State Of Washington, V Raymond U. Arndt, Jr. ( 2014 )

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STATE OF WASHINGTON
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent, No. 43717 -1 - II
V.
RAYMOND UWE ARNDT, JR., PUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
MAXA, J. — Raymond Arndt, Jr. appeals his sentence following his conviction for
vehicular assault. He asserts that the sentencing court sentenced him based on an inflated
offender score because the court erroneously included points for five prior Oregon convictions.
We hold that the State met its burden to prove that the Oregon conviction for unauthorized use of
a vehicle was comparable to a Washington offense. However, we hold that the State failed to
prove that Arndt' s Oregon convictions for attempted second degree assault, driving while under
the influence of intoxicants ( DUII), and third degree rape were legally or factually comparable to
Washington offenses. Therefore, the sentencing court should not have included the Oregon
attempted second degree assault, DUII, and third degree rape convictions in Arndt' s offender
score. Accordingly, we remand for resentencing.
No. 43717 -1 - II
FACTS
Arndt pleaded guilty to one count of vehicular assault, but he disputed the State' s
computation of his offender score at sentencing. Specifically, he argued that five prior Oregon
convictions —attempted second degree assault, unauthorized use of a vehicle, DUII (two), and
third degree rape — should not be included in his offender score because the State failed to prove
comparability. The sentencing court performed a legal and factual comparison on the record and
found that the Oregon convictions at issue were comparable to Washington offenses, which
resulted in an offender score of 8. The sentencing court sentenced Arndt to a mid -
range sentence
of 62 months. Arndt appeals his sentence.
ANALYSIS
A. USE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS IN OFFENDER SCORE
Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 ( SRA), chapter 9. 94A RCW, the sentencing
court uses the defendant' s prior convictions to determine an offender score, which along with the
seriousness level' " of the current offense establishes his or her presumptive standard
sentencing range. State v. Ford, 137 Wash. 2d 472, 479, 973 P.2d 452 ( 1999) ( quoting State v.
Wiley, 124 Wash. 2d 679, 682, 880 P.2d 983 ( 1994)). We review a sentencing court' s calculation
of an offender score de novo. State v. Bergstrom, 162 Wash. 2d 87, 92, 169 P.3d 816 ( 2007).
The State must prove the existence of prior felony convictions) used to calculate an
offender score by a preponderance of the evidence. Ford, 137 Wash. 2d at 479 -80; see also RCW
Generally, only felonies are included in the offender score. State v. Larkins, 147 Wash. App.
858, 862 -63 & n. 7, 199 P.3d 441 ( 2008). But where the current conviction is for a felony traffic
offense, a sentencing court may include serious misdemeanor traffic offenses, such as driving
under the influence in the offender score. Larkins, 147 Wash. App. at 862 -63 & n. 7; see RCW
9. 94A.525 (11).
F)
No. 43717 -1 - II
9. 94A. 500( 1). If the convictions are from another jurisdiction, the State also must prove that the
conviction would be a felony under Washington law. Ford, 137 Wash. 2d at 480. " The existence
2
of a prior conviction is a question of fact." In re Pers. Restraint ofAdolph, 170 Wash. 2d 556,
566, 243 P.3d 540 ( 2010).
Where the defendant' s offenses resulted in out - state convictions, RCW 9. 94A.525( 3)
of -
provides that such offenses " shall be classified according to the comparable offense definitions
and sentences provided by Washington law." This statute requires the sentencing court to make
a factual determination of whether the out - - tate conviction is comparable to a Washington
of s
conviction. State v. Morley, 134 Wash. 2d 588, 601, 952 P.2d 167 ( 1998) ( citing former 9. 94A.360
1996), recodified as RCW 9. 94A.525 by LAWS of 2001, ch. 10, § 6). Only if the convictions
are comparable can the out -of state conviction be included in the offender score. State v.
-
Thiefault, 160 Wash. 2d 409, 415, 158 P.3d 580 ( 2007).
Our Supreme Court has adopted a two -
part analysis for determining whether an out-of-
state conviction is comparable to a Washington conviction. Thiefault, 160 Wash. 2d at 414 -15.
First, the sentencing court determines whether the offenses are legally comparable —whether the
elements of the out -of - tate offense are substantially similar to the elements of the Washington
s
offense. Thiefault, 160 Wash. 2d at 415. If the elements of the out - state offense are broader
of -
2
Arndt does not challenge the existence and felony classification of his Oregon convictions.
And the State presented certified copies of the judgment of each of those convictions.
Accordingly, the State proved their existence by a preponderance of the evidence.
No. 43717 -1 - II
3
than the elements of the Washington offense, they are not legally comparable. In re Pers.
Restraint ofLavery, 154 Wash. 2d 249, 258, 111 P.3d 837 ( 2005).
Second, even if the offenses are not legally comparable, the sentencing court can still
include the out - - tate conviction in the offender score if the offense is factually comparable.
of s
Thiefault, 160 Wash. 2d at 415; Lavery, 154 Wash. 2d at 255. Determining factual comparability
involves analyzing whether the defendant' s conduct underlying the out - state conviction would
of -
have violated the comparable Washington statute. Thiefault, 160 Wash. 2d at 415. The sentencing
court may " look at the defendant' s conduct, as evidenced by the indictment or information, to
determine if the conduct itself would have violated a comparable Washington statute." Lavery,
154 Wash. 2d at 255. In making this factual comparison, the sentencing court may rely on facts in
the out -of - tate record only if they are admitted, stipulated to, or proved beyond a reasonable
s
doubt. Thiefault, 160 Wash. 2d at 415. But the elements of the charged crime must remain the
cornerstone of this inquiry because " ``[ f]acts or allegations contained in the record, if not directly
related to the elements of the charged crime, may not have been sufficiently proven in the
trial.'" Lavery, 154 Wash. 2d at 255 ( quoting Morley, 134 Wash. 2d at 606).
In the factual comparability analysis, the sentencing court is not allowed to consider
evidence not presented in the out - - tate proceeding. The facts must be admitted or proved
of s
beyond a reasonable doubt in the of state conviction.
out - - Lavery, 154 Wash. 2d at 258. For
example, in State v. Ortega, the issue was whether a prior Texas conviction for second degree
indecency with a child, which required the child victim to be under 17 years old, was comparable
to a Washington offense that required the child victim be under 12 years old. 120 Wash. App. 165,
3 We use the elements of the Washington offenses in effect at the time the out - - tate crime was
of s
committed in our analysis. In re Pers. Restraint ofLavery, 154 Wash. 2d 249, 255, 111 P.3d 837
2005).
4
No. 43717- 1- 11
168 -69, 173 - 74, 84 P.3d 935 ( 2004), vacated on remand, 131 Wash. App. 591, 128 P.3d 146
2006). At sentencing, the State offered testimony of a Texas official and the Texas indictment,
judgment, and police reports to establish that the Texas victim was 10 years old. Ortega, 120
Wash. App. at 168, 173 -74. The defendant submitted letters from the Texas victim and her mother
urging the court to provide the defendant counseling; additionally the letters stated that the Texas
victim was 10 years old when the offense occurred. Ortega, 120 Wash. App. at 173 -74. Applying
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 ( 2000), the
sentencing court refused to consider the evidence of the victim' s age because the victim' s age
was not proven at the Texas trial. Ortega, 120 Wash. App. at 169, 174. Division Three of this
court affirmed and held that " Apprendi prohibits a sentencing court' s consideration of the
underlying facts of a prior conviction if those facts were not found by the trier of fact beyond a
reasonable doubt." Ortega, 120 Wash. App. at 174.
If an out - - tate conviction involves an offense that is neither legally or factually
of s
comparable to a Washington offense, the sentencing court may not include the conviction in the
defendant' s offender score. Thiefault, 160 Wash. 2d at 415.
B. COMPARABILITY OF OREGON CONVICTIONS
Arndt argues that the sentencing court erred in classifying five Oregon convictions as
comparable to Washington offenses and including them in his offender score calculation. We
hold that the Oregon unauthorized use of a vehicle conviction is comparable to a Washington
conviction, but that the Oregon attempted second degree assault, DUII, and third degree rape
convictions are not.
R
No. 43717 -1 - II
Unauthorized Use of Vehicle Conviction
Arndt was convicted of unauthorized use of a vehicle in Oregon based on an incident that
occurred in 1998. At sentencing, the State conceded that the Oregon and Washington offenses
were not legally comparable. See State v. Jackson, 129 Wash. App. 95, 107 -08, 117 P.3d 1182
2005) ( holding that Oregon'.s former unauthorized use of a vehicle offense was not legally
comparable to Washington' s taking a motor vehicle without permission offense because the
former Oregon statute prohibited a broader range of activity than the former Washington
4
statute). But the sentencing court performed a factual comparability analysis and determined
that Arndt' s conduct would have violated the former Washington statute. In his statement of
additional grounds for review, Arndt argues that the State did not prove that his conduct met the
intent element required by the former Washington statute. We disagree.
The former Washington statute for taking a motor vehicle without permission requires ( 1)
intentionally taking or driving away a motor vehicle without permission of the owner or person
entitled to the possession thereof or ( 2) voluntarily riding in a motor vehicle with knowledge that
it was unlawfully taken. Former RCW 9A.56. 070 ( 1975); see Jackson, 129 Wash. App. at 108. In
his guilty plea, Arndt admitted that he drove a vehicle he had stolen. A sentencing court
properly can consider facts conceded by the defendant in a guilty plea as an admitted fact.
Thiefault, 160 Wash. 2d at 415; see State v. Tewee, 176 Wash. App. 964, 970, 309 P.3d 791 ( 2013)
considering admission in guilty plea), petition for review filed, No. 89446 -9 ( Wash. Oct. 23,
2013); State v. Bunting, 115 Wn. App. 135, 143, 61 P.3d 375 ( 2003) ( noting that element of
Washington offense was not conceded by the defendant' s guilty plea in out -of state case).
-
4 The analysis in Jackson applies here because the court compared the Washington and Oregon
statutes in effect in 1998. 129 Wn. App. at 107 -08; see former RCW 9A.56. 070 ( 1975); former
ORS 164. 135 ( 1971).
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No. 43717 -1 - II
Arndt' s admission demonstrates that he committed an intentional taking of the vehicle without
permission. Therefore, his conduct would have met the requirements of the former Washington
statute. Because Arndt' s Oregon conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle is factually
comparable to Washington' s former taking a motor vehicle without permission statute, the
sentencing court properly included it as a point in Arndt' s offender score.
2. Attempted Second Degree Assault Conviction
Arndt was convicted of attempted second degree assault in Oregon for an incident that
occurred in 2007. Under the SRA, prior convictions for felony anticipatory offenses, including
attempts, are scored the same as if they were convictions for completed offenses. RCW
9. 94A. 525( 4). Arndt argues that the Oregon and Washington attempted second degree assault
offenses are not legally comparable because the Oregon offense is broader than the Washington
offense. We agree.
a. Definition of Attempt
Arndt asserts that " attempt" is defined more narrowly in Washington than in Oregon.
Under ORS 161. 405( 1), " A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when the person
intentionally engages in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the
crime." And under RCW 9A.28. 020( 1), " A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime, if
with intent to commit a specific crime, he or she does any act which is a substantial step toward
the commission of that crime." ( Emphasis added.) The difference is that Washington requires
specific intent to commit a crime rather than general intent to engage in conduct constituting a
substantial step towards commission of a crime.
The sentencing court acknowledged that the Oregon and Washington elements of attempt
are not legally comparable. However, under the second part of the comparability analysis it
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No. 43717 -1 - II
determined that the offenses were factually comparable. In his guilty plea, Arndt admitted that
he " intentionally attempted to cause serious physical injury" to the victim. Clerk' s Papers at 84.
As stated above, a sentencing court properly can consider this plea as an admitted fact.
Thiefault, 160 Wash. 2d at 415; See Tewee, 176 Wash. App. at 970; Bunting, 115 Wash. App. at 143.
The sentencing court correctly held that this admission showed that Arndt specifically intended
to commit the crime of assault. Therefore, his conduct would have met the requirements of the
Washington attempt statute.
b. Assault Statutes
Arndt argues that the Oregon second degree assault statute is broader than the
Washington second degree assault statute. In Oregon, a person commits second degree assault if
the person "[ i] ntentionally or knowingly causes serious physical injury to another." ORS
163. 175( 1)( b) ( emphasis added). " `` Serious physical injury' means physical injury which creates
a substantial risk of death or which causes serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted
impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ." ORS
161. 015( 8). In Washington a person commits second degree assault if the-person, under
circumstances not amounting to first degree assault, "[ i]ntentionally assaults another and thereby
recklessly inflicts substantial bodily harm." RCW 9A.36. 021( 1)( a) ( emphasis added).
Substantial bodily harm' means bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial
disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily part or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily part." RCW 9A.04. 110( 4)( b).
Arndt argues that the term " serious physical injury" used in the Oregon statute is broader
than the Washington requirement of "substantial bodily harm" because it permits conviction for
impairment of a person' s " health" but Washington' s does not. He argues that " impairment of
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No. 43717 -1 - II
health" ( Oregon statute) is broader than " impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ"
Washington statute) because " health" could include mental or emotional health, or a general
feeling of malaise that cannot be traced to a particular bodily part or organ. We agree.
The Oregon and Washington statutes are similar in that they both require some physical
injury. Under the Oregon statute, " serious physical injury" exists only ifphysical injury causes
the " impairment of health." ORS 161. 015( 8). However, a victim could suffer a " protracted
impairment of health" ( Oregon statute) that does not involve the " impairment of the function of
any bodily part or organ" ( Washington statute). ORS 161. 015( 8); RCW 9A.04. 110( 4)( b). For
instance, a victim could suffer a laceration and scar that resulted in long -
term psychological
injury that would qualify as impairment of mental health, but would not constitute impairment of
the function of a bodily part or organ. As a result, a showing of "serious bodily injury" under the
Oregon statute would not necessarily meet the Washington requirement of "substantial bodily
harm." We hold that the Washington and Oregon statutes are not legally comparable in this
5
regard.
Even though the convictions are not legally comparable, the Oregon conviction could be
included in the offender score if they are factually comparable. But nothing in the record for the
Oregon attempted second degree assault conviction allows a finding that Arndt intended to cause
an injury that satisfied the Washington definition of "substantial bodily harm." As a result, this
conviction is not factually comparable to a Washington offense.
5 Arndt also argues that the Oregon statute does not require proof that the assault caused
substantial" impairment and therefore that a protracted but insubstantial impairment or loss
qualifies for conviction of second degree assault in Oregon but not in Washington. Because we
find that the statutes are not legally comparable for another reason, we need not address this
argument.
9
No. 43717 -1 - II
In sum, attempted second degree assault in Oregon is not legally comparable to attempted
second degree assault in Washington because the Oregon term " serious physical injury" is
broader than the Washington term " substantial bodily harm." And there is no basis in the record
of the Oregon conviction for finding factual comparability. Accordingly, the sentencing court
erred in including the Oregon conviction in Arndt' s offender score
DUII Convictions
Arndt twice was convicted of DUII in Oregon for conduct that occurred in 1998. Arndt
argues that even though the language of the Oregon and Washington driving under the influence
statutes is substantially similar, the offenses are not legally comparable because Washington and
Oregon have interpreted " under the influence" differently. We agree.
a. Interpretation of Statutes
In Oregon, a person commits DUII if the person drives a vehicle while the person "[ i] s
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance." Former ORS 813. 010( 1)( b)
1991). The Washington driving under the influence ( DUI) statute in effect in 1998, former
RCW 46. 61. 502( 1)( b) ( 1994), provides that a person is guilty of DUI for driving while " under
the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor or any drug." The elements of the offenses are
the same — both are committed by driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.6
Former ORS 813. 010( 1)( b); former RCW 46. 61. 502( 1)( b). Nevertheless, Arndt argues that even
though the statutory elements of the offenses are nearly identical, the offenses are not legally
6 We discuss only the driving " under the influence" section of the DUI/DUII statutes because
that is the only section discussed by the parties. There are alternative theories of DUI / UII,
D
including proof of certain blood alcohol content, but these sections are not at issue.
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No. 43 717 -1 - II
comparable because Oregon and Washington courts have interpreted " under the influence"
7
differently.
In Oregon, " a person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor when he or she has
consumed enough liquor to adversely affect that person' s mental or physical faculties to some
noticeable or perceptible degree." Chartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern, Inc., 298 Or. 689, 699 -700,
696 P.2d 513 ( 1985) ( emphasis added). In Oregon v. Moody, 201 Or. App. 58, 64, 116 P.3d 935
2005), the Oregon Court of Appeals interpreted this rule as requiring a showing of impairment
due to a controlled substance. In Washington, a person is under the influence of or affected by
the use of intoxicating liquor " if the person' s ability to drive a motor vehicle is lessened in any
appreciable degree." 11A WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
CRIMINAL 92. 10, at 286 ( 3d ed. 2008); see State v. Wilhelm, 78 Wash. App. 188, 193, 896 P.2d 105
1995); State v. Hansen, 15 Wash. App. 95, 95 -97, 546 P.2d 1242 ( 1976).
b. Effect on Ability To Drive
Arndt argues that the Oregon and Washington interpretations of "under the influence"
differ in that the Washington interpretation focuses on a person' s actual ability to drive, while the
Oregon interpretation focuses on impairment of a person' s mental or physical faculties without
reference to the ability to drive. Under Washington law direct evidence that the defendant' s
7
Initially, it is unclear whether court interpretations of statutory elements can defeat legal
comparability of statutes containing identical elements. When courts have adopted non -statutory
elements of crimes, those non -statutory elements should be included in the comparability
analysis. See State Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 88, 292 P.3d 715 ( 2012) ( considering specific
v.
intent to steal an essential, nonstatutory element of second degree robbery); Lavery, 154 Wash. 2d
at 255 -56 ( same). However, we found no Washington authority addressing whether or not
courts' interpretations of statutory elements also must be comparable. Because the State did not
argue that court interpretations are irrelevant to the comparability analysis, we do not address
this issue.
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No. 43717 -1 - II
ability to drive was affected is not required to convict under RCW 46. 61. 502( 1). Wilhelm, 78
Wn. App. at 192 -93. We have held that RCW 46. 61. 502 is violated if circumstantial evidence
allows the fact finder to infer that the defendant' s ability to handle an automobile was lessened in
an appreciable degree. Wilhelm, 78 Wash. App. at 192 -93. As a result, proof that a defendant' s
mental or physical faculties are adversely affected as required under the Oregon statute would
allow a Washington fact finder to infer that the defendant' s ability to drive was affected.
However, under Washington law a fact finder is not required to infer that if a defendant' s
mental or physical faculties are adversely affected his or her ability to drive also was affected.
Accordingly, the facts required to convict under the Oregon statute would not necessarily result
8
in a conviction under the Washington statute. This precludes a finding of legal comparability.
We hold that the former Oregon DUII statute is not legally comparable to the former
Washington DUI statute. Although the language of the statutes is identical, the respective
interpretations of the statutory language provide different standards.
Factual Comparability
Nothing in the record for the Oregon DUII convictions allow a finding that Arndt
admitted or stipulated in his guilty plea agreement that his intoxication affected his ability to
drive. As a result, the convictions are not factually comparable to a Washington offense.
8 Arndt also argues that the Washington and Oregon statutes are not legally comparable based on
an Oregon case suggesting that the Oregon DUII statute only requires the " slightest degree" of
impairment. Dyrdahl v. Dep' t of Transp., 204 Or. App. 509, 514 -16, 131 P.3d 770 ( 2006).
Because we find that the statutes are not legally comparable on other grounds, we need not
address this issue.
12
No. 43717 -1 - II
The State failed to prove legal or factual comparability between the Oregon and
Washington driving under the influence of intoxicants statutes. Accordingly, the sentencing
court erred by including the two Oregon DUII convictions in calculating Arndt' s offender score.
4. Third Degree Rape
Arndt was convicted of third degree rape in Oregon for conduct that occurred in May
2001. He argues that his conviction is not comparable because the offense is defined more
broadly in Oregon than in Washington and the record does not show that his conduct met the
more narrow definition of the Washington offense. 9 We agree.
a. Legal Comparability
In Oregon, a person commits third degree rape by having sexual intercourse with another
person less than 16 years of age. ORS 163. 355. The comparable Washington offense is third
degree rape of a child, which a person commits by having sexual intercourse with another person
who is at least 14 years old but less than 16 years old and who is not married to the perpetrator,
and the perpetrator is at least 48 months older than the victim. RCW 9A.44. 079.
Both offenses require proof that the victim be less than 16 years old. But the Oregon
offense is broader than the comparable Washington offense because the Washington offense
requires the State to prove additional elements —that the victim and perpetrator are not married
and that the perpetrator is at least 48 months older than the victim. As a result, the Oregon
offense is not legally comparable to the Washington offense.
9 The State argues that Arndt did not make this argument in the sentencing court and cannot raise
the issue for the first time on appeal. However, Arndt did object to considering the Oregon
convictions on comparability grounds. In any event, improperly including an out -of state
-
conviction in the defendant' s offender score can be raised for the first time on appeal. Ford, 137
Wash. 2d at 484 -85.
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No. 43717 -141
b. Factual Comparability
The next step is to determine whether the offenses are factually comparable —i.e.,
whether Arndt' s conduct would have allowed conviction under the Washington statute. Here,
the State cannot establish the additional Washington requirement that the victim not be married
to the defendant. Arndt did not make any admission or stipulation regarding marital status and
the record from the Oregon proceeding does not reflect the marital status of Arndt or the victim.
The State argues that the sentencing court may infer that Arndt and the victim were not
married because ( 1) most people who are married would know their spouse' s age and Arndt
testified at sentencing in the present case that he did not know the victim was under 16 at the
time that they had sex, and ( 2) the 16 year old victim was below the minimum age to marry in
Oregon, which is 18 years old or 17 years old with parental permission. ORS 106. 010, . 060. But
sentencing courts may only rely on facts in the out -of - tate record that are admitted or proved to
s
the fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt in the out - - tate conviction. Lavery, 154 Wn.2d at
of s
258; Ortega, 120 Wash. App. at 174. There was no evidence in the Oregon proceeding regarding
marital status, and a finding regarding marital status was not necessary for the conviction.
Inferences from Arndt' s testimony at sentencing in the present case or from the Oregon marriage
statute are not sufficient for a Washington sentencing court to conclude that the fact that Arndt
and the victim were not married was proved beyond a reasonable doubt in the Oregon
10
proceeding.
io The State' s arguments do not show that it was impossible for Arndt and the victim to have
been married. It is possible that a person would not know his spouse' s age. And in California
there is no minimum age for marriage with a court order and written parental consent, Cal. Fam.
Code 302, while in Washington, a superior court judge may waive the age requirements on a
showing of necessity. RCW 26. 04. 010( 2).
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No. 43717 -1 - II
The State failed to prove legal or factual comparability between the Oregon third degree
rape statute and the Washington third degree rape of a child statute. Accordingly, the sentencing
court erred by including the Oregon third degree rape conviction in calculating Arndt' s offender
MIGMM
C. EVIDENCE ALLOWED ON RESENTENCING
Arndt contends with a citation to a single case and without argument that upon remand
the State is limited to the record as it existed at the prior sentencing hearing. The State does not
discuss whether it should have another opportunity to prove factual comparability of Arndt' s
Oregon attempted second degree assault, DUII, and third degree rape convictions on
resentencing. Whether the State may attempt to introduce evidence regarding these convictions
on remand is not before this court. State v. Lucero, 168 Wash. 2d 785, 789 n. 1, 230 P.3d 165
2010). We leave that issue to the sentencing court. Lucero, 168 Wash. 2d at 789 n. l.
D. CONCLUSION
We hold that Arndt' s Oregon conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle was
comparable to a Washington conviction and therefore was included properly in Arndt' s offender
score. However, we hold that Arndt' s Oregon convictions for attempted second degree assault,
DUII, and third degree rape were not legally or factually comparable to Washington convictions
15
No. 43717 -1 - II
and therefore should not have been included in Arndt' s offender score. Accordingly, we remand
for resentencing.
I & r-%
ij I
1 1
MAXA, J.
We concur:
A.C. J.
B.k RGE .
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