City Of Bonney Lake v. Robert Kanany ( 2014 )

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
2014 DEC 30 AM 9: 42
STATE OF WASHINGTON
BY
E ° UTY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
CITY OF BONNEY LAKE, a municipal No. 42988 -8 -II
corporation,
Respondent, PART PUBLISHED OPINION
v.
ROBERT KANANY,
Appellant.
BJORGEN, J. — Robert Kanany appeals the trial court' s denial of his summary judgment
motion and its grant of summary judgment to the City of Bonney Lake ( City), upholding civil
penalties assessed by the City for various code violations at Kanany' s properties. The published
portion of this opinion addresses Kanany' s argument that portions of Title 14 of the Bonney Lake
Municipal Code ( BLMC) deprived him of procedural due process because they did not provide an
appeal process for all violations claimed and penalties assessed. On this issue, we hold that the
relevant portions of Title 14 BLMC provided Kanany with a full opportunity to appeal the notices
of violation and penalties at issue and therefore did not deprive him of due process. In the
unpublished portion of the opinion, we reject Kanany' s remaining arguments. Accordingly, we
affirm the decision of the trial court.
No. 42988 -8 -II
FACTS
Kanany and Navid Kananil are co- owners of property in the City. In 2004, Kanany applied
for a residential accessory building permit from the City, indicating his intent to build a duplex
and a garage with a heated upstairs unit on the property. The City approved his permit and noted
that " per code detached garage may not be converted to living space." Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 212.
After the duplex and garage were built, Kanany used the duplex as a rental property.
Between 2007 and 2009, responding to complaints about Kanany' s property, the City
investigated the space above Kanany' s garage to determine whether he was in compliance with
the BLMC. In February 2007, the City sent Kanany a notice of civil violation, indicating that his
property was in violation of BLMC 18. 22. 090 because he utilized or converted a portion of the
garage into an " Accessory Dwelling Unit" ( ADU). ADUs are prohibited in conjunction with a
duplex. BLMC 18. 22. 090( C)( 1). The City imposed a $ 1, 000 -a -day fine until Kanany became
compliant. The notice stated that Kanany had 15 days to appeal the notice.
In March 2007, Kanany sent Denney Bryan of the City a letter stating that his attorney had
been told by the City that Kanany would not be in violation of the BLMC as long as the space
above the garage did not contain a kitchen stove and washer /dryer and that Bryan had told him
that the washer /dryer " is not an issue." CP at 216. Kanany stated that his tenants were using the
space above the garage as a bedroom and recreational room and that " neither appliances" were in
that space. CP at 216. This apparently satisfied the City for 2007. In 2008, responding to a
1 Because the last names Kanany and Kanani are similar, we refer to Navid Kanani by his first
name to avoid confusion, intending no disrespect.
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complaint from a neighbor, the City again investigated and concluded that Kanany' s property and
the space above the garage still complied with the BLMC.
On August 5, 2009, after another complaint, the City issued a letter to Kanany stating that
the space above the garage violated BLMC 18. 22. 090( C)( 1). The City asked Kanany to voluntarily
comply with its requests to vacate tenants from the space and arrange an inspection of the property
to verify the vacancy. The City gave Kanany 45 days to comply.
On November 18, 2009, the City sent Kanany a notice of civil violation indicating that he
had failed to respond to its letter within 45 days. The notice stated that under BLMC 14. 130. 070,
it was imposing a $ 1, 000 -a -day fine until Kanany complied, and that under BLMC 14. 130. 080 and
BLMC 14. 120. 020, the City' s violation determination and subsequent fine were final unless
Kanany appealed within 15 days. Kanany did not appeal.
On January 8, 2010, the City filed a complaint against Kanany in superior court, asserting
that he maintained an impermissible ADU in violation of BLMC 18. 22. 090( C)( 1). Alleging
Kanany' s failure to respond to the November 2009 notice of civil violation, the City stated that its
code violation determination and fines were final and collectible under BLMC 14. 130. 070.
In the complaint, the City misidentified the property' s address and in June 2010, it moved
under CR 15( a) for leave to file an amended complaint with the property' s correct address.2
Kanany objected to the City' s motion because the City had not joined Navid as a necessary party
in the lawsuit under CR 19( a).
2 The City identified Kanany' s city mailing address as the address in violation instead of the proper
address of the property containing the duplex and garage.
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In August, the trial court determined that ( 1) chapter 14. 130 BLMC was constitutional on
its face and as applied to Kanany, ( 2) Navid was not a necessary party to the action under the
BLMC or CR 19( a), and ( 3) the City' s motion to amend was proper under CR 15( a). The trial
court granted the City' s motion to amend.
In November 2011, Kanany and the City filed cross motions for summary judgment.
Kanany' s motion asked the court to dismiss the City' s complaint with prejudice. Kanany
contended that beginning in 2004, he communicated with City officials several times about the
space above his detached garage and they always told him that he was in compliance with the
BLMC until the November 2009 notice of civil violation. Kanany asserted that he was not in
violation of the BLMC because his tenants' use of the space above the garage had not changed
between 2004 and 2009. Kanany also asserted that equitable estoppel prevented the City from
assessing fines against him because it had previously agreed that Kanany was not in violation.
Finally, Kanany argued that BLMC 18. 22. 090( C)( 1) was invalid and unenforceable because it
directly conflicted with an overriding BLMC provision and was fatally inconsistent with the City' s
comprehensive plan.
To support his motion, Kanany filed a declaration attaching copies of several documents,
including his 2007 and 2008 communication with the City, a June 2008 letter from the City to the
complaining neighbor, the August 2009 letter and Kanany' s letter in response, and the November
2009 notice of violation from the City. Kanany also supported his motion with a declaration from
his attorney and attached copies of several City ordinances and the City' s comprehensive plan.
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The City' s cross motion for summary judgment asked the court to find that Kanany violated
the BLMC and owed $48, 000 in fines. The City argued that it gave Kanany proper notification of
the violation and the consequences for failing to voluntarily correct the violation. The City stated
that because Kanany failed to contact the City within 45 days of receiving the notice letter, it issued
a notice of civil violation and imposed a $ 1, 000 -a -day penalty while the violation continued. In
addition to the 45 days given to respond to the City' s August 2009 letter, the City gave Kanany 15
days to appeal the November 2009 violation notice and penalty; however, Kanany still failed to
respond. The City argued that there was no genuine issue of fact that Kanany failed to appeal the
notice and fines and, absent any appeal, the City' s notice of civil violation is final and the
associated fines are collectible.
In December 2011, the trial court granted the City' s motion for summary judgment and
denied Kanany' s motion for summary judgment. The court entered judgment " against [ Kanany]
on behalf of the City for $48, 000, the total amount of fines owed in connection to the Notice of
Civil Violation as of the filing of the original complaint in this matter." CP at 350. Kanany
appeals.
ANALYSIS
Kanany argues that under Post v. City of Tacoma, 167 Wash. 2d 300, 217 P.3d 1179 ( 2009),
BLMC 14. 120. 020, 14. 130. 070, and 14. 130. 080 are unconstitutional because they allow a single
notice of violation to impose subsequent daily penalties without any opportunity to appeal them.
The City argues that the BLMC is unlike the Tacoma city ordinances at issue in Post because the
BLMC provided express procedures for Kanany to raise any argument against the violation
determination, but Kanany declined to take advantage of any of the procedures. Kanany also
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raises a number of challenges discussed in the unpublished portion of this opinion. We affirm all
the challenged rulings of the trial court.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings and affidavits show there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR
56( c). We review questions of law de novo. Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wash. 2d 91, 103, 26 P.3d
257 ( 2001). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we consider solely the issues and
evidence called to the trial court' s attention on a motion for summary judgment. RAP 9. 12.
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Title 14 BLMC provides the City' s enforcement authority for development code violations.
BLMC 14. 130. 010. Each day in violation constitutes a separate offense. BLMC 14. 130. 020( C).
BLMC 14. 130. 030( A) provides that any development code violation shall be a misdemeanor and
a civil violation, the penalty being $ 1, 000 for each day in violation. If the City determines that a
person is violating the development code, it attempts to secure voluntary correction of the problem
by explaining the violation and requesting correction before issuing a notice of civil violation.
BLMC 14. 130. 060.
A notice of civil violation represents a determination that a violation of the development
code has been committed. BLMC 14. 130. 070( A). A property owner may file a written appeal of
the notice to the hearing examiner within 15 days of its issuance. BLMC 14. 120. 020( A), .130. 080.
At the hearing before the hearing examiner, the property owner and the City department director
may participate and call witnesses. BLMC 14. 130. 080. The hearing examiner is required to
prepare findings as to whether a preponderance of evidence shows that the violation occurred and
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that the required corrective action is reasonable. BLMC 14. 130. 080. The hearing examiner' s
decision may be appealed to superior court. BLMC 14. 120. 020( G).
Our state and federal case law holds that the fundamental requirement of procedural due
process " is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Post,
167 Wash. 2d at 313 ( citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18
1976)). To determine whether existing procedures are adequate to protect the interest at stake, a
court must consider the following three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government' s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 313 ( quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335); see also Tellevik v. Real Prop., 120
Wash. 2d 68, 78, 838 P.2d 111 ( 1992) ( adopting and applying the Mathews test).
The analysis in Post illustrates the application of the Mathews test in a setting similar, but
not identical to that presented here. In Post, the City of Tacoma found many of Post' s properties
to be in violation of various city standards. Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 303. Tacoma sent notices of
violation for each property, " notifying Post that the properties were either substandard or derelict."
Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 305. These notices " described the violations and advised Post how to seek
administrative review of the violation notice." Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 305. For most of his properties,
Post responded to the notices by agreeing to repair schedules. Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 305. However,
he did not respond to at least two of the violation notices. Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 306.
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Post failed to comply with the agreed repair schedules for 17 properties." Post, 167 Wash. 2d
at 306. In response, Tacoma began issuing civil penalties in the amount of $125 per property
pursuant to the Tacoma Municipal Code 2. 01. 060( D)( 4)( b) and ( E)( 3)( b). Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 306.
As a result, Tacoma imposed hundreds of thousands of dollars in civil penalties. Post, 167 Wash. 2d
at 303, 307. Post attempted to appeal many of the fines, but in most cases Tacoma denied a hearing,
taking the position that the appeals were untimely because its municipal code required an appeal
within 30 days of the first notice of violation. Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 306. Post sued, " seeking to bar
Tacoma from enforcing its building code against him on numerous grounds," including the claim
that his rights to due process were violated. Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 303 -04.
On appeal, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the civil infraction ordinance at issue
offended procedural due process under Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, because " it purport[ ed] to
authorize the unlimited and unreviewable issuance and enforcement of subsequent civil infractions
and penalties without any system of procedural safeguards." Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 315. In its
Mathews analysis, the court in Post relied heavily on the risk of the erroneous deprivation of
property rights due to the absence of any procedural, safeguards after issuance of the first
mandatory fine, including subsequent discretionary fines. Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 313 - 15. Because
those were separate decisions involving changed facts and risk of error, Post held that due process
required new appeal opportunities. 167 Wash. 2d at 314 -15.
The mechanics of Tacoma' s flawed system, though, were different in critical respects from
that of the City of Bonney Lake. If, after issuance of a notice of violation, the violation was not
corrected, the Tacoma ordinance provided for four successive mandatory fines. Post, 167 Wash. 2d
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at 304 -05. If the violation remained after the four fines, Tacoma had the discretion either to assess
or not to assess fines for each day until the violation was remedied. Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 305. The
owner had the right to seek administrative review only after the initial notice of violation and after
the first mandatory fine. Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 305. The owner had no right to an administrative
appeal of any of the wholly discretionary fines Tacoma might impose after the mandatory
penalties. Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 305.
Here, in blunt contrast, there was nothing discretionary about the daily fines at issue. They
were automatic, and Kanany had the full opportunity to appeal the continuing fines for his specific
violation. The November 18 notice of civil violation characterized itself as continuing in nature
and specifically described the nature of the violation, the code section violated, and the nature of
the action required for its remedy. The notice imposed a daily fine3 until compliance was achieved
and specifically stated that the violation was ongoing. The notice then expressly advised Kanany
that he could appeal under BLMC 14. 130. 080 and BLMC 14. 120. 020 by filing an appeal in writing
with the Bonney Lake Planning and Community Development Department within 15 days of his
receipt of the notice. BLMC 14. 120. 020 and BLMC 14. 130. 080 each specifically allow appeals
of notices of civil violations.
Thus, the right to appeal that notice under BLMC 14. 120. 020 and. BLMC 14. 130. 080
afforded the full opportunity to challenge both the determination that the violation was occurring
and the imposition of specific
daily fines until that violation was remedied. This appeal
opportunity provided Kanany the vehicle to challenge the ongoing daily fines, whether accruing
before or after the end of the 15 -day appeal period.
3 No issue is raised whether the total amount of the fines assessed is excessive as a remedial
measure.
No. 42988 -8 -II
In sum, Kanany was given the full opportunity to appeal all aspects of the notice of civil
violation, including the ongoing daily fine. That opportunity to appeal the entire assessment of
fines was the step that was absent in Post. The absence of that opportunity, the absence of that
safeguard against erroneous deprivation of property, was the flaw that led the court in Post to
find a due process violation under Mathews. Here, that safeguard is fully present.
Returning to the test in Mathews, applied by our court in Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 313, the
private interest here is the same as that at stake in Post, that of avoiding the " assessment of
erroneous or excessive monetary penalties." Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 313. The government interest is
also the same as that in Post, " protecting public safety, protecting property values, and preventing
declining neighborhoods." Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 314. The critical weight in the Mathews test in the
present appeal is the second element, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest.
As noted, Post relied on the absence of any procedural safeguards when Tacoma decided whether
to issue its discretionary fines. Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 314 -15. As also noted, Kanany had the
opportunity to appeal his ongoing fines in full. Requiring multiple opportunities to appeal the
same fines for the same violation, which accrue after the appeal period, does little, if anything, to
further guard against erroneous deprivation of the private interest at stake. Rather, its principal
effect is to burden the municipality with superfluous and costly administrative processes, which
directly erode the governmental interest protected by the third element in the Mathews test. Such
redundancies in procedure are not among the majestic requirements of due process. Under both
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Mathews and Post, the City here did not deprive Kanany of procedural due process. 4
Our decision of this appeal, of course, is confined to those issues properly raised by it.
Kanany' s due process challenge is to the ongoing fines imposed by the notice of civil violation.
He does not argue that he has attempted to remedy any lack of compliance or that the City has
erred in deeming any such attempt to be inadequate. Thus, his due process challenge fails
because he was given the opportunity to appeal his continuing daily fines for the violation found
in the notice, as described above. On the other hand, if Kanany were challenging the City' s
decision .on the adequacy of corrective measures he took, due process may well require the City
to afford an administrative appeal of that decision and the continuation of the remedial fines. 5
See Post, 167 Wash. 2d at 315. Kanany, however, is not raising such a challenge, either in an as
applied or facial sense. The trial court was correct in ruling that the City' s actions before us did
not deprive Kanany of procedural due process.
4
Alternatively, Kanany argues that the BLMC is also unconstitutional in that it does not provide
a complete system for enforcing civil infractions. The system is incomplete, Kanany argues,
because the hearing examiner is not authorized to decide constitutional or equitable matters. The
City responds that the BLMC comports with chapter 7. 80 RCW and is constitutional because
constitutional and equitable arguments can still be raised through appeals in the state court system
as provided in BLMC 14. 120. 020( G). Kanany' s argument rests on Post. The citations he gives
from Post, however, come from the Supreme Court' s discussion of whether the Land Use Petition
Act, chapter 36. 70C RCW, barred Post from challenging Tacoma' s imposition of penalties. Post,
167 Wash. 2d at 308 -12. Because neither party in this case raises a land use challenge, this portion
of Post cannot be read for the remarkable proposition that hearing examiner systems throughout
the state are unconstitutional because examiners are not authorized to decide equitable or
constitutional questions. The BLMC is not unconstitutional for this reason.
5 The City stated at oral argument that its municipal code would afford Kanany an opportunity to
appeal in such a situation. Wash. Court of Appeals oral argument, City ofBonney Lake v.
Kanany, No. 42988 -8 -II (Sept. 13, 2013), at 15 min., 06 sec. ( on file with the court).
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A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will
be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record
in accordance with RCW 2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
III. REMAINING ISSUES
Kanany next argues that the trial court improperly granted the City' s summary judgment
motion, thereby denying his motion for summary judgment, because ( 1) the space above his garage
is not an ADU as defined by the BLMC; ( 2) equitable estoppel prevents the City from claiming
that Kanany' s property is in violation of the BLMC; and (3) the portion of the BLMC that the City
is enforcing is in direct conflict with the City' s comprehensive plan and the state Growth
Management Act, chapter 36. 70A RCW.
The City responds that the trial court properly granted it summary judgment because ( 1)
Kanany failed to timely challenge whether the space was an ADU; ( 2) equitable estoppel is
unwarranted ; and ( 3) the BLMC is not in direct conflict with the City' s comprehensive plan or
the state Growth Management Act, chapter 36. 70A RCW. We hold that Kanany is precluded from
factually challenging the validity of the initial violation, that Kanany fails to meet all of the
elements of equitable estoppel, and that the BLMC is not in conflict with the City' s comprehensive
plan or the state Growth Management Act.
A. Whether the Space is an ADU
Citing the BLMC' s ADU definition, Kanany argues that the space above his garage is not
an ADU because it did not have a kitchen stove and washer /dryer appliances. The City responds
that because Kanany failed to respond to the City' s November 2009 notice of civil violation, as
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required by the BLMC, the City' s ADU determination was final and conclusive. BLMC
14. 130. 070( A) flatly states that a notice of civil violation is final, " unless appealed as provided
herein." Kanany did not appeal the notice at issue. Therefore, the City is correct that Kanany is
precluded from making this factual challenge.
B. Equitable Estoppel
A party claiming equitable estoppel must establish by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that
1) the conduct, acts, or statements by the party to be estopped are inconsistent with
a claim afterward asserted by that party, (2) the party asserting estoppel took action
in reasonable reliance upon that conduct, act, or statement, and ( 3) the party
asserting estoppel would suffer injury if the party to be estopped were allowed to
contradict the prior conducts, act, or statement.
Sorenson v. Pyeatt, 158 Wash. 2d 523, 538 -39, 146 P.3d 1172 ( 2006); Kramarevcky v. Dep' t ofSoc.
Health Servs., 122 Wash. 2d 738, 743, 863 P.2d 535 ( 1993). In addition to satisfying each of the
above elements, the party asserting equitable estoppel must have proceeded in good faith and have
clean hands,'" or be free from fault in the matter. Mut. ofEnumclaw Ins. Co. v. Cox, 110 Wash. 2d
643, 650, 757 P.2d 499 ( 1988).
The application of equitable estoppel against state or local governments is disfavored.
Kramarevcky, 122 Wash. 2d at 743. Consequently, where a party asserts equitable estoppel against
the government, it must meet two additional requirements: ( 1) equitable estoppel must be
necessary to prevent a manifest injustice, and ( 2) the exercise of governmental functions must not
be impaired as a result. Kramarevcky, 122 Wash. 2d at 743. The promulgation of zoning ordinances
is a governmental function and generally estoppel does not apply to government enforcement of
zoning ordinances, even when its officers have issued building permits, allowed construction
contrary to regulations, have given general approval to regulation violations, or have remained
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inactive in the face of such violations. City ofMercer Island v. Steinmann, 9 Wash. App. 479, 483,
513 P.2d 80 ( 1973).
Kanany fails to meet the requirements to successfully assert equitable estoppel against-the
City. He argues that he and the City had an express agreement that absent a kitchen stove and
washer /dryer, the City would not consider his property to be an ADU. He asserts that he has " lived
up to his side" of the agreement °and that therefore the City should be equitably estopped from
assessing monetary penalties against him. Br. of Appellant at 35. However, Kanany fails to cite
any evidence that was before the trial court at summary judgment which supports his assertion that
he has lived up to his side of the agreement as far as these appliances are concerned. Because he
failed to appeal the initial violation, he cannot challenge its validity now. Kanany has failed to
show any inconsistency in the positions taken by the City, not to mention any manifest injustice if
the City is not estopped from enforcing its ordinances. Therefore, he has not met the requirements
for equitable estoppel.
C. Whether the BLMC is in Conflict with the City' s Comprehensive Plan and State Growth
Management Act
Kanany argues that BLMC 18. 22. 090( C)( 1) is in direct conflict with BLMC 18. 16. 020( A),
the City' s comprehensive plan, and the Growth Management Act. Former BLMC 18. 16. 0206 is
titled " Uses permitted outright" for medium density residential districts, and provides, in part,
The following uses are permitted in an R -2 zone, subject to the off -street parking
requirements, bulk regulations and other provisions and exceptions set forth in
this code:
A. Residential Uses:
1. Single Family residence;
2. Duplexes ( two- family residences);
6 BLMC 18. 16. 020 was repealed in 2010 but was in effect during the time at issue here.
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3. Modular homes on individual lots;
4. Manufactured homes on individual lots;
5. Accessory dwelling units.
Emphasis added.) BLMC 18. 22. 090( C)( 1) provides, in part,
One accessory unit shall be allowed per legal building lot as a subordinate use in
conjunction with any single -family residence; no ADU will be permitted in
conjunction with any duplex or multiple -family residence.
Contrary to Kanany' s argument, these two subsections are not in conflict. Rather, former
BLMC 18. 16. 020 allows ADUs in medium density residential districts, subject to other provisions
and exceptions set forth in the City' s development code. BLMC 18. 22. 090( C)( 1) is one such
provision in the development code that limits ADUs. Thus, these provisions are wholly consistent.
Kanany also argues that BLMC 18. 22. 090( C)( 1)' s prohibition of ADUs in conjunction
with a duplex violates the Bonney Lake Comprehensive Plan and the Growth Management Act.
These arguments also fail. Although comprehensive plan policy 3 - 7a states the policy of allowing
ADUs in all residential zones, the plan does not suggest that ADUs must be allowed in every
location and every situation in those zones. Nor does the reasonable regulation of ADUs, including
their prohibition in conjunction with duplexes, jeopardize the policy of allowing them in all
residential zones. That prohibition is not inconsistent with the Bonney Lake Comprehensive Plan.
Kanany' s claim of inconsistency with the Growth Management Act fails for the same
reason. He argues that because the City' s regulations are inconsistent with its comprehensive plan,
they also violate the requirement of RCW 36. 70A.040( 3)( d), part of the Growth Management Act,
that " each city ... shall adopt a comprehensive plan under this chapter and development
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regulations that are consistent with and implement the comprehensive plan." As just held, Kanany
has not shown any inconsistency between the City' s development regulations and its
comprehensive plan. Therefore, he also has shown no violation of RCW 36. 70A.040( 3)( d).
D. Motion to Amend Complaint
Kanany assigns error to the trial court' s order granting the City' s motion for leave to amend
its complaint. Kanany argues that the trial court should have denied the City' s motion because the,
City failed to join Navid to the lawsuit and, as a co- owner, Navid was a necessary and
indispensable party.
We require appellants to argue assignments of error with citations to authority and
references to relevant parts of the record. RAP 10. 3( a)( 6). " Passing treatment of an issue or lack
of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration." Joy v. Dep' t of Labor &
Indus., 170 Wn. App. 614, 629, 285 P.3d 187 ( 2012) ( quoting West v. Thurston County, 168 Wn.
App. 162, 275 P.3d 1200 ( 2012)), review denied, 176 Wash. 2d 1021 ( 2013) ( alteration omitted).
We do not consider Kanany' s argument that the trial court erred when it granted the City
leave to amend its complaint because he failed to provide sufficient argument or provide relevant
7
Kanany argues also that the lack of necessary parties deprived the trial court of subject matter
jurisdiction. This argument misunderstands the nature of subject matter jurisdiction. Washington
superior courts have broad subject matter jurisdiction. See WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6. The critical
factor in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is the type of controversy.
Cole v. Harveyland, LLC, 163 Wash. App. 199, 209, 258 P.3d 70 ( 2011). The superior court has
original jurisdiction over all cases and proceedings in which jurisdiction has not been vested
exclusively in some other court. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; Wimberly v. Caravello, 136 Wash. App.
327, 333, 149 P.3d 402 ( 2006). Therefore, a court' s jurisdiction does not depend on the presence
or absence of a party. Wimberly, 136 Wn. App. at 334. Instead, failure to join affects only the
court' s authority over the absent party. Wimberly, 136 Wash. App. at 334.
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authority sufficient to merit further judicial review. Accordingly, we do not address Kanany' s
arguments on this issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court' s decision.
We concur:
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