State Of Washington v. Aaron Teng-hao Chung ( 2019 )

FILET)
COURT OF APPEALS 01Y1
STATE OF WASHIN•3TON
2019 JAN 14 AM 8:L9
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 76650-3-1
)
Respondent, )
)
v. )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
AARON TENG-HAO CHUNG, )
) FILED: January 14, 2019
Appellant. )
)
VERELLEN, J. — Aaron Chung appeals his conviction for third degree assault
of a child on the grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Because his attorney's decision not to request a lesser included offense instruction
was a legitimate trial tactic, Chung does not establish ineffective assistance.
Chung also appeals the portion of his sentence imposing a five-year
no-contact order prohibiting him from contacting his three children, K.C., L.C., and
J.C. Because the record does not support the scope or duration of the order as to
K.C. or L.C., we remand for resentencing.
J.C. was the victim of her father's crime, and evidence in the record
supports imposing a no-contact order as to her. But the court should also take the
opportunity on resentencing to address more precisely the potential circumstances
for revisiting the scope or duration of the no-contact order for J.C.
Therefore, we affirm Chung's conviction and remand for resentencing.
No. 76650-3-1/2
FACTS
Chung and Stacie Ly, his ex-wife, have three children together. After their
divorce, Chung saw his children every other weekend. Chung lives with his
parents, who help care for his children when they stay with him.
In February 2016, Chung's children were spending the weekend with him
at their grandparents' house. J.C., Chung's daughter, was six years old at the
time, and K.C. and L.C., Chung's two sons, were three and four. J.C. was playing
with her brothers when Chung took her aside into a hallway and claimed Ly stole
money from him. J.C. denied it and called Chung a liar. Chung responded by
punching his daughter above her right eye, causing her to fall backward and hit
her head on the hardwood floor. After J.C. got back to her feet, Chung used a
"very low and quiet" voice and said, "Don't tell anyone."'
After Ly brought J.C. to a doctor because her daughter was acting
unusually, the doctor diagnosed J.C. with a head injury and a concussion. The
doctor reported Chung to Child Protective Services.
The State charged Chung with second degree assault of a child. At trial,
the State also requested a lesser included offense instruction on third degree
assault of a child. The jury found Chung not guilty of second degree assault and
convicted him of the lesser included charge. In addition to 10 days in jail and 10
days of community service, the court prohibited Chung from having any contact
with his children for five years, subject to modification and review based upon
1 Report of Proceedings(RP)(Jan. 23, 2017) at 232.
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No. 76650-3-1/3
future progress in family court proceedings.
Chung appeals.
ANALYSIS
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
We review de novo a claim of ineffective assistance of counse1.2 The
defendant bears the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counse1.3 First,
the defendant must prove his counsel's performance was deficient.4 Second, the
defendant must prove his counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense.5
Failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice ends the inquiry.6
A defendant must overcome "a strong presumption that counsel's
performance was reasonable.'"7 When defense counsel's decisions "can be
characterized as legitimate trial strategy or tactics, performance is not deficient."5
Although questions of ineffective assistance of counsel do not lend themselves to
per se rules, the decision to include or exclude lesser included offense instructions
"is a tactical decision for which defense attorneys require significant latitude."9
2 State v. Sutherby, 165 Wash. 2d 870, 883, 204 P.3d 916 (2009).
3 State v. Grier, 171 Wash. 2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011)(quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984)).
4 Id. at 32 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
5 Id. at 33(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
6 State v. Woods, 198 Wash. App. 453, 461, 393 P.3d 886 (2017).
7 Grier, 171 Wn.2d at 33(quoting State v. Kyllo, 166 Wash. 2d 856, 862, 215
P.3d 177(2009)).
8 Kyllo, 166 Wash. 2d at 863.
9 Grier, 171 Wash. 2d at 34, 39.
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No. 76650-3-1/4
Chung contends his counsels'1° performance was deficient because they
did not request a lesser included offense of fourth degree assault after the court
agreed to provide an instruction on third degree assault. But the court granted the
State's request for the lesser included instruction only after both sides had rested
and were preparing for closing argument. Chung's theory of the case up to that
point was that he did not punch his daughter.11 And the only testifying eyewitness
to the assault was J.C. herself. By contrast, J.C.'s grandfather testified that
"nothing happen[ed]," and other testimony established that the grandfather was
either in the room with J.C. or in an adjacent room at the time of the alleged
assault.12 Chung also cross-examined the doctor who diagnosed J.C.'s
concussion about whether ordinary play activities could cause a concussion, and
he cross-examined J.C. about whether she liked playing on monkey bars and
doing handstands.
Rather than dramatically shifting tactics in the closing hours of trial, Chung's
attorneys made the legitimate tactical decision to continue to pursue their
established strategy.13 Because Chung does not demonstrate his trial counsels'
10 Chung was represented jointly at trial by two attorneys.
11 See, e.g., RP (Jan. 23, 2017) at 138-43(Chung's opening argument
contending the State's theory does not hold up to scrutiny).
12 RP (Jan. 23, 2017) at 185; RP (Jan. 24, 2017) at 519. J.C. gave
conflicting accounts about whether J.C.'s grandfather was in the room or in an
adjacent room when the assault occurred. Compare RP (Jan. 23, 2017) at 185
(police officer testified to J.C. saying her grandfather was standing right behind her
father when the assault occurred), with RP (Jan. 23, 2017) at 244 (J.C. testified
her grandparents were in an adjacent room).
13 Moreover, one of Chung's attorneys argued against providing the
instruction on third degree assault because he was "afraid of a compromised
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No. 76650-3-1/5
performance was deficient, he cannot show he received ineffective assistance of
counsel.
2. No-Contact Order
We review sentencing conditions for abuse of discretion.14 A court abuses
its discretion when imposing a crime-related prohibition if it employs the wrong
legal standard.15 When a prohibition affects a constitutional right, the extent to
which it does is a legal question subject to strict scrutiny.16
RCW 9.94A.505(9) gives courts the power to impose "crime-related
prohibitions and affirmative conditions." "Crime-related prohibitions" are "directly
relate[d] to the circumstances of the crime" for which the defendant was
convicted.17 A no-contact order may be a crime-related prohibition.15 A
no-contact order can prohibit any contact between a person and that person's
children because the State has a compelling interest in protecting children and
preventing physical or psychological harm to them.19
verdict," wherein the jury would decide to convict Chung of a lesser offense after
being worn down by many hours of deliberation. RP (Jan. 25, 2017) at 585. The
jury deliberated for almost three days before convicting Chung.
14 State v. Warren, 165 Wash. 2d 17, 32, 195 P.3d 940 (2008).
15 In re Pers. Restraint of Rainey, 168 Wash. 2d 367, 375, 229 P.3d 686
(2010).
16 Id. at 374.
17 RCW 9.94A.030(10).
18 Rainey, 168 Wash. 2d at 376.
19 State v. Howard, 182 Wash. App. 91, 101, 328 P.3d 969 (2014); see
Rainey, 168 Wash. 2d at 378 ("Washington law recognizes that the State has a
compelling interest in protecting children from witnessing domestic violence.").
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No. 76650-3-1/6
But prohibitions that interfere with fundamental rights, such as the right to
parent one's children, must be "sensitively imposed," "narrowly drawn," and
carefully reviewed.20 "There must be no reasonable alternative way to achieve the
State's interest."21 Remand is required when either the scope or the duration of a
no-contact order impinging a fundamental right is not "reasonably necessary to
accomplish the essential needs of the State and public order."22
In State v. Torres, the trial court imposed a five-year no-contact order
prohibiting a father from contacting his minor son except by mail screened by his
son's mother.23 The court imposed the order after the father was convicted of
witness tampering for ordering his son to lie to the police about how the father's
other child died.24 Division Three of this court remanded for resentencing because
the trial court "failed to acknowledge [the father's] fundamental right to parent his
child or explain why a five-year prohibition on all personal contact was reasonably
necessary to further the State's interests."25
Similarly, this court remanded for resentencing in State v. Ancira, where the
trial court entered a five-year no-contact order prohibiting all contact between the
defendant and his wife and children after he violated an existing no-contact order
20 Warren, 165 Wash. 2d at 32, 34.
21 Id. at 34-35.
22 Id. at 32; Howard, 182 Wash. App. at 101; see Rainey, 168 Wash. 2d at
378-82(remanding for resentencing when a no-contact order had a reasonable
scope but unreasonable duration).
23 198 Wash. App. 685, 687, 689, 393 P.3d 894(2017)
24 Id. at 687-88.
25 Id. at 689.
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No. 76650-3-1/7
that covered only the wife.26 The trial court imposed the order to prevent the
children from witnessing any more domestic violence.27 This court remanded
because "the State has failed to demonstrate that this severe condition was
reasonably necessary to prevent the children from witnessing domestic
violence."28 Although "some limitations on [the defendant's] contact with his
children, such as supervised visitation, might be appropriate," there was no
evidence justifying a total restriction on all contact for five years.29
By contrast, in State v. Corbett, Division Two of this court upheld a
no-contact order imposed on a sexual offender that restricted his right to parent his
children.3° The offender sexually abused his stepdaughter repeatedly, and the
no-contact order restricted the offender's ability to contact any minors, including
his biological children.31 However, the no-contact order allowed for supervised
visits with his biological children subject to approval of the Department of
Corrections and a sexual deviancy treatment provider.32 Division Two held the
no-contact order was a "valid crime-related prohibition" that did not "unduly
burden" the offender's "fundamental parenting rights."33
26 107 Wash. App. 650, 652-54, 27 P.3d 1246 (2001).
27 Id. at 653.
28 Id. at 654.
28 Id. at 655.
30 158 Wash. App. 576, 601, 242 P.3d 52(2010).
31 Id. at 583-84, 601.
32 Id. at 601 n.14.
33 Id. at 601.
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No. 76650-3-1/8
Chung is subject to a no-contact order for each of his children, and those
orders prohibit him from contacting them through any means and from knowingly
coming within 1,000 feet of them, their home, or their schoo1.34 Those orders will
expire on March 22, 2022, unless removed earlier.
At sentencing, the court briefly addressed its no-contact order:
No-contact order with J.C., K.C., and L.C. for a period of five years.
That can be reviewed if and when the family court decides to make
modifications in the no-contact orders that are admitted entered in
that venue. I'm not inclined to just wholesale say we'll follow what
they do, because I don't always know why they're doing what they
do. But I would certainly be willing to review it once they see fit to
change the circumstances. Because I think you're right, [defense
counsel]. They're going to have a better handle on the details than
we will.[36]
The court does not otherwise explain the rationale behind the scope of its order
and the record does not contain any documents or filings with the family court
either pre- or post-trial.
Because the court's order infringes on Chung's fundamental right to parent,
we consider whether the scope and duration of the order are directly related to his
crime, narrowly drawn, and reasonably necessary to uphold the State's interests.36
The jury found Chung assaulted J.C. Following the assault, J.C."woke up
on many nights sweating, shaking, and sobbing uncontrollably" because she
thought she "saw daddy's angry face and worried that he was going to kill her."37
34 CF at 122; 144-49.
35 RP (Mar. 22, 2017) at 936. We note that Chung's attorney requested the
language allowing modification based on the family court's decisions.
36 RCW 9.94A.030(10), .505(9); Warren, 165 Wash. 2d at 34-35.
37 RP (Mar. 22, 2017) at 916.
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No. 76650-3-1/9
Ly testified that J.C. has "displayed more self-confidence" and had fewer
nightmares after a family court imposed a no-contact order on Chung during the
year between the assault and tria1.38 J.C. suffered both physical and psychological
harm from her father's assault, and her mother told the court that J.C. has
benefitted from Chung's absence. Because Chung's crime relied on unsupervised
physical proximity with J.C. and he tried to silence her following the assault, we
agree that restrictions on Chung's right to parent her are directly related to his
crime. The court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a no-contact order on
Chung for J.C.
The court also imposed no-contact orders on Chung for his two other
children. The court faced directly conflicting testimony about Chung's treatment of
his sons. J.C. testified that her brothers attacked Chung after the assault and that
he responded by squeezing them until they could not breathe and demanding that
they apologize for attacking him. But her grandfather's testimony contradicts this,
and no other testimony indicates Chung assaulted his other children.39 Unlike
J.C., the jury made no findings about K.C. and L.C. And the court made no
findings of fact or observations about whether J.C. was more credible than her
grandfather or whether the court could reasonably infer a threat to K.C. and L.C.
88 Id. at 917-18.
Ly testified at sentencing that K.C. and L.C. returned from an overnight at
Chung's on one occasion with multiple facial abrasions, but she also admitted she
did not know how they were injured.
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No. 76650-3-1/10
Sentencing conditions that restrict fundamental rights are appropriate only
when there is "no reasonable alternative way to achieve the State's interest."40 As
in Torres and Ancira, nothing shows the trial court considered whether any less
restrictive options could uphold the State's interest in protecting K.C. and L.C. from
harm. Although the court's oral ruling correctly recognizes that family courts are
better positioned than criminal courts to evaluate family dynamics,'" the court
provided only for possible reevaluation of the no-contact order if a family court
modified the no-contact orders it had imposed. Even assuming that some
restrictions on Chung's ability to contact K.C. and L.C. are justified, there is
nothing in the record to let us discern the reason for these broad restrictions.42
In addition, the trial court did not explain its rationale for the five-year
duration of its order. The court noted Chung's need to "salvage [his] relationship
with [his] kids,"43 and how "since the children are so young at this point, Mr. Chung
has a lot of work to do to repair the damage that was done to these kids and his—
more importantly—his relationship with them."44 But the court did not reconcile
how prohibiting Chung from having any contact with his children for five years
would improve his relationship with them. Nor did the court consider a shorter
duration or benchmarks Chung could meet to regain his rights over time.
40 Warren, 165 Wash. 2d at 34-35.
41 Torres, 198 Wash. App. at 690-91; Ancira, 107 Wash. App. at 655.
42 Even in Torres, where the father was being investigated for killing one
son and tampered with the other son's testimony to hamper the investigation, the
trial court let the father contact his son by mail. 198 Wash. App. at 687-89.
43 RP (Mar. 22, 2017) at 935.
44 Id. at 933-34.
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No. 76650-3-1/11
As in Torres, "[w]e are unable to discern the court's likely reasoning from
the limited information presented. It is the trial court's duty to balance the
competing interests impacted by a no-contact order."5 Imposing sentencing
restrictions is a "fact intensive exercise" better conducted by the trial court than an
appellate court.46 The trial court is not required to make findings of fact when
imposing a no-contact order, but it should articulate the rationale and
considerations behind its ruling.
Consistent with Torres, the trial court should first address whether
no-contact orders are still reasonably necessary for K.C. and L.C. in light of the
State's interests in protecting them from harm. If the orders are still necessary,
then the court should "endeavor to narrowly tailor the order, both in terms of scope
and duration."47 This must include consideration of less restrictive alternatives to a
total ban on contact between Chung and his children. Regarding the no-contact
order for J.C., the court should articulate reasons for whatever duration the court
orders.
Chung makes a variety of arguments in his statement of additional grounds
that his conviction should be vacated.
First, Chung argues insufficient evidence supported his conviction.
Evidence is sufficient to support a guilty verdict if any rational trier of fact, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and drawing all inferences in
45 Torres, 198 Wash. App. at 690.
46 Id.
47 Id.
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No. 76650-3-1/12
its favor, could find the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable
doubt." Credibility determinations are reserved solely for the trier of fact and are
not subject to review." When viewing the facts discussed above in a light most
favorable to the State, sufficient evidence supported Chung's conviction.50
Second, Chung claims a technical glitch during his father's testimony that
required his father testify again the following day to produce a record, thereby
prejudicing the jury. But Chung fails to explain how exposing the jury twice to the
same defense witness being asked the same questions by defense counsel would
result in prejudice to the defendant.
Third, Chung argues he is entitled to a new trial due to prosecutorial
misconduct. Chung contends the prosecutor prejudiced his trial by misstating the
definition of "reasonable doubt" and by bringing up new information, both during
closing argument. A defendant claiming prosecutorial misconduct has the burden
of showing that the prosecutor's comments were improper and that the comments
were prejudicia1.51 The "'failure to object to an improper remark constitutes a
waiver of error unless the remark is so flagrant and ill intentioned that it causes an
enduring and resulting prejudice that could not have been neutralized by an
v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wash. 2d 243, 265, 401 P.3d 19, affirmed,
48 State
189 Wash. 2d 243(2017).
49 Id. at 266.
59 We note that J.C. herself testified to her father punching her, and that the
doctor who treated and diagnosed J.C. testified to her injuries and to J.C. reporting
that Chung caused them.
51 Warren, 165 Wash. 2d at 26.
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No. 76650-3-1/13
admonition to the jury.'"52 Here, Chung failed to object to any of the comments he
now claims prejudiced his trial. Because none of the remarks by the prosecutor
could have caused "enduring and resulting prejudice," Chung does not
demonstrate any misconduct.
We decline to consider Chung's remaining contentions. They would be
better addressed in a personal restraint petition either because he relies on
information outside the appellate record or because he fails to make objections
specific enough to allow for review.
Accordingly, we affirm Chung's conviction and remand for resentencing.
WE CONCUR:
52 State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d 438, 443, 258 P.3d 43(2011)(quoting
State v. Russell, 125 Wash. 2d 24, 86, 882 P.2d 747 (1994)).
13