Hugh Bangasser v. Thomas F. Bangasser ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
HUGH F. BANGASSER, an individual; ) No. 78595-8-I
and ELIZABETH B. HALL, an individual,) (Consolidated with No. 78670-9-I)
Respondents, ) DIVISION ONE
v. )
THOMAS F. BANGASSER, an )
individual; BANGASSER & )
ASSOCIATES, INC., a Washington )
corporation, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellants,
and
VISION VASHON, ostensibly a )
Washington non-profit corporation, )
Defendant. ) FILED: October 14, 2019
SCHINDLER, J. — The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, chapter 25.10 RCW, gives
the superior court the discretion to issue a lien against the transferable interest of the
judgment debtor in a limited partnership. Siblings Thomas Bangasser, Elizabeth Hall,
and Hugh Bangasser are limited partners of the MidTown Limited Partnership.1 In
these consolidated appeals, Thomas challenges the charging and disbursement orders
1 We refer to siblings Elizabeth Hall, Hugh Bangasser, and Thomas Bangasser by their first
names for clarity and mean no disrespect by doing so.
No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)/2
entered against his interest in the limited partnership to pay judgment creditors
Elizabeth and Hugh the award for attorney fees incurred postjudgment. We affirm.
This is the third appeal in this case. The facts are set forth in Hall v. Bangasser,
No. 76077-7-I (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/
760777.pdf, and Banqasser v. Banqasser, No. 77398-4-I (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 14,
2019), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pcif/773984.pdf, and will be repeated only as
necessary.
MidTown Limited Partnership
MidTown is a Washington limited partnership. The primary asset of the
partnership is several parcels of commercial real estate in Seattle. The limited partners
are siblings or entities owned by siblings. Thomas Bangasser was the general partner
of MidTown until 2015.
Loans to Thomas Bangasser
In October 2003, Elizabeth Hall loaned her brother Thomas $75,000. Thomas
signed a promissory note as the secretary/treasurer of Vision Vashon, a now-defunct
nonprofit corporation. Thomas guaranteed payment of the promissory note personally
and as the president of Bangasser & Associates Inc. The promissory note provides that
payment on the note with interest is due October 2004.
In October 2003, Hugh Bangasser loaned Thomas $70,000. Thomas signed a
promissory note on behalf of Vision Vashon. Thomas guaranteed payment of the
promissory note personally and as the president of his company Bangasser &
Associates. The promissory note provides that payment on the note with interest is due
October 2004.
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Thomas never made any payments on the principal or interest due on the
promissory notes to either Elizabeth or Hugh. Both of the promissory notes include a
provision for the award of reasonable attorney fees and costs in a lawsuit to enforce the
notes to the prevailing party.
Breach of Partnership Agreement Lawsuit
On June 22, 2015, the limited-partner siblings voted to remove Thomas as the
general partner of MidTown.
In September 2015, Thomas filed a lawsuit against MidTown and the limited
partners (collectively, MidTown) for breach of the partnership agreement and claimed
he was entitled to compensation. Thomas also sought a security interest in property
owned by MidTown and appointment of a receiver to sell the property owned by
MidTown.
Thomas filed a is pendens against the property. The court granted MidTown’s
motion to strike the is pendens because the lawsuit Thomas filed did not involve a
dispute over the title to real property.
MidTown filed a motion for partial summary judgment on two issues: (1) Thomas
was validly removed as the general partner and (2) Thomas had no right of first refusal
regarding the property or the interests of the limited partners in the partnership. In
response to the motion, Thomas conceded both these issues. The court granted the
motion for partial summary judgment, entered a final judgment under CR 54(b), and
awarded attorney fees to MidTown.
On appeal, Thomas challenged the decision to strike the us pendens he filed on
the property and the order on summary judgment. We affirmed. Bangasser v. MidTown
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Ltd. P’ship, No. 75226-0-I (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.courts.wa.gov/
opinions/pdf/752260 pdf.~ .
Lawsuits To Enforce the Promissory Notes
In December 2015, Thomas sent an e-mail to Elizabeth and Hugh stating, “[W]e
were finally able to refinance/sell our Vashon Island real estate and would like to now
address the outstanding Promissory Notes payable to you.”
On July 14, 2016, Elizabeth filed a lawsuit against Thomas, Vision Vashon, and
Bangasser & Associates (collectively, Thomas) to enforce the October 2003 promissory
note for $75,000 plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney fees and
costs.
On September 13, 2016, Elizabeth filed a motion for summary judgment.
Elizabeth argued Thomas never made any payments and acknowledged his obligation
to pay the 2003 promissory note. The court granted the motion for summary judgment.
On October 14, 2016, the court entered a judgment in favor of Elizabeth for the principal
amount owed, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees and costs for a total of
$194,737.63. The court ordered postjudgment interest of $24.66 per day. Thomas filed
an appeal. We affirmed and awarded Elizabeth attorney fees and costs on appeal.
HaN, No. 76077-7-I, slip op. at 1.
On November 22, 2016, Hugh filed a lawsuit against Thomas, Vision Vashon,
and Bangasser & Associates (collectively, Thomas) to enforce the October 2003
promissory note and entry of a judgment for the principal amount owed plus
prejudgment and postjudgment interest and an award of attorney fees and costs.
2 Thomas later voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit.
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Hugh filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion for
summary judgment. On August 18, 2017, the court entered a judgment against Thomas
for the principal amount owed and prejudgment interest in the amount of $184,681.09.
The court ordered postjudgment interest of $72.86 per day. The court reserved ruling
on the request for an award of attorney fees. On September 8, 2017, the court awarded
Hugh reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $39,831 .00. Thomas filed an appeal.
We affirmed and awarded Hugh attorney fees and costs on appeal. Bangasser, No.
77398-4-I, slip op. at 1.
Sale of the MidTown Progerty and Entry of Charging Orders
In May 2017, MidTown sold the property it owned for $23,300,000. A letter dated
June 22, 2017 addressed partial distribution from the sale of the ‘23rd & Union
Property.” The letter states the sale proceeds of $14,041,347 “will be distributed next
week to the five limited partnership groupings in five equal shares of $2,808,269.” The
letter also states, “Our hope is that the funds will be transferred to your respective banks
by Friday, June 30th.”
On July 7, Elizabeth filed a motion for an order to show cause why the court
should not enter a charging order against the interest of Thomas in the limited
partnership for the amount Thomas owed on the October 14, 2016 judgment plus
postjudgment interest. On July 10, the court entered a charging order. The charging
order directed MidTown to “set aside $201 099.91 plus interest from its declared
distributions to Thomas F. Bangasser and hold that amount for the benefit of Judgment
Creditor Elizabeth B. Hall pursuant to RCW 25.10.556.” On August 22, Elizabeth
obtained an order to disburse proceeds and release the July 10, 2017 charging order.
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On August 30, the court granted Hugh’s motion for a charging order against
Thomas’ partnership interest for the August 18, 2017 judgment of $185,950.36 plus
postjudgment interest.
On August 31, 2017, MidTown deposited approximately $1.4 million of Thomas’
share of the proceeds from the sale of the MidTown property in the King County
Superior Court Clerk’s Office Registry of the Court pending resolution of the remaining
disputes in the Midtown Ltd. Partnership v. Thomas F. Banqasser lawsuit. One of the
disputes in the MidTown lawsuit was whether Thomas “transferred one-half of his
interest in MidTown, as he previously claimed, and hence one-half of his distributable
proceeds, to a community group Africatown Community Land Trust.”
The August 31, 2017 letter from the attorney representing MidTown states, in
pertinent part:
In accordance with our previous correspondence, today MidTown is
tendering one-half of the Distributable Proceeds, slightly more than $1 .4
million, to the King County Superior Court Clerk’s office for deposit in the
court registry. It is doing so without in anyway conceding that the
Africatown Community Land Trust is entitled to that money, or that any
purported transfer of MidTown units from Tom to the Africatown Trust was
authorized; it was not. Further, one or more plaintiffs may have claims on
those funds. We are nonetheless tendering to the Court so that all claims
to those funds can be properly adjudicated. As I have previously
mentioned, only the Court can authoritatively decide whether Tom actually
and validly transferred one-half of his interest in MidTown to the
Africatown Trust. On those and related issues, my clients reserve all
rights.
The letter also states, “MidTown today is distributing money to Elizabeth in
accordance with her charging order and order authorizing distribution. In accordance
with the charging order obtained by Hugh, MidTown is holding back funds.”
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On September 15, 2017, Hugh filed a motion for an order to disburse proceeds
and release the August 30, 2017 charging order. Hugh also filed a motion to issue a
substitute and corrected charging order to include the $39,831 in attorney fees and
postjudgment interest as of September 25, 2017.
On September 25, 2017, the court entered an order granting Hugh’s motion to
issue a substitute and corrected charging order. The order states, in pertinent part:
MidTown shall therefore set aside $225,781 .36 (consisting of the sum of
the $185,950.36 Judgment amount and the $39,831.00 Attorney Fee
Judgment), plus interest. from any distribution to Thomas F. Bangasser
. .
and hold that amount for the benefit of Judgment Creditor Hugh
Bangasser pursuant to RCW 25.10.556.
On October 9, 2017, the court entered an order to correct the charging order and
disburse proceeds to Hugh.
On November 13, 2017, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Elizabeth
and against Thomas for $6,838.97 in postjudgment attorney fees and costs. On
November 22, 2017, the court awarded postjudgment attorney fees and costs to Hugh
in the amount of $9,566.97.
On April 12, 2018, Thomas paid the August 18, 2017 judgment amount owed to
Hugh on the promissory note and the September 8, 2017 award of attorney fees but not
the November 22, 2017 award of postjudgment attorney fees. On April 13, 2018, the
court entered a partial satisfaction of the October 14, 2016 judgment owed to Elizabeth
on the promissory note and the award of attorney fees. The order states the payment
did not satisfy the November 13, 2017 award of postjudgment attorney fees owed to
Elizabeth.
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Charging and Disbursement of Proceeds Orders for Postjudgment Award of Attorney
Fees
On May 31, 2018, Elizabeth and Hugh each filed a motion for entry of a charging
and disbursement of proceeds order against Thomas’ partnership interest for the award
of attorney fees incurred postjudgment. Thomas filed a brief in opposition to the
motions to issue a charging order and disburse proceeds.
The court granted Elizabeth’s motion for a charging and disbursement order for
the postjudgment award of attorney fees in the amount of $6,838.97 plus interest. On
June 19, 2018, the court entered an “Order Granting Motion for Charging Order and
Disbursement of Proceeds to Judgment Creditor.” Thomas filed a notice of appeal of
the order.
The court granted Hugh’s motion for a charging and disbursement order for the
award of postjudgment attorney fees in the amount of $9,556.97 plus interest. On June
20, 2018, the court entered an “Order Granting Motion for Charging Order and
Disbursement of Proceeds to Judgment Creditor.” Thomas filed a notice of appeal of
the June 20 order.
This court consolidated the two appeals.
Appeal of Charging and Disbursement Orders for Postiudgment Award of Attorney Fees
In this appeal, Thomas contends the court did not have authority to enter the
charging and disbursement orders under RCW 25.10.556; MidTown did not have the
authority to deposit his partnership distribution in the court registry; and the attorney
representing Hugh, Elizabeth, and MidTown has a conflict of interest. Thomas also
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No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)19
argues we should review entry of the previous charging orders that were not designated
in the notice of appeal.
Authority To Enter Charging and Disbursement Orders
Thomas contends the court did not have the authority under RCW 25.10.556 to
enter the charging and disbursement orders against his limited partnership interest for
the award of attorney fees and costs Elizabeth and Hugh incurred postjudgment.
Thomas cites language in ROW 25.10.556 and supplemental proceedings statute ROW
6.32.085 to argue the court has authority to enter a charging order on only future
partnership distributions. The plain and unambiguous language of ROW 25.1 0.556 and
RCW 6.32.085 does not support his argument.
The meaning of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. Dep’t of
Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Our objective is
to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 9.
We look first to the text of a statute to determine its meaning. Griffin v. Thurston County
Bd. of Health, 165 Wash. 2d 50, 55, 196 P.3d 141 (2008). Statutory interpretation begins
with the plain meaning of the statute. Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n, 169
Wash. 2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). Plain meaning “is discerned from all that the
Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent
about the provision in question.” Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 11. When the
meaning of the statute is plain on its face, the court must give effect to that plain
meaning as the expression of the legislature’s intent. Bostain v. Food Express, Inc.,
159 Wash. 2d 700, 708, 153 P.3d 846 (2007); City of Spokane v. Spokane County, 158
Wash. 2d 661, 673, 146 P.3d 893 (2006). Statutes are to be read together, whenever
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No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)/10
possible, to achieve a” harmonious total statutory scheme . . . which maintains the
integrity of the respective statutes.’ “ Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 117
Wash. 2d 606, 614, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991)~ (quoting State v. O’Neill, 103 Wash. 2d 853, 862,
700 P.2d 711 (1985)). An interpretation that reads language in isolation is too limited
and fails to apply this rule. Jonqeward v. BNSF Ry., 174 Wash. 2d 586, 595, 278 P.3d 157
(2012); see Davis v. Mich. Dept of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S. Ct. 1500, 103 L.
Ed. 2d 891 (1989) (‘It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of
a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.”). The construction of two statutes shall be made with the
assumption that the legislature does not intend to create an inconsistency. State v.
Bash, 130 Wash. 2d 594, 602, 925 P.2d 978 (1996).
In 2009, the Washington legislature enacted the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
chapter 25.10 RCW. LAWS OF 2009, ch. 188. RCW 25.10.556 addresses the “[r}ights of
creditor of partner or transferee.” RCW 25.10.556 provides:
(1) On application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any judgment
creditor of a partner or transferee, the court may charge the transferable
interest of the judgment debtor with payment of the unsatisfied amount of
the judgment with interest. To the extent so charged, the judgment
creditor has only the rights of a transferee. The court may appoint a
receiver of the share of the distributions due or to become due to the
judgment debtor in respect of the partnership and make all other orders,
directions, accounts, and inquiries the judgment debtor might have made
or that the circumstances of the case may require to give effect to the
charging order.
(2) A charging order constitutes a lien on the judgment debtor’s
transferable interest. The court may order a foreclosure upon the interest
subject to the charging order at any time. The purchaser at the
foreclosure sale has the rights of a transferee.
(3) At any time before foreclosure, an interest charged may be
redeemed:
(a) By the judgment debtor;
~ Alteration in original.
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(b) With property other than limited partnership property, by one or
more of the other partners; or
(c) With limited partnership property, by the limited partnership with
the consent of all partners whose interests are not so charged.
(4) This chapter does not deprive any partner or transferee of the
benefit of any exemption laws applicable to the partner’s or transferee’s
transferable interest.
(5) This section provides the exclusive remedy by which a
judgment creditor of a partner or transferee may satisfy a judgment out of
the judgment debtor’s transferable interest.
Chapter 6.32 RCW governs supplemental proceedings to enforce a judgment.
ROW 6.32.085 provides:
Order charging partnership interest or directing sale. If it appears from the
examination or testimony taken in the special proceedings authorized by
this chapter that the judgment debtor owns an interest in a partnership, the
judge who granted the order or warrant or to whom it is returnable may in
his or her discretion, upon such notice to other partners as the judge
deems just, and to the extent permitted by Title 25 ROW, (1) enter an
order charging the partnership interest with payment of the judgment,
directing that all or any part of distributions or other amounts becoming
due to the judgment debtor, other than earnings as defined in ROW
6.27.010, be paid to a receiver if one has been appointed, otherwise to the
clerk of the court that entered the judgment, for application to payment of
the judgment in the same manner as proceeds from sale on execution
and, in aid of the charging order, the court may make such other orders as
a case requires, or (2) enter an order directing sale of the partnership
interest in the same manner as personal property is sold on execution.
The plain and unambiguous language of ROW 25.10.556 and the statutory
definitions establish that a charging order under ROW 25.10.556 is not limited to future
distributions. The statute expressly states the court has the authority to enter a
charging order against “the transferable interest” of the limited partner judgment debtor.
ROW 25.10.556(1). ROW 25.10.011(5) defines “distributions” as “a transfer of money
or other property from a limited partnership to a partner in the partner’s capacity as a
partner.” ROW 25.10.011(22) defines a “transferable interest” as “a partner’s right to
receive distributions.” ROW 25.10.011(23) defines a “transferee” as “a person to which
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No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)112
all or part of a transferable interest has been transferred, whether or not the transferor is
a partner.”
Thomas cites language in ROW 25.10.556(1) and ROW 6.32.085(1) to argue the
court can issue a charging order only on partnership distributions “to become due” or
“becoming due.”
The plain and unambiguous language in ROW 25.10.556(1) that ‘{t]he court may
appoint a receiver of the share of the distributions due or to become due to the
judgment debtor in respect of the partnership” means the court has the “discretion” to
appoint a receiver for distributions “due or to become due.” Strenqe v. Clarke, 89
Wash. 2d 23, 28, 569 P.2d 60 (1977). The plain and unambiguous language of ROW
25.10.556(1) also states the court has the discretion to “make all other orders,
directions, accounts, and inquiries the judgment debtor might have made or that the
circumstances of the case may require to give effect to the charging order.” Here, the
undisputed record shows that as a limited partner, Thomas was entitled to a distribution
from the proceeds from the sale of the MidTown property and the court did not appoint a
receiver.
ROW 6.32.085 expressly states that issuing a charging order under that statute is
authorized only “to the extent permitted by Title 25 ROW.” ROW 25.10.556(5) states,
“This section provides the exclusive remedy by which a judgment creditor of a partner or
transferee may satisfy a judgment out of the judgment debtor’s transferable interest.”
Therefore, the court may enter an order charging partnership interest and directing
payment of judgment on “all or any part of distributions or other amounts becoming due”
only to the extent permitted by ROW 25.10.556(5). ROW 6.32.085(1).
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No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)113
Construing the language of the two statutes together, we conclude the court has
the authority to issue a charging order against the partnership interest of a judgment
debtor to pay the judgment creditor. RCW 25.10.556 is the exclusive remedy to “charge
the transferable interest of the judgment debtor with payment of the unsatisfied amount”
due to the judgment creditor. The statute also gives the court the discretion to appoint a
receiver for “the share of the distributions due or to become due to the judgment debtor”
and to enter orders “that the circumstances of the case may require to give effect to the
charging order.” RCW 25.10.556(1).
For the first time on appeal at oral argument, Thomas argued the court did not
have authority to simultaneously enter a charging and disbursement of proceeds order.
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time at oral argument. Maziar v. Dept
of Corr., 180 Wash. App. 209, 227 n.1 1, 327 P.3d 1251 (2014) (legal theories raised for
the first time at oral argument are too late for consideration), rev’d on other grounds by
183 Wash. 2d 84, 349 P.3d 826 (2015). Nonetheless, as noted, ROW 25.10.556(1) gives
the court the discretion to enter orders that “the circumstances of the case may require
to give effect to the charging order.”
Depositing Proceeds in Court Registry
Without citation to authority, Thomas claims MidTown did not have the authority
to deposit partnership distributions in the court registry. We do not consider issues not
supported by argument and citation to authority on appeal. RAP I 0.3(a)(6); Darkenwald
v. Emp’t Sec. Dept, 183 Wash. 2d 237, 248, 350 P.3d 647 (2015); Mairs v. Dep’t of
Licensing, 70 Wash. App. 541, 544-45, 854 P.2d 665 (1993).
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No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)114
Nonetheless, the record supports the decision of MidTown to deposit the
proceeds in the court registry pending resolution of the remaining disputes in the
Midtown lawsuit. The declaration Hugh filed as the general partner of MidTown
addresses the decision to deposit the proceeds in the court registry:
3. Disbursement of the roughly $2.8 million otherwise available
to Tom Bangasser has been held up because of confusion over who owns
Tom’s ownership units in the MidTown Partnership. Tom claims that he
sold half of the 12 units he claims he owns to the Africatown Trust .
The MidTown Partnership Agreement, however, forbids assignment of
ownership interests without consent of the limited partners, which Tom
never obtained. . He also claimed that as of year-end 2016, he had
. .
transferred 4 of the 12 units he claims to own to his daughter Lauren.
MidTown’s limited partners did not consent to that transfer.
4. Given MidTown’s knowledge of Tom’s position that he
transferred half of his ownership interest to Africatown, MidTown simply
cannot put itself at risk by not accepting Tom’s “instruction” to send aM of
the sale proceeds associated with his ownership units to Tom’s daughter
Lauren.[41
Article 5.3 of the MidTown Partnership Agreement, Distributive Shares and
Other Distribution,” also specifically provides:
The net profits of the partnership available for distribution after payment of
partnership liabilities then due, less reserves for the reasonable needs of
the business of the partnership, ~j~y be distributed at such times as the
General Partner may determine.15~
Conflict of Interest
In his opening brief, Thomas asserts the attorney who represents Hugh,
Elizabeth, and MidTown has a conflict of interest. But Thomas does not present
argument or explain why “there is a significant risk that the representation” is a conflict
or why the representation is “directly adverse” under RPC 1 .7(a). State v. Living
Essentials, LLC, 8Wn. App.2d 1, 14, 436 P.3d 857 (2019) (mere assertions of error are
~ Emphasis in original.
~ Emphasis added.
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No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)115
not enough to prevail on appeal). An appellant must include all theories upon which he
seeks reversal, accompanied by argument and citation to authority in his opening brief,
otherwise an appellate court will not consider the issue. Jackson v. Quality Loan Serv.
Corp., 186 Wash. App. 838, 845, 347 P.3d 487 (2015); Maziar, 180 Wash. App. at 227 n.1 1;
see also RAP 10.3(a); Univ. of Wash. v. Govt Emps. Ins. Co., 200 Wash. App. 455, 465
n.3, 404 P.3d 559 (2017) (‘An issue raised in a party’s opening brief but unsupported by
legal authority is waived.”). In his reply brief, Thomas cites the RPCs but does not
explain why these RPCs support his conflict of interest argument.
Charging Orders Not Designated on Appeal
Thomas argues this court should review charging orders the court entered on
July 10, 2017; August 30, 2017; and September 25, 2017. Thomas did not designate
these orders on appeal. We will review an undesignated order only if “the order or
ruling prejudicially affects the decision designated in the notice” of appeal. RAP
2.4(b)(1). Our Supreme Court has interpreted the term “prejudicially affects” to turn on
whether the order designated in the notice of appeal would have occurred absent the
other order. Adkins v. Alum. Co. of Am., 110 Wash. 2d 128, 134-35, 750 P.2d 1257, 756
P.2d 142 (1988); Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 146
Wash. 2d 370, 380, 46 P.3d 789 (2002). The issues in the orders ‘must be so entwined
“
that to resolve the order appealed, the court must consider the order not appealed.’ “ In
re Estate of Foster, 165 Wash. App. 33, 45, 268 P.3d 945 (2011) (quoting Right-Price
Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 105 Wash. App. 813, 819, 21 P.3d
1157 (2001)). Here, the prior charging orders are not so entwined with the charging
orders on appeal that we must considered those orders to resolve this appeal.
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Attorney Fees
When a contract provides for an attorney fee award, the party prevailing before
this court may seek reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. First Citizens Bank &
Trust Co. v. Harrison, 181 Wash. App. 595, 607, 326 P.3d 808 (2014); see also RAP 18.1.
The promissory notes state that “[ijf suit should be brought to collect any of the principal
or interest of this Note, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs.”
We affirm the charging and disbursement orders. Subject to compliance with
RAP 18.1, we award Elizabeth and Hugh reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
___________________ ~
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