State of Washington v. Frederick Del Orr ( 2018 )

FILED
APRIL 26, 2018
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 34729-0-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
FREDERICK DEL ORR, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. — Frederick Orr appeals from his convictions for second degree
assault and first degree burglary, both of which were committed with a deadly weapon,
and his ensuing persistent offender sentence. Concluding that the evidence supported the
first degree burglary conviction, there was no basis for instructing the jury on defense of
others, and that Mr. Orr’s constitutional challenges are without merit, we affirm.
FACTS
Mr. Orr was charged with the two noted offenses after breaking into an occupied
house in northwest Spokane while armed with a metal pipe and then attempting to fight
his way off the property. According to Mr. Orr, 41 at the time of these charges, he was
living on the streets of Spokane when an acquaintance named Sean told him that a man
known as “Sasquatch” was obtaining sexual favors from Sean’s girlfriend in exchange for
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr
drugs. Sasquatch also was alleged to be holding children against their will. These events
were allegedly happening at a house on West Gardner Avenue.
Deeply upset because of abuse he himself had suffered while a child, and having
heard in prison sex offenders discuss their treatment of children, Mr. Orr approached a
house at 2620 West Gardner Avenue and began knocking on doors and windows.
Frightened when her back door was broken down, Liv Nelson grabbed her child and fled
out the front door. She observed Mr. Orr just inside the door, holding a metal pipe.1
Mr. Orr, now aware that he had not found Sasquatch’s lair, left the house and went
into the backyard. Neighbors had observed his actions and several had gathered to assist
Ms. Nelson. One of them, Dale Wills, had armed himself with a gun. An argument
ensued between Wills and Orr, with Orr several times swinging his metal pipe at Wills’
head while challenging Wills to shoot him. Eventually acknowledging that he had the
wrong house, Orr dropped his pipe. The police soon arrived and arrested Orr. He told
them that if he found children in peril, “all I know is I’m going to kick somebody’s ass. I
won’t kill them, but they deserve an ass whopping.” Report of Proceedings (RP) at 313-
314.
Mr. Orr testified at the ensuing jury trial that he never swung the pipe at Wills, but
did gesture with it while speaking. He further testified that he carried the pipe throughout
the entire incident with the intent of scaring or hitting someone if necessary.
1
The pipe was later identified as the leg of a camp stove.
2
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr
The defense sought a defense of others self-defense instruction on the burglary
count, but the court rejected the request because there was no objective evidence to
support the instruction. The court did permit a self-defense instruction as to the assault
against Mr. Wills and also gave an instruction on the inferior degree offense of fourth
degree assault. The jury convicted Mr. Orr of first degree burglary of the Nelson house
while armed with a deadly weapon and second degree assault against Mr. Wills while
armed with a deadly weapon.
The court sentenced Mr. Orr to life in prison as a persistent offender. He
previously had been convicted in 1993, at age 19, of second degree robbery. In 1995,
while age 21, he pleaded guilty to a crime of first degree robbery. Four years later, he
was sentenced to 20 years in prison for five felony offenses. He was released from
custody in January 2014, little over a year before the current incident.
Mr. Orr timely appealed to this court. A panel heard oral argument on the matter.
ANALYSIS
This appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the first degree
burglary conviction, the failure to grant a self-defense instruction on that charge, and the
constitutionality of the persistent offender sentencing statute. We will address the
arguments in the order listed.
3
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The initial challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the element of
first degree burglary that Mr. Orr was armed with a deadly weapon. He contends that
because no one was present against whom he could threaten to use the pipe, he was not
“armed” at the time of the crime.
As charged here, to convict of first degree burglary, the State had to establish,
among other elements, that Mr. Orr unlawfully entered the Nelson house with the intent
to commit a crime against a person or property therein and, while in the building and in
immediate flight therefrom, he was armed with a deadly weapon. RCW 9A.52.020(1)(a);
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 38, 170. The jury was instructed that a deadly weapon:
means any weapon, device, instrument, substance, or article which under
the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to
be used is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm.
CP at 160. This instruction reflects a portion of the language of RCW 9A.04.110(6),
defining the term “deadly weapon” when the weapon in question is not a firearm or
explosive device.
Sufficiency of the evidence challenges are reviewed under very well settled
standards. Appellate courts assess such challenges to see if there was evidence from
which the trier of fact could find each element of the offense proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wash. 2d 216, 221-222, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (citing Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). The reviewing
4
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr
court will consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. This
court also must defer to the finder of fact in resolving conflicting evidence and credibility
determinations. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wash. 2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990).
Relying on the definition of “deadly weapon” contained in instruction 13 (above),
Mr. Orr argues there was no evidence that the pipe was “used, attempted to be used, or
threatened to be used” because he encountered no one in the building once he broke in.
His focus is too narrow.
The meaning of RCW 9A.04.110(6) in the “attempted use” context was at issue in
In re Personal Restraint of Martinez, 171 Wash. 2d 354, 256 P.3d 277 (2011). There the
petitioner had been interrupted in the course of burglarizing a rural building and fled
upon the arrival of a deputy sheriff. Id. at 357-358. The deputy eventually caught the
burglar and tackled him. Id. at 358. At that point the officer noted that the burglar was
wearing a knife sheath, but had no knife; the knife was later located on the ground about
15 feet from the building. Id. Mr. Martinez was convicted of first degree burglary based
on his possession of the deadly weapon during the crime and flight therefrom.
The Washington Supreme Court noted that Mr. Martinez had neither used nor
threatened to use the knife, so treated the case as a matter of attempted use. Id. at 368. In
cases of a deadly weapon “in fact,” courts must look to the totality of the circumstances
to determine whether the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon. Id. at 368 n.6.
The court concluded that no one saw Mr. Martinez with the knife or even attempt to
5
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr
reach the knife, and he “manifested no intent to use it.” Id. at 368. The most that could
be said was that the knife’s sheath had been unfastened. Id. at 369. In those
circumstances, the evidence was insufficient to find that the defendant was armed with a
deadly weapon. Id. at 368-369. The court expressly distinguished State v. Gotcher, 52
Wash. App. 350, 759 P.2d 1216 (1988). Id. at 368. There, during a struggle, the defendant
had reached for the pocket in which he kept his knife, thus evidencing his intent to use
the weapon. Id.
Mr. Orr relies heavily on Martinez, arguing there was no evidence that he
attempted to use the pipe as a club, largely because there was no one to use the club
against. Although we agree there was no threatened use of the pipe, we question whether
or not Mr. Orr actually used the pipe in the course of the burglary. Nonetheless, even if
we analyze this solely as an attempted use case a la Martinez, we conclude that it is closer
to the Gotcher example of attempted use than it is to the Martinez nonuse situation.
As noted, in Gotcher the act of reaching for a pocket where the defendant had a
knife was sufficient to demonstrate attempted use of the deadly weapon. The facts of this
case demonstrate even more attempted use of the club as a deadly weapon. Mr. Orr
articulated his intent to use the weapon both to the police who arrested him and to the
jury. He was armed with the club prior to breaking into the house, although our record
does not demonstrate whether he used the club when forcing his entry into the building.
He carried the club out of the house and then used it against Mr. Wills. Unlike Martinez,
6
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr
here the totality of the circumstances evinced Mr. Orr’s intent to use the weapon but for
the absence of the man he sought.2 By arming himself prior to the entry, and breaking
into the home with the expressed intent to use the weapon against Sasquatch, Mr. Orr
attempted to use a deadly weapon.
Accordingly, the evidence allowed the jury to conclude that Mr. Orr was armed
with a deadly weapon when he entered the Nelson home. The evidence was sufficient to
support the jury’s verdict.
Defense of Others Instruction
Mr. Orr also argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a defense of others
instruction concerning the burglary charge. However, Mr. Orr’s subjective belief that
others needed rescuing was not a sufficient basis for giving such an instruction.
Once again, well settled standards govern review of this claim. RCW
9A.16.020(3) permits the use of force against another person in certain circumstances,
including when lawfully aiding in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against
a party about to be injured. A criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on his
theory of the case if the evidence supports the instruction. State v. Werner, 170 Wash. 2d
333, 336, 241 P.3d 410 (2010). More specifically, a defendant is entitled to a defense of
2
The unarticulated premise of Mr. Orr’s argument is that there can never be a first
degree burglary of an unoccupied building unless the defendant is armed with a firearm
or an explosive device. This runs counter to the legislative determination that neither
factual nor legal impossibility is a defense to an attempted crime. RCW 9A.28.020(2).
7
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr
another instruction if there is “some evidence” demonstrating defense of another. State v.
Marquez, 131 Wash. App. 566, 578, 127 P.3d 786 (2006). When a trial court refuses to
give a self-defense instruction because it finds no evidence supporting the defendant’s
subjective belief of imminent danger of great bodily harm, the standard of review on
appeal is abuse of discretion. State v. Read, 147 Wash. 2d 238, 243, 53 P.3d 26 (2002).
The trial court must evaluate evidence of self-defense “from the standpoint of a
reasonably prudent person who knows all the defendant knows and sees all the defendant
sees.” Id. at 242. This analysis involves both subjective and objective components. Id.
at 242-243. For the subjective component, the court must “place itself in the defendant’s
shoes and view the defendant’s acts in light of all the facts and circumstances the
defendant knew when the act occurred.” Id. at 243. For the objective component, the
court must “determine what a reasonable person would have done if placed in the
defendant’s situation.” Id. The same approach applies to the defense of another.
Marquez, 131 Wash. App. at 575.
Defense of another is permitted when: (a) the defendant would be justified in
using force to defend himself against the same injury being threatened against the third
party, (b) under the circumstances as understood by the defendant, the third party would
be justified in using force to protect himself or herself, and (c) the defendant believes that
the intervention is necessary to protect the third party. State v. Penn, 89 Wash. 2d 63, 66,
568 P.2d 797 (1977). Critically, the person the defendant seeks to protect must be
8
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr
present at the time. If there is no evidence that any “victims” were present, the defendant
has no right to defend them. State v. Trevino, 10 Wash. App. 89, 99, 516 P.2d 779 (1973)
(discussing previous justifiable homicide statute, former RCW 9.48.170 (1973)) (“The
statute has no application to a situation involving the defense of an absent person.”).
The proposed instruction certainly foundered on the last requirement. There was
no one inside the Nelson home who needed protecting. For that reason, among others,3
the trial court did not abuse its discretion. There was no basis for instructing on defense
of others.
Sentencing Challenges
Mr. Orr also raises two challenges to the persistent offender sentencing scheme.
This court has previously rejected both challenges, so we need not discuss them at any
length.
First, Mr. Orr contends that the persistent offender statute does not account for his
youth at the time he committed the first two “strike” offenses. He was 19 and 21,
respectively, when he committed the earlier “most serious offenses.” This argument
fundamentally fails because Mr. Orr was not a youthful offender at age 41 and he is not
now being punished once again for those earlier offenses. In re Pers. Restraint of
Williams, 111 Wash. 2d 353, 363, 759 P.2d 436 (1988). To the extent that youthful
3
It also was not reasonable for Mr. Orr to believe his intervention was necessary.
A call to law enforcement would have sufficed.
9
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr
immaturity is considered when sentencing youthful offenders and those just out of their
minority, it is factored into the sentence they receive rather than into the determination of
guilt or innocence. It is only the fact of guilt that has consequence today, not any
mitigated punishment imposed two decades earlier. Simply put, the age at which Mr. Orr
committed his earlier offenses is of no concern in this case.
This court previously rejected this argument in State v. Hart, 188 Wash. App. 453,
462-465, 353 P.3d 253 (2015). Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court has
consistently rejected a somewhat similar challenge to the persistent offender statute.
State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wash. 2d 875, 887-891, 329 P.3d 888 (2014). That court also has
previously rejected a variety of constitutional challenges to the persistent offender statute.
E.g., State v. Thorne, 129 Wash. 2d 736, 921 P.2d 514 (1996).
Mr. Orr also contends that the prior convictions should have been submitted to a
jury rather than have been found by a trial judge. However, the United States Supreme
Court has expressly exempted prior convictions from the scope of the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-304, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159
L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147
L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239, 118 S. Ct.
1219, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1998). Washington courts are in accord. Witherspoon, 180
Wash. 2d at 891-894; State v. Williams, 156 Wash. App. 482, 498, 234 P.3d 1174 (2010).
10
No. 34729-0-111
State v. Orr
There is no right to require proof of a prior conviction to a jury in a persistent
offender sentencing case. Mr. Orr's argument is without merit.
The convictions and sentence are affirmed. In light of the determination that Mr.
Orr is a persistent offender and will likely be unable to repay appellate costs, we grant his
motion to deny costs.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
I CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berre C.J.
11
No. 34729-0-III
FEARING, J. — (dissenting in part, concurring in part) I disagree with the majority
that sufficient evidence sustains Frederick Orr’s guilty verdict for first degree burglary. I
concur in the remainder of the majority’s rulings, including the ruling that upholds the
sentence of life in prison. The conviction for second degree assault of Dale Wills alone
qualifies Frederick Orr for the life sentence. I disagree with some of the reasoning
employed by the majority in upholding the sentence and thus concur in the result only as
to the sentence.
As to the charge of first degree burglary, this appeal asks if Frederick Orr used a
“deadly weapon” in the course of the burglary within the meaning of the term’s definition
found in RCW 9A.04.110(6). The State presented evidence that Orr, a homeless
transient, entered the Nelson abode without permission and with a two-foot metal pipe in
hand. Traci Pronto, an investigating officer, described the pipe as one of four metal legs
from a camp stove.
Officer Traci Pronto testified to the injuries that could result from the use of the
pipe:
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
Q And based on your experience and what you’ve personally
observed, what kind of injuries can be inflicted with a weapon such as this?
A Well, really depending on—on who’s swinging it and how hard it
is and where they connect at. I mean, that can do pretty good damage. If
someone were to get hit in the head with that, I would suspect it would
cause a skull fracture or something; some pretty good damage.
Report of Proceedings (RP) at 193.
Frederick Orr testified to his behavior on the day of the entry into the Nelson
home. He entered the home because he believed, from a conversation with Sean, that a
big dude, nicknamed Sasquatch, abused people, including children, inside the home. Orr
did not request law enforcement assistance to apprehend Sasquatch, because he inhabits a
world where denizens do not call the police. Orr intended to use the pipe to scare and
strike Sasquatch. He characterized his prospective swinging of the pipe as an “ass
whooping.” RP at 313-14. Nonetheless, the State presented no evidence of Orr using the
pipe when entering, while inside, or when leaving the Nelson dwelling. Orr planned to
swing the pipe if he encountered Sasquatch, but he never encountered the big, malevolent
dude so he never attempted to employ the pipe inside the home.
The statute defining first degree burglary, RCW 9A.52.020(1), provides:
A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if, with intent to
commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or
remains unlawfully in a building and if, in entering or while in the building
or in immediate flight therefrom, the actor or another participant in the
crime (a) is armed with a deadly weapon, or (b) assaults any person.
2
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
The evidence showed that Frederick Orr entered the Nelson residence with the intent to
assault Sasquatch such that he intended to commit a crime against a person inside the
dwelling. Thus, the State satisfied this first element of the crime.
First degree burglary under RCW 9A.52.020 requires the State to prove, among
other elements, that the defendant armed himself with a deadly weapon or assaulted
another person. In re Personal Restraint of Martinez, 171 Wash. 2d 354, 364, 256 P.3d 277
(2011). Although the State convicted Frederick Orr of assaulting Dale Wills, the State
does not rely on this assault to convict on first degree burglary perhaps because Wills
never inhabited the burglarized Nelson home. Instead, the State relies on the deadly
weapon alternative to prove first degree burglary and contends that the two-foot pipe held
by Orr, when entering the Nelson home, constituted a deadly weapon because Orr
intended to pummel Sasquatch inside the home with the pipe. The State identifies the
ogre Sasquatch, not Liv Nelson or Nelson’s daughter, as a subject of the assault. In turn,
Orr argues that mere possession of a deadly weapon does not qualify for first degree
burglary. He further contends that the State presented insufficient evidence of use or
attempted use of the pipe in order to convict him of the crime. I agree with Orr.
The term “armed” as used in RCW 9A.52.020(1)(a) means a weapon readily
accessible and available for use. State v. Gotcher, 52 Wash. App. 350, 353, 759 P.2d 1216
(1988); State v. Randle, 47 Wash. App. 232, 235, 734 P.2d 51 (1987). I assume that
Frederick Orr “armed himself” with the metal pipe, since he does not argue to the
contrary. I move to the next element of the crime, the accused being armed with a
3
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
“deadly weapon.”
RCW 9A.04.110(6) defines “deadly weapon” for purposes of first degree burglary
as:
“Deadly weapon” means any explosive or loaded or unloaded
firearm, and shall include any other weapon, device, instrument, article, or
substance, including a “vehicle” as defined in this section, which, under the
circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be
used, is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm.
(Emphasis added.) This definition also applies to the crime of second degree assault
when the State charges the crime based on use of a deadly weapon. RCW
9A.36.021(1)(c). A distinct definition applies to a mandatory minimum sentence based
on the use of a deadly weapon. RCW 9.95.040. Note that, under RCW 9A.04.110(6), the
deadly weapon need not be capable of inflicting death, only substantial bodily harm.
RCW 9A.04.110(6) creates two classes of deadly weapons: (1) any explosive or
loaded or unloaded firearm, and (2) any other weapon or instrument which, under the
circumstances in which the accused uses it, attempts to use it, or threatens to use it, is
readily capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In re Personal Restraint of
Martinez, 171 Wash. 2d at 365 (2011). Under Washington law, the first category of per se
deadly weapons reviews the nature of the weapon and the second category of
circumstantial deadly weapons addresses the method of use of the weapon. The trier of
fact need not determine any willingness or present ability to use the firearm or explosive
as a deadly weapon. State v. Gotcher, 52 Wash. App. at 354.
A weapon included in the second category as a circumstantial deadly weapon does
4
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
not qualify as a per se deadly weapon, but the State must show that, under the
circumstances the accused used, attempted to use, or threatened to use the weapon in a
manner readily capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. State v. Gotcher, 52
Wash. App. at 354. Within the second category, the inherent capacity and the
circumstances in which the accused used the weapon control the deadly nature of the
weapon. State v. Skenandore, 99 Wash. App. 494, 499, 994 P.2d 291 (2000).
Circumstances include the intent and present ability of the user, the degree of force, the
part of the body to which the accused applied the weapon, and the physical injuries
inflicted. State v. Skenandore, 99 Wash. App. at 499. The trier of fact ascertains ready
capability in relation to surrounding circumstances with reference to potential substantial
bodily harm. State v. Skenandore, 99 Wash. App. at 499. The accused must manifest a
willingness to use the weapon before the trier of fact may categorize the weapon as
deadly. State v. Gotcher, 52 Wash. App. at 354.
The principles of law listed in deadly weapon decisions and recited above fall
short in aiding a reviewing court. Those principles alternate between the potentiality of
the harm controlling and the actual harm imposed dominating the outcome. The
principles oscillate also between the accused’s intent and the accused’s actions as
significant to the result. Thus, I review the facts of individual decisions to discern
whether to concentrate on the accused’s intent and the weapon’s potential for harm, on
the one hand, or the accused’s actions and the actual harm suffered by a victim, on the
other hand. I include in the discussion decisions involving prosecutions for second
5
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
degree assault, since no decision construes the definition found in RCW 9A.04.110(6)
differently depending on whether the State charges the accused with second degree
assault or first degree burglary.
I initially note that if the court examined only the potentiality of harm, the court
would need to consider a paper clip a deadly weapon, since the clip could pierce the
victim’s eyeball and render the victim sightless. If the court assessed only the intent of
the accused, the court would need to deem all weapons deadly weapons, no matter how
used by the accused, if the accused hope to inflict substantial bodily injury.
I survey deadly weapon decisions in chronological order. In State v. Gotcher, 52
Wash. App. 350 (1988), Norman Gotcher and a companion broke into a residence. Law
enforcement later apprehended the intruding duo inside the residence. Police found
valuables from the residence in Gotcher’s possession. Gotcher also held in a coat pocket
a partially opened switchblade knife with a blade four-and-one-half inches long. During
closing argument, the State argued that the knife qualified as a deadly weapon.
According to the State, possession of the knife was sufficient to convict regardless of
whether Gotcher intended to use the weapon to further the burglary. This court reversed
the conviction because of the misstatement of the law by the State.
The Gotcher court refused, however, to dismiss the charge of first degree burglary
but remanded for a new trial. The court held that, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, evidence sufficed from which the jury could find all the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This court decided State v. Gotcher
6
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
before the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in In re Personal Restraint of Martinez,
171 Wash. 2d 354 (2011), discussed below.
In State v. Carlson, 65 Wash. App. 153, 828 P.2d 30 (1992), this court ruled that a
BB gun, under the circumstances of its use, did not constitute a deadly weapon. Todd
Carlson approached Cliff Ewell with what appeared to be a rifle. Carlson pointed the gun
at Ewell, and held the barrel inches from his face. Ewell grabbed the barrel of the gun
and pushed it away. Ewell testified that Carlson stepped back and held the gun as if
preparing to strike him with it. Carlson, however, did not strike Ewell, but turned and
walked away. Carlson testified that the gun was an inoperative, unloaded, sawed off BB
gun. Carlson also testified that the safety switch was on and that the gun was incapable
of firing in any event. Carlson did not tell Ewell that it was a BB gun nor did he tell
Ewell that the gun was inoperative. Carlson testified that he pointed the BB gun at Ewell
to intimidate and frighten him. Based on Carlson’s testimony that the gun was
inoperable, we held that the State submitted insufficient evidence to show the gun was
readily capable of causing substantial bodily harm and constituted a deadly weapon.
In State v. Shilling, 77 Wash. App. 166, 889 P.2d 948 (1995), we affirmed James
Shilling’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. Shilling threw a drinking glass at
the head of a bar bouncer after the bouncer grabbed the overserved Shilling’s alcohol
glass. The blow from the glass knocked off the bouncer’s eyeglasses. The drinking glass
broke on impact and glass shards flew fifteen feet. The bouncer’s face suffered
lacerations and demanded five stitches. One glass shard fell from the bouncer’s head one
7
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
month later. Expert testimony showed that the glass could have fractured the bouncer’s
nose and caused permanent scarring. Since the glass did not qualify as a deadly weapon
per se, this court analyzed the circumstances under which Shilling utilized the glass.
Shilling admitted that the glass carried the inherent capability of causing substantial
bodily harm.
State v. Taylor, 97 Wash. App. 123, 982 P.2d 687 (1999) contrasts with State v.
Carlson, 65 Wash. App. 153 (1992), previously discussed. Charles Taylor held a BB gun
to the head of three trespassing teenagers and threatened to blow the youths’ respective
“‘fucking brains out.’” State v. Taylor, 97 Wash. App. at 125. Taylor appealed his
conviction for second degree assault and argued that the State did not prove the BB gun
to be a deadly weapon. We disagreed. The evidence showed that Taylor threatened to
use the gun to shoot the boys in a way that would have caused substantial bodily harm.
In State v. Skenandore, 99 Wash. App. 494 (2000), the State charged Neil
Skenandore, an inmate at the Clallam Bay Corrections Center, with second degree
assault. Skenandore assaulted Corrections Officer Jason Jones with a homemade spear
two-and-one-half feet to three feet long, fashioned from writing paper rolled into a rigid
shaft bound with dental floss, affixed to a golf pencil. As Jones peered through the
viewing window on the left side of Skenandore’s cell door, he bent over to pass breakfast
through a locked portal in the door. The spear struck Jones twice on the chest and once
on the arm. The spear did not tear the shirt, but left pencil marks on Jones’ left shirt
pocket, near the center of the chest, and on the left sleeve. The makeshift spear also left
8
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
indented red marks but did not break Jones’ skin. A physician assistant examined Jones,
but prescribed no treatment. The marks on Jones’ chest evaporated within two hours.
The State argued to the jury that a sharpened pencil in the eye could cause substantial
bodily injury and thus the spear qualified as a deadly weapon.
This court, in State v. Skenandore, reversed Neil Skenandore’s conviction for
second degree assault and dismissed the charges based on insufficiency of evidence. We
reasoned that the State failed to present evidence that the homemade spear functioned as
a deadly weapon. Although under some circumstances the spear used by Skenandore
might be shown to be a deadly weapon, the record did not demonstrate that the
instrument served as a per se deadly weapon. The State presented no testimony regarding
the spear’s potential for substantial bodily harm had Skenandore struck Jones on the face
or in the eye. The record did not reflect that Jones placed his face near the cuff port such
that the spear could have struck his eye. The three blows all landed on Jones’ upper
torso, well below his head. The cell door that separated Jones and Skenandore restricted
the spear’s movement. Thus, the surrounding circumstances inhibited the spear’s
otherwise potential, but unproven, ready capability to inflict substantial bodily harm. The
red indentations on Jones’ chest faded within hours of the assault. Thus, no rational trier
of fact could have found that Skenandore’s spear was readily capable of causing death or
substantial bodily harm under the circumstances in which Skenandore used it.
In State v. Barragan, 102 Wash. App. 754, 9 P.3d 942 (2000), we affirmed the
conviction of Miguel Barragan for first degree assault by reason of using a pencil as a
9
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
deadly weapon. Barragan resided in jail with Steven Garcia. The two physically fought.
Barragan swung first and told Garcia, “‘You’re gonna die.’” State v. Barragan, 102 Wn.
App. at 759. As Garcia pushed an intercom alarm button, Barragan picked up a pencil
from the floor and swung it toward Garcia’s left eye. Garcia blocked the first swing, but
only partially blocked a second blow, which struck him in the left temple. The pencil
shattered as it hit Garcia’s head, and over one-half inch of it embedded into his temple.
An officer who used forceps to remove the pencil from Garcia’s temple later testified that
it was as difficult to remove as a nail. The actual wound, however, was not serious. We
noted that a pencil poke could blind the victim.
In State v. Winings, 126 Wash. App. 75, 107 P.3d 141 (2005), Ryan Winings
appealed his conviction of second degree assault while armed with a deadly weapon.
Daniel Warner visited Tracy Neitzel’s residence to show him a sword he recently
acquired. Warner joined other guests at the home, including Winings, who imbibed
alcohol. Warner displayed the sword to his friends, when Winings grabbed the sword
and pulled it from its sheath. Winings swung the sword in the air and then poked Warner
in the chest with the sword. Warner exclaimed: “‘ow that hurts,’” after which Winings
stabbed Warner in the foot with the sword. State v. Winings, 126 Wash. App. at 81. The
sword cut a hole in Warner’s leather shoe. Warner received a small cut on his toe.
Warner did not seek medical attention for his foot.
On appeal, Ryan Winings assigned error to the trial court’s refusal to deliver a jury
instruction for an inferior degree of assault. He argued that the evidence could also
10
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
support a finding that he employed a nondeadly weapon and emphasized that Warner did
not suffer serious injury. We observed that, if Winings had landed the sword in a slightly
different manner, the sword could have severed the toe. We ruled that the trial court
committed no error.
In State v. Baker, 136 Wash. App. 878, 151 P.3d 237 (2007), Shappa Baker
deliberately drove his car into a police car and a police motorcycle. We held the
evidence sufficient to convict Baker of first and second degree assault with a deadly
weapon, his vehicle.
In State v. Gamboa, 137 Wash. App. 650, 154 P.3d 312 (2007), this court held that
Joaquin Gamboa’s possession of a machete as he burglarized a home constituted the use,
attempted use, or threatening of use of a deadly weapon for purposes of first degree
burglary. We agreed with the State’s contention that Gamboa armed himself with a
deadly weapon merely because Gamboa held the weapon and the machete was readily
capable of causing death. We reasoned:
It is the potential as a weapon and not how the machete was actually
used [was] important. . . . It is rather the potential for inflicting bodily
injury or death that counts. . . . It was not necessary for the homeowners to
appear and for Mr. Gamboa to brandish the machete for it to qualify as a
deadly weapon. A machete is readily capable of causing great harm by its
very nature and size.
....
The question is whether the machete was “‘easily accessible and
readily available for use by the defendant for either offensive or defensive
purposes.’”
State v. Gamboa, 137 Wash. App. at 653 (internal citations omitted). If State v. Gamboa
11
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
remained good law, I would affirm Frederick Orr’s conviction for first degree burglary.
In State v. Hoeldt, 139 Wash. App. 225, 160 P.3d 55 (2007), this court held a pit bull
dog constituted a deadly weapon under the circumstances in which the accused employed
the dog. Robbie Hoeldt held, by the collar, his powerful, barking, and growling pit bull.
Hoeldt released the dog, who then charged a law enforcement officer and lunged at the
officer’s throat and chest.
In In re Personal Restraint of Martinez, 171 Wash. 2d 354 (2011), Washington’s
leading decision on the subject of a deadly weapon, Raymond Martinez challenged his
conviction for first degree burglary, by contending that the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he armed himself with a deadly weapon within the meaning of
RCW 9A.04.110(6). The state high court agreed and vacated the conviction. Grant
County Sheriff Deputy Joseph Wester spied Raymond Martinez rummaging in a rural
farm shop. Deputy Wester shined his flashlight on Martinez, drew his gun, and
commanded Martinez to stop. Martinez fled, but Wester chased and eventually tackled
him. Deputy Wester then noticed an empty knife sheath on Martinez’s belt. Later, law
enforcement officers retraced the path on which the chase had occurred and located a
knife with a fixed blade in the mud, about fifteen feet from the farm shop. The State
argued that the knife constituted a deadly weapon for purposes of first degree burglary.
Martinez contended he had neither used nor threatened to use his knife during the alleged
burglary.
The Martinez court rejected the State’s contention that mere possession of the
12
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
knife by Raymond Martinez when he entered the farm shop constituted being armed with
a deadly weapon. The court reasoned:
Under the plain meaning of this statute, mere possession is
insufficient to render “deadly” a dangerous weapon other than a firearm or
explosive. To interpret the statute otherwise would eliminate the
distinction between deadly weapons per se (firearms and explosives) and
deadly weapons in fact (other weapons). Likewise, it would render
meaningless the provision as to the circumstances of use, attempted use, or
threatened use.
Thus, we hold that RCW 9A.04.110(6) requires more than mere
possession where the weapon in question is neither a firearm nor an
explosive. In accordance with the plain meaning of this statute, unless a
dangerous weapon falls within the narrow category for deadly weapons per
se, its status rests on the manner in which it is used, attempted to be used,
or threatened to be used.
In re Personal Restraint of Martinez, 171 Wash. 2d at 366.
The Martinez court concluded that, even when viewed in the light most favorable
to the State, the evidence did not support a finding of Raymond Martinez arming himself
with a deadly weapon. No one saw Martinez with the knife, and he manifested no intent
to use it. No one saw Martinez reach for the knife at any time after his apprehension.
Martinez did not have access to the knife during the scuffle with Deputy Wester. Viewed
in the light most favorable to the State, the only evidence that Martinez attempted to use
the knife was the unfastened sheath. In so ruling, the Martinez court disapproved of our
decision in State v. Gamboa, because Gamboa characterized the machete as a deadly
weapon on the sole basis of its inherent dangerousness rather than its actual, attempted or
threatened use.
None of the Washington decisions analyze whether the accused “attempted” to
13
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
assault a victim with a deadly weapon for purposes of RCW 9A.04.110(6) by employing
the “substantial step” test applied under the attempted crime statute, RCW 9A.28.020(1).
The State may ask that we apply RCW 9A.28.020 for the purposes of assessing whether
Frederick Orr attempted to use a deadly weapon. The State writes that “Orr manifested a
clear intent to use the metal pipe on the inhabitants of the Nelson home and he took a
substantial step toward that end.” Br. of Resp’t at 11. Nevertheless, the evidence only
supports Orr possessing an intent to hurt Sasquatch, not the “inhabitants” of the
residence. One might guess that entering the home could constitute a step toward
attacking Sasquatch, but the State does not identify the substantial steps purportedly
taken by Orr that it claims entailed substantial steps. More importantly, the State presents
no case wherein a Washington court analyzes an attempt to arm oneself with a deadly
weapon as eliciting the same test required for an attempt under RCW 9A.28.020.
In holding that the State presented sufficient evidence of attempted use of a deadly
weapon, the majority writes: “[b]y arming himself prior to entry, and breaking into the
home with the expressed intent to use the weapon against Sasquatch, Mr. Orr attempted
to use the deadly weapon.” Majority at 7. Yet, no Washington decision adjudges a
weapon as deadly simply by intent. Two sentences earlier, the majority declares: “He
[Frederick Orr] carried the club out of the house and then used it against Mr. Wills.”
Majority at 6. When juxtaposing the two sentences, the reader wonders if the majority
bases its holding on an attempt to use a deadly weapon against Dale Wills, against
Sasquatch, or both.
14
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
If the majority relies on the use of the deadly weapon toward Dale Wills, the
majority does not need to even concern itself with Frederick Orr arming himself with a
deadly weapon, since Orr actually assaulted Wills. One commits the crime of first degree
burglary when one assaults another in the immediate flight from the burglary regardless
of whether one arms himself with a weapon, let alone a deadly weapon. RCW
9A.52.020(1). Nevertheless, the majority makes sure to hold that Orr armed himself with
a deadly weapon.
If the majority bases its decision on an attempt to wield a deadly weapon against
Dale Wills, the majority also grounds its ruling in an argument never made by the State.
We do not decide appeals based on theories not raised by the parties. FPA Crescent
Associates, LLC v. Jamie’s LLC, 190 Wash. App. 666, 679, 360 P.3d 934 (2015). This
court has bestowed no opportunity on Frederick Orr to address such a theory of criminal
liability.
RCW 9A.52.020 allows a conviction for first degree burglary only if the use of the
deadly weapon accompanies the entering of the dwelling, presence inside the dwelling, or
immediate flight from the residence. The evidence does not support a finding that the
assault on Dale Wills occurred during an immediate flight from the dwelling. Frederick
Orr did not even flee the Nelson dwelling.
Frederick Orr possessed an intent to assault Sasquatch. Nevertheless, although
Washington courts deem intent a factor for consideration, Washington courts rely on how
the accused actually employed the weapon, not how he hoped to use the weapon
15
No. 34729-0-III
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
regardless of a real or illusory victim. Washington decisions further rule that the accused
must manifest the intent by some actions involving use of the weapon. In each decision,
the Washington court only held the defendant to be armed with a deadly weapon if the
defendant actually wielded and used the weapon against a victim in the present, real
world.
In re Personal Restraint of Martinez, 171 Wash. 2d 354 (2011) and State v.
Skenandore, 99 Wash. App. 494 (2000) suggest we consider the capability of the weapon
under the circumstances of what actually transpired, not what might have happened.
Those circumstances include the intent and present ability of the user, the degree of force
exerted, the part of the body to which the accused applied the weapon, and the physical
injuries inflicted. State v. Skenandore, 99 Wash. App. at 499. Frederick Orr had no ability
to harm Sasquatch. Orr expended no force against the Bigfoot. The metal pipe struck no
muscle of the mean monster. Orr inflicted no injury on the phantom menace.
The State relies on State v. Kilponen, 47 Wash. App. 912, 737 P.2d 1024 (1987) for
the proposition that the burglary statute, RCW 9A.52.020(1), does not demand that the
person, against whom the burglar intends to commit a crime, be present in the home at
the time of the burglary. The State accurately cites the decision for this rule.
Nevertheless, the Kilponen court applied the rule to the element of the crime of first
degree burglary that requires proof of the intent to commit a crime against a person
therein. The court did not apply the rule to the element at issue in this appeal, that being
whether the trespasser armed himself with a deadly weapon. Gerald Kilponen entered his
16
No. 34729-0-111
State v. Orr (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
estranged wife's home with a rifle, so he bore a per se deadly weapon.
Insufficient evidence wrongly convicted Frederick Orr of first degree burglary.
�\�
Fe
17