State of Washington v. Brandon Jerald Johnson , 421 P.3d 969 ( 2018 )

FILED
JULY 17, 2018
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 34928-4-III
)
Respondent, )
)
v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
BRANDON JERALD JOHNSON, )
)
Appellant. )
PENNELL, A.C.J. — When sentencing an individual to a term of community custody,
trial courts are tasked with crafting supervision conditions that are sufficient to promote
public safety, but also respectful of a convicted person’s statutory and constitutional rights.
Striking the right balance is no easy task, especially in the context of an appellate legal
landscape that is in flux and does not always set clear standards.
Brandon Johnson’s case is one where the trial court’s efforts to impose appropriate
community custody conditions unfortunately fail to meet the rigors of appellate scrutiny.
Mr. Johnson has challenged five of his community custody conditions, imposed pursuant
to his child molestation conviction. Four of the challenged conditions prohibit Mr.
No. 34928-4-III
State v. Johnson
Johnson’s access to images or media containing some form of sexual content. The fifth
condition prohibits Mr. Johnson from being present at locations where children
congregate. Mr. Johnson’s challenges to the prohibitions on media access must be
sustained as either overbroad or not crime related. The condition restricting Mr.
Johnson’s access to certain locations is affirmed, but warrants slight modification so as to
define the word “children” to mean individuals under 16 years of age. We therefore
remand for resentencing as to Mr. Johnson’s community custody conditions.
FACTS
Mr. Johnson’s criminal charges arose from conduct with his female adolescent
cousin. Mr. Johnson had been living with his aunt and uncle (the cousin’s parents) when
his uncle discovered Mr. Johnson rummaging through his cousin’s clothes. Later, Mr.
Johnson asked his uncle for lotion to use for masturbation. Mr. Johnson’s uncle
subsequently found women’s underwear in Mr. Johnson’s room.
Around the same time as the discoveries by Mr. Johnson’s uncle, the cousin
reported to her mother that Mr. Johnson had twice snuck into her room after dark. Mr.
Johnson’s aunt subsequently caught Mr. Johnson sneaking into his cousin’s room.
Mr. Johnson’s cousin subsequently informed her mother that Mr. Johnson had
touched her breasts twice, her bottom once, and had attempted to kiss her. The cousin
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reported that Mr. Johnson frequently sought to talk to her about masturbation and about
her breasts.
Mr. Johnson’s aunt and uncle immediately reported Mr. Johnson’s behavior to the
police.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The State of Washington charged Brandon Johnson with second degree child
molestation. During a bench trial, Mr. Johnson testified and denied any sexual contact
with his cousin. The trial court convicted Mr. Johnson of second degree child molestation
based on one of the two episodes described by his cousin.
The trial court sentenced Mr. Johnson to 18 months’ confinement with an
additional 36 months’ community custody. The community custody conditions include:
(14) Avoid places where children congregate to include, but not limited
to: parks, libraries, playgrounds, schools, school yards, daycare
centers, skating rinks, and video arcades.
....
(17) Do not possess or view material that includes images of nude
women, men, and/or children.
(18) Do not possess or view material that includes images of children
wearing only undergarments and/or swimsuits.
(19) Do not possess or view material that shows women, men, and/or
children engaging in sexual acts with each other, themselves, with an
object, or animal.
(20) Do not attend X-rated movies, peep shows, or adult book stores.
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Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 41. Mr. Johnson did not object to any of the conditions during
sentencing. The trial court entered no findings of fact that relate the community custody
conditions to Mr. Johnson’s crime of child molestation.
ANALYSIS
Mr. Johnson appeals the trial court’s imposition of the aforementioned community
custody conditions. 1 He contends the trial court lacked statutory authority to enter
conditions 17-20. He further contends that all challenged conditions (including condition
14) are unconstitutional. Although no objection was raised to the conditions during the
superior court proceedings, Mr. Johnson’s contentions are amenable to review for the first
time on appeal. State v. Bahl, 164 Wash. 2d 739, 744-45, 193 P.3d 678 (2008); State v.
Irwin, 191 Wash. App. 644, 650-51, 364 P.3d 830 (2015).
1
Mr. Johnson also initially challenged the trial court’s failure to enter written
findings of fact and conclusions of law following his bench trial. That omission has since
been corrected and therefore need not be addressed. Mr. Johnson has also filed a
statement of additional grounds for review, alleging 10 additional claims of error.
Because Mr. Johnson’s additional claims either rest on allegations outside the record or
request that this court reweigh evidence, we decline review. State v. Calvin, 176 Wn.
App. 1, 26, 316 P.3d 469 (2013); Quinn v. Cherry Lane Auto Plaza, Inc., 153 Wash. App.
710, 717, 225 P.3d 266 (2009). Issues involving facts or evidence outside the current
record are properly raised through a personal restraint petition, not a statement of
additional grounds. State v. McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
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Conditions restricting access to images and media
Mr. Johnson asserts that community custody conditions 17, 18, 19, and 20 lack a
relationship to his crime and thus are unlawful. He further contends that these conditions
violate his constitutional right to free speech. 2 Conditions 17 and 18 prohibit possessing
or viewing nude images or images of children wearing only undergarments or swimsuits.
Conditions 19 and 20 prohibit viewing sexually explicit activity and attendance at X-rated
movies, peep shows, or adult book stores.
Relevant legal standards
Trial courts are authorized to impose a variety of discretionary community custody
conditions as part of a criminal sentence. The applicable statute declares:
Discretionary conditions. As part of any term of community
custody, the court may order an offender to:
(a) Remain within, or outside of, a specified geographical boundary;
(b) Refrain from direct or indirect contact with the victim of the
crime or a specified class of individuals;
(c) Participate in crime-related treatment or counseling services;
(d) Participate in rehabilitative programs or otherwise perform
affirmative conduct reasonably related to the circumstances of the offense,
the offender’s risk of reoffending, or the safety of the community;
(e) Refrain from consuming alcohol; or
(f) Comply with any crime-related prohibitions.
Former RCW 9.94A.703(3) (2009) (emphasis added).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. I; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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A crime-related prohibition “means an order of a court prohibiting conduct that
directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been
convicted.” RCW 9.94A.030(10). We have interpreted this language to mean a
sentencing court may impose conditions “reasonably related” to the crime. State v.
Kinzle, 181 Wash. App. 774, 785, 326 P.3d 870 (2014) (citing State v. Autrey, 136 Wn.
App. 460, 468, 150 P.3d 580 (2006).
In addition to meeting the statutory requirements under RCW 9.94A.703(3),
community custody provisions must also pass constitutional muster. Although courts are
not prohibited from imposing community custody conditions that impinge on a
defendant’s free speech rights, such conditions must be sensitively imposed in a manner
that is “reasonably necessary to accomplish essential state needs and public order.” Bahl,
164 Wash. 2d at 757-58.
Application of the legal standards to Mr. Johnson’s case
Conditions 17 and 18, restricting Mr. Johnson’s access to nude images and images
of children wearing only undergarments and/or swimsuits, are invalid in that they are both
overbroad and not crime related. While Mr. Johnson was convicted of an offense against
a minor and appears to have had an interest in undergarments and masturbation, there is
no indication that Mr. Johnson was aroused by the type of nonerotic images described in
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conditions 17 and 18. At the same time, conditions 17 and 18 encompass broad swaths of
materials with significant social value. For example, condition 17, prohibiting possession
or viewing material that includes images of nude men, women, and/or children, would
extend to medical text books, health-related internet sites, and most art museums.
Condition 18, prohibiting possession or viewing material that includes images of children
wearing only undergarments and/or swimsuits, would extend to countless advertisements
for diapers and sunscreen that are depicted in newspapers and magazines. There is no
indication that such a broad prohibition on constitutionally-protected materials is
reasonably necessary for public order or safety. Accordingly, conditions 17 and 18 must
be struck. State v. Padilla, 190 Wash. 2d 672, 416 P.3d 712, 717 (2018).
Conditions 19 and 20 meet a similar fate. Although we have previously affirmed
analogous conditions in the face of statutory and constitutional challenges, see State v.
Alcocer, 2 Wash. App. 2d 918, 413 P.3d 1033 (2018) and State v. Magana, 197 Wash. App.
189, 389 P.3d 654 (2016), the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Padilla compels us to
reverse course. Pursuant to Padilla, “[t]here is currently no connection in the record”
between Mr. Johnson’s offense conduct and the type of materials and locations identified
in conditions 19 and 20. 416 P.3d at 719. The mere fact that Mr. Johnson has been
convicted of a sex offense, and thus exhibited an inability to control sexual impulses, is
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insufficient to provide the necessary link. Id. To the extent that our prior decisions in
Alcocer and Magana condoned conditions such as 19 and 20 as generally crime related in
sex offense cases, those decisions appear to no longer be good law after Padilla.
Vagueness challenge
Mr. Johnson challenges the remaining community custody condition (condition 14)
solely on vagueness grounds. Condition 14 demands Mr. Johnson “[a]void places where
children congregate to include, but not limited to: parks, libraries, playgrounds, schools,
school yards, daycare centers, skating rinks, and video arcades.” CP at 41.
Due process requires that citizens have fair warning of proscribed conduct. State
v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wash. 2d 782, 791, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010). This requirement
extends to community custody conditions. To be valid, a community custody condition
must be sufficiently definite that an ordinary person can understand what conduct is
proscribed. Bahl, 164 Wash. 2d at 752-53. The condition also must be worded so as to
protect against arbitrary enforcement. Id.
We disagree with Mr. Johnson’s complaint that condition 14 is impermissibly
vague. As written, condition 14 indicates the first clause—places where children
congregate—modifies the clause that provides the illustrative list. Viewed in its entirety,
condition 14 provides fair warning of the areas Mr. Johnson is to avoid and it is not
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susceptible to arbitrary enforcement. Cf. Irwin, 191 Wash. App. at 652-53; see also United
States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 165-66 (5th Cir. 2001) (condition not unconstitutionally
vague when phrase “‘in any area in which children are likely to congregate’” modifies a
list of specific locations)(quoting United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir.
2001)). The fact that the list of prohibited places in condition 14 is not exhaustive does
not render it invalid. Paul, 274 F.3d at 166-67; Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wash. 2d at 793
(“[A] community custody condition ‘is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a
person cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point at which his actions would
be classified as prohibited conduct.’”)(internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting City of
Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wash. 2d 22, 27, 759 P.3d 366 (1988)).
None of the terms utilized in condition 14 make it confusing or difficult to follow.
In the context of a sex offense, the term “children” refers to individuals under the age of
16. RCW 9A.44.073-.089. 3 In addition, the word “congregate” means “to collect
together into a group, crowd, or assembly.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 478 (1993). Given these applicable definitions, condition 14 fairly instructs
Mr. Johnson about what locations are prohibited. Under the terms of his community
3
Because this definition may not be readily apparent to someone outside the
criminal justice system, condition 14 shall be modified on remand to specify that Mr.
Johnson shall avoid places where “children under 16 congregate . . . .”
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custody, Mr. Johnson must avoid locations where individuals under 16 collect together in
groups. Outside of special circumstances (such as a children's day or event), universities,
national parks, and adult areas of worship would not be covered. While the exact
confines of condition 14 are not amenable to description, the condition provides Mr.
Johnson sufficient notice to allow for compliance and it comports with constitutional
protections.
CONCLUSION
This matter is remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court may only
restrict Mr. Johnson's access to sexually explicit materials or vendors if the record
indicates that doing so is justified by the nature of Mr. Johnson's offense conduct or if it
is required for compliance with a court-ordered treatment program. The court should also
amend community custody condition 14 so as to clarify that the term "children" refers
only to individuals under 16 years of age. Mr. Johnson's request to deny an award of
appellate costs is granted.
Pennell, A.CJ.
I CONCUR:
Siddoway, J.
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FEARING, J. (dissenting in part) — I agree with the majority’s ruling vacating
Brandon Johnson’s community custody conditions 17, 18, 19, and 20. I agree with the
majority that Johnson’s community custody condition 14 must be reformed, but I would
direct reformation beyond that directed by the majority. The trial court should modify
the condition beyond defining “children” to be minors under the age of sixteen.
Condition 14 should also be modified to fairly instruct Johnson as to restricted locations.
Brandon Johnson challenges community custody condition 14 on vagueness
grounds. The condition demands that Johnson “[a]void places where children congregate
to include, but not limited to: parks, libraries, playgrounds, schools, school yards, daycare
centers, skating rinks, and video arcades.” Clerk’s Papers at 41. Since vagueness
challenges focus on the precise language of the community custody condition, I note that
condition 14 lists eight nonexclusive prohibited areas. Johnson could violate the
community custody by entering other unlisted places where children congregate. Also,
the sentencing court did not employ the phrase “such as” before listing the eight location
examples. Thus, the court did not limit community custody condition 14 to locations
similar in nature to the eight examples. Johnson could violate his conditions by entering
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an area disparate in character from the identified sites. I deem these observations
controlling and would hold that community custody condition 14 lacks constitutional
specificity.
The law demands that the legislature describe a crime in specific, not vague,
language, so that citizens and law enforcement may comprehend the variety of human
conduct that the legislature intends to proscribe, prevent, and punish. City of Spokane v.
Douglass, 115 Wash. 2d 171, 179, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). The legislature holds a duty to
write statutes with specificity. State v. Richmond, 102 Wash. 2d 242, 248, 683 P.2d 1093
(1984). In the state of Washington, the demand for precision in criminal statutes arises
from three constitutional provisions. Both the United States and the State of Washington
Constitutions prohibit the government from depriving one of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; CONST. art. I, § 3. In
addition, article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution, grants an accused, in a
criminal prosecution, “the right . . . to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.” These constitutional sections generate the void for vagueness doctrine.
State v. DeVore, 2 Wash. App. 2d 651, 660, 413 P.3d 58 (2018).
The void for vagueness doctrine addresses legislative enactments, not court
sentences. In turn, I note that Washington courts have refused to review vagueness
challenges to sentencing statutes because the void for vagueness doctrine applies only to
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statutes that proscribe criminal conduct. State v. Baldwin, 150 Wash. 2d 448, 78 P.3d 1005
(2003); State v. DeVore, 2 Wash. App. 2d at 661 (2018). Nevertheless, no Washington
decision has rejected a vagueness challenge to community custody conditions on the
basis that the doctrine does not extend to sentencing conditions. I deem reviewing the
challenge to community custody conditions acceptable because the challenge does not
merely concern the length of a sentence or the amount of a fine, but forbids conduct, the
commission of which could lead to more imprisonment. The State does not request that
we refuse to address the merits of Brandon Johnson’s vagueness challenge.
Many courts apply to sentencing conditions the same vagueness doctrine that
operates with respect to statutes and ordinances. State v. Bahl, 164 Wash. 2d 739, 753, 193
P.3d 678 (2008). Nevertheless, application of the doctrine bears one important
distinction in the context of community custody conditions. In the case of statutes and
ordinances, the challenger bears a heavy burden of establishing unconstitutionality of the
law. State v. Bahl, 164 Wash. 2d at 753. We do not presume the constitutional validity of
community custody conditions. State v. Irwin, 191 Wash. App. 644, 652, 364 P.3d 830
(2015).
The due process vagueness doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment and article
I, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution requires that citizens have fair warning
of proscribed conduct. City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash. 2d at 178 (1990). A statute
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State v. Johnson (dissenting in part)
is unconstitutionally vague if it (1) does not define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed, or (2) does
not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement.
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983); State
v. Bahl, 164 Wash. 2d at 752-53 (2008). If the State does not satisfy either of these
requirements, the condition is unconstitutionally vague. State v. Bahl, 164 Wash. 2d at 753.
In deciding whether a term is unconstitutionally vague, we do not consider the
terms in a “vacuum,” but within their context with other words. State v. Bahl, 164 Wash. 2d
at 754. If persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what the law proscribes,
notwithstanding some possible areas of disagreement, the law is sufficiently definite.
State v. Bahl, 164 Wash. 2d at 754. A community custody condition is not
unconstitutionally vague merely because a person cannot predict with complete certainty
the exact point at which his actions would be classified as prohibited conduct. State v.
Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wash. 2d 782, 793, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010). We test, in part, whether
a condition guards against arbitrary enforcement by looking to whether it proscribes
conduct by resort to “inherently subjective terms.” City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115
Wash. 2d at 181 (quoting State v. Maciolek, 101 Wash. 2d 259, 267, 676 P.2d 996 (1984)).
Brandon Johnson highlights State v. Irwin, 191 Wash. App. 644 (2015) as
confirming his argument. The trial court convicted Samuel Irwin of child molestation
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and possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexual conduct. On appeal, this court
voided a community custody condition that commanded Irwin not to “frequent areas
where minor children are known to congregate, as defined by the supervising CCO
[community corrections officer].” State v. Irwin, 191 Wash. App. at 652 (footnote
omitted). In remanding, this court noted that, without some clarifying language or an
illustrative list of prohibitions, ordinary people lacked sufficient notice of the proscribed
conduct. This court additionally noted the imprecision of the description “public places
where children are known to congregate.” State v. Irwin, 191 Wash. App. at 654. This
court suggested that a list of forbidden sites might survive challenge. This court also
suggested that the term “areas of high concentration of children” will survive scrutiny
before “areas of concentration of children.” State v. Irwin, 191 Wash. App. at 655.
The Irwin court also emphasized that the challenged community custody condition
left discretion to the community custody officer to discern prohibited territory. A
provision bestowing discretion on a government official acknowledges the lack of
ascertainable standards for enforcement.
Similar in nature to State v. Irwin is our recent decision in State v. Magana, 197
Wash. App. 189, 389 P.3d 654 (2016). Sergio Magana challenged community custody
condition 14, that read: “Do not frequent parks, schools, malls, family missions or
establishments where children are known to congregate or other areas as defined by
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supervising CCO [community corrections officer], treatment providers.” State v.
Magana, 197 Wash. App. at 200 (alteration in original). We observed that the condition
empowered the community custody officer to designate prohibited spaces and could
result in arbitrary enforcement. While the condition listed several prohibited locations
and explained that the list covered places where children congregate, the condition did
not limit the officer’s designation authority to either the list or an explanatory statement.
In a footnote, we suggested that a properly worded condition restricting Magana’s access
to areas where children are known to congregate would survive scrutiny. State v.
Magana, 197 Wash. App. at 201 n.3. We did not draft a properly worded condition.
Another recent parallel decision is State v. Norris, 1 Wash. App. 2d 87, 404 P.3d 83
(2017), review granted, 190 Wash. 2d 1002, 413 P.3d 12 (2018). Dominique Norris
challenged a community custody condition that read: “Do not enter any
parks/playgrounds/schools and or any places where minors congregate.” State v. Norris,
1 Wash. App. 2d at 95. On appeal, the State conceded the unconstitutionality of the
condition, so this court did not analyze the constitutionality in depth. This court relied on
State v. Irwin, when accepting the State’s concession. The Norris decision mentioned
that Samuel Irwin’s community custody condition allowed the community custody
officer discretion in determining the banned sites. In dicta, this court agreed with Norris
that removing the language “and or any places” would right the community custody
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condition. Stated differently, this court approved of the language: “Do not enter any
parks/playgrounds/schools where minors congregate.” State v. Norris, 1 Wash. App. 2d at
95.
In this appeal, the State counters that Brandon Johnson’s condition 14 has been
adapted to be responsive to concerns raised in State v. Irwin. Presumably the State’s
argument would extend to concerns also raised by this court in State v. Magana. I agree,
in part. Johnson’s community custody condition no longer delegates to an officer the
prerogative of identifying outlawed sites.
I would still hold that Brandon Johnson’s condition 14 suffers from imprecision.
The condition precludes Johnson from visiting any place where minor children
congregate. Johnson likely can ascertain what human beings constitute minor children,
although an ordinary person might question whether the phrase “minor children” extends
to all minors or only people below an age lower than eighteen. Nevertheless, the words
“place” and “congregate” lack specificity. Condition 14 does not limit itself to an
exclusive list of locations. State v. Irwin suggests that listing places survives
constitutional challenge but included in the decision’s suggestion lies the assumption that
the prohibited locations be exhaustive.
I note the statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis, that a general term
when used in conjunction with specific terms incorporates only those things similar to or
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comparable to the specific terms. State v. Larson, 184 Wash. 2d 843, 849, 365 P.3d 740
(2015). I decline to employ this principle to save condition 14 from constitutional defeat.
No court has applied ejusdem generis to restrict the extent of a community custody
condition. The ordinary person would encounter difficulty in discerning the extent to
which locations parallel parks, libraries, playgrounds, schools, school yards, daycare
centers, skating rinks, and video arcades.
Brandon Johnson also argues that community custody condition 14 breaches his
First Amendment rights. He contends that the condition violates his rights to the exercise
of religion, since the condition precludes his attending worship services. He also
maintains that the condition breaches his right to assembly. The majority does not
address these contentions. I would remand the case for restructuring of condition 14,
during which resentencing Johnson could again raise his First Amendment objections.
_________________________________
Fearing, J.
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