State Of Washington, Maria Gonzales Esquivel. ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 77723-8-1
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
V. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MARIA GONZALES ESQUIVEL
Appellant. FILED: April 22, 2019
CHUN, J. — The trial court imposed a 13-year no-contact order on Maria
Gonzales Esquivel with respect to her daughter, E.G., and an indeterminate life
sentence for her second degree rape conviction. We conclude the trial court
imposed a reasonably necessary no-contact order to protect E.G. and affirm as
to that decision. The State properly concedes the sentencing error, which
requires remand for entry of a determinate sentence.
I.
BACKGROUND
A jury convicted Esquivel of one count of assault in the first degree, three
counts of second degree assault, and one count of•rape in the second degree,
with all counts domestic violence-related. The jury also found the aggravating
factors of an ongoing pattern of psychological, physical, or sexual abuse of the
same victim or multiple victims; deliberate cruelty; destructive and foreseeable
impact on persons other than the victim; the offenses occurred within sight or
sound of a minor child of the victim or offender; and the defendant's use of
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position of trust to facilitate the offense. The convictions stemmed from a lengthy
campaign of physical and mental abuse of members of the Chagoya family while
they lived in Esquivel's home.
The court sentenced Esquivel to consecutive exceptional statutory
maximum sentences on all counts. This included a term of life for the first degree
assault and minimum and maximum terms of life for the second degree rape.
In addition to lifetime no-contact orders to protect all members of the
Chagoya family, the court imposed a 20-year no-contact order for Esquivel's
daughter, E.G., who was 11 years old at the time of trial. State v. Esquivel,
No. 73411-3-1,(Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 6,2017)(unpublished)
http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/734113.pdf. E.G. testified that while in her
bedroom, she frequently heard sounds of violence and members of the Chagoya
family screaming. Esquivel, No. 73411-3-1, slip op. at 5. While listening to the
beatings, E.G. feared she might end up like the Chagoyas. Esquivel, No. 73411-
3-1, slip op. at 6. E.G. also testified she witnessed Esquivel hitting members of
the Chagoya family. Esquivel, No. 73411-3-1, slip op. at 6.
Esquivel appealed her convictions, alleging prosecutorial misconduct.
Esquivel, No. 73411-3-1, slip op. at 7. She also appealed the 20-year no-contact
order for E.G. and the life sentence for the first degree assault conviction.
Esquivel, No. 73411-3-1, slip op. at 10-11.
The State conceded that the trial court erroneously imposed an
indeterminate life sentence for the first degree assault conviction, rather than a
determinate sentence as required under the Sentencing Reform Act(SRA).
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Esquivel, No. 73411-3-1, slip op. at 13. This court remanded for correction of this
sentencing error. Esquivel, No. 73411-3-1, slip op. at 14.
Additionally, this court remanded for further proceedings related to the no-
contact order for E.G. We concluded,"The evidence in this case clearly
supported the imposition of a no-contact order as to E.G. But the mere fact that
E.G. was a victim of Esquivel's offenses does not justify a no-contact order of
any length." Esquivel, No. 73411-3-1, slip op. at 13. We noted that the scope
and duration of the no-contact order must be reasonably necessary to protect the
State's interests. Esquivel, No. 73411-3-1, slip op. at 13. Because the trial court
did not provide a reason for the duration of the no-contact order, we remanded
the case for the trial court to address the no-contact order in light of the
"reasonably necessary" standard. Esquivel, No. 73411-3-1, slip op. at 13.
On remand, the trial court corrected the sentencing error on the first
degree assault conviction with a 480 month exceptional sentence. At that time,
the State also requested the trial court resentence Esquivel on the second
degree rape conviction with the same error. While Esquivel did not appeal the
second degree rape conviction, the State hoped to preclude a future appeal due
to the indeterminate life sentence issue. Esquivel requested an exceptional
downward sentence but otherwise objected to resentencing on the rape
conviction. The trial court denied the State's request to resentence on the rape
conviction.
On the issue of the duration of the no-contact order with E.G., the State
presented information from E.G.'s father that E.G. had struggled to adjust to her
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new life with her father and had behavior issues at home and at school from the
trauma she had endured. According to her father, E.G. had only recently
experienced positive returns from counseling to help her cope with the trauma.
At age 14, E.G.'s father believed her too young to know the details of her
mother's actions or have contact with Esquivel. As a result, E.G.'s father
requested the court continue the 20-year no-contact order, but allow E.G. to have
input as to whether she wanted contact with Esquivel at 21 years of age.
The trial court imposed a no-contact order until E.G. was 27 years old,
resulting in a duration of 13 years.1 In reaching this decision the trial court
informed Esquivel:
I appreciate that you think that you are a good parent, but I heard the
testimony. This trial was four months. I saw all the pictures. And
the State's, in my opinion, probably their best witness was your
daughter who described what happened in the household. And she
clearly was a victim of mental abuse. So, I will impose a No Contact
Order until she's 27 years old because the research would indicate
that that's when she'll reach maturity in terms of brain development.
If she wants to contact you before once she's 21, she or her attorney
can ask me for relief and I'll consider it.
The trial court incorporated E.G.'s ability to petition for lifting of the no-contact
order at age 21 into the judgment and sentence. The trial court noted E.G. could
petition to lift the no-contact order anytime, "but I doubt that I'm going to consider
it before that age."
Esquivel now appeals the no-contact order as to E.G. and the
indeterminate life sentence for the second degree rape conviction.
1 Esquivel contends the trial court imposed a 20-year no-contact order for E.G. She is
incorrect. The trial court imposed the no-contact order until E.G. is 27 years old. Because E.G.
was 14 at the time of resentencing, the no-contact order had a duration of 13 years.
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II.
ANALYSIS
A. Indeterminate Sentence
Esquivel argues the trial court exceeded its statutory authority by imposing
a minimum term of life for the second degree rape conviction. The State
concedes the trial court improperly imposed an indeterminate sentence. We
accept this concession and remand for the trial court to enter a determinate
sentence for the rape conviction.
B. No-Contact Order
Esquivel again appeals the duration of the no-contact order for E.G. as a
violation of her fundamental right to parent. The State argues this crime-related
prohibition is reasonably necessary to protect E.G. from further harm. We agree
with the State.
As part of a sentence, the court may impose "crime-related prohibitions"
that prohibit conduct "that directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for
which the offender has been convicted." RCW 9.94A.505(9);
RCW 9.94A.030(10). "The fundamental right to parent can be restricted by a
condition of a criminal sentence if the condition is reasonably necessary to
prevent harm to the children." State v. Ancira, 107 Wash. App. 650, 654, 27 P.3d
1246 (2001). While parents have a fundamental interest in the care, custody,
and control of their children, the State has a compelling interest in protecting
children from physical or mental harm. Ancira, 107 Wash. App. at 653-54.
Appellate courts review crime-related prohibitions for abuse of discretion.
In re Pers. Restraint of Rainey, 168 Wash. 2d 367, 374, 229 P.3d 686 (2010).
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However, conditions that interfere with a fundamental constitutional right, such as
the right to parent, require more careful review. Rainey, 168 Wash. 2d at 374.
"Such conditions must be 'sensitively imposed' so that they are 'reasonably
necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the State and public order."
Rainey, 168 Wash. 2d at 374 (quoting State v. Warren, 165 Wash. 2d 17, 32, 195 P.3d
940 (2008)). In addition, the duration of the restriction must also be reasonably
necessary. Rainey, 168 Wash. 2d at 381.
In this case, this court previously noted, the evidence "clearly supported
the imposition of a no-contact order as to E.G." Esquivel, No. 73411-3-1, slip op.
at 13. We remanded the issue for the trial court to address the basis for the 20
year duration of the no-contact order. Esquivel, No. 73411-3-1, slip op. at 13.
The trial court heeded this directive and specifically addressed the issue of
duration during resentencing.
The trial court noted that E.G. had testified at trial and had clearly been a
victim of Esquivel's mental abuse. The trial court then issued a no-contact order
to apply to E.G. until 27 years old, "because the research would indicate that
that's when she'll reach maturity in terms of brain development." This reference
to E.G.'s maturity echoes the request of both E.G.'s father and the State to
continue the no-contact order until E.G. became more mature. Thus, the trial
court imposed a no-contact order of a duration reasonably necessary to protect
E.G. until she was mature enough to learn of, and cope with, the full extent of her
mother's crimes.
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Furthermore, the trial court considered and allowed for a less restrictive
alternative to the 13-year no-contact order. E.G. may petition the court to lift the
restriction before age 27. As a result, the no-contact order is significantly less
restrictive than the 20-year or "lifetime" no-contact order Esquivel claims the
court imposed. In light of the violence witnessed and mental abuse suffered by
E.G., the trial court's no-contact order was "sensitively imposed" and reasonably
necessary to protect E.G. until such time as she has the maturity to cope with her
mother's crimes.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the no-
contact order with E.G. Therefore, we remand only for correction of the sentence
for second degree rape.
We affirm in part, and remand only for correction of the sentence for
second degree rape.
ez..., 9,
WE CONCUR:
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