State of Washington v. Scott Montgomery Nicholas ( 2014 )

FILED
DEC 30, 2014
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 31218-6-111
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
SCOTT MONTGOMERY NICHOLAS, ) OPINION PUBLISHED IN PART
)
Appellant. )
)
FEARING, J. "We thought that this issue was resolved." State v. Moore, 179
Wash. App. 464, 465,318 P.3d 296, review denied, 180 Wash. 2d 1019 (2014).
A jury found Scott Nicholas guilty of possession with intent to deliver
methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and use of drug paraphernalia. On appeal,
Nicholas assigns error to the trial court's instruction on the "duty to return a verdict of
guilty." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 31. As other courts have previously done, we approve
the jury instruction. We also devote pages to addressing the numerous attacks by
Nicholas upon the instruction.
Nicholas also argues the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose a variable
term of community custody, which the State concedes as error. We affirm Nicholas'
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State v. Nicholas
convictions, but accept the State's concession.
LA W AND ANALYSIS
Neither party outlines the facts behind Scott Nicholas' convictions. The facts are
unimportant. We proceed directly to our legal analysis.
Duty to Convict Jury Instruction
For each of the three charges against Scott Nicholas, the trial court instructed the
jury that: "If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty."
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 31, 41, 43. Washington decisions refer to this jury instruction as
the duty to convict instruction. The language of this instruction is recommended at 11
Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 4:21 (3d ed.
2008). Nicholas raises a familiar argument: the trial court's instruction misled the jury
about its power to acquit.
Each division of this court has approved, at least once, the propriety of the duty to
convict instruction. State v. Moore, 179 Wash. App. 464, 318 P.3d 296, review denied, 180
Wash. 2d 1019 (2014). (Division One); State v. Meggyesy, 90 Wash. App. 693, 700,958 P.2d
319 (1998) (Division One), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Recuenco, 154 Wash. 2d
156, 110 P.3d 188 (2005); State v. Brown, 130 Wash. App. 767, 124 P.3d 663 (2005)
(Division Two); State v. Bonisisio, 92 Wash. App. 783, 794, 964 P.2d 1222 (1998)
(Division Two); State v. Wilson, 176 Wn. App. 147,307 P.3d 823 (2013), review denied,
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State v. Nicholas
179 Wash. 2d 1012 (2014) (Division Three). Challenges to the instruction surround the
concept ofjury nullification. Jury nullification occurs in a trial when a jury acquits a
defendant, even though the members of the jury believe the defendant to be guilty of the
charges. This may occur when members of the jury disagree with the law the defendant
has been charged with breaking, or believe that the law should not be applied in that
particular case. Nullification is a juror's knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence
or refusal to apply the law because the result dictated by law is contrary to the juror's
sense ofjustice, morality, or fairness. State v. Elmore, 155 Wn.2d 758,761 n.l, 123 P.3d
72 (2005) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 875 (8th ed. 2004)).
Division One of this court thoroughly addressed arguments against use of the duty
to convict instruction in State v. Meggyesy, 90 Wash. App. 693 (1998). Like Nicholas, the
appellants in Meggyesy pointed to the jury's power to acquit against the evidence. The
Meggyesy court noted the ability of the jury to engage in nullification, but upheld the
instruction as a correct statement oflaw. Jury nullification "is an inherent feature of the
use of general verdicts. But the power to acquit does not require any instruction telling
the jury that it may do so." 90 Wash. App. at 700 (internal citations omitted). In other
words, courts recognize that jury nullification occurs in practice, but we will not promote
it nor educate jurors about nullification.
Scott Nicholas seeks to distance himself from appellants in previous decisions by
arguing that appellants in Meggyesy and Bonisisio also asked the court to approve a jury
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No. 31218-6-111
State v. Nicholas
instruction that tells the jury it may acquit. Nicholas only asks this court to disapprove an
instruction that tells the jury it has a duty to convict when the State proves all elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, Nicholas' distinction lacks
importance. Meggyesy and Bonisisio addressed the respective appellant's objection to the
duty to convict instruction as a discrete issue and did not conflate the issue with the
appellant's desire for a jury nullification instruction. Nicholas also fails to observe that
the courts in State v. Moore, State v. Brown, and State v. Wilson addressed only Nicholas'
assignment of error. The appellant in Brown sought to distinguish his appeal on the same
ground as Nicholas does here, but to no avail. 130 Wash. App. at 770-71.
Scott Nicholas contends the State violated two Washington constitutional
provisions by employing the duty to convict jury instruction. Article I, section 21
provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." Article I, section 22
provides: "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have
been committed." Nicholas maintains that, based on these constitutional provisions, the
word "duty" in the jury instruction unconstitutionally impinges upon ajury's inherent
power to acquit. Meggyesy already addressed this argument. Nicholas cites no authority
to the effect that a right to a jury trial equates to a right of acquittal.
Scott Nicholas argues that the duty to convict jury instruction should not be given
because the state and federal constitutions do not impose a duty upon a jury to render a
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State v. Nicholas
guilty verdict even ifit finds the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. He cites no authority for this contention. A duty need not arise from
the constitution, but can arise from a statute or common law.
Scott Nicholas maintains that the Washington constitution provides greater
protection for the right to a jury since the state constitution reads that the right shall
remain inviolate. He argues the difference in language from the United States
constitution suggests the drafters of the state constitution meant something different from
the federal Bill of Rights. He cites the late Hon. Robert F. Utter's seminal article,
Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the
Washington Declaration ofRights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 491, 515 (1984).
Nevertheless, Justice Utter's article does not support jury nullification nor does it criticize
a duty to convict instruction. Nicholas does not explain how the difference in language
between the Washington and federal constitutions establishes a constitutional right to jury
nullification.
In State v. Meggyesy, 90 Wash. App. 693 (1998), Division One ably analyzed, under
State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 59, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), the state constitution's
difference in language from the federal constitution's jury trial right provision. After
engaging in the six step analysis, the court held the Washington constitution does not
support jury nullification nor preclude the giving of a duty to convict instruction.
Meggyesy, 90 Wash. App. at 701-05. We cannot improve on Meggyesy's Gunwall analysis.
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State v. Nicholas
Scott Nicholas contends the right to a jury trial is so fundamental that any
infringement violates the constitution. He cites no authority supporting a conclusion that
a fundamental right precludes instructing a jury that it holds a duty to convict. He does
not explain how imposing a duty to convict on the jury, if the State proves its case
beyond a reasonable doubt, infringes on the constitution.
Scott Nicholas contends two territorial decisions support the rendering of a jury
nullification instruction or at least an instruction that informs the jury it "may" rather than
"must" convict upon the government's meeting its burden of proof. Based on these two
decisions, Nicholas argues that the state's 1889 constitution was adopted under such a
legal background such that the constitution adopted jury nullification and disapproved the
duty to convict instruction. The two decisions are Hartigan v. Territory o/Washington, 1
Wash. Terr. 447 (1874) and Leonard v. Territory o/Washington, 2 Wash. Terr. 381, 7 P.
872 (1885).
Hartigan v. Territory o/Washington disassembles Scott Nicholas' argument. The
territorial Supreme Court ruled that the judge declares the law of the case. The court
wrote:
A juryman is just as much bound by the laws of this territory as any
other citizen. He acquires no right to disregard that law simply because he
has taken an oath as juryman to aid in its administration.
1 Wash. Terr. at 451.
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State v. Nicholas
In Leonard v. Territory of Washington the trial court instructed the jury, in part:
"If you find the facts necessary to establish the guilt of defendant, proven to the certainty
above stated, then you may find him guilty of such a degree of crime as the facts so found
show him to have committed." 2 Wash. Terr. at 399 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the
territorial high court did not address the validity of the jury instruction. No
preconstitutional state decision approves jury nullification or disapproves of a duty to
convict instruction. The Meggyesy court also rejected this same argument.
Scott Nicholas claims he reframes the standard defense argument to avoid the
precedents of Meggyesy and Bonisisio by focusing on the word "duty." Nicholas defines
"duty" as "[a]n act or a course of action that is required of one by ... law," citing The
American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed. 2000). Nicholas argues the use of the word
"duty" misstates the law because it requires a jury to convict if it finds that the State
proved all of the elements of the charged crimes. We disagree. Division Two, in State v.
Brown, also disagreed. 130 Wash. App. at 771. None of Nicholas' arguments are new
under the sun.
Judges must declare the law, while jurors must swear to faithfully apply that law.
Our state constitution requires: "Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of
fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law." CONST. art. IV, § 16. The judge
must be permitted to instruct the jury on the law and to insist that the jury follow his or
her instructions. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513,115 S. Ct. 2310,132 L. Ed.
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No. 31218-6-III
State v. Nicholas
2d 444 (1995); Spar/v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-06, 15 S. Ct. 273,39 L. Ed. 343
(1895). Jurors swear an oath to faithfully apply the law. RCW 4.44.260 requires:
When the jury has been selected, an oath or affirmation shall be
administered to the jurors, in substance that they and each of them, will
well, and truly try, the matter in issue between the plaintiff and defendant,
and a true verdict give, according to the law and evidence as given them on
the trial.
(Emphasis added.) The use of the word "duty" is consistent with the oath requirement
that the jury give a true verdict, and that it does so according to the law and evidence.
Scott Nicholas contends an a9cused may have no right to a jury instruction stating
that the jury can ignore the law, but the State holds no corresponding right to a jury
instruction that tells the jury it cannot ignore the law. RCW 4.44.260 reads otherwise.
Scott Nicholas identifies several rules that preclude a court's interference in a
jury's deliberation and verdict. For example, a court may never direct a verdict of guilty
in a criminal case. United States v. Garaway, 425 F.2d 185, 185 (9th Cir. 1970); State v.
Primrose, 32 Wn. App. 1,4,645 P.2d 716 (1982). A court may not punish jurors for the
jury verdict. Bushel's Case, 124 E.R. 1006 (1670). A court should not inquire into the
substance ofjury deliberations or the thought process of any particular juror. State v.
Berniard, 182 Wash. App. 106, 119,327 P.3d 1290 (2014). A trial court should not
dismiss a juror accused ofjury nullification if there is a reasonable possibility that the
accusation arises from the juror's views of the merits of the case. State v. Elmore, 155
Wash. 2d at 778. Scott Nicholas argues that these rules demand a court refrain from
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No.31218-6-II1
State v. Nicholas
delivering a duty to convict instruction. Nevertheless, courts created these rules to
protect the cherished right to a jury trial. To protect this right, courts indulge a strong
presumption that ajury functions wisely and within the law. The right to a jury trial
under these circumstances trumps the jury's obligation to obey the law. A defendant
should not take advantage of these protections by demanding jury nullification.
Scott Nicholas reasons that, if a court may not direct a verdict, the jury must be
free to ignore the law and instructing the jury otherwise is wrong and misstates the law.
The answer to this contention has already been given. The ability to acquit does not
require any instruction telling the jury that it may do so. Meggyesy, 90 Wash. App. at 700.
Scott Nicholas' argument omits recognition of rules that discourage jury
nullification. The state of Washington may remove from the jury panel a potential juror
who refuses to obey state law authorizing the death penalty. State v. Cross, 156 Wn.2d
580,597, 132 P.3d 80 (2006). A juror who engages injury nullification may be excused.
State v. Morfin, 171 Wash. App. 1, 7-8, 287 P.3d 600 (2012), review denied, 176 Wash. 2d
1025 (2013). These rules presuppose that jurors must obey the law.
Scott Nicholas observes that, if a duty to convict exists, the law lacks any method
of enforcing it. We agree with this observation. It does not follow, however, that a court
cannot or should not instruct the jury it must follow the law. Many other laws may lack
methods of enforcement or lack practical methods of enforcement. A lack of
enforcement measures does not render the law invalid.
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Scott Nicholas retraces a history in the United States ofjury nullification. He
provides examples of nullification as if to argue we should follow such examples. We
could add to those examples. In 1734, a colonial jury acquitted John Peter Zenger of
seditious libel against the New York colonial governor. Pre-Civil War erajuries
sometimes refused to convict for violations of the Fugitive Slave Act. Later, during
prohibition, juries often nullified alcohol control laws. This resistance contributed to the
repeal of prohibition.
Justice Story dealt a blow to jury nullification in a crucial ruling in United States v.
Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545). Justice Story sustained the
conception that the jury's function lay in accepting the law given to it by the court and
applying that law to the facts. This reasoned ruling of an influential jurist won increasing
acceptance in the nation. By 1835, a youthful passion for independence succumbed to
the reality that former rebels now controlled their own destiny. The practical needs of
stability and sound growth outweighed the abstraction of centrifugal philosophy. Judges
were no longer colonial appointees projecting royalist patronage and influence but
contributed to the nation's intellectual mainstream, subject to the checks of the common
law tradition and professional opinion. In Washington, we elect judges such that an
arbitrary judge may be voted out of office.
In 1895, the United States Supreme Court ended any seeds of acceptance ofjury
nullification in the federal courts. In Spar/v. United States, 156 U.S. 51,15 S. Ct. 273,
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39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), the Court held 5 to 4 that a trial judge has no responsibility to
inform the jury of the right to nUllify laws. The jury's role was respected as significant
and wholesome, but it was not to be given instructions that articulated a right to do
whatever it willed. Washington courts have accepted the fact that jury nullification
occurs, but the courts have never promoted the practice.
Scott Nicholas employs rhetorical flourishes to promote jury nullification and to
reject a jury instruction informing the jury it must convict upon proof of the elements of
the crime. Nicholas argues that the purpose behind a jury is to take power away from an
abusive and powerful government and from judges beholden to the government. Jury
nullification prevents a majority from imposing its will on a minority. Nullification
precludes prosecutorial abuse of power. Nicholas does not observe that, in Washington,
we elect prosecuting attorneys who can be voted from office.
Scott Nicholas and proponents ofjury nullification fail to recognize the harm
caused by and a hideous history of abuse of nullification. On August 28, 1955, Roy
Bryant and his half-brother 1. W. Milam kidnapped fourteen-year old Emmett Louis Till,
an African-American who reportedly flirted with Bryant's wife, in Money, Mississippi.
The brothers removed Till to a bam, where they beat him, gouged out one of his eyes,
and shot him through the head. They disposed of the body in the Tallahatchie River, by
tying a cotton gin fan around the boy's neck with barbed wire. The following month, a
jury acquitted Bryant and Milam of kidnapping and murder. The half-brothers, being
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No. 31218-6-111
State v. Nicholas
protected by double jeopardy, publicly admitted in an interview with Look magazine that
they killed Till.
In 1963, Byron De La Beckwith assassinated NAACP leader Medgar Evers
outside Evers' Jackson, Mississippi home. The state twice prosecuted De La Beckwith
for murder in 1964, but both trials ended with hung juries. During the second trial,
former Governor Ross Barnett interrupted the trial to shake hands with Beckwith while
Evers' widow testified. De La Beckwith thereafter repeatedly bragged about the murder.
We could provide other examples ofjury nullification resulting in extreme
injustice. Many, who never complained ofjury nullification in the south, objected to the
acquittal ofO. J. Simpson as a form of nullification.
A fundamental value of America is the rule of law rather than rule by men. The
Washington populace justifiably does not want activist judges who base decisions upon
political views or moral judgments. The same should hold true for jurors. Jury
nullification destroys the rule of law upon which America is based. As the 1992 Los
Angeles riots evidence, nullification engenders anarchy.
The rest of this opinion is unpublished because it lacks precedential value.
Therefore, it will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, the rules
governing unpublished opinions.
Variable Term o/Community Custody
Scott Nicholas contends the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose a
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State v. Nicholas
variable term of community custody. The State concedes error and we accept the
concession.
A trial court may only impose sentences that statutes authorize. State v. Albright,
144 Wash. App. 566, 568, 183 P.3d 1094 (2008). Previously, a court could impose a
variable term of community custody under RCW 9.94A.715. But our legislature
repealed RCW 9.94A.715 in 2008 in favor of fixed terms of community custody. LAWS
OF 2008, ch. 231, § 57; LAWS OF 2009, ch. 28, § 42. Under the amended statute, RCW
9.94A.701(1)-(3), a court may no longer sentence an offender to a variable term of
community custody contingent on the amount of earned release, but it must instead
determine the precise length of community custody at the time of sentencing. State v.
Franklin, 172 Wash. 2d 831, 836, 263 P.3d 585 (2011). Therefore, Scott Nicholas'
contingent sentence, the longer of the period of early release or 12 months, violates RCW
9.94A.701.
Statement ofAdditional Grounds
In his statement of additional grounds (SAG), Scott Nicholas asks a series of
questions and alleges errors for which the current record is insufficient to review.
Nicholas asks: "Is there case law used to determine how much the amount of
methamphetamine is considered a possession / versus possession with intent to deliver?"
SAG at 1. We refrain from answering the question because Nicholas forwards no facts to
show this question relevant to the appeal. This court avoids deciding issues unnecessary
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No. 31218-6-II1
State v. Nicholas
to the resolution of a case, and also avoids rendering advisory opinions where there is no
real justiciable controversy. Cena v. Dep't ofLabor & Indus., 121 Wash. App. 915, 924,
91 PJd 903 (2004).
Scott Nicholas also complains that the State failed to list Detective Michael Kallio
as a witness for the erR 3.5 suppression hearing. We reject this complaint because
Kallio testified only at trial.
Scott Nicholas appears to argue that he received ineffective assistance from
counsel. To convict Nicholas, the State relied on testimony that he safeguarded
methamphetamine for his girlfriend in order to argue that Nicholas planned to return the
methamphetamine to her, thus showing that he intended to deliver the methamphetamine.
Nicholas now asserts that he did not understand that "delivery" includes returning
someone else's property to her. He avers that, had he understood the full extent of the
meaning of "delivery," he would not have testified. Nicholas claims his defense counsel
did not adequately advise him on this subject. He concedes, however, that he and his
defense counsel "did discuss this issue about the bag of methamphetamine that belonged
to my girlfriend before trial." SAG at 4. On the current record, and in light of Nicholas'
concession, Nicholas cannot show counsel to be ineffective.
Scott Nicholas further complains that the local newspaper ran a story about him,
which interfered with his right to a fair trial and impartial jury. Nicholas neither claims
nor shows that any juror read this story. Nor does Nicholas explain how the story
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No. 31218-6-III
State v. Nicholas
otherwise impacted his trial. Thus, we are unable to conclude that the story thwarted his
right to a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
We affirm Scott Nicholas' convictions but remand with instructions for the trial
court to impose a fixed term of community custody.
WE CONCUR:
``~,evE
Siddoway, C ..
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