Jimmie R. Goode v. Tukwila School District 406 ( 2016 )

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JIMMIE R. GOODE, No. 73546-2-1
Appellant, DIVISION ONE
v.
TUKWILA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. UNPUBLISHED
406,
FILED: July 5. 2016
Respondent.
Cox, J. — Jimmie Goode appeals the order granting summary judgment
of dismissal to the Tukwila School District. This action is for claimed violations of
the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) and for negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm the trial court's grant of
summary judgment on the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims. There are no genuine issues of material fact respecting these
claims. Because genuine disputes of material fact exist as to both of the WLAD
claims, we reverse the remainder of the order granting summary judgment. We
also deny both parties' requests for attorney fees on appeal.
No. 73546-2-1/2
In 2007, Goode began working for the Tukwila School District as a
physical education teacher and coach at Foster High School. Ethelda Burke was
then the district superintendent.
Goode, an African American, claims that Burke made numerous racially
derogatory remarks about African Americans to employees of the District.
Among these remarks, she allegedly referred to African American employees as
slaves. At a staff meeting, she told one employee to "'giddy up, black man.'"
She also asked a group of African American employees "'Why are all you blacks
sitting together?'" She also allegedly stated that hiring blacks made the District
look "too ghetto."
Goode further claims that he was subjected to adverse employment
actions due to his race. Among the adverse actions that he claims is an alleged
failure to afford him a name clearing hearing, unfavorable work assignments, and
exclusion from decision making processes.
He commenced this action against the District on April 10, 2014. In his
complaint, he claims violations of WLAD as well as negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.1
The District moved for summary judgment on all claims. The trial court
granted the motion in its entirety.
Goode appeals.
1 Clerk's Papers at 7.
No. 73546-2-1/3
WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
Goode argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his WLAD claims on
summary judgment. We agree.
Summary judgment is proper "only when there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law."2 There is a genuine issue of material fact if reasonable minds could differ
on the facts controlling the litigation outcome.3 We consider "the evidence and
all reasonable inferences from [such] evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party."4
We review de novo a trial court's grant of summary judgment.5
In WLAD cases, granting summary judgment to an employer is seldom
appropriate due to the difficulty of proving a discriminatory motivation.6
Hostile Work Environment
Goode argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his hostile work
environment claim. We agree.
2 Scrivener v.Clark Coll.. 181 Wash. 2d 439, 444, 334 P.3d 541 (2014);
accord CR 56(c).
3 Knight v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 181 Wash. App. 788, 795, 321 P.3d 1275
(quoting Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wash. 2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886
(2008)), review denied, 339 P.3d 635 (2014).
4 Keck v. Collins, 184 Wash. 2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015).
5ld
6 Scrivener, 181 Wash. 2d at 445.
No. 73546-2-1/4
Hostile work environment claims based on discrimination are brought
under RCW 49.607 Because RCW 49.60 substantially parallels Title VII, federal
discrimination cases are persuasive.8
RCW 49.60.180(3) provides that an employer may not discriminate
against any person due to the person's race or color. To establish a hostile work
environment claim, a plaintiff must show that "'(1) the harassment was
unwelcome, (2) the harassment was because [plaintiff was a member of a
protected class], (3) the harassment affected the terms and conditions of
employment, and (4) the harassment is imputable to the employer.'"9
Washington courts permit hostile work environment claims "based on acts
that individually may not be actionable but together constitute part of a unified
whole comprising a hostile work environment."10 This is because these claims
"'are different in kind from discrete acts' and '[t]heir very nature involves repeated
conduct.'"11 Thus, determining whether a work environment is hostile involves a
flexible analysis. For example, an employee may satisfy an element of a hostile
work environment claim if, considering the totality of the circumstances, the
7 Estevez v. Faculty Club of Univ. of Wash., 129 Wash. App. 774, 790, 120
P.3d 579 (2005).
8 Antonius v. King County, 153 Wash. 2d 256, 266, 103 P.3d 729 (2004).
9 Loeffelholz v. Univ. of Wash., 175 Wash. 2d 264, 275, 285 P.3d 854 (2012)
(alteration in original) (quoting Antonius, 153 Wash. 2d at 261).
10 Antonius, 153 Wash. 2d at 268.
11 \± at 264 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002)).
No. 73546-2-1/5
harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the employee's employment
conditions and create an abusive working environment.12
Here, there is a threshold issue to address regarding the evidence that
was before the trial court. In its summary judgment order, the trial court
characterized as hearsay what it called "highly offensive remarks ... by
Superintendent Ethelda Burke about African Americans . . . ."13 Although the
court did not expressly strike this evidence as hearsay, it did not discuss in any
detail how these comments applied to the WLAD claims. Because these alleged
comments are not hearsay and must be evaluated in light of the hostile work
environment claim, we take this opportunity to explain why they are not hearsay.
Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."14 "Where a statement is not offered for the truth of the contents
of the conversation, but only to show that it was made, the statement is not
hearsay."15
Here, Burke's statements are not hearsay because they are not offered to
prove the truth of the matters asserted in them. Rather, they are offered to show
that offensive statements were made.
12 Loeffelholz, 175 Wash. 2d at 275.
13 Clerk's Papers at 2074.
14 ER 801(c).
15 State v. Gonzalez-Hernandez, 122 Wash. App. 53, 57, 92 P.3d 789
(2004).
No. 73546-2-1/6
For example, Burke's reference to other employees as slaves was not
offered to prove that the employees were bound to involuntary servitude.
Likewise, her question to a group of African American employees asking "'Why
are all you blacks sitting together'" was not offered to show that the employees
were actually sitting together. Accordingly, we consider this evidence in our
substantive analysis.
Imputing Harassment to Employer
In this case, determining which harassing conduct can be imputed to the
District is an important initial step to focus the analysis of Goode's hostile work
environment claim. Goode argues that Burke's and the assistant principal's
harassing conduct may be imputed to the District. We need only determine
whether Burke's conduct may be imputed to the District for purposes of summary
judgment review.
Harassment may be imputed to the employer in one of two ways. First,
the harassment may be imputed if a manager participated in the harassment.16
For summary judgment purposes, employees with authority to affect employee
hours, wages, and working conditions qualify as managers.17 "[A] manager is
something more than a supervisor."18
16 Davis v. Fred's Appliance, Inc., 171 Wash. App. 348, 362, 287 P.3d 51
(2012).
17 Alonso v. Qwest Commc'ns Co., LLC, 178 Wash. App. 734, 752, 315 P.3d
610(2013).
18 Henningsen v. Worldcom, Inc.. 102 Wash. App. 828, 838, 9 P.3d 948
(2000).
No. 73546-2-1/7
But within some employers, there may be "little distinction" between
managers and supervisors.19 Thus, Washington courts must look to the
functions and responsibilities of the person at issue.20 A manager's rank in a
company's hierarchy must be high enough where the manager is the employer's
"alter ego" to automatically impute harassment to an employer.21
Harassment may also be imputed to the employer if the harasser is the
employee's supervisor and the employer "'authorized, knew, or should have
known of the harassment and . . . failed to take reasonably prompt and adequate
corrective action.'"22 A supervisor can hire, fire, promote, or discipline an
employee.23 When disputed, a supervisor's status may often be resolved as a
matter of law before trial.24
Here, only Burke's conduct may be automatically imputed to the District.
Burke's rank in the District hierarchy is high enough that she is the District's "alter
19 Davis, 171 Wash. App. at 363.
20 Francom v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 98 Wash. App. 845, 854, 991 P.2d
1182(2000).
21 Davis, 171 Wash. App. at 363.
22 jd at 362 (alteration in original) (quoting Glasgow v. Georgia-Pac.
Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 401, 407, 693 P.2d 708 (1985)).
23 Vance v. Ball State Univ., U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443, 186 L.
Ed. 2d 565 (2013).
24 Id. at 2450.
No. 73546-2-1/8
ego."25 As superintendent, Burke exercised her authority to affect Goode's
wages and working conditions. Thus, her conduct is imputed to the District.
Harassment
The parties do not appear to dispute the first element of Goode's hostile
work environment claim—that Goode received unwelcome harassment. But a
discussion on what constitutes harassment is necessary to narrow the focus of
this claim.
Harassment is conduct an employee finds offensive.26 Discriminatory or
derogatory comments, mockery, or insults towards the employee generally
constitutes harassment.27 Asserting subjective offense to facially innocuous
comments, especially without acknowledging how the comment was
discriminatory, is not sufficient to prevent summary judgment dismissal.28
"[I]f racial hostility pervades a workplace, a plaintiff may establish a
violation of Title VII, even if such hostility was not directly targeted at the
plaintiff."29
25 Davis, 171 Wash. App. at 363.
26 Glasgow, 103 Wash. 2d at 406.
27 See, e^, Loeffelholz. 175 Wash. 2d at 275; Antonius. 153 Wash. 2d at 259;
Alonso. 178 Wash. App. at 740; Davis. 171 Wash. App. at 362; Davis v. W. One Auto.
Grp.. 140 Wash. App. 449, 453, 457, 166 P.3d 807 (2007).
28 See Crownover v. Dep't of Transp., 165 Wash. App. 131, 144-45,265
P.3d971 (2011).
29 McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004).
8
No. 73546-2-1/9
Here, Goode relies on discriminatory comments Burke made to other
employees to establish harassment. For example, Burke referred to athletic
director J.D. Hill as "J.Darky," who found this name to be offensive. Goode
overheard Burke refer to Hill as "J.Dark."
After Hill informed Burke that he was expecting another child, Burke stated
"'typical black man'" in response to him.
Burke also allegedly referred to African American employees as slaves.
At a staff meeting, she told one employee to "'giddy up, black man'" and asked a
group of African American employees "'Why are all you blacks sitting together?'"
Goode was present at the staff meeting but did not hear the "giddy up" comment.
He was told that Burke made the comment.
These comments constitute harassment. Specifically, Burke's statements
to the African American employees are not "facially innocuous" because they
were used to refer to the employees based on their skin color.30 Although Goode
did not understand the "J.Dark" name when he heard it, Goode stated that he
"would have been highly upset" had he known and was "sickened" after Hill
explained the name to him. Goode also stated that he was "disturbed" by the
slave comment and "offended" by the "'giddy up, black man'" comment. Goode's
reactions to these comments demonstrate that he found them to be offensive,
which establishes the harassment requirement for his claim.
Goode also relies on numerous incidents throughout his employment to
establish harassment, such as the change of the physical education department
30 Crownover, 165 Wash. App. at 145.
No. 73546-2-1/10
head and his exclusion from decision making processes. But case authority
demonstrates that these incidents do not constitute harassment for hostile work
environment purposes. These incidents may support a disparate treatment
claim, as discussed later in this opinion.
The District argues that Goode cannot base his claim on conduct allegedly
directed at others, citing Crownover v. Department of Transportation31 to support
this argument. We disagree.
In that case, Division Three of this court stated that "The law requires
some of the alleged acts directed at the particular plaintiff to occur within the
statute of limitations in order for the claim to be timely filed."32 But that case does
not support the untenable proposition that a hostile work environment claim fails
ifdiscriminatory comments are not made directly to a plaintiff who is also a
member of the protected class. Rather, the court merely explained why one of
the plaintiffs failed to identify discriminatory conduct within the statute of
limitations.33
The very nature of a hostile work environment claim is that the working
environment is poisoned by discriminatory conduct. It makes no sense to this
court that proof of such a claim requires that the discriminatory conduct must be
directed at a specific individual. As previously stated, "if racial hostility pervades
31 165 Wash. App. 131,265P.3d971 (2011).
32 Id, at 143.
33 ]d
10
No. 73546-2-1/11
a workplace, a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII, even if such hostility
was not directly targeted at the plaintiff."34
In sum, Goode established this element of his hostile work environment
claim.
Motivating Factor for the Harassing Conduct
To establish this element of the hostile work environment claim, an
employee need only produce evidence supporting a reasonable inference that
his or her protected class status was the motivating factor for the harassing
conduct.35 The employee "must prove the conduct would not have occurred had
the employee been [outside of the protected class]."36 A jury could reasonably
conclude that subjecting an employee to "derogatory racial name-calling [i]s
motivated by racial or ethnic reasons."37 Additionally, derogatory comments
about the class to which the employee belongs is "sufficient evidence to raise a
question of fact on this element."38
Here, Goode produced evidence supporting a reasonable inference that
race was the motivating factor for Burke's harassing conduct. Burke's comments
towards African American employees were based on the employees' race or
ethnicity, which constitutes derogatory racial name-calling. Although the
34 McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1117.
35 Alonso. 178 Wash. App. at 749.
36 Crownover. 165 Wash. App. at 146.
37 Alonso, 178 Wash. App. at 750.
38 Campbell v. State, 129 Wn. App. 10,19,118 P.3d 888 (2005).
11
No. 73546-2-1/12
comments were not directed to Goode, some of the comments were made in his
presence. Further, the comments were derogatory towards African Americans,
the protected class to which Goode belongs. This is sufficient evidence to raise
a genuine issue of fact for trial on this element.39
Harassment Affecting Employment Conditions
A hostile work environment occurs over time and is "'based on the
cumulative effect of individual acts.'"40 A single act of harassment is rarely
sufficient to establish a claim.41 More specifically, "Casual, isolated or trivial
manifestations of a discriminatory environment do not affect the terms or
conditions of employment to a sufficiently significant degree to violate the law."42
An employee satisfies this element if, considering the totality of the
circumstances, the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the
employee's employment conditions and create an abusive working
environment.43 Courts must look at the "frequency and severity of harassing
conduct, whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, or merely an
offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee's
39 id, at 19-20.
40 Loeffelholz, 175 Wash. 2d at 273 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Antonius, 153 Wash. 2d at 264).
41 h± at 277.
42 Glasgow, 103 Wash. 2d at 406.
43 Loeffelholz, 175 Wash. 2d at 275.
12
No. 73546-2-1/13
work performance."44 The conduct must be "objectively abusive" and subjectively
perceived as abusive or offensive by the employee.45
Additionally, the conduct's level of severity or seriousness varies inversely
with the conduct's pervasiveness or frequency.46 For example, "'mere utterance
of an . .. epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee[]' does not
sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII."47 Use of a
racial slur towards an employee "on three separate occasions does not, as a
matter of law, reach the level of severity sufficient to create an issue of fact as to
whether a hostile work environment existed."48 But "'[r]epeated derogatory or
humiliating statements . . . can constitute a hostile work environment.'"49
Further, a work environment may be considered hostile even ifoffensive
comments are not made directly to the employee.50 That is the case here.
44 Alonso. 178 Wash. App. at 751.
45 Cl. Ch. v. Office of the Att'v Gen.. 133 Wash. App. 767, 787, 138 P.3d 144
(2006).
46 McGinest. 360 F.3d at 1113.
47 Harris v. Forklift Svs., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 126 L. Ed.
2d 295 (1993) (citation omitted) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank. FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 67, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986)).
48 Egual Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Swissoort Fueling. Inc.. 916 F.
Supp. 2d 1005, 1022 (D. Ariz. 2013).
49 McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1115 (alteration in original) (quoting Raw.
Henderson. 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000)).
50 Eoual Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, 916 F. Supp. 2d at 1023.
13
No. 73546-2-1/14
Whether offensive comments affect employment conditions is a factual
question.51 Humiliation, emotional distress, absence from work, or "friction" with
other employees is sufficient to create an "inference" that such reactions resulted
from a hostile work environment.52
The employee need not prove that the harassment lessened his or her
"'tangible productivity.'"53 "It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected
to the discriminatory conduct would find . . . that the harassment so altered
working conditions as to 'ma[k]e it more difficult to do the job.'"54
Here, Burke's discriminatory conduct was sufficiently pervasive so as to
create an abusive working environment. The comments are "objectively abusive"
and are "subjectively perceived as abusive" by Goode.55
Specifically, Goode stated that Burke's comments affected and impacted
his work environment and discouraged him. He also allegedly suffered emotional
distress, causing him to miss work. He experienced headaches, high blood
pressure, difficulty sleeping, anxiety, and depressed mood. Viewing this
evidence in the light most favorable to Goode and considering the totality of the
51 Alonso. 178 Wash. App. at 751.
52 See W. One Auto. Grp., 140 Wash. App. at 457-58; see also Glasgow,
103 Wash. 2d at 403; Alonso, 178 Wash. App. at 752.
53 Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (quoting Davis v.
Monsanto Chem. Co.. 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)).
54 Id, (quoting Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d at 349).
55 Clarke, 133 Wash. App. at 787.
14
No. 73546-2-1/15
circumstances, a genuine dispute of material fact exists whether the harassment
was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter Goode's employment conditions.
Accordingly, summary judgment was improper on his hostile work
environment claim. We must reverse.
Disparate Treatment
Goode also argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his disparate
treatment claim. We agree.
Under WLAD, disparate treatment occurs when employers treat certain
employees "less favorably" than others because of race, color, or other protected
status.56
To survive summary judgment, the employee must show that a
reasonable jury could find that the employee's "protected trait was a substantial
factor motivating the employer's adverse actions."57 The plaintiff bears this
burden of production and may use either direct or circumstantial evidence.58
Adverse Action
Goode argues that he suffered a variety of adverse employment actions.
For the most part, we disagree.
Adverse employment actions are "tangible change[s] in employment
status," such as reducing an employee's workload and pay.59 They involve
56 Alonso. 178 Wash. App. at 743.
57 Scrivener. 181 Wash. 2d at 445.
58 Id,
59 Alonso. 178 Wash. App. at 746; Crownover, 165 Wash. App. at 148.
15
No. 73546-2-1/16
changes in employment conditions that are more than inconveniences or
alterations of an employee's job responsibilities.60 A "'reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities'" or a demotion constitute adverse
employment actions.61 According to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, an
undeserved and negative performance evaluation can constitute an adverse
employment decision.62 But there is no adverse employment action if the
evaluation is subject to modification by the employer.63
Whether a particular action is materially adverse is case specific, using the
reasonable person standard.64 Determining whether a reasonable employee in
the employee's position would view an action as adverse is a question of fact for
a jury.65
Here, Goode relies on numerous claimed adverse employment actions.
But these claims fall outside the statute of limitations and are not actionable.
Discrimination claims must be brought within three years.66 The
limitations period starts when a cause of action accrues, which is when a party
60
Id.
61 Id.; Crownover, 165 Wash. App. at 148 (quoting Burlington Indus.. Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 141 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1998)).
62 Brooks v. City of San Mateo. 229 F.3d 917, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2000).
63 Id, at 930.
e^ Bovd v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.. 187 Wn. App. 1,13, 349 P.3d
864(2015).
65 Id, at 13-14.
66 Antonius, 153 Wash. 2d at 261-62.
16
No. 73546-2-1/17
has the right to seek relief in court.67 Specifically, "[a] cause of 'action accrues
when the plaintiff knows or should know the relevant facts . . . .'"68
Here, Goode filed his complaint on April 10, 2014. Thus, Goode's claims
arising from incidents prior to April 10, 2011 are time barred.
Goode was the physical education department head from 2007 through
2008. Later, he was told that he would share these responsibilities by rotating
with Shauna Briggs as the department head. Briggs is not African American.
The responsibilities were not rotated back to Goode after Briggs obtained the
responsibilities. But Goode told Briggs and another employee that he did not
want the department head position after he requested the position. In any event,
this record does not establish that this event occurred after the April 10, 2011 bar
date. It cannot be a basis for a disparate treatment claim.
In 2008, Goode was prohibited from attending football practice or the last
two games after swearing at a referee during a football game. Sometime before
2009, Goode chaperoned at a school prom and was assigned outside to monitor
the back of the venue. In 2009, the District denied Goode's request for his
daughter, a former Foster high school student, to use the school's pole vaulting
facilities. These events are all outside the April 10, 2011 bar date, as well.
Goode also substituted for another teacher in 2010 and saw a picture of
President Obama in the class room. Someone had made the picture "black face"
67 Crownover, 165 Wash. App. at 141.
68 Id, (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gilbert v. Sacred Heart
Med. Ctr., 127 Wash. 2d 370, 381, 900 P.2d 552 (1995) (Durham, C.J., dissenting)).
17
No. 73546-2-1/18
and drew monkey ears. Goode reported the picture to the District, but he claims
the District did not respond. Goode also claims that his compensation in 2010
did not accurately reflect his coaching experience. Again, these incidents fall
outside the bar date.
Lastly, Goode claims that because he is African American, African
American students with disciplinary issues were placed in his class for him to
supervise. He claims that this interfered with his class instruction. But this
incident does not appear to fall within the April 10, 2011 bar date. It does not
create any genuine issue of material fact.
The absence of a record to show any of these incidents fell within the
three-year statute of limitations is fatal. Accordingly, we decline to address them
further.
The following incidents fall within the statute of limitations. But Goode fails
to show how these incidents are adverse employment actions.
Goode claims that the former principal, Forrest Griek, rated Goode poorly
although Griek had not observed Goode's performance. In 2012, Goode
discussed this with Griek, who allegedly responded "okay my bad." The record is
unclear on the date of this rating. But there is nothing in this record to show that
it was final or not subject to modification.
In or after December 2012, Daryl Wright went to Goode's home while he
was absent from work due to illness. Goode claims that the District wanted
Wright to check that Goode was actually ill and that this was not done with other
18
No. 73546-2-1/19
teachers. How this constitutes an adverse employment action is left
unexplained.
In September 2011, Goode complained about another teacher's
continuous use of the bathroom near Goode's office where the teacher did not
flush the toilet. Again, there is no showing how this is an adverse employment
action by the District.
In 2013, Goode was not selected to participate on a committee formed to
acquire a new principal. He also claims that he was a member of a disciplinary
committee and was excluded from meetings. But Goode fails to explain how
these incidents changed his employment conditions and status as a physical
education teacher, which is required to show an adverse employment action.
Goode further argues that he worked in an unsafe weight room and that
his safety concerns were ignored due to his race. Although Goode sustained an
injury while assisting a student in class, he fails to explain how the allegedly
unsafe weight room tangibly changed his employment conditions or status. For
example, the record does not show that the weight room was safe before Goode
taught there and later became unsafe when he started teaching. And Goode
fails to show how the weight room condition was more than an inconvenience or
altered his job responsibilities.
Lastly, Goode claims he was denied a "name clearing hearing" after
Briggs alleged that Goode made an inappropriate comment to her. Goode
claims that the mentor teacher consultant told Briggs to keep her distance from
Goode, although he was Briggs's mentor. Goode claims that this negatively
19
No. 73546-2-1/20
impacted his opportunity for professional development and impacted his work
environment. He also claims that this damaged his reputation. Goode also
argues that "the District promptly investigated and cleared a [Caucasian] teacher"
after he made a racially insensitive comment toward Goode.
But the record shows that the District responded to Goode's concern
about this incident and offered to contact Briggs to inquire into the situation. The
District also retained an investigator in response to Goode's request for an
investigation into the matter. The record indicates that Goode declined to
participate in the investigation, and, accordingly, the District did not proceed with
an investigation.
On this record, there is simply no genuine issue of material fact for trial.
To the extent this incident was problematic, the District has demonstrated that it
responded to his report of alleged disparate treatment. His failure to participate
in the proposed investigation bars pursuit of any claim based on this incident.
This brings us to another incident involving Briggs. Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to Goode, we conclude it creates a genuine issue of
material fact for trial.
Goode claims that Briggs was allowed to make department operation
decisions without his "input," resulting in "major changes" for him. He also stated
that this exclusion from the decision making process adversely impacted his
teaching and class structure and negatively impacted his work environment.
Although the record does not clearly show that this significantly changed
Goode's responsibilities as a physical education teacher, we must view the
20
No. 73546-2-1/21
evidence in the light most favorable to him. A reasonable person in his position
would consider this to be an adverse employment action because it adversely
impacted his teaching and class structure and negatively impacted his work
environment. Thus, Goode satisfied this element of his disparate treatment
claim.
Protected Status as Substantial Factor Motivating Adverse Action
Having concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding
the adverse employment action regarding Briggs, the question is whether the
motivation is racially based. Goode argues that discrimination motivated the
District's adverse employment action. We conclude there is a genuine issue of
material fact.
An employee establishes a disparate treatment claim either by offering
direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent or by satisfying the
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green69 burden-shifting test.70
If an employee uses direct evidence, he or she must show that the
employer acted with a "discriminatory motive" and that "the discriminatory
motivation was a significant or substantial factor in an employment decision."71
69 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).
70 Alonso, 178 Wash. App. at 744.
71 jd,
21
No. 73546-2-1/22
Direct evidence proves discriminatory animus without inference or
presumption.72 An employer's discriminatory remarks are direct evidence of
discrimination.73
When an employer's statements do not directly concern the plaintiff, some
inference is necessary to establish discrimination against the plaintiff.74 But
"when evidence establishes the employer's animus toward the class to which the
plaintiff belongs, the inference to the fact of discrimination against the plaintiff is
sufficiently small," and the evidence is treated as direct evidence.75
For example, in Dominguez-Currv v. Nevada Transportation Department,
a supervisor made demeaning comments to and about women in the work place,
including the plaintiff.76 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the
supervisor's comments were direct evidence of his "discriminatory animus,"
"overtly exhibited] his hostility to women in the workplace," and were "probative
of his discriminatory intent even if he directed them to other women in the
division."77
72 Rashdan v. Geissberger, 764 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2014).
73 Alonso, 178 Wash. App. at 744.
74 Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 n.6 (9th Cir.
2005).
75 id,
76 424 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005).
77 id, at 1038.
22
No. 73546-2-1/23
Similarly, in Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co.. Inc.. the plaintiff
used depositions from other employees stating that the employer used racial
slurs when describing African American employees.78 The employer argued that
the district court's exclusion of this evidence was proper because the statements
were not directed toward the plaintiff.79 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that the jury was entitled to consider this evidence. It specifically
stated "that the value of these statements in revealing state of mind may still be
significant. . ." and that the employer's argument went more toward the weight of
the evidence rather than its admissibility.80
But there must be a connection between the discriminatory motive and the
employment decision.81 And a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
discriminatory animus affected an employment decision "[w]here the person who
exhibited discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decisionmaking
process."82 Thus, courts must determine whether a reasonable jury could
78853F.2d 1130, 1132 (4th Cir. 1988).
79 id, at 1134.
80 id,
81 See Alonso, 178 Wash. App. at 746; Dominguez-Currv, 424 F.3d at 1038-
40; McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1123; Laxton v. Gap Inc.. 333 F.3d 572, 584 (5th Cir.
2003); Russell v. McKinnev Hosp. Venture. 235 F.3d 219, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2000);
Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2000); Llampallas v.
Mini-Circuits. Lab. Inc.. 163 F.3d 1236, 1246-49 (11th Cir. 1998); Shager v.
Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990); DeHomevv. Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 879 F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir. 1989).
82 Dominguez-Currv, 424 F.3d at 1039-40.
23
No. 73546-2-1/24
conclude that the employee exhibiting discriminatory animus was in a position to
influence the employment decision.83
For example, in Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Edward
Ercegovich's employer, Goodyear, eliminated Ercegovich's position and denied
him the opportunity to transfer to available positions.84 Ercegovich sued based
on age discrimination, arguing that high ranking employees in his division,
including the vice president overseeing the division, made age-based
discriminatory statements.85 The district court concluded that the statements
were irrelevant because they were not made by the decision-maker.86
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, stating the vice president
"was in a position to shape the attitudes, policies, and decisions" of the decision
maker.87 The court then concluded that "a genuine issue of fact exists as to
whether [the vice president] was involved in the employment decisions adverse
to Ercegovich."88
83 Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.. 154 F.3d 344, 355 (6th Cir.
1998).
84 154 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998).
85 Id, at 354.
86 id,
87 JU at 355.
88 Id.
24
No. 73546-2-1/25
The court also "assume[d] for purposes of summary judgment that [the
vice president] did in fact play a meaningful role in those decisions."89 Thus, the
court ultimately reversed the district court's granting of summary judgment on
that claim, concluding that the vice president's remarks "support[ed] the inference
that age-discriminatory animus entered in Goodyear's alleged decision to deny
Ercegovich the opportunity to transfer to available positions."90
Here, Goode relies only on direct evidence to support his claim. He
specifically relies on Burke's discriminatory comments to and about African
American employees, such as her discriminatory comments to Hill and other
African American employees as described earlier.
Because these comment are discriminatory, they are direct evidence of
discrimination towards the class to which Goode belongs.91 Burke's comments
were based on the employees' skin color, which is "probative of [her]
discriminatory intent" towards Goode, even if she directed these comments
toward other African American employees.92
Additionally, a reasonable jury could conclude that Burke was in a position
to influence the adverse employment action as district superintendent.
Specifically, Goode discussed his exclusion from the decision-making process
with assistant principal Daryl Wright. Wright allegedly told Goode that "nothing
89 id,
90 Id, at 356, 358.
91 Alonso. 178 Wash. App. at 744.
92 Dominguez-Currv. 424 F.3d at 1038.
25
No. 73546-2-1/26
w[ould] change" because Burke was "in charge." Thus, a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether Burke was involved in the adverse employment
action and whether Goode's race was a substantial factor motivating the adverse
action. Accordingly, summary judgment was improper on Goode's disparate
treatment claim regarding this aspect of his relations with Briggs.
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Goode argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his negligent infliction
of emotional distress claim. We disagree.
An employee may recover damages for emotional distress in an
employment context but only ifthe factual basis for the claim is distinct from the
factual basis for the discrimination claim.93 The employee must also establish
emotional distress by "'objective symptomatology,'" which means the distress is
"'susceptible to medical diagnosis and proved through medical evidence.'"94
Here, the trial court dismissed Goode's negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim because he made "no showing that the factual basis for such a
claim [wa]s distinct from the factual basis for his discrimination claim."95
This was proper because Goode explicitly attributes his distress "to the
different treatment" he received and the District's "discriminatory environment."
93 Haubrv v. Snow, 106 Wash. App. 666, 678, 31 P.3d 1186 (2001).
94 Kumar v. Gate Gourmet. Inc.. 180 Wash. 2d 481, 505-06, 325 P.3d 193
(2014) (first quoting Strong v. Terrell, 147 Wash. App. 376, 387, 195 P.3d 977
(2008); then quoting Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122, 135, 960 P.2d 424
(1998)).
95 Clerk's Papers at 2077.
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No. 73546-2-1/27
Thus, "there is no separate compensable claim because the factual basis for the
emotional distress claim is the same as the [hostile work environment and
disparate treatment] claim[s]."96
Goode argues that there are "sufficient questions of fact" whether he
satisfied the objective symptomology requirement for this claim. He argues that
his treating physician's declaration should have defeated the District's motion for
summary judgment. He is mistaken.
Although Goode's doctor's declaration may satisfy the objective
symptomology requirement for this claim, Goode does not overcome the first
hurdle in establishing this claim.97 This claim must be distinct from the factual
basis for the discrimination claim.98 That is simply not the case here. The
dismissal of this claim was proper.
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Goode also asserted in his complaint a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The trial court dismissed this claim on summary judgment.
But Goode does not discuss this on appeal. We deem the claim abandoned.99
96 Haubrv. 106 Wash. App. at 678.
97 See id.
98 id,
99 See Podbielancik v. LPP Mortg. Ltd.. 191 Wash. App. 662, 668, 362 P.3d
1287(2015); RAP 10.3(a)(6).
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No. 73546-2-1/28
ATTORNEY FEES
Each party requests attorney fees. Goode requests attorney fees
pursuant to the WLAD under RCW 49.60.030(2). The District requests fees
based on its claim that this appeal is frivolous.
Goode's request for fees is premature because he has not, as yet,
prevailed under the provisions of the WLAD statute. Thus, we deny without
prejudice this request.
The District bases its request for fees on RAP 18.9(a), which provides for
attorney fees if a party "files a frivolous appeal." "An appeal is frivolous if there
are no debatable issues [upon] which reasonable minds might differ and it is so
totally devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal."100
Because there is no basis to conclude this appeal is frivolous, an award to
the District is not merited.
We affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the trial court's grant of
summary judgment on the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims. We reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on both
of the WLAD claims. We deny both parties' requests for attorney fees on appeal.
fa* X si .
WE CONCUR:
cKc^
100 Ha v. Signal Elec, Inc., 182 Wash. App. 436, 456, 332 P.3d 991 (2014),
review denied, 182 Wash. 2d 1006 (2015).
28