State Of Washington, V Kevin S. Robinson ( 2016 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
April 12, 2016
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 46557-4-II
Respondent,
v.
ORDER PUBLISHING OPINION
KEVIN S. ROBINSON,
Appellant.
Appellant Kevin S. Robinson has moved to publish the court’s March 1, 2016 opinion.
Respondent State of Washington opposed Appellant’s motion. The Court has determined that the
opinion in this matter satisfies the criteria for publication. It is now
ORDERED, that the motion to publish is granted and the opinion’s final paragraph
reading:
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed
in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance
with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
is deleted. It is further
ORDERED that this opinion will be published.
PANEL: Jj. Maxa, Melnick, Sutton.
DATED this 12th day of April, 2016.
Melnick, J.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
March 1, 2016
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 46557-4-II
Respondent,
v.
KEVIN S. ROBINSON, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
MELNICK, J. – Kevin S. Robinson appeals the trial court’s denial of his CrR 7.8 motion
challenging sanctions that the Department of Corrections (DOC) imposed after he violated his
community custody conditions. Robinson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his motion without holding a hearing on the merits or transferring the motion to this court
for consideration as a personal restraint petition. In a pro se statement of additional grounds
(SAG), Robinson contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his only redress for the
sanctions was through DOC. He also asserts that DOC’s disciplinary procedures were unlawful.
The State concedes that the trial court did not follow the procedure outlined in CrR 7.8(c)(2).
We reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the findings of fact and conclusions of
law denying Robinson’s motion and to either hold a show cause hearing under CrR 7.8 or transfer
the motion to this court for consideration as a personal restraint petition.
FACTS
Robinson pleaded guilty in 2008 to delivery of methamphetamine and unlawful possession
of a firearm in the first degree. He received a sentence of 90 months of incarceration and 9 to 12
months of community custody. After his release from incarceration, Robinson committed several
46557-4-II
community custody violations. As a result, Robinson was reincarcerated and it is from this custody
that he files the current appeal. CP 77.
On June 13, 2014, Robinson filed a “Motion for Relief from Judgment, Order, or
Proceeding Pursuant to CrR 7.8(b), and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Pursuant to RCW
7.24.010 and RCW 7.24.080” in the superior court. Clerk’s Papers at 25. In his motion, which
named both the State and DOC as respondents, Robinson sought relief from sanctions that DOC
imposed after he violated his community custody conditions. Robinson explained that he had
exhausted the DOC appeal process and that DOC’s decision became final on April 23, 2014.
The superior court considered Robinson’s motion on July 7, 2014. Robinson was not
present at the hearing and was not represented by counsel, and DOC did not appear. After the
prosecutor made a brief argument, the court denied the motion, stating, “Mr. Robinson is directed
to go through the appropriate procedures to appeal his sanctions from the DOC.” Report of
Proceedings at 1. In its written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the superior court stated
that it had no jurisdiction over the matter and that there was no legal basis to review the DOC
sanctions. Robinson appeals.
ANALYSIS
Robinson argues that the superior court should have addressed the merits of his motion or
transferred it to this court for consideration as a personal restraint petition. The State asserts that
transfer was appropriate.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a CrR 7.8 motion for abuse of discretion. State v.
Zavala-Reynoso, 127 Wash. App. 119, 122, 110 P.3d 827 (2005). Under this standard, the trial
court’s decision will not be reversed unless it was manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable
grounds or reasons. State v. Powell, 126 Wash. 2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995).
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46557-4-II
Under CrR 7.8(c)(2), the superior court must transfer a motion to vacate judgment to this
court unless it determines that the motion is timely filed and “either (i) the defendant has made a
substantial showing that he or she is entitled to relief or (ii) resolution of the motion will require a
factual hearing.” In other words, only if the motion is timely and appears to have merit or requires
fact finding should the superior court retain and hear it; in all other cases, the motion is transferred
to this court. State v. Smith, 144 Wash. App. 860, 863, 184 P.3d 666 (2008). If the trial court retains
the motion, it must order a show cause hearing directing the adverse party to appear. CrR 7.8(c)(3).
The superior court has subject matter jurisdiction to either hear and decide a CrR 7.8 motion
or transfer it. Smith, 144 Wash. App. at 863. This jurisdiction includes the ability to consider
motions challenging sanctions imposed for community custody violations. State v. Madsen, 153
Wash. App. 471, 475, 228 P.3d 24 (2009), overruled on other grounds by In re Pers. Restraint of
Flint, 174 Wash. 2d 539, 277 P.3d 657 (2012). The Madsen court held that the trial court had
jurisdiction to consider a CrR 7.8 motion challenging the statutory authority under which DOC
returned an inmate to prison following a community custody violation. 153 Wash. App. at 475. The
Supreme Court overruled the Madsen court’s interpretation of the statute governing that sanction
but did not address the jurisdictional issue. Flint, 174 Wash. 2d at 542.
There is no dispute that Robinson’s motion was timely, as he filed it within one year after
DOC’s decision became final. See CrR 7.8(b)(5) (motions are subject to one-year time limit in
RCW 10.73.090). But, under the mistaken conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to decide
Robinson’s motion, the superior court did not address the merits of that motion or hold a fact
finding hearing. Indeed, the court could not have undertaken either alternative without holding a
hearing attended by both Robinson and DOC. See City of Seattle v. Fontanilla, 128 Wash. 2d 492,
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502, 909 P.2d 1294 (1996) (party is not bound by judgment in litigation in which he is not
designated as a party or not made a party by service of process).
We reverse and remand for an order vacating the findings of fact and conclusions of law
on the motion for relief from judgment. The superior court then must hold a show cause hearing
or transfer Robinson’s CrR 7.8 motion to this court for consideration as a personal restraint
petition.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Melnick, J.
We concur:
Maxa, P.J.
Sutton, J.
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