State Of Washington v. Jordan John Tasca ( 2018 )

FIL.ED
COURT OF APPEALS DIV I
STATE OF WASHINGTON
201811 23 AM 8:36
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 76056-4-1
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
V.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JORDAN JOHN TASCA,
Appellant. FILED: July 23, 2018
)
APPELWICK, C.J. Tasca was convicted of felony harassment. He argues
that the trial court erred in upholding a search warrant under the independent
source exception and that the prosecutor committed misconduct. We reject
Tasca's claim of prosecutorial Misconduct. But, because the trial court did not
make findings necessary to apply the independent source exception, we remand
for a new hearing on the application of the independent source exception
consistent with this opinion. The trial court may determine whether to take
additional evidence at the hearing and shall enter new findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the motion to suppress.
FACTS
A vehicle had begun tailgating Kenneth Williams after that same vehicle had
cut him off during a lane change. Williams slowed down in response. The other
No. 76056-4-1/2
driver then pointed a gun at him. Williams called 911 and provided a description
and a photo of the vehicle.
Shortly after the incident, sheriffs deputies arrived at the residence where
the suspect vehicle was registered. A deputy observed the suspect vehicle in the
• carport. The deputy knocked on the door, and Jordan Tasca, the registered owner
of the vehicle, answered. He was placed under arrest without incident. While in
handcuffs Tasca stated,"'[1]s it a felony to run someone off the road?'" Williams
arrived at the residence and positively identified Tasca as the suspect. Police
Performed a "protective sweep" of Tasca's residence. One officer observed a
handgun during that sweep. Officers then obtained and executed a search
warrant, recovering a firearm and magazine during the search.
Tasca was charged with one count of felony harassment. He moved to
exclude the evidence seized from his residence, because the warrant was granted
based on evidence discovered during a warrantless protective sweep of the
residence, and there were no circumstances that justified the warrantless sweep.
The trial court agreed that the warrantless search was unlawful. But, it ruled that
the warrant was nevertheless valid, because the evidence was sufficient to justify
a search warrant even when excising the improperly obtained evidence, namely,
the observation of the firearm:
The warrant provides for a search of car or home. It's clear in
the affidavit that the defendant was located in his home shortly after the
incident. There is probable cause to believe that by virtue of the size of
the contraband being sought that it would be reasonable that that
firearm would be found in the home with Mr. Tasca or in his car, which
he wasn't in at the time. I do so find that the warrant remains valid even
2
No. 76056-4-1/3
with the excised portions, and the search incident to said warrant is
valid.
A jury convicted Tasca as charged. He appeals.
DISCUSSION
Tasca makes two arguments. First, he argues that the trial court erred in
erred in upholding a search warrant for Tasca's home. Second, he argues that the
prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument.
I. Search Warrant
Tasca argues that the trial court upheld the search warrant for his residence
based on a misapplication of the independent Source doctrine.
Absent an exception to the warrant requirement, a warrantless search is
impermissible under both article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution and
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Johnson, 128
Wash. 2d 431, 446-47, 909 P.2d 293 (1996), abrogated on other grounds by Carey
v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S. Ct. 649, 166 L. Ed. 2d 482 (2006). Generally,
evidence seized during an illegal search is suppressed under the exclusionary rule.
See State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 359, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). In addition,
evidence derived from an illegal search may also be subject to suppression under
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. State v. Gaines, 154 Wn.2d 711,717, 116
P.3d 993(2005)
However, evidence tainted by unlawful governmental action is not subject
to suppression under the exclusionary rule, provided that it ultimately is obtained
pursuant to a valid warrant or other lawful means independent of the unlawful
action. Id. at 718. Under this "independent source" doctrine, an unlawful search
3
No. 76056-4-1/4
does not invalidate a subsequent search if (1) the issuance of the search warrant
is based on untainted, independently obtained information, and (2) the State's
decision to seek the warrant is not motivated by the previous unlawful search and
seizure. State v. Miles, 159 Wash. App. 282, 284, 244 P.3d 1030(2011).
Under this test, we first must determine the validity of the warrant absent
the illegally obtained information. Whether facts set out in an affidavit are sufficient
to conclude that probable cause exists is a question of law that we review de novo.
State v. Nusbaum, 126 Wash. App. 160, 166-67, 107 P.3d 768 (2005). Probable
cause exists where the affidavit in support of the warrant sets forth facts and
circumstances sufficient to establish a reasonable inference that evidence of the
crime may be found at a certain location. State v. Jackson, 150 Wash. 2d 251, 264-
65,76 P.3d 217(2003).
Here, the trial court determined that the lawfully obtained information that
was included in the warrant application was sufficient to show probable cause,
even when the evidence of the illegal protective sweep was excluded. Tasca
argues that this conclusion was erroneous.
We disagree. The officers received a report that an individual had
brandished a weapon in a road rage'incident. Roughly one hour later, they arrived
at the registered address of the vehicle whose driver brandished the weapon. The
suspect's vehicle was in the open carport. When handcuffed, Tasca asked the
officers,"'Ms it a felony to run someone off the road.'" This indicated that he was
involved in the incident. A firearm Was reported to have been brandished, but the
officers had not yet located it. It was reasonable to infer that the weapon may have
4
No. 76056-4-1/5
been located inside of Tasca's vehicle or residence. The warrant was supported
by probable cause independent of the wrongfully obtained evidence.
Second, the independent source exception requires courts to analyze
whether the State's decision to seek the warrant was motivated by the fruits of the
illegal search. Miles 159 Wash. App. at 284. The record does not show that the trial
court made such findings here, and the State concedes this.
However, the State argues that Tasca made no argument below regarding
the motivation prong of the independent source exception and therefore Tasca has
waived this argument. Under RAP 2.5(a), we need not consider arguments raised
for the first time on review, exceptfor manifest errors affecting a constitutional right.
But, in his motion to suppress, Tasca sufficiently cited Gaines, 154 Wash. 2d at 718.
In that case the court analyzed the multiple prongs of the independent source
exception analysis. See id. at 718, 721. And it recognized the officer motivation
prong based on controlling United States Supreme court authority, Murray v.
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 101 L. Ed. 2d. 472 (1988).1
Presenting this authority to the trial court was sufficient to raise both prongs of the
test before the trial court.
Under Murray, it is the function of the trial court to determine the facts.
Following Murray, we remand to the trial court for appropriate findings and
conclusions with regard to the independent source doctrine. See id. at 542-44.
1 In Murray the court remanded, in part because the district court made no
findings on whether officers would have sought the warrant in question but for an
initial illegal entry into a suspect's property. 487 U.S. at 542-43.
5
No. 76056-4-1/6
II. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Tasca next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in two ways.2
First, Tasca argues that the prosecutor impugned defense counsel's integrity.
Second, Tasca argues that the prosecutor also committed misconduct by shifting
the burden to Tasca.
Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. State v. Lindsay, 180 Wash. 2d 423, 430, 326 P.3d 125 (2014). The
defendant bears the burden of showing that the comments were (1)improper and
(2) prejudicial. Id. We review a prosecutor's comments during closing argument
in the context of the total argument,the issues in the case,the evidence addressed
in the argument, and the jury instructions. State v. Dhaliwal, 150 Wash. 2d 559, 578,
79 P.3d 432(2003).
A. Impudnind Defense Counsel's Integrity
Tasca argues that the prosecutor impugned defense counsel's integrity
when he told the jury that "this case is not about Kenneth Williams' employment at
Metro three and a half years ago. It's not about getting pulled over for reckless
driving three years ago. Those are, bought up to distract you." Tasca objected,
but was overruled.
A prosecutor may argue that the evidence does not support the defense
theory. Lindsay, 180 Wash. 2d at 431.1 However, a prosecutor may not impugn the
2 Proecutorial Misconduct that prejudices a defendant warrants a new trial.
State v. Jones, 144 Wash. App. 284, 290, 183 P.3d 307(2008). Therefore, although
we remand for findings regarding the independent source exception, we also must
address Tasca's prosecutorial misconduct argument.
6
No. 76056-4-1/7
role or integrity of defense counsel. Id. at 431-32. Prosecutorial statements that
malign defense counsel can severely damage an accused's opportunity to present
his or her case and are therefore impermissible. Id. at 432.
Tasca analogizes to Lindsay. There, our Supreme Court found
prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor referred to defense counsel's
presentation as a "crock." Id. at 433-34. It reasoned that this "implies deception
and dishonesty," and therefore was improper. Id. at 433.
Tasca argues that the same is true here. We disagree. Here, the defense
focus on the conduct of the victim three years prior had nothing to do with the facts
of this case. It was evidence which would put the victim in a less sympathetic light
and perhaps undermine his credibility. The comment does not rise to the same
level as allegations that counsel is dishonest and was not so improper and
prejudicial to amount to misconduct
B. Burden Shifting
Tasca also argues that the 'prosecutor improperly shifted the burden to
Tasca by stating, "Must because you have two conflicting stories, that does not
mean there's reasonable doubt. LOok at the stories, look at the testimony, and
think about which is more plausible." Tasca also objected to this statement, but
was again overruled.
Arguments by the prosecution that shift or misstate the State's burden to
prove the defendant's guilt beyond, a reasonable doubt constitute misconduct.
Lindsay, 180 Wash. 2d at 434. Tasca argues that this statement did exactly that,
because it invited the jury to convict based on the theory that it found more
7
No. 76056-4-1/8
plausible. But, here the prosecutor merely urged the jury to find his theory more
plausible. He did not invite the jury to convict the jury solely because that theory
was more plausible. The prosecutor was entitled to compare theories of the case,
and urge the jury to find the prosecution's theory more plausible, without shifting
the burden. This remark was not improper.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no prosecutorial
misconduct.
We remand for a new hearing on the application of the independent source
exception consistent with this opinion. The trial court may determine whether to
take additional evidence at the hearing and shall enter new findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the motion to suppress.
8