Campbell v. Tacoma Public School District No. 10 ( 2016 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
March 8, 2016
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
TERI CAMPBELL, No. 46067-0-II
Respondent,
v.
TACOMA PUBLIC SCHOOLS, a.k.a. PUBLISHED OPINION
TACOMA PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 10.
Appellant.
SUTTON, J. — Tacoma Public Schools (the District) suspended teacher Teri Campbell for
15 days without pay and imposed a 3-year drug testing requirement because she violated District
Policy 5201 by not reporting to the District the medications she was taking that could have
potentially affected her ability to work safely and productively. A hearing officer upheld the
District’s decision and the superior court reversed. The District appeals.
We hold that (1) Policy 5201 is not unconstitutionally vague, (2) there is substantial
evidence to support the hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law upholding the
District’s probable cause determination, (3) the imposed sanction of a 15-day unpaid suspension
and a 3-year drug testing requirement is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, and (4) the
superior court’s award of attorney fees and costs to Campbell under RCW 28A.405.350 was not
supported by any findings and was improper. Further, because Campbell does not prevail on
appeal, we deny her request for attorney fees and costs on appeal.
No. 46067-0-II
Accordingly, we reverse the superior court’s judgment and order and its award of attorney
fees and costs under RCW 28A.405.350. We reinstate the hearing officer’s decision upholding
the District’s probable cause determination and the sanction imposed, and deny Campbell’s request
for attorney fees and costs on appeal.
FACTS
Teri Campbell is a certificated teacher in the District and has taught at Mason Middle
School since 2004. In 2006, doctors diagnosed her with Guillain-Barre Syndrome, a medical
condition resulting in chronic pain, that required Campbell to have a pain pump implanted the
following year to manage her symptoms. Campbell disclosed the pain pump to her principal,
Patrice Sulkosky, but did not disclose the specific medications that the pump delivered.
On November 2, 2011, Campbell passed out as she drove to work and struck another
vehicle in the oncoming lane of traffic. The officer responding to the collision discovered a tin
containing 45 Xanax pills in Campbell’s purse, and Campbell admitted to smoking marijuana a
few days before the accident. As a result, the officer arrested Campbell, and she ultimately pled
guilty to vehicular assault.
After recovering from her injuries, Campbell returned to work on January 2, 2012. The
District placed Campbell on paid administrative leave on January 5 to conduct an internal
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the collision and her arrest. The District sought to
determine whether Campbell intended to report to work under the influence.
During the investigation, Campbell and her doctors provided the District with a list of her
prescribed medications, and the doctors explained in their letters to the District that none of the
medications impaired Campbell’s ability to teach or carry out her job duties. On September 26,
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No. 46067-0-II
Gayle Elijah, the District’s Director of Human Resources, advised Campbell in a letter that the
District discovered that Campbell failed to disclose a number of prescription medications that she
was taking. The District cited the following relevant medications: Metoclopramide, Acyclovir,
Estradiol, Tapentadol, Zolpidem, Alprazolam, Lisinopril, Levothyroxine, Sufentanil, and
Bupivacain. Because these medications “are known or advertised as possibly affecting”
Campbell’s ability to perform her job safely and productively, the District alleged that she had
violated Policy 5201 by failing to report them. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 788-91.
District Policy 5201, Drug Free Schools, Community and Workplace, states in relevant
part:
Any staff member who is taking a drug or medication whether or not
prescribed by the staff member’s physician, which may adversely affect that staff
member’s ability to perform work in a safe or productive manner is required to
report such use of medication to his or her supervisor. This includes drugs which
are known or advertised as possibly affecting judgment, coordination, or any of the
senses, including those which may cause drowsiness or dizziness. The supervisor
in conjunction with the district office then will determine whether the staff member
can remain at work and whether any work restrictions will be necessary.
CP at 809.
Based on the alleged violations of Policy 5201, the District advised Campbell that it was
considering terminating her employment and scheduled a Loudermill1 hearing to allow Campbell
to respond to the allegations. At the Loudermill hearing, Campbell did not dispute that she took
the medications listed in Elijah’s letter or that the medications had the listed side effects.
1
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985) (holding that public
employees facing termination have a right to the opportunity to respond pretermination).
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No. 46067-0-II
On December 5, 2013, District Superintendent Santorno informed Campbell in writing
that,
I have determined that there is probable cause to suspend you without pay for
fifteen (15) work days. In addition, you will be required to submit to random drug
tests for a period of three (3) years, and to comply with all District Policies and
Procedures, including identifying to your supervisor any and all drugs or
medications that you are taking that may impact your ability to perform work in a
safe and productive matter (sic) as required under District Policy.
CP at 313 (emphasis added). The District found that Campbell violated the reporting requirement
in District Policy 5201 by failing to report to her supervisor that she was taking drugs or
medications that “are known or advertised as possibly affecting” her ability to work safely and
productively.2 CP at 304.
Campbell appealed the District’s probable cause determination to a hearing officer.3 At
the hearing, Campbell admitted, and the hearing officer found, that, although Campbell told
Principal Sulkosky that she had a pain pump, Campbell never disclosed the medications
administered in her pain pump or any of her other medications to Principal Sulkosky or anyone
else at the District. The hearing officer found that, although Campbell relied solely on her doctor’s
letters and expert testimony that she did not suffer actual side effects, she never disputed her
medication usage or their potential side effects as alleged by the District. The hearing officer also
found that Campbell had failed to report those medications. Based on these findings, the hearing
2
The District sought to discipline Campbell on two other alleged violations for which the hearing
officer found the District lacked probable cause for discipline. Those two issues were not before
the superior court and are not before us on appeal.
3
RCW 28A.405.310.
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No. 46067-0-II
officer concluded that, “Policy 5201 is clear that any such use [of medications] must be reported,”
CP at 18, and that the District had:
sufficient cause for discipline of Ms. Campbell on the basis that Ms. Campbell
failed to report to her supervisor that she was taking drugs or medication that might
adversely affect her ability to perform work in a safe or productive manner.
CP at 19.
Campbell appealed the hearing officer’s decision to superior court. Campbell disputed
only the hearing officer’s Finding of Fact No. 21,4 and because there was no evidence that
Campbell actually suffered any adverse side effects, Campbell argued that the District’s list of
medications and their side effects were insufficient to uphold the hearing officer’s conclusion that
the District had probable cause to sanction her for violating Policy 5201.5
The superior court reversed the hearing officer’s decision that upheld the District’s
probable cause determination. In its ruling, the superior court stated that Policy 5201 was void for
vagueness because it lacked specificity as to “who determines which drugs or medications may
adversely affect” a teacher’s work performance and “what would constitute sufficient reporting.”
CP at 1492-93. The superior court also ruled that there was “no cognitive evidence” to support
the District’s probable cause determination because Campbell was on “a stable opioid therapy and
other medications that would not adversely affect her judgment, coordination, and senses.” CP at
4
Finding of Fact No. 21 stated, “[Campbell] did not report to Ms. Sulkosky that she had the Xanax
pills in her possession at school.” CP at 15. This finding is not before us on appeal, and is not
relevant to our analysis.
5
In her appeal to superior court, Campbell did not assign specific error to any of the other findings
of fact and does not dispute them. Therefore, these other findings of fact are verities on appeal.
Riley-Hordyk, 187 Wn. App. 748, 758-59, 350 P.3d 681 (2015).
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No. 46067-0-II
1494, 1496. The superior court did not reach the sanction issue but stated that the sanction was
reviewable on appeal. The court then awarded Campbell $49,476.11 in attorney fees and costs
under RCW 28A.405.350. The District appeals.
ANALYSIS
The District argues that the superior court erred when it concluded that (1) the District
Policy 5201 was unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable, (2) substantial evidence did not
support the District’s probable cause determination or the hearing officer’s decision, and (3) the
sanction was reviewable. It also argues that, without any findings that the District acted in bad
faith or upon insufficient legal grounds, the superior court’s award of attorney fees and costs to
Campbell was improper under RCW 28A.405.350. We agree with the District. In addition, we
review the sanction and we find that it is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
I. VAGUENESS
The District argues that the superior court erred when it held that Policy 5201 is
unconstitutionally vague. We agree.
We examine the validity of an agency rule de novo. Marcum v. Dep’t of Soc. and Health
Serv., 172 Wn. App. 546, 556, 290 P.3d 1045 (2012). Under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)6, we may declare an agency rule invalid if the rule violates constitutional provisions. RCW
34.05.570(2)(c); Marcum, 172 Wn. App. at 556. We have a duty to construe an administrative
rule or statute to avoid constitutional questions where such construction is reasonably possible.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 162, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1975). When construing
6
Ch. 34.05 RCW.
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No. 46067-0-II
an undefined term in a rule, we give the term its ordinary, common, everyday meaning. Stastny v.
Bd. of Tr. of Cent. Wash. Univ., 32 Wn. App. 239, 253, 647 P.2d 496 (1982). We presume
regulations and statutes are constitutional; however, rules imposing sanctions for unprofessional
conduct must not be unconstitutionally vague. Keene v. Bd. of Accountancy, 77 Wn. App. 849,
854, 894 P.2d 582 (1995).
A rule is void for vagueness if “it is framed in terms so vague that persons of ‘common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’” Keene, 77 Wn.
App. at 854 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Haley v. Med. Disciplinary Bd.,
117 Wn.2d 720, 739, 818 P.2d 1062 (1991)). A rule must provide an explicit standard to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Stastny¸ 32 Wn. App. at 253. But a rule is not void for
vagueness simply because it uses vague terms or fails to list every possible prohibited behavior,
and we do not analyze portions of a rule in isolation from the context in which they appear. Hayley,
117 Wn.2d at 741; Keene, 77 Wn. App. at 854. If, as a whole, a rule has the required degree of
specificity, then it can withstand a vagueness challenge despite its use of terms or phrases which,
when considered in isolation, have no determinate meaning. Haley, 117 Wn. 2d at 741. To
determine whether Policy 5201 is unconstitutionally vague as applied, we determine whether the
policy, when read as a whole, gave Campbell adequate notice of what was prohibited or required
to comply, and whether it was sufficiently specific to prevent the possibility of arbitrary
enforcement.
Here, the superior court held that Policy 5201 was unconstitutionally vague for three
reasons. First, the superior court stated that Policy 5201 did not identify “who determines” what
drugs “may adversely affect [a teacher’s] ability to perform work in a safe or productive manner.”
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No. 46067-0-II
CP at 1492. The superior court’s focus ignores the basis of the District’s finding that Campbell
violated Policy 5201—that Campbell failed to report the drugs or medications she was taking that
“are known or advertised” as possibly affecting judgment.7 Regardless of whether or not the
medications actually had adverse effects on her performance, Policy 5201 expressly required
Campbell to report her medications because they “were known or advertised” as possibly having
adverse effects. CP at 809. The duty to report does not require that anyone determine whether or
not her medications had any actual adverse effects on her ability to perform her job safely and
productively. Thus, because the duty to report is not dependent upon a determination of whether
the medications actually adversely affect the staff member, Policy 5201 is not unconstitutionally
vague on the basis that it fails to identify who determines which drugs or medications may
adversely affect a staff member’s job performance.
Second, the superior court ruled that Policy 5201 was unconstitutionally vague because it
“fails to mandate any degree of specificity for reporting,” leaves “persons of ordinary intelligence
to guess at what would constitute sufficient reporting,” and leads to arbitrary enforcement. CP at
1493-94. Policy 5201 requires that “[a]ny staff member” taking a drug or medication, whether
prescribed by their physician or not, to report the usage of the drug or medication if it “may
adversely affect” the staff member’s safe and productive job performance or if it is “known or
advertised” as possibly affecting judgment or the senses. CP at 809. Although the policy does not
7
The superior court did not address or acknowledge the language of Policy 5201’s reporting
requirement, that school district employees are required to report to their supervisor any drugs or
medications they are taking that “are known or advertised as possibly affecting judgment,
coordination, or any of the senses, including those which may cause drowsiness or dizziness,” but
only focused on the language regarding drugs “which may adversely affect” the teacher’s ability
to perform work in a safe or productive manner. CP at 809.
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No. 46067-0-II
specifically state that the staff member must report the dosage of a drug, it does require reporting
the use of the drug or medication.
Policy 5201 does not define the term “drug” or “medication.” CP at 809. Thus, we give
those terms their ordinary, common everyday meaning. A “drug” is a substance that is
recognized in an official pharmacopoeia or formulary; a substance intended for use
in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in humans or
other animals; a substance other than food intended to affect the structure or
function of the body of [a human] or other animal . . . a narcotic substance of
preparation; [and] something that is narcotic in its effect.
MERRIAM–WEBSTER UNABRIDGED, available at http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com. A
“medication” is “a medical substance.” Id. Giving the terms “drug” and “medication” their
ordinary, common, everyday meaning, and reading Policy 5201 as a whole, it is reasonable to infer
that “drug” and “medication” mean the specific name of the drug or medication administered to
and taken by the staff member. See Stastny, 32 Wn. App. at 253.
Policy 5201’s use of broad terms or its failure to list every possible prohibited behavior
does not invalidate the policy. See Keene, 77 Wn. App. at 854-55. Although Campbell reported
her pain pump to her supervisor, she did not disclose the names of the medications administered
in her pain pump or any of the other medications she took that could have potentially affected her
judgment or senses. Under a plain reading of Policy 5201, Campbell was required to report the
names of all of the medications administered to and taken by her to constitute sufficient reporting.
Because Policy 5201 requires reporting of the actual drug or medication that the staff member
uses, it gave Campbell notice of what constitutes sufficient reporting. Thus, Policy 5201 has the
required degree of specificity to overcome the vagueness challenge and provides an explicit
standard, reporting the usage of the drug or medication, to avoid the risk of arbitrary enforcement.
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No. 46067-0-II
Third, the superior court ruled that Policy 5201 was void for vagueness because it failed to
define what the term “taking” means. When construing an undefined term in a rule, we give the
term its ordinary, common, everyday meaning. Stastny, 32 Wn. App. at 253. The definition of
“take,” the root form of “taking,” when referring to consuming a substance is, “to introduce or
receive into one’s body (as by eating, drinking, or inhaling).” MERRIAM–WEBSTER UNABRIDGED,
available at http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com.
Campbell testified that she was “taking” the medications in the list given to the District,
including oral pain medications, Xanax, and sleeping pills. She testified that her pain pump
administered pain medications on a dosage schedule and that she took a number of her medications
orally. Under a plain meaning of “taking,” Policy 5201 requires staff members to report all drugs
and medications consumed, at any time, which “may adversely affect that staff member’s ability
to perform work in a safe or productive manner” including those “known or advertised as possibly
affecting judgment, coordination, or any of the senses, including those which may cause
drowsiness or dizziness.” CP at 809. Thus, Policy 5201’s failure to define “taking” does not
render it unconstitutionally vague.
Although Policy 5201 is not a model of clarity, under a plain reading it is not
unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, we hold that the superior court erred when it ruled Policy
5201 was unconstitutionally vague.
II. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
The District next argues that the superior court erred because it failed to give the
appropriate deference and apply the correct standard of review to the hearing officer’s
unchallenged findings of fact regarding Campbell’s failure to report her medications to her
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No. 46067-0-II
supervisor, and that there was substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s findings of fact
which supported the hearing officer’s conclusions of law. We agree.
We confine our review of the hearing officer’s decision to the verbatim transcript and the
evidence admitted at the hearing and give no deference to the superior court’s ruling. RCW
28A.405.340; Riley-Hordyk, 187 Wn. App. at 756. Under RCW 28A.405.340(5), we review a
hearing officer’s factual determinations under the “‘clearly erroneous standard.’” Riley-Hordyk,
187 Wn. App. at 755 (quoting Clarke v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412, 106 Wn.2d 102, 109-10, 720
P.2d 793 (1986).
A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Clarke, 106 Wn.2d at 121. Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded
person of the finding’s truth or correctness. Campbell v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 180 Wn.2d 566, 571,
326 P.3d 713 (2014). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. Riley-Hordyk,
187 Wn. App at 758-59; In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Jones, 182 Wn.2d 17, 35, 338 P.3d
842 (2014). We review the hearing officer’s conclusions of law and its ultimate conclusion
de novo and uphold the hearing officer’s conclusions of law and ultimate conclusion if they are
supported by the findings of fact. Jones, 182 Wn.2d at 35.
The hearing officer’s findings of fact support the District’s conclusion that there was
sufficient cause for the District to discipline Campbell for violating Policy 5201. The hearing
officer found that Campbell did not report the specific medications in her pain pump or her other
medications to Principal Sulkosky, and Campbell did not dispute the medications or their listed
potential side effects. The hearing officer also found that the undisputed potential side effects of
the medications could have potentially affected Campbell’s ability to perform her job safely and
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No. 46067-0-II
productively. Campbell does not assign error to these findings,8 and therefore, they are verities on
appeal.
Thus, we hold that the undisputed findings of fact support the hearing officer’s conclusion
that the District had sufficient cause to sanction Campbell for violating Policy 5201 by failing to
report her medications that could have potentially affected her ability to perform her job safely and
productively. Accordingly, we reinstate the hearing officer’s decision upholding the District’s
probable cause determination.
III. SANCTION
Next, the District argues9 that the superior court erred in not deferring to the District’s
choice of sanction under our precedent in Simmons v. Vancouver School District No. 37.10 In the
alternative, the District argues that, if we do review the choice of sanction, its choice of sanction
is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. We depart from our precedent and review the
District’s choice of sanction. After review, we hold that the District’s sanction is not arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.
8
Campbell disputes only the hearing officer’s Finding of Fact No. 21.
9
The District also argued that the District’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA) preempts
Campbell from challenging the drug-testing requirement. The CBA specifically exempts “[a]ny
matter involving employee probation procedures, discharge, nonrenewal, adverse effect, or
reduction in force,” from its four-step grievance procedure. CP at 707. The manner in which the
District imposed the drug-testing requirement is similar to a probation condition, and does have an
adverse effect on Campbell’s employment contract. Thus, because of the specific exemptions, the
CBA does not preclude Campbell from challenging the imposed drug-testing requirement.
10
41 Wn. App. 365, 704 P.2d 648 (1985).
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No. 46067-0-II
In Simmons, we held that, once probable cause is determined, we do not reach review of
the District’s imposed sanction on a teacher because “determination of the sanction to be imposed
is within the province of the District.” Simmons v. Vancouver Sch. Dist. No. 3741, 41 Wn.
App. 365, 704 P.2d 648 (1985). However, Simmons, was decided before our legislature enacted
the 1988 Administrative Procedure Act. See RCW 34.05.001. Because RCW 28A.405.340, also
enacted after our decision in Simmons, follows the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of
RCW 34.05.570, we adopt the procedure set forth in Griffith v. Seattle School District No. 1,11 as
the modern standard of review for school district sanctions under RCW 28A.405.340.
“Once sufficient cause is established, the choice of sanction is a policy decision made by
the district that we review to determine if it is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.” Griffith v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 165 Wn. App. 663, 675, 266 P.3d 932 (2011) (citing Butler v. Lamont
Sch. Dist. No. 246, 49 Wn. App. 709, 712, 745 P.2d 1308 (1987)). An arbitrary and capricious
action is “‘willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of facts and
circumstances.’” Cummings v. Dep’t of Licensing, 189 Wn. App. 1, 25, 355 P.3d 1155 (2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heinmiller v. Dep’t of Health, 127 Wn.2d 595, 609,
903 P.2d. 433 (1995)).
The “‘harshness’” of an agency’s sanction is not the test for whether the sanction is
arbitrary and capricious. Cummings, 189 Wn. App. at 26 (quoting Heinmiller, 127 Wn.2d at 609).
“‘Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary and capricious even though one
may believe an erroneous conclusion has been reached.’” Cummings, 189 Wn. App. at 25-26
11
165 Wn. App. 663, 266 P.3d 932 (2011).
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No. 46067-0-II
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heinmiller, 127 Wn.2d at 609). Because we give an
agency’s choice of sanction considerable judicial deference, our scope of review here is narrow,
and the challenger of the sanction carries a heavy burden. Cummings, 189 Wn. App. at 26.
Here, the hearing officer found that, although she reported her pain pump, Campbell failed
to report the medications administered by her pain pump as far back as 2007, four years before her
November 2011 vehicle collision and arrest. Campbell knew about the reporting requirement; she
told Principal Sulkosky that she was on pain medications, but failed to report the specific
medications she was taking. Campbell also testified that she had not reported to Principal Sulkosky
every medication change her doctor made to her pain pump. The hearing officer also found that
Campbell consumed a number of other medications that could have potentially affected her ability
to safely perform her job functions and that she never disputed taking the medications or their
reported side effects. Based on its findings, the hearing officer determined that the District had
sufficient cause to suspend Campbell and impose the drug-testing requirement.
The hearing officer’s findings support the conclusion that there was sufficient cause for a
15-day suspension without pay. Under RCW 28A.405.060, the District was within its power to
suspend Campbell without pay for failing to comply with the reporting requirement in Policy 5201.
Additionally, because Campbell admittedly did not report any medication changes in the pain
pump to Principal Sulkosky, the findings support the conclusion that there was sufficient cause to
impose the drug-testing requirement to ensure she complies with Policy 5201’s reporting
requirement.
Campbell argues that her suspension is unsupported, and that the drug-testing requirement
is ultra vires. However, Campbell fails to provide evidence that, by imposing sanctions, the
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No. 46067-0-II
District has treated her differently from any other teacher in a similar situation. See Griffith,
165 Wn. App. at 675 (noting that the imposed sanction on Griffith was consistent with the imposed
sanction on another teacher for violating the same policy). Thus, we affirm the hearing officer’s
determination that the District had sufficient cause to impose a 15-day unpaid suspension for
violating Policy 5201 and a 3-year drug-testing requirement to ensure compliance with Policy
5201. We further hold that the imposed sanction is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
IV. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
Finally, the District argues that the superior court erred by awarding Campbell attorney
fees and costs without making any findings under RCW 28A.405.350 to support the award. We
agree.
The court may award an employee reasonable attorney fees and costs if the employee
prevails and if the court finds that the district’s probable cause determination was made in bad
faith or upon insufficient legal grounds. RCW 28A.405.350. But the superior court did not make
any such findings related to the District’s probable cause determination.
Absent such findings, Campbell was not entitled to attorney fees and costs under RCW
28A.405.350, and the superior court erred in awarding $49,476.11 in attorney fees and costs to
her.
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Campbell asks us to award her attorney fees and costs on appeal under RAPs 14.2, 14.3,
and 18.1. However, because Campbell does not prevail in this appeal, we deny her request for an
award of attorney fees and costs under RAPs 14.2, 14.3, and 18.1.
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No. 46067-0-II
CONCLUSION
We hold that (1) Policy 5201 is not unconstitutionally vague, (2) there is substantial
evidence to support the hearing officer’s decision upholding the District’s probable cause
determination, (3) the imposed sanction of a 15-day suspension and a 3-year drug testing
requirement is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, and (4) the superior court’s award of
attorney fees and costs under RCW 28A.405.350 was unsupported and improper. Further, because
Campbell does not prevail on appeal, we deny her request for attorney fees and costs under RAPs
14.2, 14.3, and 18.1.
Accordingly, we reverse the superior court’s judgment and order and its award of attorney
fees and costs under RCW 28A.405.350. We reinstate the hearing officer’s decision upholding
the District’s probable cause determination, and deny Campbell’s request for attorney fees and
costs on appeal.
SUTTON, J.
We concur:
WORSWICK, P.J.
LEE, J.
16