State Of Washington, Resp/cross-app v. Jonathan S. Wood, App/cross-resp ( 2018 )

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHING*
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THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) co *-CI
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) No. 76221-4-1 cPrn0
Respondent, ) =7>
) DIVISION ONE Glu)
•
v. )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JONATHAN STEPHEN WOOD, )
)
Appellant. ) FILED: June 18, 2018
)
APPELWICK, C.J. — Wood appeals his conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver, challenging the denial
of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his car. He claims
that the search was not a lawful inventory search prior to impounding his vehicle.
He also argues that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority in imposing a
$3,000 VUCSA1 fine, and in imposing community custody conditions that were
unconstitutionally vague and not crime-related. We reverse.
FACTS
Around 6:30 a.m. on April 17,2015, Washington State Patrol Trooper Anson
Statema was on Interstate 5 (1-5) when he heard a 911 report that a blue Hyundai
Sonata had been involved in a hit and run collision. Statema saw a vehicle
matching that description and pulled the car over to the right shoulder of 1-5, just
south of the 44th Street onramp. The car was approximately two to three feet from
1 Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW.
No. 76221-4-1/2
the fog line and in a tow zone. Statema spoke with the vehicle's driver, Jonathan
Wood.
Wood initially denied being involved in the hit and run. While Statema was
talking with Wood, Trooper Steve Palm arrived at the scene with the victim of the
hit and run. Palm was the lead investigator for the collision, and Statema testified
that he was assisting Palm at the scene. The other driver identified Wood's vehicle
as the car that hit him. At 6:55 a.m., Statema saw what he believed was fresh
damage on the front of Wood's car, and asked Wood to exit the vehicle so that he
could show it to him. Wood admitted that he had been in an accident and left
because he was late for work. Palm then arrested Wood for hit and run, put him
in the back of his police car, and read him his Miranda2 rights.
At 6:59 a.m., after Wood was arrested, Statema entered Wood's vehicle to
conduct what he later claimed was an inventory search prior to impounding.
Statema testified that he was looking for valuable items such as electronics to
preserve them for Wood. Statema saw a cord running into the center console, so
he looked inside it to see if the cord was connected to an electronic device. Inside
the console Statema saw pills of various colors wrapped in individual packages,
with about 10 pills in each "baggie." Believing that he had found evidence, Statema
ended his inventory search and notified Trooper Palm.
At 7:07 a.m., Statema asked Palm if he was going to tow the vehicle. Palm
told him, "Not right now." Statema ran Wood's license and discovered that it had
been revoked in the first degree, and that he was required to have an ignition
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694(1966).
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interlock. Palm requested a tow truck at 7:16 a.m., and the vehicle was
subsequently towed to the State Patrol evidence locker in Marysville.
On April 18, Palm obtained a search warrant for Wood's car based on the
suspected contraband. While searching the car, Palm found several controlled
substances, $997 in cash, a digital scale with drug residue, and two cell phones.
Wood was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to
manufacture or deliver. At a CrR 3.6 hearing, he moved to suppress the evidence
that was obtained from the search of his vehicle. He argued that the impoundment
of his car was unlawful because the troopers did not explore any reasonable
alternatives. He further claimed that the inventory search was unlawful because it
"had nothing to do with taking inventory of an impounded vehicle." He asserted
that the search was before troopers discovered his license was revoked in the first
degree, and before they decided to impound the vehicle.
The trial court denied Wood's motion to suppress evidence. It found that
the initial search of Wood's car was "to turn off the vehicle, to retrieve a phone for
the defendant. . . . [S]o it was a mixed bag . . . of both a community caretaking
function and an inventory search." It stated,
[T]he decision to impound the vehicle and not release it to somebody
else was perfectly justified under these circumstances. First, the
car's running; secondly,the video shows clearly that it is a dangerous
area. Cars are passing close to this vehicle in the travel portion of
the freeway to the left of where the vehicle was stopped and parked.
It was illegally parked because it's a 24-hour tow zone meaning that
vehicles left there are subject to tow at any time.
It recalled that both troopers testified that "they may choose not to impound a
vehicle, even where it's in a tow zone. They may choose to contact someone to
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come get the vehicle." But, it found that the troopers' decision to impound the
vehicle "was perfectly authorized, if not compelled, and certainly justified by the
circumstances." It stated further that there was "no support in the evidence" that
the search was a pretext to search for drugs.
Following a stipulated facts bench trial, Wood was convicted of possession
of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver. The court imposed
a standard range sentence of 30 months of confinement and 12 months of
community custody. Wood appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Suppression of Evidence
Wood argues that his conviction must be reversed because the evidence
supporting it was discovered in violation of his constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. First, he asserts that the impoundment of
his vehicle was unlawful because the troopers did not explore reasonable
alternatives. Then, he argues that the inventory search was unlawful because it
was an illegal impounding of his car, and the claimed inventory search was
pretextual.
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, an appellate court
determines whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact
and whether the findings support the conclusions of law. State v. Garvin, 166
Wash. 2d 242, 249, 207 P.3d 1266(2009). Evidence is substantial when it is enough
to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the stated premise. Id. This court
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No. 76221-4-1/5
reviews conclusions of law from an order pertaining to the suppression of evidence
de novo. Id.
B. Impoundment
Warrantless searches of vehicles are per se unreasonable, in violation of
article 1, section 7 of our state constitution, subject to a few exceptions that are
narrowly drawn. State v. Tyler, 177 Wash. 2d 690, 698, 302 P.3d 165 (2013). One
of these exceptions is a valid inventory search of an impounded vehicle. Id. at
698, 701. This is the exception that the State maintains justifies the search of the
car that Wood was driving. The State bears the burden of establishing that this
exception applies. Id. at 698.
Our Supreme Court has listed specific circumstances for when a vehicle
may be lawfully impounded:
(1) as evidence of a crime, when the police have probable cause to
believe the vehicle has been stolen or used in the commission of a
felony offense; (2) under the "community caretaking function" if (a)
the vehicle must be moved because it has been abandoned,
impedes traffic, or otherwise threatens public safety or if there is a
threat to the vehicle itself and its contents of vandalism or theft and
(b) the defendant, the defendant's spouse, or friends are not
available to move the vehicle; and (3)in the course of enforcing traffic
regulations if the driver committed a traffic offense for which the
legislature has expressly authorized impoundment.
Id.(emphasis omitted).
The State contends that Wood's car was lawfully impounded under the
second and third circumstances. First, it contends that the troopers impounded
Wood's car under the community caretaking function, because it presented a
threat to public safety. It states that the car was "parked on a narrow shoulder" in
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No. 76221-4-1/6
a "dangerous" area, at the end of a freeway onramp, where cars travelling at
freeway speeds passed by the car very closely. Then it states that Wood could
not move his vehicle because he was being arrested, and, without citation to the
record, it states that "[n]o one else was immediately in the area who could move
the vehicle once the investigation had been completed."
Second, the State argues the troopers validly impounded the car because
they were enforcing traffic regulations and Wood committed a traffic offense for
which the legislature has expressly authorized impoundment. It cites RCW
46.55.113(2)(b) and (d). RCW 46.55.113(1) states that whenever the driver of a
vehicle is arrested for a violation of driving with an invalidated license, the vehicle
is subject to summary impoundment. The statute also provides:
(2) In addition, a police officer may take custody of a vehicle,
at his or her discretion, and provide for its prompt removal...
(b) Whenever a police officer finds a vehicle unattended upon
a highway where the vehicle constitutes an obstruction to traffic or
jeopardizes public safety
(d)Whenever the driver of a vehicle is arrested and taken into
custody by a police officer.
RCW 46.55.113(2)(b) and (d).
But, if there is no probable cause to seize the vehicle, impoundment is
inappropriate when reasonable alternatives exist. Tyler, 177 Wash. 2d at 698-99. In
Tyler the court stated:
The police officer does not have to exhaust all possible alternatives,
but must consider reasonable alternatives. Reasonableness of an
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impoundment must be assessed in light of the facts of each case.
However, facts subsequent to impoundment do not bear on whether
the impoundment was reasonable.
Id. at 699 (emphasis added)(citations omitted). There, the court found that the
community caretaking function was "plainly implicated" because, if not impounded,
the vehicle would have been left unattended very close to a very busy, congested
single lane section of the highway. jcj. And, the officer explored alternatives,
including asking Tyler to loan his cell phone to the car's passenger to attempt to
locate someone to move the car. Id. at 700. Our Supreme Court concluded that
the impoundment was lawful, because the vehicle threatened public safety if left
where it was,the driver had been arrested, and the officer had explored reasonable
alternatives to impoundment. Id.
This case differs from Tyler, but closely resembles State v. Froehlich, 197
Wash. App. 831, 391 P.3d 559 (2017). In Froehlich, after hitting another car, the
defendant left the scene of the car accident in an ambulance. 197 Wash. App. at
834-35. There was no evidence in the record that the officer at the scene or the
one who accompanied Froehlich to the hospital asked her what she wanted to do
with the car. Id. at 835, 839. The trooper at the scene decided to impound the
vehicle and, while conducting an inventory search, discovered what he suspected
was narcotics. Id. at 836.
In its analysis of the impoundment, Division II discussed the community
caretaking rule:
How strictly the second community caretaking requirement
stated in Tyler should be applied is somewhat unclear. We can
conceive of circumstances where it would be reasonable for an
officer to impound a vehicle even though he or she may not know the
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No. 76221-4-1/8
availability of the defendant or the defendant's spouse or friends to
remove a vehicle or when removal by those persons would be
impractical. However, Tyler suggests that an officer should at least
consider whether the defendant can make arrangements for
someone to remove the vehicle before impounding it. Otherwise,the
second community caretaking requirement would be superfluous.
Id. at 839. And, in discussing the "reasonable alternatives" rule to statutory
impoundment, the court stated, "One of the alternatives that an officer should
consider is asking the driver if arrangements can be made for someone to move
the vehicle." Id. at 845. The court held that police unlawfully impounded
Froehlich's car under the community caretaking function, because there was no
evidence that the officer considered the defendant's ability to arrange for the car
to be moved from the scene. Id. at 841. And, it held that even though the
impoundment was authorized by statute, it was unlawful because the officer did
not consider reasonable alternatives. Id. at 845-46.
Likewise here, neither trooper asked Wood what he wanted to do with the
car or discussed any alternatives to impoundment with him before Statema entered
the vehicle to search. Both troopers also testified that they did not consider
alternatives to impoundment appropriate. Statema testified that he did not think,
in this circumstance, it was appropriate to call another driver to retrieve the car,
explaining,
Typically, the times where we would consider having another driver
come would be a situation where a person's license was simply not
valid, if it was suspended third degree, or lower degree of
suspension. If they were being-- if there was some other reason that
they couldn't drive, I don't know what those would be, but just other
circumstances. But, generally speaking, hit and run collisions where
that person is a registered owner and license revocations are ones
where that we would pretty much always impound the vehicle unless
there is some large circumstance against it.
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No. 76221-4-1/9
He also testified that he did the inventory search before he checked the status of
Wood's license and discovered that it was revoked in the first degree and learned
that Wood was required to have an ignition interlock. When asked if he would
"have considered having someone else come to the scene" to remove the vehicle,
Trooper Palm answered "no" stating,
Because of the time of the day, rush hour, like I've said before, 24-
hour tow zone. That area that we're in, we're bringing more people
to the scene, that means more people out of their cars on the narrow
shoulder.
As in Froehlich where the officer spoke with the defendant on several issues but
never asked her about removing the car, here both troopers spoke with Wood, but
never asked him what he wanted to do with the car. Trooper Statema entered
Wood's car and began searching a mere four minutes after he asked Wood to step
out of the car, and only one minute after Wood was arrested.
The State argues that the impoundment was reasonable under the
community caretaking function for two main reasons. First, it contends that "unlike
in Froehlich[,] the defendant's vehicle did present an imminent danger to the
public." In Froehlich, the car was on the shoulder of a highway, 100 feet from a
"very busy intersection," and one to two feet from the fog line. 197 Wash. App. at
834-35. Here, Wood's car was on the shoulder of 1-5, just south of the 44th Street
onramp, and approximately two to three feet from the fog line. The State's
argument is unpersuasive that Wood's car posed a danger greater than that of the
car in Froehlich. And, even if Wood's car was in a more dangerous location than
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No. 76221-4-1/10
the vehicle's location in Froehlich, that does not negate the officers' duty to
consider reasonable alternatives to impoundment under Tyler.
Second, the State argues that the officer's entry into Wood's car was also
justified because the car was running when Wood was arrested. There is no
mention of this in the written findings of fact and conclusions of law, but the State
asks this court to consider this justification anyway. A trial court's oral ruling "may
be considered in interpreting the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but they
cannot be considered as the basis for the trial court's judgment and sentence."
State v. Mallory, 69 Wash. 2d 532, 533, 419 P.2d 324 (1966). The trial court
mentioned the reasoning in passing in its oral ruling:
But the fact that the police have discretion doesn't mean that the
exercise of their discretion here to arrest[Wood]for hit and run and
to impound his vehicle is somehow unlawful. And that doesn't mean
that because the police happened to find drugs when they're looking
in the console to retrieve his phone or to see if they can get a key fob
to turn the vehicle off that somehow what is purported to be an
inventory search isn't an inventory search.
It's also probably a part of a community caretaking function.
And later, the court commented "the car's running" and that the "initial
search, as I mentioned, was to turn off the vehicle, to retrieve a phone for the
defendant."
Statema's testimony at the suppression hearing did not establish that he
entered the car to look for the key fob to turn off the car. He testified that, upon
entering the car he
[s]tarted looking for electronic devices, first of all. I didn't see a GPS
up on the console or anything like that. I did notice that the vehicle
was a push start type of vehicle.
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No. 76221-4-1/11
And, Statema testified that he did not know if the electronic key fob "was in the car
or if Mr. Wood had it on his person." Even if entering the car to turn it off was
proper under the community caretaking function, this does not support the
trooper's choice to look in the center console. Statema did not testify that he went
into the car to turn it off. And, even if that was his purpose, the officer did not need
the key fob to turn off the car,3 nor did he ask Wood if he had the key fob on him
before he entered the car. The record is insufficient to affirm the trial court's denial
of the suppression on this basis. The State bears the burden of establishing that
this was a valid inventory search of an impounded vehicle, and it cannot meet its
burden on this record. See Tyler, 177 Wash. 2d at 698.
For the impoundment of Wood's car to be lawful under the community
caretaking function, the troopers were required to at least consider whether
Wood's spouse or friends were available to move the car from the scene. Palm
testified that he would not have considered bringing someone to the scene to
retrieve the car because the area was too dangerous. Even if the trooper thought
it was too dangerous for a friend or family member to come retrieve the vehicle,
allowing Wood to arrange private towing would have been an alternative to
impound, as the court noted in Froehlich. See 197 Wash. App. at 840. A private tow
would have obviated the need for an inventory search. Under these
circumstances, the trial court's findings of facts are not sufficient to support its
conclusion of law that the State satisfied the second community caretaking
3 The State conceded at oral argument that the car could have been turned
off without the key fob.
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No. 76221-4-1/12
requirement. And, even though the impoundment of Wood's car was authorized
under RCW 46.55.113, it was not lawful because the troopers did not consider
reasonable alternatives.4
Because the impoundment was unlawful, the inventory search of his car
was improper. An inventory search may occur after a vehicle is lawfully
impounded. Tyler, 177 Wash. 2d at 701. Trooper Palm obtained a warrant to search
Wood's car based exclusively on what was observed during the unlawful search.
When an unconstitutional search or seizure occurs, all subsequently uncovered
evidence becomes fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed. State v.
Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 359, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). Therefore, the evidence
obtained from Wood's car was fruit of the poisonous tree, and must be suppressed.
Where the State's case rests exclusively on improperly seized evidence, the
proper remedy is to vacate the conviction and dismiss the charge with prejudice.
State v. Hopkins, 128 Wash. App. 855, 866, 117 P.3d 377(2005). Wood's conviction
rested exclusively on the controlled substances obtained from the search of his car
after the seizure.
Because the car was unlawfully impounded, the seizure of evidence from
Wood's car was unlawful. Thus, the trial court erred in denying Wood's motion to
suppress. We reverse.
4We distinguish this scenario from one in which a car is summarily towed
from a tow away zone because no one is present with the vehicle. While Wood's
car was parked in a 24 hour tow zone, he was present at the scene and, under
Tyler, the officers should have considered reasonable alternatives before
impoundment, including permitting Wood to arrange a private tow.
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II. VUCSA Fine
To make a clear record we also address Wood's second argument, where
he argues that the trial court exceeded its authority by imposing a $3,000 fine
pursuant to the Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (VUCSA),
chapter 69.50 RCW. RCW 69.50.430(2) authorizes a $2,000 fine for an
individual's second or subsequent VUCSA conviction. Wood has a prior VUCSA
conviction. Wood asserts that the trial court was not authorized to impose a $3,000
fine instead of the $2,000 authorized by RCW 69.50.430(2).
The State responds that, because Wood failed to object to the fine below,
and the court did not exceed its statutory authority, the challenge to the fine is
waived. It argues that the court had authority to impose a $3,000 fine, interpreting
it as a $2,000 fine under VUCSA and $1,000 as a general fine.
This court has held that a trial court's error in imposing costs not authorized
by statute is a challenge that may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v.
Diaz-Farias, 191 Wash. App. 512, 520, 362 P.3d 322(2015).
Here, the trial court ordered Wood to pay a $3,000 VUCSA fine, not a
$2,000 VUCSA fine and a $1,000 fine under RCW 9A.20.021(1)(b), which states
that a maximum penalty for a class B felony may include a fine up to $20,000. The
trial court exceeded its authority by imposing a $3,000 VUCSA fine instead of the
statutory $2,000 fine. If we were not reversing the conviction, we would remand
to the trial court to correct the VUCSA fine.
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No. 76221-4-1/14
111. Community Custody Conditions
Finally, Wood argues that two unlawful community custody conditions
should be stricken from his sentence. He argues first that the condition ordering
him to remain outside "known drug areas as defined by DOC [(Department of
Corrections)] officer" is unconstitutionally vague. The State concedes that "drug
areas" is unconstitutionally vague and this condition should be clarified or stricken.
We accept the State's concession.
Wood argues second that the condition prohibiting him from visiting
establishments where alcohol is the primary commodity for sale is not crime
related. A "crime related prohibition" is an order of a court prohibiting conduct that
directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been
convicted. RCW 9.94A.030(10). The State argues that, even though this condition
is listed under crime related prohibitions in the judgment and sentence, "it is not
that kind of condition," claiming instead that it is a condition limiting Wood's entry
into a specific geographical boundary. But, at sentencing the trial court stated, "I
think that it may well be that alcohol is the sort of substance that sometimes
weakens a person's judgment and resolve.... I think I'm going to impose this
condition." This refutes the State's argument that the trial court intended this to be
a condition limiting Wood's entry into specific geographical boundaries. At
sentencing the State acknowledged that there were no allegations that alcohol was
involved in Wood's convicted offense. Therefore, the condition prohibiting Wood
from entering establishments where alcohol is the primary commodity for sale is
not crime related.
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No. 76221-4-1/15
If we were not reversing the conviction, we would remand to the trial court
to strike both of the contested conditions.
We reverse.
WE CONCUR:
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