State Of Washington, V Rex Lee Pope ( 2013 )

COURT O ADPEALS
20100 EC 17
5C
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHI" SN1
BY
DIVISION II DEI ' Y
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 43172 -6 -II
Respondent,
IM
REX LEE POPE, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
t.
WORSWICK, C. J. — A jury returned verdicts finding Rex Lee Pope guilty of second degree
assault and attempted theft of a motor vehicle. The jury also returned special verdicts finding the
aggravating factors that Pope committed both offenses shortly after being released from
incarceration. Pope appeals his convictions, asserting that ( 1) the trial court violated his right to
present a defense by denying his continuance motion, (2) the trial court improperly commented
on the evidence, ( 3) the trial court' s substantial step definitional jury instruction relieved the
State of its burden to prove the essential elements of attempted theft of a motor vehicle, and (4)
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his case before trial and for
failing to adequately advise him about accepting a plea offer. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 8, 2011, Laverne Hallsted parked his Toyota pickup truck at a Port Orchard,
Washington park -
and -
ride lot and rode a commuter bus to his job at the Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard in Bremerton. When Hallsted returned to the park -and -
ride lot at around 4: 25 PM, he
saw that a door to his truck was open and that two feet were hanging out of the open door. As he
No. 43172 -6 -I1
approached his truck, Hallsted saw a man, later identified as Pope, attempting to smash the
truck' s ignition lock with a stick. Hallsted asked Pope, " Sir, can I help you ?" Report of
Proceedings ( Dec. 8, 2011) at 99. Pope responded, " Yes, you can," as he stood in front of
Hallsted. RP ( Dec. 8, 2011) at 99. Pope then looked down, grabbed Hallsted' s shirt, and
punched Hallsted in the face with his right hand. Hallsted responded by grabbing Pope' s shirt
and jabbing keys into his cheek. During the struggle, items from Pope' s satchel fell to the
ground. Among those items were several blister packs of medication marked with Pope' s name,
as well as a roll of duct tape, a notebook, a hat, an X - cto knife, and X -
A Acto knife blades. Pope
fled and Hallsted chased him for a short distance before calling 911.
Port Orchard Police Officer Donna Main took Hallsted' s statement and summoned
medical assistance to treat his injuries. The following day Hallsted identified Pope from a
photographic montage as the man who had broken into his truck and assaulted him. Main
arrested Pope the next day. When she arrested Pope, Main saw that Pope had scratch marks and
injuries on the left side of his face. During his arrest, Pope did not appear to have any physical
disability and did not have any difficulty walking, kneeling, or getting out of the patrol car.
On November 8, 2011, the State charged Pope by first amended information with second
degree assault and attempted theft of a motor vehicle. The State also alleged aggravating factors
that Pope committed each offense shortly after being released from incarceration and that his
multiple offenses and high offender score would result in some of his offenses going unpunished.
Pope was arraigned and was appointed counsel on September 12, 2011. On November 8,
Pope moved to continue the start of his trial. The trial court granted Pope' s continuance motion
and set his trial to commence on December 6. On December 6, Pope again moved for a
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continuance, asserting that he was attempting to obtain medical records and to secure witnesses
to testify about his Parkinson' s disease. When the trial court asked about the relevance of Pope' s
Parkinson' s disease, defense counsel stated:
Your Honor, there' s an allegation in part of this case regarding an alleged
assault that occurred between —where Mr. Pope is the alleged offender on that.
And the defense is trying to gather more information regarding his Parkinson' s
disease to show that Mr. Pope because of the —how far the disease has progressed
at this point, that he would be unable to conduct himself in a manner that the state
is alleging.
RP ( Dec. 6, 2011 AM) at 4.
The State opposed Pope' s continuance motion, asserting that it was not basing Pope' s
second degree assault charge on allegations that Pope had severely beaten the victim but, rather,
that it was charging him under RCW 9A.36. 021( 1)( e) for assaulting the victim " with intent to
commit a felony." Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 1. The State argued that it was unlikely that any
expert witness would testify that Pope could not commit assault in the manner alleged. The State
also told the trial court that it would be willing to stipulate that Pope suffered from Parkinson' s
disease. The trial court denied Pope' s continuance motion, noting that his trial had already been
continued once for the same reason.
That same day, Pope' s case was called for trial before a different trial court judge, and
Pope renewed his motion to continue the start of his trial. The trial court denied Pope' s
continuance motion, stating:
Well, that decision has been made. I' m not going to overrule what' s
already been decided this morning. There' s no new information provided so far
as the And I' ve not heard anything specific as to how it' s going
medical records.
to relate to or be relevant to the defense, in this case, especially in light of the fact
that there appears to be an acknowledgement this afternoon that there is no mental
defense being sought.
No. 43172 -6 -II
RP ( Dec. 6, 2011 PM) at 13. Before the start of trial, Pope requested that the trial court admit two
exhibits titled, " Parkinson' s Disease at a Glance," and " Symptoms by Mayo Clinic Staff." RP
Dec. 6, 2011 PM) at 32. Defense counsel stated that the purpose of the exhibits was to " have
something for the jurors available to explain why Mr. Pope visibly shakes in the courtroom." RP
Dec. 6, 2011 PM) at 33. The State opposed admission of the exhibits but stated that it wasn' t
opposed to having the trial court instruct the jury about Pope' s visible symptoms of Parkinson' s
disease. Following a lengthy discussion, both parties agreed that the trial court could instruct the
jurors as follows, "`` At Mr. Pope' s request, I would like to inform you that he suffers from
Parkinson' s disease. This is not a fact in the case. But he has requested that this be conveyed to
you so as to explain his symptoms."' RP ( Dec. 6, 2011 PM) at 43.
The following day, the trial court suggested modifying the agreed instruction to read,
At Mr. Pope' s request, I would like to inform you that Mr. Pope suffers from Parkinson' s
disease. This is not a fact in the case, but he has requested that this be conveyed so as to explain
his visible symptoms of shaking. "' RP ( Dec. 7; 2011) at 49. Defense counsel and the State
agreed to the modified language in the proposed instruction, and the trial court later read the
instruction to potential jurors at the start of voir dire.
At trial, Hallsted and Main testified consistently with the facts as stated above. The trial
court provided the jury with an instruction stating, " A substantial step is conduct which strongly
indicates a criminal purpose and which is more than mere preparation." Suppl. CP at 146. Pope
did not object to this instruction. The jury returned verdicts finding Pope guilty of second degree
assault and attempted theft of a motor vehicle. The jury also returned special verdicts finding the
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No. 43172 -6 -II
aggravating factors that Pope committed both offenses shortly after being released from
incarceration.
At a January 13, 2012 sentencing hearing, Pope' s defense counsel moved to withdraw
from representation, asserting that communications with Pope had broken down. The trial court
granted defense counsel' s motion to withdraw, appointed new counsel to represent Pope, and set
a new sentencing hearing date. On February 24, Pope' s new defense counsel informed the
sentencing court that he had reviewed the trial transcript and could not find a basis to file a
meritorious CrR 7. 5 motion and, therefore, he was prepared to go forward with sentencing.
Farettal
Pope then told the trial court that he wanted to act pro se. Following a inquiry,
the trial court found that. Pope had knowingly waived his right to counsel. Pope then filed a
written CrR 7. 5 motion for a new trial, which motion the trial court denied on March 2. The trial
court declined to impose an exceptional sentence and sentenced Pope within the standard range.
Pope timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
I RIGHT To PRESENT A DEFENSE
Pope first contends that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense
by denying his motion to continue the start of trial. We disagree.
A. Standard ofReview
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right to present a defense. State v.
Rehak, 67 Wn. App. 157, 162, 834 P.2d 651 ( 1992). " The right of an accused in a criminal trial
to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State' s
1
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 ( 1975).
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No. 43172 -6 -Ii
accusations." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297
1973).
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if
necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the
defendant' s version of the facts as well as the prosecution' s to the jury so it may
decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the
prosecution' s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the
right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a
fundamental element of due process of law.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 ( 1967). However, a
criminal defendant' s right to present a defense is not absolute; a defendant seeking to present
evidence must show that the evidence is at least minimally relevant to a fact at issue in the case.
State v. Jones, 168 Wash. 2d 713, 720, 230 P.3d 576 ( 2010).
A trial court' s denial of a continuance motion may infringe on a defendant' s right to
compulsory process and right to present a defense " if the denial prevents the defendant from
presenting a witness material to his defense." State v. Downing, 151 Wash. 2d 265, 274 -75, 87
P.3d 1169 ( 2004). We determine whether a trial court' s denial of a continuance motion violated
a criminal defendant' s constitutional right to present a defense on a case -by -case basis,
examining "`` the circumstances present in the particular case. "' Downing, 151 Wash. 2d at 275 n. 7
quoting State v. Eller, 84 Wash. 2d 90, 96, 524 P.2d 242 ( 1974)). We review the trial court' s
decision to grant or deny a continuance motion for an abuse of discretion. Downing, 151 Wash. 2d
at 272. And we review de novo claims of a denial of Sixth Amendment rights, including the
right to present a defense. See e. g., Jones, 168 Wash. 2d at 719; State v. Iniguez, 167 Wash. 2d 273,
280, 217 P.3d 768 ( 2009).
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No. 43172 -6 -II
B. Trial Court' s Continuance Ruling Did Not Violate Pope' s Right To Present a Defense
Examining the particular circumstances present here, we hold that the trial court did not
violate Pope' s right to present a defense. Fatal to his claim is Pope' s failure to show any
prejudice resulting from the trial court' s denial of his continuance motion.
E] ven where the denial of a motion for continuance is alleged to have deprived a
criminal defendant of his or her constitutional right to compulsory process, the
decision to deny a continuance will be reversed only on a showing that the
accused was prejudiced by the denial and /or that the result of the trial would
likely have been different had the continuance not been denied.
State v. Tatum, 74 Wn. App. 81, 86, 871 P.2d 1123 ( 1994) ( citing Eller, 84 Wash. 2d at 95 -96).
First, Pope has not demonstrated that the medical records and testimony he sought to
obtain for trial would have supported his contention that he could not have committed assault in
the manner alleged by the State. The medical records attached to Pope' s CrR 7. 5 motion for a
new trial merely show that Pope was diagnosed with Parkinson' s disease, exhibited "jerky" and
stiff' movements, had poor coordination and balance, and had an " uncontrollable tremor in the
right and to a lesser extent left hand, with some spread into the right leg." Suppl. CP at 36, 45.
Nothing in the medical records showed that Pope could not commit an assault during his
attempted theft of a motor vehicle, and he has not identified any expert witness that would so
testify. Additionally, the trial court had already granted Pope a nearly one -month continuance to
obtain the medical records he had sought. And Pope did not explain why he had been unable to
obtain the records during that time when he again moved for a continuance on the first day of
trial.
Finally, the outcome of Pope' s trial would not likely have differed had the trial court
granted him a continuance to allow him to present medical records and testimony regarding his
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No. 43172 -6 -II
Parkinson' s disease in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Hallsted identified Pope
as his assailant in a photographic montage and at trial. Several blister packs of medication
labeled with Pope' s name fell from the assailant' s satchel and were recovered by Main at the
scene. Hallsted and Pope both had injuries consistent with Hallsted' s account of the assault.
And Main did not see that Pope had any apparent physical disability when she arrested him. In
light of these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not violate Pope' s constitutional
right to present a defense by denying his second continuance motion.
II. JUDICIAL COMMENT
Next, Pope contends that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence in
violation of article IV, section 16 of the Washington Constitution. Specifically, Pope asserts that
the trial court improperly commented on the evidence when it orally instructed prospective
jurors, pursuant to the parties' agreement, that " At Mr. Pope' s request, I would like to inform
you that Mr. Pope suffers from Parkinson' s disease. This is not a fact in the case, but he has
requested that this be conveyed to you so as to explain his visible symptoms of shaking." RP
Dec. 7, 2011) at 52. We disagree.
Article IV, section 16 of the Washington Constitution prohibits a trial court from
conveying to the jury its personal attitude toward the merits of the case and prohibits the trial
court from " instructing a jury that ``matters of fact have been established as a matter of law. "'
State v. Levy, 156 Wash. 2d 709, 721, 132 P.3d 1076 ( 2006) ( quoting State v. Becker, 132 Wash. 2d
2
Article IV, section 16 of the Washington Constitution provides, " Judges shall not charge juries
with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law."
No. 43172 -6 -II
54, 64, 935 P.2d 1321 ( 1997)). A jury instruction that does no more than accurately state the law
pertaining to an issue does not constitute an impermissible comment on the evidence. State v.
Woods, 143 Wash. 2d 561, 591, 23 P.3d 1046 ( 2001).
Here, Pope argues that the trial court' s instruction impermissibly commented on the
evidence by stating that his Parkinson' s disease was " not a fact in the case" because it prohibited
the jurors from considering his Parkinson' s disease during its deliberations. RP ( Dec. 7, 2011) at
52. But the instruction' s directive that Pope' s Parkinson' s disease was " not a fact in the case"
was an accurate statement of the law because there was no evidence presented at trial regarding
his Parkinson' s disease. Rather, the trial court gave the instruction.because Pope had requested
that the jury be informed of his disease to explain why he was visibly shaking in the courtroom.
Thus, consistent with the jury instructions as a whole, the trial court properly instructed the jury
that it should not consider Pope' s Parkinson' s disease when determining whether the State
3
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the charged offenses.
Moreover, even if the trial court erred in giving the challenged instruction, Pope invited
such error by agreeing to the instruction' s language. The invited error doctrine prohibits a party
from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of the error on appeal. State v. Wakefield,
130 Wash. 2d 464, 475, 925 P.2d 183 ( 1996). Pope asserts that the invited error doctrine does not
apply here because, although he had agreed that the trial court should give the instruction, he did
not propose the instruction or its language. But, "[ u] nder the doctrine of invited error, even
3
The trial court' s written jury instructions stated in part, " The evidence is the testimony and the
exhibits. The law is contained in my instructions to you. You must disregard any remark,
statement, or argument that is not supported by the evidence or the law in my instructions."
Suppl. CP at 133.
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where constitutional rights are involved, we are precluded from reviewing jury instructions when
the defendant has proposed an instruction or agreed to its wording." State v. Winings, 126 Wn.
App. 75, 89, 107 P.3d 141 ( 2005) ( emphasis added). Here, Pope did more than merely acquiesce
to the trial court giving the challenged instruction; he requested that the jury be informed about
his Parkinson' s disease and twice agreed to the language of the trial court' s proposed instruction.
Because Pope expressly agreed to the language of the instruction, the invited error doctrine
prohibits him from challenging the instruction on appeal.
III. SUBSTANTIAL STEP JURY INSTRUCTION
Next, Pope asserts that the trial court' s substantial step jury instruction relieved the State
of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of attempted theft of a motor
vehicle. As an initial matter, we must determine if this issue is properly before us. Generally,
we will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Powell, 166 Wash. 2d 73, 82,
206 P.3d 321 ( 2009). And Pope did not object to the substantial step jury instruction at trial. He
asserts, however, that his claimed error is of constitutional magnitude and, thus, we may review
4
it for the first time on appeal under RAP 2. 5( a)( 3). We disagree.
Although a trial court' s failure to instruct the jury on every element of an offense is an
error of constitutional magnitude under RAP 2. 5( a)( 3), "`` any error in further defining terms used
in the elements is not of constitutional magnitude. "' State v. Gordon, 172 Wash. 2d 671, 677, 260
4 RAP 2. 5( a) provides in relevant part:
Errors Raised for First Time on Review. The appellate court may refuse to
review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court. However, a
party may raise the following claimed errors for the first time in the appellate
court:... ( 3) manifest error affecting a constitutional right.
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P. 3d 884 ( 2011) ( quoting State v. Stearns, 119 Wash. 2d 247, 250, 830 P.2d 355 ( 1992)). Here,
Pope does not contend that the trial court' s attempted theft of a motor vehicle ``to convict' jury
5
instruction failed to inform the jury on every element of the offense. Instead, he only takes
issue with the trial court' s substantial step definitional instruction. But this is not an alleged
error of constitutional magnitude that we may address for the first time on appeal. Gordon, 172
Wash. 2d at 677. Accordingly, we hold that by failing to object to the substantial step instruction,
Pope has failed to preserve his argument that the trial court erred in giving the instruction.
Moreover, even if this issue were properly before us, Pope' s claim lacks merit. Here the
trial instructed the jury, " A substantial step is conduct which strongly indicates a criminal
purpose and which is more than mere preparation." Suppl. CP at 146. This instruction deviates
from Washington Pattern Jury Instruction: Criminal 100. 05 only insofar as it replaces " that" with
which." 11A WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL
100. 05 at 390 ( 3d ed. 2008) ( WPIC).
5 That instruction provided:
To convict the defendant of the crime of Attempted Theft of a Motor Vehicle as
charged in count II, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt —
1) That on or about August 8th, 2011, the defendant did an act which was a
substantial step toward the commission of theft of a motor vehicle;
2) That the act was done with intent to commit theft of a motor vehicle; and
3) That the acts occurred in the State of Washington.
If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.
On the other hand, if, after weighing all of the evidence, you have a
reasonable doubt as to any one of these elements, then it will be your duty to
return a verdict of not guilty.
Suppl. CP at 147.
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No. 43172 -6 -II
Pope nonetheless argues that the trial court erred by using WPIC 100. 05 because the
instruction differs from the instruction adopted in State v. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d 443, 584 P.2d
382 ( 1978). Specifically, Pope claims that the substantial step jury instruction' s use of the word
indicate" rather than " corroborate" relieved the State of its burden of providing independent and
corroborating proof of Pope' s intent. Br. of Appellant at 20. He also claims that the
instruction' s reference to " a criminal purpose" rather than " the criminal purpose" relieved the
State of its burden to prove Pope' s criminal intent. Br. of Appellant at 21. But we have recently
rejected these same exact claims in State v. Davis, 174 Wash. App. 623, 636 -37, 300 P.3d 465,
review denied, 178 Wash. 2d 1012 ( 2013). Accordingly, even if Pope had preserved these issues
for appeal by objecting to the substantial step definitional jury instruction at trial, his claims lack
merit in light of our decision in Davis.
IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Last, Pope contends that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately
investigate his case and for failing to advise him about accepting a plea offer. Again, we
disagree.
We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. State v. Thach, 126 Wn.
App. 297, 319, 106 P.3d 782 ( 2005). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Pope must
show both that ( 1) his counsel' s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness based on all the circumstances and ( 2) the deficient performance
resulted in prejudice in that there was a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the proceeding
would have differed but for counsel' s deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 ( 1984); State v.. Reichenbach, 153 Wash. 2d 126, 130,
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No. 43172 -6 -II
101 P.3d 80 ( 2004). We strongly presume that counsel is effective. Reichenbach, 153 Wash. 2d at
130. To overcome this presumption, the defendant bears the burden of "establishing the absence
of any `` conceivable legitimate tactic explaining counsel' s performance. "' State v. Grier, 171
Wash. 2d 17, 42, 246 P.3d 1260 ( 2011) ( quoting Reichenbach, 153 Wash. 2d at 130).
A. Failure To Investigate
Pope first asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his
case before trial. Specifically, Pope argues that his defense counsel failed to review his medical
records before trial, failed to consult with his treating physicians, failed to consult with experts to
determine whether Pope could have punched the victim in the manner alleged, and failed to
secure witnesses to testify on Pope' s behalf. In support of his claim that defense counsel failed
to review his medical records before trial, Pope cites to counsel' s December 14, 2011 motion for
funds for copies of Pope' s health records, which was filed after the guilt phase of Pope' s trial had
ended on December 8. Although Pope' s defense counsel did not file for reimbursement until
after trial, a November 30, 2011 invoice attached to the motion clearly shows that defense
counsel requested Pope' s medical records prior to the start of trial on December 6, 2011.
Accordingly, Pope fails to show that defense counsel rendered deficient performance by failing
to review his medical records before trial.
With regard to his claims that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to consult
with his treating physicians or with experts that could testify that he was unable to commit the
assault because of his Parkinson' s disease, Pope fails to demonstrate that the outcome of his trial
would have differed had his counsel consulted with his physicians or potential expert witnesses.
On this record, Pope cannot show that his treating physicians or any potential expert witness
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No. 43172 -6 -I1
Would have provided admissible evidence favorable to his defense. Thus, his claim fails the
prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test.
And, with regard to his claim that defense counsel failed to secure witnesses to testify on
his behalf, Pope similarly fails to show that any potential witness would have provided
admissible evidence favorable to his defense. Accordingly, Pope fails to demonstrate on this
record that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his case.
B. Failure To Advise Pope Regarding Plea Deal'
Finally, Pope argues that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him
about whether to accept a plea offer. This argument is meritless because there is no evidence in
the record that the State had offered a plea deal to Pope. Accordingly, we hold that Pope cannot
show that his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance and we affirm his convictions.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
Worswick, C. J.
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