State of Washington v. J.L.C. III ( 2019 )

FILED
MARCH 19, 2019
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 35934-4-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
J. L. C. III, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. — J.C. appeals from an adjudication in the Yakima County Superior
Court finding that he committed fourth degree assault against his mother. The evidence
supported the bench verdict. We affirm.
FACTS
Sixteen-year-old J.C. was in his bedroom arguing with his girlfriend, and then
with his sister, when his mother, R.L. intervened. She initially told him he could not
leave the house, but then told him that if he did leave, he could not take anything with
him. He was only wearing shorts at the time. When he attempted to gather up some
clothing, his mother grabbed his hands and threw the clothing down.
R.L. threw the dresser in J.C.’s bedroom to the floor. J.C. pushed her into a wall,
knocking the breath out of her. He then went upstairs to his grandmother’s apartment.
Police contacted him there.
No. 35934-4-III
State v. J.L.C. III
J.C. testified in his own behalf that he purposely used language that angered his
mother and had pushed her aside in order to re-enter his bedroom to retrieve clothing
before departing. He testified that he acted in self-defense when he pushed his mother
away.
The trial judge disagreed and determined that the claim of self-defense was not
credible. His stated belief that he was afraid of his mother was inconsistent with the fact
that he did not immediately leave after pushing her out of the way. Noting that a parent
can take “lawful measures” with a child, the judge also concluded that J.C.’s use of force
was excessive. The court adjudicated him guilty of fourth degree assault.
A standard disposition involving local sanctions was imposed. J.C. then timely
appealed to this court. A panel considered the appeal without hearing argument.
ANALYSIS
J.C. argues that the trial judge erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and
concluding that he assaulted his mother. These arguments are two sides of the same
coin—was the evidence sufficient to support the adjudication? Several well understood
principles of law govern our review of this argument.
Evidence is sufficient to support a verdict if the trier-of-fact has a factual basis for
finding each element of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Green, 94
Wash. 2d 216, 221-222, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). The evidence is viewed in the light most
2
No. 35934-4-III
State v. J.L.C. III
favorable to the prosecution. Green, 94 Wash. 2d at 221. Appellate courts defer to the trier-
of-fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness
of the evidence. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wash. 2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990).
In bench trials “appellate review is limited to determining whether substantial
evidence supports the findings of fact and, if so, whether the findings support the
conclusions of law.” State v. Homan, 181 Wash. 2d 102, 105-106, 330 P.3d 182 (2014).
“‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the
truth of the asserted premise.” Id. at 106.
Because J.C. raised a claim of self-defense, the burden was on the State to
disprove the claim beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Acosta, 101 Wash. 2d 612, 615-616,
683 P.2d 1069 (1984). Self-defense is evaluated “from the standpoint of a reasonably
prudent person who knows all the defendant knows and sees all the defendant sees.”
State v. Read, 147 Wash. 2d 238, 242, 53 P.3d 26 (2002). This analysis involves both
subjective and objective components. Id. at 242-243. These two components of self-
defense break down into four elements: “(1) the defendant subjectively feared that he was
in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; (2) this belief was objectively
reasonable”; “(3) the defendant exercised no greater force than was reasonably
necessary”; and “(4) the defendant was not the aggressor.” State v. Callahan, 87 Wn.
App. 925, 929, 943 P.2d 676 (1997). Disproof of any one of these elements negates the
self-defense claim. Id.
3
No. 35934-4-III
State v. J.L.C. III
A parent is allowed to use force to discipline or restrain a child, although the use
of force must be both moderate and objectively reasonable. State v. Singleton, 41 Wn.
App. 721, 723-724, 705 P.2d 825 (1985). In turn, a child has the right to use self-defense
against excessive force by a parent. State v. Graves, 97 Wash. App. 55, 61-63, 982 P.2d
627 (1999).
In light of these standards, J.C.’s argument flounders for multiple reasons. First,
the trial court disbelieved J.C. when he claimed that he needed to use force against his
mother. This determination was understandable in light of J.C.’s conflicting testimony
that he struck his mother both because he feared she would assault him and because he
wanted to enter his room to retrieve clothing, as well as by the fact that he did not leave
immediately after pushing his mother aside. If there is no evidence of self-defense in the
eyes of the trier-of-fact, then the State has easily disproved the absence of self-defense.
Second, the use of force was unnecessary. There was no evidence that R.L. either
used, or threatened to use, unreasonable force against J.C. Viewing the youth’s testimony
most favorably to him, all that he asserted was that (1) he feared his mom would hit him,
and (2) she was preventing him from going to his room to obtain clothing. The first claim
fails to establish a necessity for action since he never claimed that he feared she would use
excessive force. The second theory fails because he had no right to defend his clothing.
She was preventing him from leaving the apartment, as was her right, by forcing him to
choose between remaining or leaving without being fully dressed. It was not unreasonable
4
No. 35934-4-III
State v. J.L. C. III
for her to demand that he stay home. His desire to be elsewhere did not create a right to
assault his mother. Even if she subsequently demanded that he leave the apartment, as
J.C. contends, he presented no evidence suggesting that he was leaving against his own
will and that he necessarily had to assault his mother to carry out her order.
The trial court did not err in determining that J.C. was not acting in self-defense
when he assaulted his mother. That determination understandably leads to the conclusion
that the State disproved the claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the
evidence supported the bench verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Pennell, J.
5