In Re Writ Of Mandamus Of Carl Alonzo Brooks v. State Of Washington ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In re the Matter of the Writ of Mandamus)
of CARL ALONZO BROOKS. ) DIVISION ONE
CARL ALONZO BROOKS, ) No. 76846-8-I
Appellant,
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT )
and the STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
Respondent. ) FILED: April 22, 2019
DWYER, J. — Carl Alonzo Brooks filed a petition for writ of mandamus
against King County and the State of Washington Department of Corrections
(DCC) seeking back wages under a theory that DCC and King County owed him
a past duty to guarantee him a minimum wage job while he was incarcerated at
various DOC facilities. On King County’s and DOC’s motions for dismissal, the
trial court dismissed all of Brooks’ claims and ruled that Brooks’ lawsuit was
frivolous. Brooks appeals, asserting that the trial court erred by dismissing his
claims against King County and DOC and by ruling that his lawsuit was frivolous.
Brooks failed to properly serve King County. His claims against both King
County and DOC were barred by the applicable statute of limitation. Therefore,
we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing Brooks’ claims against King County
and finding that Brooks’ lawsuit was frivolous.
No. 76846-8-1/2
Brooks failed to specify in his notice of appeal that he was appealing from
the order dismissing his claims against DCC. Such a specification is required to
perfect an appeal from a trial court decision. Thus, we dismiss his appeal from
that order.
This appeal arises from an action brought by Brooks entitled “Petition for
Writ of Mandamus.” Brooks filed the petition seeking back wages from DCC and
King County in the amount of $605,844.40. According to Brooks, he was entitled
to a minimum wage job while incarcerated at various DCC facilities from 1990
through 2005, and it was only through the discriminatory acts of DCC employees
that he was denied the wages he would have earned by working at such a job
during that time period. Brooks served his lawsuit on King County by mailing
copies of his petition and summons to the clerk of the King County Superior
Court and to the King County Prosecutor.
Both DCC and King County moved for dismissal, with prejudice, of all of
Brooks’ claims.1 King County asserted that Brooks had failed to comply with the
requirements for sufficient service of process, that all of his claims were barred
by the applicable statute of limitation, that his petition failed to state a cognizable
claim against King County, and that his legal action was frivolous. DCC asserted
that Brooks had an adequate remedy at law and thus was precluded from filing a
1 Brooks failed to file any timely response to these motions. Instead, on the morning of
the hearing on King County’s and DOC’s motions for dismissal, counsel for King County received
a response brief, a cross motion for summary judgment, and a motion requesting a continuance
from Brooks. Neither the trial court nor counsel for DOC received these documents. No cross
motion was noted before the court.
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No. 76846-8-113
writ of mandamus action, that he could not petition for a writ of mandamus that
sought an award of money damages, that all of his claims were barred by the
applicable statute of limitation, and that his lawsuit was frivolous.
The trial court granted both DOC’s and King County’s motions to dismiss
with prejudice. The trial court explained that it granted King County’s motion both
because Brooks failed to properly serve process on King County and because
his petition failed to state any cognizable claim against King County. The trial
court further clarified that it dismissed the claims with prejudice because—even if
Brooks managed to sufficiently serve process at a later date—all of his claims
were barred by the applicable statute of limitation.
Turning to DOC’s motion to dismiss, the trial court explained that it
granted dismissal with prejudice of all claims against DCC because (1) DCC had
no duty to provide Brooks with the minimum wage job he asserted was his right,
(2) a writ of mandamus was inappropriate as a vehicle for his claim for money
damages, and (3) Brooks previously had an adequate remedy at law (thus
barring the mandamus action). Additionally, the trial court found that Brooks’
lawsuit was frivolous for purposes of RCW 4.24.430.2
Brooks subsequently filed a notice of appeal. This notice stated:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE I, Carl Brooks, the Petitioner, pro se in the
Writ of Mandamus that was summarily dismissed by the judge’s
adaptation of Respondent’s King County’s Dispositive CR 12(b)(6),
CR 12(c) and R.C.W 4.24.430, and without any review of my (Pet.
Brooks) Response and Cross-Motion for Summary Partial
Judgment is hereby giving my notice of appeal.
2 This statute prevents persons serving criminal sentences in Washington from obtaining
waivers of court filing fees in civil actions or appeals if they have, on three or more occasions
while incarcerated, brought any actions commenced after July 22, 2011, that were dismissed as
frivolous or malicious. RCW 4.24.430.
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No. 76846-8-1/4
Brooks did not reference the trial court’s dismissal of his claims against
DCC anywhere in his notice of appeal, nor did he attach any of the trial court’s
orders to the notice of appeal.
Brooks seeks reversal of the trial court’s ruling dismissing his claims with
prejudice and the trial court’s finding that his claims were frivolous. Because
Brooks failed to properly serve King County and his claims were barred by the
applicable statute of limitation, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice
and its ruling that Brooks’ claims were frivolous with regard to the claims against
King County. However, we decline to review the trial court’s order dismissing
Brooks’ claims against DCC because Brooks did not file a notice of appeal
asserting that he was appealing from the trial court’s order dismissing Brooks’
claims against DCC.
A
King County asserts that the trial court properly dismissed Brooks’ claims
against it and properly ruled that his claims were frivolous both because the trial
court lacked personal jurisdiction over King County due to Brooks’ failure to
properly serve King County and because Brooks’ claims were barred by the
applicable statute of limitation. We agree.
We review dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo. State v. LG
Elecs., Inc., 186 Wn.2d 169, 176, 375 P.3d 1035 (2016) (citing FutureSelect
Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 954, 963, 331
P.3d 29 (2014)). ‘A court does not have personal jurisdiction over a party if the
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No. 76846-8-1/5
individual or entity is not designated as a party and has not been made a party by
service of process.” Dept of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Zamora, 198 Wn. App. 44,
73, 392 P.3d 1124 (2017).
The procedure for serving a county is set forth in RCW 4.28.080, which
states that
summons shall be served by delivering a copy thereof, as follows:
(1) If the action is against any county in this state, to the county
auditor or, during normal office hours, to the deputy auditor, or in the case
of a charter county, summons may be served upon the agent, if any,
designated by the legislative authority.
King County is a charter county. See KING COUNTY CHARTER, Preamble;
Art. I. King County’s legislative authority, the King County Council, has
designated an agent to accept service of a summons on behalf of the county:
‘Service of summons upon council clerk. For the purpose of service of
summons on King County under provisions of RCW 4.28.080, the person to be
served is the clerk of the county council. (Ord. 13, 1969).” KING COUNTY CODE §
2.04.010.
Pursuant to RCW 4.16.080(2), “[ajn action for taking, detaining, or injuring
personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any
other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated” must
be commenced within three years. An action for alleged back wages is an
invasion of a personal right subject to this three year statutory limitation period.
Sorey v. Barton Oldsmobile, 82 Wn. App. 800, 806, 919 P.2d 1276 (1996),
review granted and case dismissed, 131 Wn.2d 1001 (1997).
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No. 76846-8-116
‘A lawsuit is frivolous if, when considering the action in its entirety, it
cannot be supported by any rational argument based in fact or law.” Dave
Johnson Ins., Inc. v. Wright, 167 Wn. App. 758, 785, 275 P.3d 339 (2012) (citing
Curhan v. Chelan County, 156 Wn. App. 30, 37, 230 P.3d 1083 (2010)). We will
not disturb a trial court’s determination that an action was frivolous absent a clear
abuse of discretion. Reid v. Dalton, 124Wn. App. 113, 125, 100 P.3d 349(2004). The trial court abuses its discretion if “its order is manifestly
unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Gillett v. Conner, 132 Wn. App.
818, 822, 133 P.3d 960 (2006).
The record shows that Brooks arranged for his summons to be served on
the clerk of the King County Superior Court. This was a bad mistake on his part.
The law required that the summons be served on the clerk of the King County
Council. Therefore, Brooks did not properly serve King County and the trial court
lacked personal jurisdiction over King County in this action. Furthermore, all of
Brooks’ claims relate back to the time period of 1990 through 2005, well beyond
the three year statutory limitation period applicable to Brooks’ claim for back
wages. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Brooks’ claims against King
County with prejudice.3 Finally, because Brooks’ claims, dating back to 1990
through 2005, were so clearly barred by the three year statutory limitation period
applicable to such claims, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that
Brooks’ claims against King County were frivolous.
~ Brooks would be unable to cure the defects in his claims even if he managed to
properly serve King County.
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B
DCC asserts that we must dismiss Brooks’ appeal against it because he
failed to designate the order granting dismissal of all of Brooks’ claims against
DCC in his notice of appeal. We agree.
RAP 5.3(a) states that a “notice of appeal must (1) be titled a notice of
appeal, (2) specify the party or parties seeking the review, (3) designate the
decision or part of decision which the party wants reviewed, and (4) name the
appellate court to which the review is taken.” See also Clark County v. W. Wash.
Growth Mgmt. Hearings Review Bd., 177 Wn.2d 136, 144-45, 298 P.3d 704(2013) (“[T]he notice of appeal must properly designate the decision or part of the
decision that the party wants reviewed.” (citing RAP 5.3(a)(3); Sargent v. Selvar,
46 Wn.2d 271, 272-73, 280 P.2d 683 (1955); Stewart v. Larkin, 74 Wash. 681,
687-88, 134 P. 186 (1913))). The rule further states that the “party filing the
notice of appeal should attach to the notice of appeal a copy of the signed order
or judgment from which the appeal is made.” RAP 5.3(a). Brooks’ notice of
appeal failed to designate the decision dismissing his claims against DCC for
review and he failed to attach a copy of the trial court’s order to his notice of
appeal. ~ The appeal was not properly taken. Therefore, we dismiss his appeal
from the trial court’s order dismissing his claims against DCC.
~ While RAP 5.3(f) explains that appellate courts will ‘disregard defects in the form of a
notice of appeal or a notice for discretionary review if the notice clearly reflects an intent by a
party to seek review,” there is nothing in Brooks’ notice of appeal that reflects an intent on his part
to seek review of the trial court’s order dismissing his claims against DCC.
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No. 76846-8-1/8
The order dismissing Brooks’ claims against King County and finding that
such claims were frivolous is affirmed. The appeal from the order dismissing
Brooks’ claims against DCC is dismissed.
WE CONCUR:
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