State Of Washington v. Jerome Mcfield ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 80105-8-I
Respondent, )
) DIVISION ONE
v.
JEROME JOSEPH MCFIELD, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. ) FILED: October 7, 2019
MANN, A.C.J. — Jerome McField entered into a guilty plea to resolve multiple
charges, but then moved to withdraw his guilty plea. McField claimed that he did not
enter into the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. On appeal, McField
contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea and that he
was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm.
On June 28, 2016, the State charged McField with one count of assault in the
first degree with a firearm enhancement, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm
in the first degree, and one count of obstructing a law enforcement officer. The State
later added two additional counts of assault in the first degree each with firearm
enhancements, one count of drive-by shooting, and three counts of assault in the
No. 80105-8-112
second degree with firearm enhancements. At arraignment, McField entered a not
guilty plea on all counts.
McField was represented by attorney Matthew McGowan. McField’s charges
arose out of three separate instances that could have been tried separately. McGowan
estimated that if McField lost at trial, his sentence would have been in the “35- to 45-
year range, but that with depending on how many trials there were and how a judge
decided to sentence at the end, it could be up to 50 or 60 years.”
The State offered McField a plea deal with a recommended sentence of 15
years. McField reviewed the plea offer with McGowan.
On July 24, 2017, McField accepted the deal and pleaded guilty to one count of
assault in the first degree with a firearm sentencing enhancement, and one count of
unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree. McField signed the statement of
defendant.
McField was crying when he entered into the plea deal. McField told the judge
that he had reviewed the agreement, that he was waiving his rights to trial, and that no
one was forcing him to accept the plea deal.
[MCGOWAN]: . I believe he’s moving forward today with his
. .
plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.
THE COURT: Mr. McField, good morning. Do you agree with
everything that Mr. McGowan, your attorney, just said?
[MCFIELD]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Have you had the opportunity to thoroughly review the
Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty with Mr. McGowan?
[MCFIELD]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Did he answer all of your questions about the form, about
the decision to plead guilty, and about your case?
[MCFIELD]: Yes, sir.
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The court accepted the plea, finding that McField entered into the guilty plea
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
The day after entering the guilty plea, McField told McGowan that he wanted to
withdraw the guilty plea. McGowan acknowledged that McField was not happy about
the plea and that another attorney, Robert Quillian, took over the case soon after.
McField filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The hearing on the motion was
held on April 17, 2018. At the hearing, McField confirmed that he signed the statement
of defendant, but said that he was coerced into accepting the plea because trial was
scheduled to start that day. McField said that McGowan told him “that the plea was the
best way to go; that if I continued, that trial was going to start that day and that I had no
defense and that I was going to get 60 to 80 years if I didn’t take the deal.”
McField testified that at the time he entered the guilty plea, he did not believe that
he was voluntarily entering into a plea. McField also testified that he never had the
opportunity to review the police reports in his case. McGowan and his assistant
defense counsel, Kelley Kavanaugh, testified about reviewing the discovery, including
the police reports, with McField.
The court found that McGowan
provided the defendant with effective assistance of counsel through the
duration of the representation and was prepared to proceed to trial had the
defendant chosen not to accept the guilty plea. Mr. McGowan, however,
did not show [McField] the police reports or provide him a copy for his own
use. He did however convey the substance of the police reports and other
discovery during their consultations.
The trial court found that McField did not meet his burden to establish a manifest
injustice that would warrant the withdrawal of his guilty plea, concluding that the
“defendant entered that plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. He made the
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No. 80105-8-114
decision to plead guilty and forgo his trial after full consultation with his attorney. That
attorney more than adequately assisted the defendant in the decision of whether to
plead guilty.” The court found McGowan and Kavanaugh’s testimony to be credible.
McField appeals.
McField first challenges the trial court’s conclusion that he knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered into his guilty plea. McField argues that he did not
make a voluntary plea because his attorney placed him under undue duress by coercing
him to accept the plea deal. He also argues that his plea was not knowing because he
never reviewed the discovery and police reports for his case. We disagree.
A denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
State v. A.N.J., 168 Wash. 2d 91, 106, 225 P.3d 956 (2010). The trial court must permit a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea when withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice. CrR 4.2(f). The Washington Supreme Court recognizes four nonexclusive
criteria of manifest injustice which are (1) the denial of effective counsel, (2) the plea
was not ratified by the defendant, (3) the plea was involuntary, and (4) the plea
agreement was not kept by the prosecution. State v. Wakefield, 130 Wash. 2d 464, 472,
925 P.2d 183 (1996). “A written statement on plea of guilty in compliance with CrR
4.2(g) provides prima facie verification of its constitutionality, and when the written plea
is supported by a court’s oral inquiry on the record, the presumption of voluntariness is
well nigh irrefutable.” State v. Davis, 125 Wash. App. 59, 68, 104 P.3d 11(2004) (citing
State v. Perez, 33 Wash. App. 258, 261-62, 654 P.2d 708 (1982)).
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Here, McField acknowledges that he signed the statement of defendant for the
guilty plea. When the trial court accepted McField’s guilty plea, the court asked McField
if he was entering into the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and McField
affirmed that he was. The written evidence and oral testimony establish his
voluntariness. Although McField testified that he was coerced into signing the plea, and
that he did not think he was voluntarily entering into the plea, the court found that “{tjhe
defendant decided of his own accord to accept the State’s plea offer.”
Although McField testified that he did not see the police reports or discovery in
his case, based on the testimony of counsel, the trial court found that McGowan
conveyed the substance of the reports and other discovery to McField. While McField
and McGowan presented conflicting evidence, the court ultimately found McGowan to
be credible.
McField has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to withdraw his plea.
Ill.
McField next contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
McField argues that McGowan failed to investigate his case by failing to provide
discovery to McField before he entered his guilty plea. We disagree.
Because claims of ineffective assistance of counsel present mixed questions of
fact and law, the standard of review is de novo. A.N.J., 168 Wash. 2d at 109. To
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show “(1) that his
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, if so, (2)
that counsel’s poor work prejudiced him.” A.N.J., 168 Wash. 2d at 109 (citing Strickland v.
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No. 80105-8-1/6
Washington, 46 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). The
defendant must demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice. State v.
Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 77-78, 917 P.2d 563 (1996). To show prejudice, the
defendant must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” Hendrickson, 129
Wash. 2d at 78. We presume that the defendant was properly represented. Hendrickson,
129 Wash. 2d at 77-78.
The presumption of counsel’s adequate representation can be overcome by a
showing that counsel failed to conduct appropriate investigations. State v. Thomas, 109
Wash. 2d 222, 230, 743 P.2d 816 (1987). McField relies upon State v. Jones, 183 Wash. 2d
327, 339-40, 352 P.3d 776 (2015), for his argument that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to investigate his case. In Jones, trial counsel was found ineffective for failing
to interview three key witnesses and offering “absolutely no reason” for failing to do so.
Jones, 183 Wash. 2d at 340.
McField argues that McGowan failed to investigate his case because he did not
provide the police reports to McField before he entered his guilty plea. Not providing
independent copies of police reports is not, however, the same as not investigating the
case. McGowan estimated meeting with McField at least a dozen times. He brought in
two additional attorneys to help investigate and consult on the case. Counsel then
conducted witness interviews with “pretty much everyone who was on {McField’s] side
of the case.” As the trial court found, counsel also met with McField and his father and
conveyed the substance of the police reports and witness interviews.
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No. 80105-8-117
Because McField has failed to demonstrate that McGowan’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, McField’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim fails.
IV.
In McField’s statement of additional grounds he argues that McGowan did not
obtain all of the discovery in his case, constituting ineffective assistance of counsel.
Specifically, McField argues that McGowan did not obtain 250 photographs of the scene
that were taken after the incident.
McField cites to the report of proceedings where McGowan discusses the
photographs taken at the scene. McGowan confirmed that he reviewed the “scene
photographs” with McField. He also testified that he had taken photos of “the house
and where things would have fallen.”
McField has not demonstrated that McGowan failed to investigate his case. His
argument about McGowan’s failure to obtain the photographs is disputed, and this claim
does not appear to constitute McGowan’s failure to investigate. For these reasons,
McField’s additional ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
We affirm.
C
WE CONCUR: