A.'s paternal grandmother. After N.A.'s
birth, police detained Mason on outstanding warrants involving theft and possession
of cocaine. The court then sent her to Echo Glen Children's Center.
In December 2014, the court found N.A. dependent as to Mason. The
dispositional order required Mason to participate in a drug and alcohol evaluation and
to take parenting classes.
While at Echo Glen, Mason participated in chemical dependency and mental
health services. She made some progress but needed to continue with outpatient
treatment upon release. The Department of Social and Health Services
(Department) also arranged for Mason to visit with N.A. while she was at Echo Glen.
When Mason left Echo Glen in April 2015, the Department placed her into
foster care. A short time later, Mason left the placement and was "on the run" until
September 2015. Upon her return, the Department placed Mason in Cocoon House,
a transitional living facility for youth. It provides assistance for employment and job
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skills, housing, education, and recreation. Mental health and drug and alcohol
services are also available. The Department made arrangements for Mason to visit
with N.A. while she was at Cocoon House, but Mason missed multiple visits.
Mason participated in some services at Cocoon House, but she soon began
missing sessions and violating program rules. In December 2015, the Cocoon House
staff asked Mason to leave.
After leaving Cocoon House, Mason generally refused the Department's
placement attempts. Mason aged out of the foster care program. The court
dismissed her dependency in March 2016.
After March 2016, Mason had only intermittent contact with the Department.
In late 2016, Mason contacted a Department social worker to ask about visiting N.A.
Mason visited N.A. twice but did not continue the contacts.
At the termination trial, Mason testified that she would be comfortable with
N.A. staying with Harris until she was able to care for him. Mason estimated that she
needed five or six months to get ready. She planned to use this time to
get in school, get a job, get myself stable, you know, for-1 won't have
to do stuff, whatever I was doing before, so, being—staying out of
trouble like I'd be at my sister's house.
Although he was incarcerated, Ackah attended N.A.'s shelter care hearing on
September 12, 2014, two days after his birth. Ackah was released from jail in
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October 2014 and remained free for several months. Ackah acknowledged that he
did not attempt to contact the Department during this period to ask about N.A.
because he believed his paternity was "questionable."
Ackah returned to jail in February 2015. After he pleaded guilty to multiple
offenses, including theft and unlawful possession of a firearm, the court imposed a
57-month sentence. Ackah remained incarcerated at the time of the termination trial
in January 2017. He testified that he was currently scheduled to begin work release
in October 2017 and that his early release date was April 2018.
The court found N.A. dependent as to Ackah in February 2015. The
dispositional order required Ackah to participate in dialectical behavior therapy(DBT),
attend age appropriate parenting classes, and cooperate with the Department of
Corrections(DOC) and the prosecutor's office in establishing paternity. Among other
things, the court also directed the Department to investigate Harris as a placement
option if Ackah established paternity.
Ackah did not initially notify the Department of his incarceration. Kristin Mayer,
N.A.'s social worker, did not learn that Ackah was incarcerated in the King County
Correctional Facility until about May 2015. Mayer visited Ackah and determined that
none of the court-ordered services were available to jail inmates.
No. 76420-9-1/ 5
After Ackah spent several months in the King County Correctional Facility,
DOC sent him to the Washington Corrections Center in Shelton for classification. In
February 2016, DOC moved Ackah to the Coyote Ridge Corrections Center, a
medium security facility near Pasco. In July 2015, when Ackah's security
classification changed, DOC transferred him to the Larch Corrections Center, a
minimum security facility near Vancouver. Court-ordered services were not available
at the Coyote Ridge or Larch facilities. "Thinking for Change," a service with
elements of DBT, was available at both Coyote Ridge and Larch. At the time of trial
in January 2017, DOC was in the process of reclassifying Ackah to a medium
security facility after he committed several infractions.
During the course of the dependency, Harris contacted the Department
several times, asking the Department to consider her as a placement resource. At
the time, Harris lived in Las Vegas. In November 2015, the Department received
confirmation that Ackah was N.A.'s biological father. It then made a request under
the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) that Nevada conduct a
home study.
Jennifer Jones, an experienced Nevada family services employee, conducted
the home study. Jones's study raised "numerous concerns" about Harris's ability to
care for N.A. Jones found that Harris sometimes gave very vague and inconsistent
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answers to questions. Harris was unable to demonstrate any current income or a
meaningful future ability to support N.A. Jones was also concerned about Harris's
ability to track time, noting that she would need to be able to respond to N.A.'s
ongoing medical needs, as well as "communicate with two different states" after
placement under the ICPC. Jones concluded that Harris would be unable to meet
N.A.'s needs and recommended that she be denied placement for N.A. Harris
moved to Washington in the summer of 2016 but was unable to complete a new
home study in Washington.
In February 2016, the Department petitioned for termination of both parents'
parental rights.
Ackah filed a motion requesting in-person visits with N.A. On March 23, 2016,
the court determined that visitation with Ackah was in N.A.'s best interest but found
that in-person visits were not feasible because of Ackah's incarceration at Coyote
Ridge. The court ordered Ackah to have a minimum of two monthly visits with N.A.
via video and two by telephone. The court permitted Ackah to send N.A. letters and
pictures, and he later sent N.A. a number of letters and drawings.
Department efforts to set up video visits between Ackah and N.A. were
unsuccessful. On August 24, 2016, the court granted Ackah's motion to compel in
part and ordered the Department to comply with the court's prior order requiring video
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and telephone visits. The court noted that the assigned social worker's lack of
training had apparently prevented the Department from arranging the visits. The
court denied Ackah's request for in-person visits because of the travel distance to the
Larch Corrections Center.
The Department was unable to arrange any video or telephone visits. Ackah
had one in-person visit with N.A. in the King County Correctional Facility while
awaiting trial.
In July 2016, Ackah petitioned the court to appoint Harris as N.A.'s guardian.
Mason filed a written agreement with the petition.
The trial court conducted a nine-day combined termination and guardianship
trial in January 2017. Harris testified that she had participated in a home study with a
provider that the defense had selected. But Harris submitted no evidence about the
study results. The court rejected much of Harris's testimony as not credible.
Ackah testified that he would need 24 months after his release before he
would be able to independently care for N.A. He planned to use this time to arrange
for "Employment, housing, transportation, show my credentials and everything's
updated, uh, drug-free." Ackah expected to find regular employment, but he also
expected to start an independent recording label and a private jet airline company to
finance his plan for N.A. to become a professional basketball player. Ackah did not
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believe the transition from N.A.'s current foster placement to placement with Harris
and then to living with Ackah would have any serious negative effect on N.A.
The court rejected guardianship as not in N.A.'s best interest, finding that
Harris "is not qualified, appropriate and capable of performing the duties of guardian."
The court entered the following supporting findings of fact:
2.4.1 Ms. Harris's inconsistent statements regarding her
relationship with the child's mother Druche Mason, her
inconsistent statements regarding her son's deficiencies and
expected role in the child's life, and lack of candor with this
court pose an untenable risk that she will not follow through
with her assurances to protect the child with clear
boundaries for the parents.
2.4.2 Ms. Harris' inability to clearly communicate with
professionals involved in [N.A.'s] case, her inability to set
and keep appointments with these professionals, and her
inability to take responsibility for her part in
miscommunications and missed appointments creates
undue risk that she will not be able to consistently follow-
through with the therapeutic needs of [N.A.], which would
adversely impact the progress he has made in his
development. This inability was demonstrated by the
evidence of her missing appointments and calling or showing
up repeatedly without an appointment.
2.4.3 Professionals working with [N.A.] and the CASA
assigned to the case shortly after the child's birth indicate
the importance of a stability and routine to his continued
progress. The evidence before the court does not
demonstrate that Ms. Harris can provide that required
routine and stability. She has failed a home study in Nevada
and been unable to navigate the process of submitting to a
new home study through the Division of Licensed Resources
at DSHS in Washington. She testified to participating in an
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No. 76420-9-1 /9
investigation of her home with a provider arranged by
defense but has provided no evidence of the conclusions
drawn from that investigation. The Nevada home study
professional, Jennifer Jones, described Ms. Harris' manner
and responses to questions as "vague." This was consistent
with the court's observations of Ms. Harris in court. She often
did not answer questions, and instead began talking about
something else. She gave inconsistent testimony on
significant issues. The court did not find her testimony
credible.
2.5 Based on the admissions of the parents, the court finds that
the elements required by 13.36.040(2)(c)(i)-(vi) have been
established by a preponderance of the evidence. However, a
preponderance of the evidence does not support the required
finding under RCW 13.36.040(2)(a) that it is in [N.A.'s] best interest
to establish a guardianship, rather than to terminate the parent-
child relationship and proceed with adoption. ...
2.5.1 [N.A.] does not have a relationship with Ms. Harris or
with his extended family. While it is clear that Ms. Harris and
the father wish for him to have connection to his biological
family, there is no evidence before the court from which to
conclude that severing the legal relationship between [N.A.]
and his parents and possible relationships with extended
family would have deleterious effect on the child.
2.5.2 [N.A.'s] progress in addressing his developmental
deficits would be impacted by a move from his current stable
placement, and it is uncertain whether that progress would
be regained. If moved, it is uncertain whether he could
attach to a new primary caregiver since the only mother
figure he has known is his current foster mother. The risk to
[N.A.'s] continued developmental progress from disrupting
his current stable home is balanced by the speculative
benefits he would gain from furthering a relationship with his
parents, paternal grandmother and any extended family he
would be likely to come to know.
2.5.3 It is not in [N.A.'s] best interest to move him from the
only home he has known to the home of his paternal
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No. 76420-9-1 / 10
grandmother in a guardianship, where the paternal
grandmother has not demonstrated that she will be
adequately protective of the child. Her lack of candor with
this court regarding her relationship with Ms. Mason,
regarding her current occupation, and relationships does not
give this court confidence that she will place this child's
needs above her own if she were to be appointed as his
guardian.
The court found the Department had proved the statutory termination factors
by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and that termination was in N.A.'s best
interest. The court entered the following findings relevant to the arguments on
appeal:
2.7.1 The court considers near future from the position of
the child. [N.A.] is just 28 months old. He has never lived
with his mother or father. CASA testimony and the testimony
of the social workers demonstrate that, for a child of this
young age, the near future is measured in weeks or several
months. The father was realistic in his testimony about
when he believes he would be ready to parent [N.A.],
approximately 24 months after his release. In that case he
would be unavailable to parent [N.A.] until at the earliest
April 2020. Even if Ms. Mason were to fully engage in
services today, she would need well over 6 months in order
to demonstrate stability in her own life, ensure sobriety and
address her deficiencies related to mental health that would
position her to safely parent this child, and there is no reason
to believe Ms. Mason will so engage. The time it would take
before either parent could safely parent [N.A.] is well beyond
his near future.
2.7.2 The father's plans for how he would ensure [N.A.] was
provided a safe and stable home in his care are hopeful, but
not realistic. While the father states that he would work a
regular 8-5 job to provide for his son, he also states a
number of fanciful plans that are not well reasoned that
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No. 76420-9-1 / 11
appear to be more his focus than working on a solid plan to
establish his own stability on his release, much less his
son's. He hopes to own an[ ] independent recording label
and a private jet airline company, to support his plans for
[N.A.] to be an NBA player.
2.8 Continuation of the parent child relationship clearly
diminishes this child's prospects for early integration into a
permanent and stable home.
2.8.1 [N.A.] has prospects for adoption and cannot be
adopted while his mother and father's rights are intact. For
the reasons stated above, guardianship is not an
appropriate permanent plan for this child and this young
child is in need of permanence now.
2.8.2 Even if his current prospects for adoption became
unavailable, there are additional adoptive resources that
would be available if the legal relationship were severed
between [N.A.] and his parents that would allow for his early
integration into an adoptive home.
2.8.1 The court has considered the factors set forth in
13.34.145 and does not believe that the father has a
meaningful relationship with his son. The father has
demonstrated his concern for his son through his letters and
requests for phone contact or visits at the facility. However,
it is concerning that prior to his incarceration he expressed
no interest in [N.A.] and did not involve himself in the case.
While the Department could have done more to assist the
father in having consistent contact with his son, given the
child's young age, additional video visits and phone calls
would not likely have changed the nature of their
relationship significantly. There were limitations to the
father's ability to engage in services once he was
incarcerated, and he did participate in the "Thinking for
Change" program once he reached the Larch Correctional
facility, however his own actions in violating DOC rules, led
to his reclassification to a more secure facility and need to
leave Larch for reassignment. Although the father has
made efforts to engage in the case and be a presence in his
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No. 76420-9-1 /12
son's life after he became incarcerated, continued
involvement is not in the best interest of[N.A.].
2.9.1 There is no current relationship between Mr. Ackah or
Ms. Mason, and their son [N.A.]. That lack of relationship for
the father is due in part to his criminal behavior leading to his
incarceration, due in part to the inability of the Department to
timely navigate the visitation program rules at the DOC
facility before the father's actions led to his reassignment,
and in part due to the circumstantial barrier of incarceration
itself. Ms. Mason has not maintained consistent visitation
with her son and has no current relationship. It is not in this
child's best interest to remain in legal limbo until his father is
available to parent or his mother is ready to place his needs
above her own and consistently participate in his life.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
Parents have fundamental liberty and privacy interests in the care and custody
of their children.' Before terminating parental rights, Washington courts must follow a
two-step process.
First, the Department must prove the following six statutory requirements by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence:
(a)That the child has been found to be a dependent child;
1 In re Welfare of A.J.R., 78 Wn. App. 222, 229, 896 P.2d 1298 (1995)(citing
In re Dependency of J.B.S., 123 Wn.2d 1, 12, 863 P.2d 1344 (1993)); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982).
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(b) That the court has entered a dispositional order pursuant
to RCW 13.34.130;
(c) That the child has been removed . . . from the custody of
the parent for a period of at least six months pursuant to a finding of
dependency;
(d) That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have
been expressly and understandably offered or provided and all
necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the
parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been
expressly and understandably offered or provided;
(e) That there is little likelihood that conditions will be
remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near
future. .. ; and
(f) That continuation of the parent and child relationship
clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a
stable and permanent home.. .[2]
Second, if the Department proves the six termination factors, the court then
determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, if termination is in the child's best
interests.3
An appellate court reviews a termination decision "to determine whether
substantial evidence supports the trial courts findings of fact by clear, cogent, and
2RCW 13.34.180(1)(a)-(f); see also In re Welfare of A.B., 168 Wn.2d 908,
911, 232 P.3d 1104(2010); RCW 13.34.190.
3 RCW 13.34.190(1)(b).
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No. 76420-9-1 / 14
convincing evidence." Clear, cogent and convincing evidence exists when the
evidence shows the ultimate fact at issue to be highly probable.5
We necessarily defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony,
credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence.6 Our deference is
particularly important in proceedings affecting the parent and child relationship
because of "the trial judge's advantage in having the witnesses before him or her."'
Before terminating the rights of an incarcerated parent, RCW 13.34.180(1)(f)
provides that the trial court "shall consider" three specific factors: (1) "whether a
parent maintains a meaningful role in his or her child's life based on factors identified
in RCW 13.34.145(5)(b);" (2) "whether the department or supervising agency made
reasonable efforts as defined in this chapter; and" (3) "whether particular barriers
existed as described in RCW 13.34.145(5)(b) including, but not limited to, delays or
barriers experienced in keeping the agency apprised of his or her location and in
accessing visitation or other meaningful contact with the child."
RCW 13.34.145(5)(b) sets forth the following nonexclusive list of factors that
the trial court "may" consider when determining whether an incarcerated parent
4 In re Parental Rights to K.M.M., 186 Wn.2d 466, 477, 379 P.3d 75 (2016)
(citing In re Dependency of K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d 918, 925, 976 P.2d 113(1999)).
5 In re Dependency of K.R., 128 Wn.2d 129, 141, 904 P.2d 1132 (1995).
6 State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850(1990).
7 In re Welfare of A.W., 182 Wn.2d 689, 711, 344 P.3d 1186 (2015).
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No. 76420-9-1/ 15
maintains a "meaningful role" in the child's life and the various barriers that
incarcerated parents face when maintaining such a role:
(i) The parent's expressions or acts of manifesting concern
for the child, such as letters, telephone calls, visits, and other forms
of communication with the child;
(ii) The parent's efforts to communicate and work with the
department or supervising agency or other individuals for the
purpose of complying with the service plan and repairing,
maintaining, or building the parent-child relationship;
(iii) A positive response by the parent to the reasonable
efforts of the department or the supervising agency;
(iv) Information provided by individuals or agencies in a
reasonable position to assist the court in making this assessment,
including but not.limited to the parent's attorney, correctional and
mental health personnel, or other individuals providing services to
the parent;
(v) Limitations in the parent's access to family support
programs, therapeutic services, and visiting opportunities,
restrictions to telephone and mail services, inability to participate in
foster care planning meetings, and difficulty accessing lawyers and
participating meaningfully in court proceedings; and
(vi) Whether the continued involvement of the parent in the
child's life is in the child's best interest.[8]
Consideration of the incarceration factors under RCW 13.34.180(f) means "a
weighing or balancing of facts, along with a resolution of that weighing."9 While the
8 See also In re Parental Rights to K.J.B., 187 Wn.2d 592, 598-603, 387 P.3d
1072(2017).
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No. 76420-9-1/ 16
record must demonstrate the court's consideration of the relevant factors, the court
need not enter formal findings of fact to support its decision.10
Statutory Incarceration Factors
Ackah concedes that the court considered the "meaningful role" factor and the
associated nonexclusive criteria set forth in RCW 13.34.145(5)(b). But he claims the
court failed to consider the "reasonable efforts" and "particular barriers" factors. He
argues that as a result, the Department failed to satisfy its burden of proving RCW
13.34.180(1)(f) ("continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes
the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home"). The
record does not support these arguments.
As Ackah acknowledges, the court considered the factors set forth in RCW
13.34.145 and found that Ackah did not have a meaningful relationship with N.A.
The court expressly recognized that after his incarceration, Ackah had demonstrated
concern for N.A. by sending him letters and requesting telephone contact and visits.
The court also found that the- Department could have done more to assist Ackah in
establishing consistent contact with N.A.
9K.J.B., 187 Wn.2d at 603 (quoting In re Parental Rights to M.J., 187 Wn.
App. 399, 409, 348 P.3d 1265 (2015)).
10 K.J.B., 187 Wn.2d at 603-04.
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But the court also weighed the fact that Department social workers made
ongoing efforts to stay in contact with Ackah as he moved through a series of
correctional facilities and assist him in determining the availability of relevant
services. Unfortunately, DOC provided only very limited services. The court further
considered that in the several months when he was out of custody after N.A.'s birth,
Ackah made no effort to pursue paternity or establish any relationship with N.A. The
court recognized that N.A.'s young age hampered Ackah's attempts at
communication. As a result, "additional video visits and phone calls would not likely
have changed the nature of their relationship significantly."
"Imprisonment alone does not necessarily justify the termination of parental
rights. But the parent's resulting inability to perform his or her parental obligations is
certainly relevant to the child's welfare."11 When considering an incarcerated
parent's ability to maintain a meaningful role in a child's life, the court need not
"disregard the negative effects that incarceration may have on a delicate parent-child
relationship [or] ignore the child's need for timely permanency."12
11 In re Parental Rights to E.D., 195 Wn. App. 673, 690, 381 P.3d 1230 (2016)
(quoting In re Dependency of J.W., 90 Wn. App. 417, 426, 953 P.2d 104 (1998)
(citations omitted))), review denied, 187 Wn.2d 1018 (2017).
12 E D , 195 Wn. App. at 695.
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No. 76420-9-1/18
The fact that some circumstances were favorable to Ackah does not
undermine the court's decision. "The statute notably does not mandate that a certain
weight be afforded to the incarceration considerations." Each case necessarily
rests "on its own set of facts."14 Viewed in context, the court's detailed findings
clearly addressed all of the mandatory statutory incarceration factors, including not
only the "meaningful role" factor, but also the Department's "reasonable efforts" and
the "particular barriers" that Ackah faced during his lengthy incarceration. Substantial
evidence supports the court's findings.
Guardianship Burden of Proof
For the first time on appeal, Ackah contends the trial court applied the wrong
standard of proof when determining that termination, rather than his proposed
guardianship, was in N.A.'s best interest. He argues that when the court decides a
parent's guardianship petition and a competing termination petition, "due process
requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that guardianship is clearly contrary
to the child's best interests." Mason has adopted Ackah's assignment of error and
corresponding argument by reference."
13 E.D., 195 Wn. App. at 695.
14 E.D., 195 Wn. App. at 695.
15 See RAP 10.1(g)(2).
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No. 76420-9-1 / 19
An appellate court generally will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal unless the claimed error is a "manifest error affecting a constitutional right."16
To satisfy the requirements of RAP 2.5(a), an appellant must "identify a constitutional
error and show how the alleged error actually affected the [appellantrs rights at
trial.'"17
Ackah cites RAP 2.5(a) in his opening brief but provides no meaningful legal
argument to demonstrate a manifest constitutional error. To the extent Ackah
attempts to rectify this omission in his reply brief, the effort comes too late.18
Accordingly, we decline to address the issue.
Failure To Enter Findings
Mason contends the trial court erred in failing to enter written findings of fact
that the State proved the first three statutory termination elements by clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence: (1) "child has been found to be a dependent child," (2)
"court has entered a dispositional order," and (3) "child has been removed ...from
16 RAP 2.5(a), see generally State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 97-98, 217 P.3d
756 (2009).
17 O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 98 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kirkman,
159 Wn.2d 918, 926-27, 155 P.3d 125 (2007)).
18 See Axess Intl Ltd. v. Intercargo Ins. Co.,107 Wn. App. 713, 719, 30 P.3d 1(2001) ("An issue raised and argued for the first time in a reply brief is raised too
late").
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No. 76420-9-1/ 20
the custody of the parent for. . . at least six months."19 Mason argues that the
termination order is therefore invalid on its face and must be reversed. In the
alternative, Mason asks the court to remand for entry of the omitted findings. Ackah
has adopted the assignment of error and corresponding arguments by reference.
The sufficiency of the evidence establishing the first three termination
elements was unchallenged at trial. Moreover, in her answer to the termination
petition, Mason expressly admitted that the Department had established the first
three statutory elements. During closing argument, counsel for Ackah conceded that
the Department has established the first three elements: "We do concede the first
three elements: there's a dependency; there's a dispo; [N.A.] has been out of the
home for six months." On appeal, neither Mason nor Ackah challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence in the record to establish the first three statutory
termination elements.
Under these circumstances, remand for entry of the findings would be a
useless act. We decline to do so.2°
19RCW 13.34.180(1)(a)-(c).
29See State v. Mecca Twin Theater & Film Exch., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 87, 92-93,
507 P.2d 1165(1973)(where essential facts were not in dispute, remand for findings
would be a useless act).
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No. 76420-9-1/ 21
Ackah's motion to modify is denied;21 the trial court order denying guardianship
and terminating parental rights is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
)
•e-f--I IV•G.... _
r•-a
21 Ackah has moved to modify the court administrator/clerk's December f4',
2017, ruling about the case title. Because the court administrator/clerk's ruling is
consistent with RAP 3.4 and the Court of Appeals General Court Order dated May
25, 2017, the motion to modify is denied. Gen. Order of Division I, In re Changes to
Case Title (Wash. Ct. App. May 25, 2017), http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate
_trial_cou rts/.
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