State Of Washington, Resp. v. Michael Goss, App. , 189 Wash. App. 571 ( 2015 )


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  •  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                      )
    No. 72409-6-1
    Respondent,          ]                                               , ~ "r~
    CO
    DIVISION ONE
    v.                           )
    PUBLISHED OPINION                       5'~ ,
    MICHAEL RAY GOSS,                                                                       >-:!,
    37"
    Appellant.            i      FILED: August 17, 2015       's_r.'   .."J -•'<•   '
    CO
    Trickey, J. — The charging document must include all essential elements
    ofan alleged crime to provide defendants notice ofthe nature ofthe allegations so
    that they can properly prepare their defense. An essential element is one that is
    necessary to establish the illegality of the behavior.
    Here, the second amended information charged the crime ofsecond degree
    child molestation alleging that the defendant was 36 months older than the victim,
    who was less than 14 years old and not married to or in a domestic partnership
    with the defendant. The statute defines the crime as "sexual contact with another
    who is at least twelve years old but less than fourteen years old."1 The lower age
    of the victim is a criterion for establishing the proper penalty and not an essential
    element of the proscribed offense, child molestation. The information was not
    deficient.
    None of the other errors raised by the defendant have merit. Because there
    is substantial evidence supporting the conviction, we affirm the judgment and
    sentence.
    RCW 9A.44.086.
    No. 72409-6-1 / 2
    FACTS
    The State charged Michael Goss with one count of second degree child
    molestation alleging that between September 25, 2011 and September 24, 2012,
    Goss had sexual contact with E.F., who was 13 years old, and further, that at the
    time, Goss was more than 36 months older than the victim. Before trial, the court
    granted the State's motion to amend the information, charging an additional count
    of third degree attempted child molestation. The second count alleged Goss
    attempted sexual contact with E.F., then 14 years old, between September 25,
    2012 and June 23, 2013. Defense did not object to that amendment.
    E.F., born September 25, 1998, in tenth grade at the time of the trial,
    testified that Goss, then her grandmother's fiance, inappropriately touched her on
    her breasts when she was at Goss's home where her grandmother lived. Goss
    called herover, grabbed her left arm, and touched her breasts stating, "I like these,
    do you like these?" The touching lasted about 15 seconds. E.F. was shocked.
    She told Goss, "No," to which he responded, "Why?" E.F. stated, "I don't," and she
    threw his hands off her.2
    E.F. went back to playing on the computer, feeling weird, and wanting to go
    home. E.F. did not tell her grandmother, or anyone else. She later remembered
    that the incident had occurred in seventh grade, because it happened before she
    moved to her father's home in California for second semester in January. Goss
    only touched her breasts one time.
    Report of Proceedings at 483.
    No. 72409-6-1 / 3
    E.F. testified to two other incidents in Goss's house where Goss attempted
    to touch her but was unsuccessful. She recounted that one attempt had occurred
    at Thanksgiving, but when she screamed, her mother yelled from the other room,
    enabling E.F. to escape. In the other incident, E.F. managed to raise her arms to
    block Goss from touching her.
    On June 22, 2013, E.F. attended a family reunion. At the reunion, E.F. was
    rude to Goss any time he approached her. E.F.'s mother, aunt, and uncle all
    chastised her for her rude behavior. E.F.'s uncle, Eric Randolph, approached E.F.
    asking her what was going on. E.F. started to cry and told her uncle what had
    occurred. Later that day, E.F., with her uncle's help, told her mother what had
    happened. The family informed E.F.'s grandmother the following day. E.F.'s
    grandmother immediately moved out of Goss's house.
    Before the State rested, it moved to amend the charging period in count Ito
    conform to testimony regarding the time frame within which the incident occurred.3
    Over an unspecified objection by defense counsel, the court permitted the
    amendment, finding there was no prejudice to the defendant.
    The jury found Goss guilty of second degree child molestation, but acquitted
    him on the attempted molestation charge. Goss appeals.
    ANALYSIS
    Goss contends that the trial court erred in permitting the State to amend the
    information prior to concluding its case and that the second amended information
    did not contain all the essential elements of the crime with which he was charged
    September 25, 2010 to September 25, 2012.
    No. 72409-6-1/4
    and convicted. Goss also argues that the evidence was insufficient and the trial
    court erred in limiting the scope of his closing argument.
    Second Amended Information
    Goss contends he was prejudiced by the State's amending the information
    to enlarge the charging period by one year after the State had presented all of its
    evidence but before the State rested. Under CrR 2.1(d), the court may permit an
    amendment of information any time before a verdict, if the defendant is not
    prejudiced. While the rule permits liberal amendment, it is tempered by article I,
    section 22 of the Washington State Constitution, which requires that the accused
    be adequately informed of the charge to be met at trial. State v. Pelkev. 
    109 Wash. 2d 484
    , 487, 
    745 P.2d 854
    (1987).
    But here, the amendment did notcharge any new offensesor add additional
    child molestation counts. Instead, it merely enlarged the time frame within which
    the crime was committed. Amendment of the charging period is usually not a
    material element of a crime and, thus, an "amendment of the date is a matter of
    form rather than substance, and should be allowed absent an alibi defense or a
    showing of other substantial prejudice to the defendant." State v. DeBolt, 61 Wn.
    App. 58, 60-62, 
    808 P.2d 794
    (1991) (motion to amend permitted after State had
    rested and after defendant had testified); see also State v. Allvn, 
    40 Wash. App. 27
    ,
    35, 
    696 P.2d 45
    (1985) (elements of the crime charged remained the same both
    before and after the change of the date). Goss has not claimed an alibi and he
    has failed to show any prejudice from the amendment. The trial court did not abuse
    its discretion in permitting the amendment.
    No. 72409-6-1 / 5
    Essential Elements
    We review the adequacy of a charging document de novo.                 State v.
    Johnson. 
    180 Wash. 2d 295
    , 300, 
    325 P.3d 135
    (2014). Goss contends that the
    second amended information charging him with second degree child molestation
    is constitutionally deficient because it only alleged that E.F. was less than 14 years
    old at the time of the crime and did not include the allegation that E.F. was at least
    12 years old as stated in the statute.
    RCW 9A.44.086(1) provides:
    A person is guilty ofchild molestation in the second degree when the
    person has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of
    eighteen to have, sexual contact with another who is at least twelve
    years old but less than fourteen years old and not married to the
    perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least thirty-six months older than
    the victim.
    The second amended information alleged:
    That the defendant Michael Ray Goss in King County,
    Washington, during an intervening period of time between
    September 25, 2010 and September 25, 2012, being at least 36
    months older than ENF (DOB 9/25/98), had sexual contact for the
    purpose of sexual gratification with ENF (DOB 9/25/98), who was
    less than 14 years old and was not married to and not in a state
    registered domestic partnership with ENF (DOB (9/25/98).t4l
    The State asserts that the only purpose ofthe "at least twelve" language of
    the statute is to differentiate the lower degrees from the higher degrees of child
    molestation. RCW 9A.44.086(1). That E.F. may have been younger than the
    lower age specified in the second degree child molestation statute does not mean
    that Goss did not commit sexual molestation. Several Washington Supreme Court
    and Court ofAppeals decisions support the State's position that statutory language
    4 Clerk's Papers at 67.
    No. 72409-6-1 / 6
    differentiating the various degrees of a crime does not necessarily create an
    additional essential element.
    In State v. Tinker. 
    155 Wash. 2d 219
    , 222, 
    118 P.3d 885
    (2005), our Supreme
    Court addressed a challenge to the sufficiency of an information alleging third
    degree theft that did not specify the value of the property taken.       The court
    concluded that property value was not an essential element of the crime of third
    degree theft, despite language in the statute then at issue that the theft "does not
    exceed two hundred and fifty dollars in value." 
    Tinker. 155 Wash. 2d at 222
    (quoting
    RCW9A.56.050(1)).
    The Tinker court reasoned that the property value was not essential to
    establish the illegality of theft behavior because such value merely served to
    distinguish the various degrees of theft and, thus, "taking any item constitutes at
    least third degree 
    theft." 155 Wash. 2d at 222
    (emphasis omitted). "An 'essential
    element is one whose specification is necessary to establish the very illegality of
    the behavior.'" 
    Tinker. 155 Wash. 2d at 221
    (quoting State v. Johnson. 
    119 Wash. 2d 143
    , 147, 
    829 P.2d 1078
    (1992)): see also State v. Levda. 
    157 Wash. 2d 335
    , 341,
    
    138 P.3d 610
    (2006) (the value of goods, services, and credit obtained through
    identity theft is not an essential element of second degree theft); State v. Feeser.
    
    138 Wash. App. 737
    , 744, 
    158 P.3d 616
    (2007) (absence of premeditation not an
    element of second degree murder even though statute's language states "without
    premeditation").
    In State v. Ward. 
    148 Wash. 2d 803
    , 
    64 P.3d 640
    (2003), the Supreme Court
    was presented with the question of whetherfailure to include that the assault was
    No. 72409-6-1 / 7
    neither first nor second degree in the information charging the defendant with
    violation of a no contact order under RCW 26.50.110(4) rendered the information
    insufficient. RCW 26.50.110(4) provided that "'[a]ny assault that is a violation of
    an order issued under this chapter. . . and that does not amount to assault in the
    first or second degree under RCW 9A.36.011 or 9A.36.021 is a class C felony.'"
    
    Ward. 148 Wash. 2d at 810
    (alterations in original) (quoting RCW 26.50.110(4)). The
    defense argued that that provision was an essential element of the crime. In
    rejecting the argument, the Supreme Court concluded that the definitional
    language, "does not amount to assault in the first or second degree," is not an
    essential element of the crime, but rather elevated no contact violations to a felony
    when any assault is committed. 
    Ward. 148 Wash. 2d at 812
    .
    In State v. Smith. 
    122 Wash. App. 294
    , 296, 
    93 P.3d 206
    (2004), this court
    rejected a similar argument to the one presented here involving a "to-convict"
    instruction rather than an information. The defendant argued that a "to-convict"
    instruction for third degree rape of a child was erroneous because it stated the
    ages of the victim as between 12 and 16, rather than between 14 and 16 years of
    age. The Smith court held that "the age of the victim is a function of the proper
    penalty and not an essential element of the proscribed offense of having sexual
    intercourse with a 
    minor." 122 Wash. App. at 296
    . In so holding, the Smith court
    approved and cited the rationale in State v. Dodd. 53 Wn. App. 178,181, 
    765 P.2d 1337
    (1989), "that 'third degree statutory rape is a crime of inferior degree to
    second degree statutory rape, as each proscribes but one offense, that of sexual
    intercourse with one too immature to rationally or legally consent to the act.'" 122
    No. 72409-6-1 
    / 8 Wash. App. at 298
    . A "to-convict" instruction, like an amended information, must
    contain all the essential elements of the crime. State v. Lorenz. 
    152 Wash. 2d 22
    , 31,
    93P.3d133(2004).
    To support his position, Goss cites Allevne v. United States.   U.S.    , 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
    , 
    186 L. Ed. 2d 314
    (2013), in which the United States Supreme Court
    held that a fact that increased the mandatory minimum sentence is an element
    which must be presented to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
    There, the defendant was charged with robbery and using or carrying a firearm.
    
    Allevne. 133 S. Ct. at 2155
    . The jury found that the defendant had used or carried
    a firearm, but had not indicated whether he had "brandished" the gun. 
    Allevne. 133 S. Ct. at 2155
    -56.    If he had brandished a gun, his mandatory minimum
    sentence would have increased from five to seven years. 
    Allevne. 133 S. Ct. at 2155
    -56.
    Allevne is not helpful. First, it applies to sentencing enhancement. Here,
    Goss was not subjected to a higher sentence. Second, the omission ofthe lower
    age of 12 did not increase his sentence. In fact, the crime for which Goss was
    convicted was a lesser crime than if he had been convicted of child molestation of
    someone under the age of 12. Adopting Goss's argument would in effect put the
    defendant in the position of arguing that he was not guilty ofsecond degree child
    molestation because he was in fact guilty of the greater crime offirst degree child
    molestation.
    The sole purpose of the "at least twelve" language of the statute is to
    differentiate the lower degrees from the higher degrees of child molestation. The
    8
    No. 72409-6-1 / 9
    omission of the "at least twelve" language did not add to Goss's burden in anyway;
    nor did it excuse the State from proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Goss, by
    his conduct, met the essential elements of child molestation in the second degree.
    The lower age limit is not an essential element of the crime and therefore its
    omission from the second amended information was not error.
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Goss argues insufficient evidence supports his conviction of child
    molestation of E.F. in the second degree.
    Sufficient evidence supports a conviction when, viewed in the light most
    favorable to the State, a rational fact finder could have found guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas. 
    119 Wash. 2d 192
    , 201, 
    829 P.2d 1068
    (1992).
    A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences
    reasonably drawn from theevidence. 
    Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d at 201
    . This court defers
    to the fact finder on issues of witness credibility and the persuasiveness of the
    evidence. State v. Camarillo, 
    115 Wash. 2d 60
    , 
    794 P.2d 850
    (1990); State v. Carver.
    
    113 Wash. 2d 591
    , 604, 
    781 P.2d 1308
    , 
    789 P.2d 306
    (1989).
    The only incident at issue here is Goss's touching E.F.'s breasts. Goss
    disputes that it occurred during the charging period, but the evidence presented
    clearly established that it occurred within the charging period. E.F. testified that
    she was in seventh grade when the incident occurred. She remembered this
    because it was the same year that she left to stay with her father in California in
    January for the second semester of seventh grade. E.F. testified that thetouching
    occurred before she went to California.
    9
    No. 72409-6-1/10
    That this touching occurred when E.F. was in the seventh grade is
    supported by testimony from E.F. and her mother, who both testified that E.F. had
    just completed her ninth grade in July 2014 at the time of the trial. Thus, her
    seventh grade school year would have been between fall 2011 and spring 2012.
    E.F. would have been 12 years old when she started seventh grade and turned 13
    years old in September 2011. Although the mother testified that E.F. went to visit
    her father in eighth grade, the jury was free to believe E.F.'s testimony. If believed,
    the evidence was sufficient to support the charge.
    Scope of Closing Argument
    During cross-examination, defense counsel asked the investigating police
    detective whether he had taken a 50 minute recorded statement from Goss
    regarding the allegations. The State objected to the question but was overruled.
    The detective verified that he had taken the statement. There was no further
    testimony about the interview.
    Before closing argument, the State moved to prevent defense counsel from
    arguing that the State did not present any evidence from the recorded interview
    because it was not helpful to the State's case. The court agreed, stating that the
    evidence was inadmissible as hearsay since it was not introduced by the State,
    the party opponent. The court refused to permit the defense toargue that the State
    should have introduced the recorded interview because it weakened the State's
    case. The court permitted the defense to argue that the detective conducted an
    investigation and that investigation included conducting a recorded interview with
    10
    No. 72409-6-1 /11
    the defendant. Any other information regarding that interview was not in evidence
    and could not be argued. Defense counsel objected to the court's ruling.
    A trial court's limitation of the scope of closing argument is reviewed for
    abuse of discretion. State v. Wooten. 178Wn.2d 890, 896-97, 312 P.3d41 (2013).
    "This court will find that a trial court abused its discretion 'only if no reasonable
    person would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" State v. Frost, 
    160 Wash. 2d 765
    , 771, 
    161 P.3d 361
    (2007) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks
    omitted) (quoting State v. Perez-Cervantes. 
    141 Wash. 2d 468
    , 475, 
    6 P.3d 1160
    (2000)). The court has stressed that "the trial court should 'in all cases ... restrict
    the argument of counsel to the facts in evidence.'" 
    Perez-Cervantes. 141 Wash. 2d at 475
    (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sears v.
    Seattle Consol. St. Rv.. 
    6 Wash. 227
    , 233, 
    33 P. 389
    , 
    33 P. 1081
    (1893)).
    Otherwise a jury may be confused or misled. 
    Perez-Cervantes. 141 Wash. 2d at 474
    .
    Here, the trial court found that the evidence sought to be introduced was
    inadmissible hearsay that was not in evidence. Because there was no evidence
    presented to the jury to support the inference Goss sought to argue, the trial court
    did not abuse its discretion in limiting the argument.
    Goss argues that his position is analogous to an argument underlying the
    right to a missing witness instruction. That doctrine permits a jury to infer that a
    witness's testimony would have been unfavorable to the party that could have
    called, but did not call, the witness at trial. State v. Flora. 
    160 Wash. App. 549
    , 556,
    
    249 P.3d 1888
    (2011). Essentially, Goss sought to introduce evidence that the
    State knew he was notguilty, arguing that the State did not introduce the evidence
    11
    No. 72409-6-1/12
    from its interview with him. Admissions of a party opponent are admissible under
    ER 801(d)(2), only if offered by the party opponent. Further, the defendant was
    unavailable to the State because it could not have called the defendant to the stand
    because of his privilege against self-incrimination.
    In sum, a defendant does not have a right to present inadmissible evidence.
    State v. Hudlow. 
    99 Wash. 2d 1
    , 14-15, 
    659 P.2d 514
    (1983).                 Under the
    circumstances here, the court did not abuse its discretion.
    Conclusion
    The trial court properly permitted the amendment of the information which
    contained all the essential elements of the crime of second degree child
    molestation. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction and the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of the defendant's closing
    argument.
    Affirmed.
    ^T/'^Ke^f )^J
    WE CONCUR:
    12