In Re The Dependency Of C.j.f., 03/22/03, Jake Fair v. Dshs ( 2017 )


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  •        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    In re the Dependency of:                          No. 74875-1-1
    (consolidated with No. 74876-9-1)
    C.J.F. (DOB: 03/22/2003),
    DIVISION ONE                    %
    Minor child.
    re
    INES FAIR and JAKE FAIR,
    Appellants,
    v.
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                              UNPUBLISHED
    DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND
    HEALTH SERVICES,                                  FILED: January 23. 2017
    Respondent.
    Cox, J. -Jake and Ines Fair appeal the trial court's order terminating their
    parental rights to their son, C.J.F. Both parents contend that the State failed to
    prove (1) that all necessary and available services capable of correcting their
    parental deficiencies were provided, (2) that there was little likelihood their
    parental deficiencies could be remedied so that C.J.F. could be returned in the
    near future, and (3) that termination of parental rights was in C.J.F.'s best
    interests. The parents also challenge the trial court's finding that the State made
    active efforts to provide remedial services as required by the federal and state
    Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Because substantial evidence supports the
    trial court's findings and the findings support the conclusions of law, we affirm the
    termination order.
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-l)/2
    The Fairs are the parents of four children: daughter S.F. (born March 31,
    2001), son C.J.F. (born March 22, 2003), son R.P.F. (born July 26, 2006) and
    son B.C.F. (born September 27, 2008).
    C.J.F. was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder in 2006. He has also
    been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), obsessive
    compulsive disorder (OCD) and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). C.J.F.
    presents with serious behavioral challenges, including aggression, self-injury,
    and running away. He requires constant adult supervision.
    On June 17, 2012, the Fairs were putting their children to bed when C.J.F.
    refused to put on his pajamas. Jake1 hit C.J.F. with a belt on his bare skin
    approximately 60 to 75 times. C.J.F. arrived at school the following day with
    extensive bruising on his legs and buttocks. C.J.F.'s teacher described the
    bruising as so severe she was surprised C.J.F. could even sit down.
    Further investigation revealed several other instances of physical and
    verbal abuse, particularly against C.J.F.2 C.J.F.'s school bus driver had
    observed bloody scratches on C.J.F.'s neck that Ines admitted inflicting. The bus
    driver had also observed Ines grabbing C.J.F. by the throat and yelling at him.
    On another occasion, when C.J.F. resisted getting off the bus, Ines grabbed
    C.J.F. by the leg and dragged him down the steps onto the sidewalk. C.J.F.'s
    1 Because the parents share the same last name, we refer to them by their first
    names for clarity.
    2According to the testimony at trial, when 2-year-old S.F. complained she was
    hot and repeatedly tried to take off a sweater, Ines pinned her down and spanked her
    severely. The Fairs also admitted they spanked R.P.F. and B.C.F. with a belt.
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-l)/3
    teacher observed Ines tell C.J.F. that he would have a cold shower and no dinner
    because he had misbehaved in class.
    The Department filed a dependency petition and all four children were
    placed with their paternal aunt and her partner. Jake reported to the Department
    that he had Cherokee heritage. The Department promptly contacted the three
    federally-recognized Cherokee tribes, all of which responded that the children did
    not qualify as Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
    On January 7, 2013, Jake pled guilty to one count of assault of a child in
    the second degree. He was subsequently sentenced to a term of 31 months.
    The terms of Jake's community custody prevented him from living with any of the
    children until April 2016. A separate no-contact order prevented Jake from
    having any contact with C.J.F. until 2023 except for professionally supervised
    visits.
    On January 23, 2013, both parents agreed to the establishment of
    dependency. The court order required Ines to participate in a parenting class,
    parent coaching, mental health counseling, a psychological evaluation, an anger
    management evaluation and a domestic violence assessment. The court also
    ordered Ines to participate in classes and support groups at The ARC of
    Snohomish County (ARC), a nonprofit outreach center for people with disabilities,
    including autism. The court ordered Jake to participate in a psychological
    evaluation, mental health counseling, parenting classes and a parenting coach.
    The Department also referred Jake to ARC upon his release from prison.
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-l)/4
    The parents complied with all of these services, though Ines made only
    limited use of ARC's resources and Jake did not contact them at all. Though
    providers testified that the Fairs generally made progress in their services, they
    continued to have difficulty handling C.J.F. during visits. For example, the Fairs
    continued to demonstrate unrealistic expectations for C.J.F.'s behavior. They
    also continued to physically restrain C.J.F. at visits for minor transgressions,
    despite the advice of multiple professionals, which caused C.J.F. to react
    aggressively. At the time of trial, the parents' visits with C.J.F. were still limited to
    once a week. And C.J.F. was rarely incorporated into the Fairs' visits with their
    other children because it was too overstimulating for C.J.F. On August 15, 2014,
    the Department filed a termination petition.3
    In June 2015, Jake was enrolled as a member of the Cherokee Nation.
    The Cherokee Nation subsequently notified the Department that the tribe
    considered the children to be Indian children as defined by the ICWA.
    Trial on the termination petition began on November 16, 2015. At the time
    of trial, C.J.F. was 12 years old and had been out of his parents' custody for
    more than three years. Following the testimony of 23 witnesses and the
    admission of 88 exhibits, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of
    3 The Department did not include S.F. in the termination petition because she
    had been returned to her mother's care by that time. The trial court did not terminate the
    parents' rights to R.P.F. and B.C.F., finding that termination was not in R.P.F.'s best
    interests and that the State had not shown that B.C.F. could not be returned to his
    mother's care in the near future. Only C.J.F. is the subject of this appeal.
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-l)/5
    law and an order terminating the Fairs' parental rights to C.J.F. Both parents
    appeal.
    SERVICES
    The Fairs contend that the Department failed to provide them with all
    necessary services capable of correcting their parental deficiencies. Specifically,
    the Fairs argue that they were not provided with hands-on parenting training for
    children with autism. We disagree.
    Parental rights are a fundamental liberty interest protected by the United
    States Constitution.4 To terminate the parent-child relationship, the Department
    must prove each of six statutory elements of RCW 13.34.180(1) by clear, cogent,
    and convincing evidence.5 Ifthe trial court finds that the State has met its burden
    under RCW 13.34.180, it may terminate parental rights if it also finds by a
    preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the "best interests" of the
    child.6
    One of these elements the Department must prove is that "the services
    ordered [by the court] have been expressly and understandably offered or
    provided and all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting
    the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and
    4 Santoskv v. Kramer. 
    455 U.S. 745
    , 753, 
    102 S. Ct. 1388
    , 71 L Ed. 2d 599
    (1982).
    5 In re Dependency of K.N.J.. 
    171 Wn.2d 568
    , 576-77, 
    257 P.3d 522
     (2011).
    6 RCW 13.34.190(1 )(b).
    5
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-l)/6
    understandably offered or provided."7 A service is "necessary" if it is "needed to
    address a condition that precludes reunification of the parent and child."8 A
    service is "reasonably available" if it is "available within the department or
    supervising agency, or within the community" or "the department has existing
    contracts to purchase" it.9 However, if a parent is unwilling or unable to make
    use of the services offered or provided, the Department is not required to offer
    additional services that might have been helpful.10
    Findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence.11
    Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal.12 In determining whether
    substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings, we will not weigh the
    evidence or the credibility of witnesses.13
    Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that all
    necessary and reasonably available services were offered to the parents. Prior
    to the dependency petition, C.J.F.'s teachers worked to help the Fairs
    understand C.J.F.'s condition. They also explained to the Fairs that physical
    discipline was not effective on children with autism. They referred the Fairs to
    7 RCW 13.34.180(1 )(d).
    8 In re Dependency of A.M.M., 
    182 Wn. App. 776
    , 793, 
    332 P.3d 500
     (2014).
    9 RCW 13.34.136(1 )(b)(vii).
    10 In re Dependency of S.M.H.. 
    128 Wn. App. 45
    , 54, 
    115 P.3d 990
     (2005).
    11 Pep. ofKN.J.. 171 Wn.2d at 577.
    12 In re Interest of J.F., 
    109 Wn. App. 718
    , 722, 
    37 P.3d 1227
     (2001).
    13 In re Dependency of E.L.F., 
    117 Wn. App. 241
    , 245, 
    70 P.3d 163
     (2003).
    6
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-l)/7
    ARC. ARC offers a wide variety of resources for parents of children with autism,
    including trainings, lectures and workshops, support groups for parents and
    siblings, and socialization activities for children. Workshop topics have included
    medications, legal issues, individual education plans (lEPs) and dietary changes.
    The Fairs attended some meetings and support groups at ARC prior to the
    dependency proceedings. However, their participation declined dramatically
    after dependency was established. Jake did not attend any ARC events after his
    release from prison in October 2014 and Ines attended only one workshop. Ines
    testified that she was unwilling to make use of ARC's resources unless C.J.F.
    was in her care. She testified that "to apply the principles and ideas that they
    had there, which are good ones, in a visit doesn't really work" because "the
    situation which visitations are is an artificial one."14 Ines also stated that she felt
    uncomfortable at ARC because she believed the other parents did not like her.
    In addition, the Department referred both parents to Marie Preftes-Arenz,
    a parent coach and in-home therapist who has both personal and professional
    experience involving children with autism. Preftes-Arenz began working with
    both parents in November 2012. When Jake went to prison in January 2013,
    Preftes-Arenz continued to work with Ines until March 2013. Preftes-Arenz
    worked with the family again from late 2014 until January 2015, and from April
    2015 up until the termination trial.
    14 Report of Proceedings (Nov. 30, 2015) at 795.
    7
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-l)/8
    Preftes-Arenz explained that parent coaching is "hands-on and interactive"
    and "different from formal education."15 Preftes-Arenz was present for the Fairs'
    visits with C.J.F. She taught the parents skills that were effective for autistic
    children, including positive reinforcement, appropriate discipline strategies, and
    stress management techniques. After teaching a specific skill, Preftes-Arenz
    would model the skill for the parents to observe. Preftes-Arenz would then give
    the parents the opportunity to practice the skill, and provide feedback. However,
    Preftes-Arenz testified that all autistic children were different and that there was
    no "one-size-fits-all" strategy for parenting children with autism. She explained
    that "trying to understand how autism affects [C.J.F.] specifically is one of the
    ways that I can help the parents parent him better."16 Preftes-Arenz also
    encouraged the parents to develop a "tool kit" of strategies so that if C.J.F. was
    not responding to one technique, they had other available options.
    In addition, Preftes-Arenz talked to C.J.F.'s caregivers about what was
    working in their home, and communicated that to the parents. Preftes-Arenz also
    encouraged Ines "to attend any workshop or class she can and to keep reading
    and researching about Autism." However, Preftes-Arenz noted that Ines did not
    follow through with this goal.
    Moreover, the Department referred C.J.F. to Christina Alexander, a
    therapist at Ryther Child Center, for trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy
    (TF-CBT). Alexander taught C.J.F. coping skills such as muscle relaxation, deep
    15 id (Nov. 19, 2015) at 637-38.
    16 Id at 574.
    8
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-l)/9
    breathing and visualization. By the time of trial, Alexander had been working with
    C.J.F. for over two years. Alexander met with Ines twice in 2014 and went over
    some of these techniques. However, Ines did not contact Alexander again after
    these two meetings.
    The Department also attempted to provide C.J.F. with Applied Behavior
    Analysis (ABA) therapy, a behavioral therapy specifically targeted for children on
    the autism spectrum. Unfortunately, there were no ABA providers in Snohomish
    County that would accept C.J.F. as a client. The Fairs do not challenge the trial
    court's finding that the Department "made a significant effort to find this service,
    but was not able to do so" and "ABA therapy for [C.J.F.] was not reasonably
    available."17
    C.J.F.'s aunt and her partner had great success managing C.J.F.'s
    behaviors. The aunt testified that she was willing to work with the Fairs to show
    them which behavior management techniques worked well with C.J.F. Ines
    refused to speak to the aunt, even referring to her as "it" in front of the children.
    Both the Department and the aunt offered to participate in mediation or dispute
    resolution to improve the relationship. Ines refused.
    Finally, Yasmin Amiri, the volunteer guardian ad litem (VGAL), attempted
    to provide the parents with additional education and training opportunities. Amiri
    was in a unique position to offer assistance, having previously been a provider of
    17 Clerk's Papers at 38 (Findings of Fact 2.80 and 2.81). Though Ines assigns
    error to these findings, she does not support her assignments of error with legal
    argument or analysis. Thus, we consider them as verities. See Cowiche Canyon
    Conservancy v. Boslev. 
    118 Wn.2d 801
    , 809, 
    828 P.2d 549
     (1992).
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-l)/10
    ABA therapy to children. Amiri offered Ines books and articles on autism, and
    suggested other trainings such as those put on by the VGAL program. Again,
    Ines refused. Amiri testified that Ines "had developed a certain response
    mechanism to most people involved in the case" and would shut down even
    when people were trying to help her.18
    Contrary to the parents' claim, there is no evidence that there were other
    available services that the Department failed to offer. Dr. Jason Prinster, a
    psychologist who evaluated the Fairs, recommended both parents participate in
    services for parenting autistic children. However, Dr. Prinster testified that those
    services "could be a program, classes, [and] other sources of parenting
    education or coaching."19 Judith Bronson, Jake's domestic violence treatment
    counselor, testified that the parents should be involved in a program "regarding
    specific parental treatment of autistic children."20 But Bronson clarified that she
    was referring to ABA therapy, which is a service for the child, not their parents or
    caregivers.
    In re Welfare of OS.,21 which Ines relies upon, is distinguishable. In C.S.,
    the trial court terminated a mother's parental rights based on an alleged inability
    to address her child's special needs. The Department had offered specialized
    training to the caregivers but not the mother. But C.S. "does not stand for the
    18 Report of Proceedings (Dec. 1, 2015) at 1119.
    19 id (Nov. 17, 2015) at 393.
    20 id (Nov. 30, 2015) at 935.
    21 
    168 Wn.2d 51
    , 
    225 P.3d 953
     (2010).
    10
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-l)/11
    proposition that noncustodial parents must receive services identical to the foster
    parents."22 In any event, unlike C.S., there was no evidence here that the
    caregivers received training or services that the Fairs did not.
    Finally, Jake contends that the Department should have offered other
    helpful services, such as alternative for family cognitive behavioral therapy (AF-
    CBT), "therapeutic visits" or family therapy. But there is no evidence in the
    record that any of these services were recommended or reasonably available.
    Alexander testified that she did not provide AF-CBT and did not know any
    providers who did. And Kelli Hogan, a Department social worker, testified that
    the Department typically did not have contracts for therapeutic visitation.
    ACTIVE EFFORTS
    The Fairs argue the State failed to make active efforts to prevent the
    breakup of the Indian family as required by RCW 13.38.130(1). The record does
    not support this claim.
    In the context of Indian children, federal and state statutes place additional
    burdens on the State prior to termination.23 The State must also prove that
    "active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
    programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these
    efforts have proved unsuccessful."24 "Active efforts" are defined as "a showing to
    the court that the department or supervising agency social workers actively
    22 Matter of KM.M., 
    186 Wn.2d 466
    , 488, 
    379 P.3d 75
     (2016).
    23 
    25 U.S.C. § 1912
    ; RCW 13.38.130(1), (3).
    24 
    25 U.S.C. § 1912
    (d); RCW 13.38.130(1).
    11
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-l)/12
    worked with the parent, parents, or Indian custodian to engage them in remedial
    services and rehabilitation programs ordered by the court or identified in the
    department or supervising agency's individual service and safety plan beyond
    simply providing referrals to such services."25
    The parents contend that referring them to ARC and expecting them to
    learn about C.J.F.'s needs on their own does not constitute active efforts. But, as
    discussed above, the Department did more than simply provide referrals. The
    Department engaged service providers to teach the parents skills for parenting
    an autistic child. When the parents had success working with Preftes-Arenz, the
    Department extended her contract twice. The Department also updated Ines's
    psychological evaluation twice in order to determine if additional services were
    necessary. In addition, the Department facilitated meetings between Ines and
    C.J.F.'s treatment providers. The Department also offered to improve the
    relationship between the parents and the caregivers so that the caregivers could
    help the parents understand C.J.F. better.
    Jerrid Miller, a tribal social worker with the Cherokee Nation, testified on
    behalf of the tribe. Miller reviewed 25 volumes of discovery and participated
    throughout the entire termination trial as the tribe's representative. Miller agreed
    the Department had made active efforts to provide appropriate services and
    those efforts had been unsuccessful. He also testified that he had discussed the
    case with several other Cherokee Nation social workers and that the tribe
    supported termination of parental rights. Miller's testimony, in addition to the
    25RCW13.38.040(1)(a)(iii).
    12
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-IV13
    other evidence in the record, was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that
    active efforts were made.
    LIKELIHOOD OF REUNIFICATION
    The Fairs argue that the Department failed to prove there was little
    likelihood that that C.J.F. could be returned in the near future, as required by
    RCW 13.34.180(1 )(e). Again, the trial court's findings to the contrary are
    supported by substantial evidence.
    The focus of RCW 13.34.180(1 )(e) is whether a parent's identified
    deficiencies have been corrected.26 "Even where there is evidence that the
    parent may eventually be capable of correcting parental deficiencies, termination
    is still appropriate where deficiencies will not be corrected within the foreseeable
    future."27 Although the law provides no numerical standard to measure the
    foreseeable future, this determination is a factual inquiry evaluated from "the
    child's point of view," which varies with the child's age.28
    At the time of trial, the parents were visiting with C.J.F. only once a week
    for an hour. The visits with C.J.F. were separate from the Fairs' visits with their
    other children, and were typically supervised by both a professional visitation
    supervisor as well as Preftes-Arenz. Department social worker Katrina Maloney
    testified that moving towards unsupervised visits with C.J.F. could take
    26 In re Welfare of M.R.H.. 
    145 Wn. App. 10
    , 27, 
    188 P.3d 510
     (2008).
    27 In re Welfare of AG.. 
    155 Wn. App. 578
    , 590, 
    229 P.3d 935
     (2010).
    28 In re Dependency of A.C., 
    123 Wn. App. 244
    , 249, 
    98 P.3d 89
     (2004).
    13
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-l)/14
    "months."29 Preftes-Arenz testified that reunification of C.J.F. would take "quite a
    period of time" due to his need for structure and consistency.30 According to
    Preftes-Arenz, any reunification plan was "going to be more on [C.J.F.'s]
    timeline."31 In addition, Preftes-Arenz testified that C.J.F. should not be reunified
    until after R.P.F. and B.C.F. had been successfully transitioned back to Ines's
    home, something that had not yet begun.
    Moreover, Jake was not permitted to live in the family home or to have any
    contact with C.J.F. unless supervised by a professional until 2023. Jake argues
    that this should not be a basis for termination of his parental rights. He argues
    that he should be permitted to share parenting responsibility for C.J.F. even if he
    does not live in the home, as is the case with many noncustodial parents. But
    this proposal is unworkable if C.J.F. cannot be returned to Ines's care. The trial
    court did not err in finding that there was little likelihood that C.J.F. could have
    been returned to the parents in the near future.
    BEST INTERESTS
    Finally, the Fairs challenge the trial court's finding that termination was in
    C.J.F.'s best interest.
    As an initial matter, Ines argues that the trial court prematurely reached
    this issue because the State had not established the statutory elements set forth
    in RCW 13.34.180(1 )(d) and (e). But as discussed above, there was substantial
    29 Report of Proceedings (Dec. 1, 2015) at 1216.
    30 id (Nov. 19, 2015) at 605.
    31 id at 650.
    14
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-IV15
    evidence in the record to support the court's findings that these elements were
    proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Thus, the court properly
    reached the second prong of analysis: whether it was in C.J.F.'s best interest to
    terminate parental rights.
    The parents also contend that termination was not in C.J.F.'s best
    interests because he was bonded to them and to his siblings. A child has a right
    to "a safe, stable, and permanent home and a speedy resolution" of dependency
    proceedings.32
    Where a parent has been unable to rehabilitate over a lengthy
    dependency period, a court is "fully justified" in finding termination in the child's
    best interests rather than "leaving [the child] in the limbo of foster care for an
    indefinite period" while the parent rehabilitates himself or herself.33
    The best interests of a child must be decided on the facts and
    circumstances of each case.34 A trial court is afforded broad discretion in making
    a "best interests" determination, and we give its decision great deference on
    review.35
    The trial court did not ignore the parent-child bond in making its decision.
    The parents do not challenge the trial court's finding that "[h]is parents clearly
    32 RCW 13.34.020.
    33 In re Dependency of T.R.. 
    108 Wn. App. 149
    , 167, 
    29 P.3d 1275
     (2001).
    34 In re Dependency of A.V.D.. 
    62 Wn. App. 562
    , 572, 
    815 P.2d 277
     (1991).
    35 In re Welfare of Young. 
    24 Wn. App. 392
    , 395, 
    600 P.2d 1312
     (1979).
    15
    No. 74875-1-1 (consolidated with No. 74876-9-l)/16
    love [C.J.F.], however they cannot effectively parent him."36 But at the time of
    trial, C.J.F. had been dependent and out of his parents' care for more than three
    years. During that time, the parents made progress but did not gain enough
    skills to be able to parent C.J.F. safely or effectively.
    We affirm the trial court's order terminating the Fairs' parental rights.
    WE CONCUR:
    *^]~