State Of Washington v. Raymond S. Reynoldson ( 2015 )

FILED
COURT OF APPEAL
DIVISION 1l
2015 FEB I 0 AM 8:
HMG
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGT 1 \\\
IN
DIVISION II
Falk,
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 44710 -0 -II
Respondent,
v.
RAYMOND SAMUEL REYNOLDSON, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
WoRSwIcK, J. — Following the State' s successful appeal of an order granting a new trial,
the trial court sentenced Raymond Reynoldson on his convictions for first degree kidnapping
with sexual motivation,1 first degree attempted rape,2 and second degree assault with sexual
motivation.3 Reynoldson now appeals, arguing that ( 1) the trial court violated his public trial
State' argument, ( 2) the prosecutor committed
rights by holding a sidebar during the s closing
misconduct by vouching, ( 3) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to
that vouching, and ( 4) jurors committed misconduct by considering extraneous information of
Reynoldson' s prior convictions. We hold that Reynoldson has failed to establish a public trial
right violation, has waived his vouching claim, and has failed to meet his burden to show either
ineffective assistance of counsel or juror misconduct. Accordingly, we affirm.
1
Former RCW 9A. 40. 020 ( 1975); former RCW 9. 94A.030( 37) ( 1999).
2 RCW 9A.44. 045; former RCW 9A.28. 020 ( 1994).
3
RCW 9A. 36. 021( 1)( f);former RCW 9. 94A.030( 37).
No. 44710 -0 -II
FACTS
A. The Facts Established by Testimony
1. DGM's Testimony ofthe Night ofthe Crime
DGM4 testified that in 2000, Raymond Reynoldson approached her at a restaurant and
solicited oral sex and vaginal intercourse from her in exchange for money. DGM agreed, and
Reynoldson and DGM went to Reynoldson' s house in his vehicle.
Reynoldson parked the vehicle behind the house. DGM and Reynoldson walked around
the house, entered through the house' s front door, and went to Reynoldson' s bedroom. Inside
the bedroom, Reynoldson unsuccessfully attempted to perform vaginal intercourse with DGM.
Then, Reynoldson, against DGM' s will, forcefully flipped her over on her stomach, ripped off
her shirt and bra, bound her hands behind her back with her bra, tied her feet up with her socks,
gagged her mouth with a bandana secured by a sock tied around her head, and twisted her
nipples. Reynoldson again attempted to penetrate her, but failed.
Reynoldson then left the bed and walked out of the room. While Reynoldson was
walking around the house, DGM managed to untie her feet. Still naked, and with her arms and
mouth bound, DGM jumped out of a closed window by breaking the glass with the force of her
body. DGM testified she felt she had to jump out of the closed window because she was afraid
of being killed or tortured.
4
This opinion uses initials to protect the victim' s privacy.
No. 44710 -0 -II
Reynoldson, who was also naked, jumped out of the window and began punching DGM
and attempting to drag her .back to the house. A nearby neighbor, Deborah Tarnecki, ran over to
help DGM. This act caused Reynoldson to flee around the house. DGM testified: " Thank God
the neighbors across the street were having a party. They heard the crash, the window crash."
Verbatim Report of Proceedings ( VRP) at 764; see also VRP at 765 ( DGM testifying: "[ T] hank
God the neighbors were having a party. ").
2. Tarnecki' s Testimony ofthe Night ofthe Crime
Tarnecki testified she was in her home when she heard glass break, and exited her home
to investigate. Tarnecki saw DGM outside of the window, naked, in a fetal position, with her
mouth gagged and hands tied. She saw Reynoldson on top of DGM, attempting to drag her back
into the house. While Reynoldson was attempting to drag DGM back to the house, she was
5
clinging to the grass and making muffled screams through the gag.
When Tarnecki ran over to DGM, Reynoldson ran into the house. Tarnecki took DGM
back to her nearby home. DGM was terrified, and in a state of such extreme shock that she
could not walk without assistance. DGM related to Tarnecki that
Reynoldson] was going to get a knife and finish her off. She said, he was torturing
me, twisting my nipples. She said, I was in so much pain. She said that she heard
the knives jingling in the kitchen, so she knew that she was going to die. She knew
that she had to jump out that window for her life. She kept saying over and over,
he was going to kill me. He is going to kill me. She thought that he was still going
to come after her because she was so scared. He had been torture raping her.
VRP at 920. Tarnecki called 911.
5 Tarnecki identified the man that she saw attempting to drag DGM back into the house as
Reynoldson. But Tarnecki also testified that "[ Reynoldson] does not look the same at all [ as]
what he looked [ like around the time of the crime], but I can see the resemblance." VRP at 903.
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No. 44710 -0 -II
3. Detective Kimberly Sheskey' s Testimony ofHer Investigation
Detective Kimberly Sheskey responded to the 911 call and met DGM at. Tarnecki' s
home. Detective Sheskey testified that DGM was visibly upset and had a sock tied around her
neck. Detective Sheskey went with DGM to the hospital, where medical professionals examined
DGM and forensics technicians took photographs of her injuries. Detective Sheskey was present
for this, and stated in her police report that DGM had " cuts, scratches, [ and] bruises on her face,
legs, arms, and back." VRP at 831.
At the hospital on the night of the crime, DGM made statements to Detective Sheskey
that were inconsistent with her trial testimony, including statements that DGM met Reynoldson
while hitchhiking for a ride to the Tacoma Dome, that Reynoldson took an unexpected detour to
the house, that Reynoldson twisted her arm behind her back immediately upon exiting
Reynoldson' s vehicle, that they entered the house through the back door, and that Reynoldson
threw DGM down on the bed. At trial, DGM testified that these inconsistent statements were
lies that she told Detective Sheskey because she was afraid of being arrested for prostitution.
After DGM' s exam, Sheskey searched Reynoldson' s house and found a condom in the
bedroom. At trial, the parties stipulated that Reynoldson' s DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) was on
the condom' s interior and that DGM' s DNA was on the condom' s exterior.
4. Tonya Bloomstine 's Testimony ofHer Medical Examination
Nurse Tonya Bloomstine was one of the medical professionals who examined DGM on
the night of the crime. Bloomstine testified that a physical exam confirmed that DGM had
multiple abrasions and contusions to her lower back, mid -back, and extremities. DGM was
4
No. 44710 -0 -II
tearful and crying during the exam. DGM told Bloomstine that her arms, legs, and mouth had
been bound and that she had been sexually assaulted.
5. DGM's Testimony as to Her Injuries
DGM provided further testimony describing the injuries she suffered from the crime.
DGM' s testimony was supported by the forensic technicians' pictures of her injuries. The
evidence showed that Reynoldson bruised DGM' s eye and face by punching her, bruised her
neck by choking her, scratched her by attempting to drag her back into the house after she had
jumped out of the window, and bruised her wrists by binding her.
B. Reynoldson' s Extradition, Charges, and Trial
Reynoldson left Washington State after the crime in 2000 and the State could not find
him again until 2005, when the State discovered he was incarcerated in Oregon on unrelated
charges. In 2006, the State charged Reynoldson with first degree kidnapping with sexual
motivation, first degree attempted rape, and second degree assault with sexual motivation. But
because the State was unable to extradite Reynoldson until 2009, he was not tried until 2010.
The trial court granted the State' s motion to exclude witnesses from the courtroom. The
State elicited the testimony discussed above. Reynoldson rested without presenting any
testimony.
C. The State' s Closing Argument
1. Sidebar
In the middle of the State' s closing argument, the State requested and was granted a
sidebar. The actual sidebar was not transcribed:
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No: 44710 -0 -II
The State]: Your Honor, can I address the court for just a moment?
Trial Court]: At sidebar?
The State] : Yes.
Trial Court] : Okay.
Sidebar)
Trial Court]: Okay, Ms. Ahrens, please continue.
The State to the Jury]: As I' m talking, ladies and gentlemen, I want you to feel free
to, just like throughout the trial, that if you feel like you may be nodding off or if
you are uncomfortable, you get up and move around and stretch your legs, if you
need to. I have a lot to talk about. I don' t want to bore you, but there are things
that I want to make sure that I want to cover. If for some reason you need to kind
of jolt your bodies, please feel free to do that.
VRP at 1053.
2. Alleged Vouching
In its closing argument, the State made the following comments that Reynoldson alleges
constituted vouching:
1] You were paying attention to what each of these witnesses testified to. I would
like to go back through at least we are all on the same page on what it is that the
State believes that the information that was elicited from these witnesses.
2] He tries to pull her back into the house. And thank God for the neighbor
Deborah Tarnecki. Deborah told you that she was seated in her home. She was
with her family. They heard this glass breaking.
3] When she went in, she told those detectives exactly what it is that she told you.
She didn' t keep along with that story that she initially told Officer Sheskey about
how it was that she and the defendant made contact. She told the truth.
4] She told the truth as she told you the events that took place on that day while
she was seated in that box for you to be able to witness and see how her demeanor
as she described those events to you.
5] So the defendant is guilty —we believe that we have proven each of these
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. At a minimum the rape in the —the Attempted
No. 44710 -0 -II
Rape in the Third Degree, but we believe that we have proven the Attempted Rape
in the First Degree.
6] You take that information and decide whether or not you think these people are
credible. Are they believable people? Does this make sense? Does it fit the
elements of the crimes that are charged. Once you do, we believe that you should
be or should have an abiding belief in the truth of the charge. You should be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the offenses charged against the
defendant.
7] What I would submit to you is that when Donna testified to you, she was honest.
She told you about her lifestyle then. She told you about her life now, how that has
changed. She told you that she initially lied and why she lied. She told you what
she had agreed upon with the defendant even though it is, clearly, embarrassing for
her to tell you that.
8] You heard from Officer Sheskey. Officer Sheskey told you, look, I don' t recall
everything that happened in this case. She needed her report to refresh her
recollection about a lot of things that happened. She didn' t get up there and try to
make up things. She got up there and looked honest. She tried to look through her
report to answer any questions that were asked of her about the evidence that was
found there.
9] You heard from Tonya Bloomstine, who treated [ DGM]; from Brett
Reynoldson, who was a bit reluctant to tell you that his father was actually staying
in the home, but did; former Detective Ed Baker came in to talk to you; and you
also heard from Detective Miller about his actions. Each one of these people
provided you with the information that they had so that you can make a decision.
These are credible people. The testimony that they gave is in line with the evidence
that you have —has been submitted to you.
VRP at 1044, 1056, 1063, 1064, 1084, 1088 -91 ( emphasis added). In its rebuttal to
Reynoldson' s closing, the State stated the following:
10] [ DGM] can be believed. She told you that she lied. She came in here and told
you that. She told you the reasons why. She told you that she was ashamed. She
told you to the best of her ability her memory, what it was that took place.
11] She told you what she did and what she didn' t do that day. She just left it up
to you to decide what happened. She didn' t come in here with any false pretenses.
She told you like it was.
7
No. 44710 -0 -II
VRP at 1123 -25 ( emphasis added). Of these eleven comments, trial counsel objected to only
comment [ 3], objecting that the prosecutor was commenting on matters not in evidence, rather
than vouching. The trial court overruled trial counsel' s objection, stating:
Well, the jury has been instructed that the lawyers' remarks, statements, and
arguments are not the evidence and not the law. They are the deciders of that. I
will let them make that decision.
VRP at 1063 -64.
D. Conviction, Juror' s Allegations ofJury Misconduct, and Order Granting a New Trial
The jury found Reynoldson guilty of first degree kidnapping, first degree attempted rape,
and second degree assault. By special verdict form, the jury found that Reynoldson committed
first degree kidnapping and second degree assault with sexual motivation. The jury was polled
and each juror affirmed that he or she agreed with the verdict, and that the verdict was the jury' s
unanimous decision.
After the verdict, one of the jurors filed an affidavit alleging many irregularities in the
jury verdict process, including the following:
There was discussion between several jurors who opined about how many other
times Mr. Reynoldson may have done this and gotten away with it. There also was
6
reference to the necessity of his being locked up.
When the jury was polled I lied when I affirmed my " guilty" vote because I was
convinced that the judge would send us all back into that room together and I would
be subjected to further verbal abuse and ridicule.
6 Reynoldson' s criminal history included four prior convictions, including two prior second
degree rape ( former RCW 9A. 44. 050 ( 1997)) convictions and one prior second degree
kidnapping ( former RCW 9A.40. 030 ( 1975)) conviction. These offenses were not mentioned to
the jury during trial.
No. 44710 -0 -II
Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 342.
Based on this affidavit, Reynoldson moved for a new trial, arguing that he was deprived
of his right to juror unanimity because the averring juror did not actually agree with the jury' s
verdict, and because the jurors committed misconduct by erroneously considering extrinsic
evidence. The trial court entered an order granting a mistrial, ruling that the verdict was not
unanimous because the juror committed misconduct by lying when polled by the trial court. The
trial court' s order did not address whether the jurors committed misconduct by considering
extrinsic evidence.
E. Appeal, Reversal of Order Granting a New Trial, Reinstatement of Verdict, and
Sentencing
The State appealed the trial court' s order granting a new trial and we reversed that order
in State v. Reynoldson, 168 Wn. App. 543, 545, 277 P.3d 700 ( 2012). When deciding
Reynoldson, we first discussed the scope of our review:
Here, the trial court found that the juror committed misconduct when she lied
during the jury poll. As Reynoldson notes, the trial court did not make findings of
fact on or rule on any other aspect of the juror' s declaration. Therefore, the sole
question before us is whether we may consider the juror' s statements in her affidavit
that she lied when she was polled.
Reynoldson, 168 Wn. App. at 548 ( internal citations omitted). We then reversed the trial court
on this narrow issue, holding courts cannot consider a juror' s statements that she lied when
polled because such statements go to the reasoning behind her vote to convict which " clearly
inheres in the verdict and is not subject to the trial court' s later review." 168 Wash. App. at 552.
We did not consider whether the jury committed misconduct by considering extrinsic evidence.
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No. 44710 -0 -II
The trial court reinstated the jury' s verdict without considering the other issues in
Reynoldson' s original motion for a new trial. The trial court imposed a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole pursuant to the persistent offender accountability
act.7 Reynoldson appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. PUBLIC TRIAL RIGHT
Reynoldson argues the sidebar conference during the prosecutor' s closing argument
violated his public trial right. We disagree.
Whether a violation of the public trial right has occurred is a question of law we review
de novo. State v. Smith, 181 Wn.2d. 508, 513, 334 P.3d 1049 ( 2014). Our state constitution and
the United States Constitution guarantee both criminal defendants and the public the right to
open and public trials. U. S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 22.
When analyzing whether a public trial right violation occurred, we now employ a three -
step framework adopted in Smith, which asks:
1) Does the proceeding at. issue implicate the public trial right? ( 2) If so, was the
proceeding closed? And (3) If so, was the closure justified?
181 Wash. 2d at 521. Where we hold the answer to the first step' s question is negative, we need
not reach the subsequent steps. 181 Wash. 2d at 519.
In Smith, our Supreme Court held that under the first step, " reasonable and traditional"
sidebars do not implicate the public trial right. 181 Wash. 2d at 521. And the court cautioned:
7 Former RCW 9. 94A. 120 ( 1999).
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No. 44710 -0 -I1
M] erely characterizing something as a " sidebar" does not make it so. To avoid
implicating the public trial right, sidebars must be limited in content to their
traditional subject areas, should be done only to avoid disrupting the flow of trial,
and must either be on the record or be promptly memorialized in the record.
181 Wash. 2d at 516 n. 10.
Here, the conversation at sidebar, occurring in the middle of the prosecutor' s closing
argument, was not memorialized in the record. 8 The record reveals that the prosecutor requested
a sidebar for "just a moment," the request was granted, a sidebar occurred, and the prosecutor
then asked the jury to maintain their concentration during his closing argument. See VRP at
1053. This appears to be the State' s response to a juror' s inattentiveness.
The sidebar at issue here was clearly done to avoid disrupting the flow of trial, and
although neither conducted nor memorialized on the record, appears to be limited to a traditional
area: seeking the trial court' s assistance in maintaining juror attentiveness during closing
arguments. We hold that a sidebar of the type conducted here did not implicate Reynoldson' s
public trial right. Because the answer to the first step' s question is negative, we do not consider
the other two steps. 181 Wash. 2d at 519.
II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: VOUCHING
We next consider Reynoldson' s argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
vouching. Reynoldson failed to preserve this argument for review.
8 We note that to raise a public trial right claim for the first time on appeal, a defendant bears the
burden of establishing a manifest error by providing a record showing that a closure occurred.
State v. Koss, 181 Wash. 2d 493, 502 -03, 334 P.3d 1042 ( 2014); see RAP 2. 5( a)( 3). Because the
sidebar was not memorialized, Reynoldson failed to provide a record showing that a closure
occurred in this case. See Koss, 181 Wash. 2d at 502 -03.
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No. 44710 -0 -II
Prosecuting attorneys are quasi-judicial officers charged with the duty of ensuring that a
defendant receives a fair trial. State v. Boehning, 127 Wash. App. 511, 518, 111 P.3d 899 ( 2005).
Prosecutorial misconduct violates that duty and can constitute reversible error. State v.
Davenport, 100 Wash. 2d 757, 762, 675 P . 2d 1213 ( 1984); see Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,
219, 102 S. Ct. 940, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78 ( 1982). A prosecutor commits misconduct by personally
vouching for a witness' s credibility. State v. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d 136, 175, 892 P.2d 29 ( 1995).
We will reverse a conviction when the defendant has met his burden of establishing ( 1) the State
acted improperly and ( 2) the State' s improper act prejudiced the defendant. State v. Emery, 174
Wash. 2d 741, 756, 278 P.3d 653 ( 2012).
But a defendant who fails to object to the State' s improper act at trial waives any error,
unless the act was so flagrant and ill- intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the
resulting prejudice. State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d 438, 443, 258 P.3d 43 ( 2011). In making
that determination, we " focus less on whether the prosecutor' s misconduct was flagrant or ill -
intentioned and more on whether the resulting prejudice could have been cured." Emery, 174
Wash. 2d at 762. Here, Reynoldson objected to only one of the statements, asserting the prosecutor
argued facts not in evidence. He did not lodge any objection based on the rule against vouching.
Because Reynoldson did not object to any vouching, and because we focus on whether the
resulting prejudice could have been cured, we consider what would have happened had
Reynoldson objected to vouching. See 174 Wash. 2d at 762 -63.
Here, had Reynoldson objected to the prosecutor' s vouching, the trial court could have
cured any prejudice resulting from the prosecutor' s statements by giving the jury an instruction
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No. 44710 -0 -II
directing them to disregard the prosecutor' s remarks as to the witnesses' credibility. See In re
Det. ofMcGary, 175 Wash. App. 328, 343, 306 P.3d 1005, review denied, 178 Wash. 2d 1020 ( 2013);
State v. Eastabrook, 58 Wn. App. 805, 817, 795 P.2d 151 ( 1990). Thus, because the resulting
prejudice could have been cured had he objected, Reynoldson waived his claim that the State
violated his right to a fair trial by vouching for the witnesses. See Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d at
443.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Reynoldson argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel
failed to object to the State' s vouching. We disagree.
Whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law
and fact, reviewed de novo. In re Pers. Restraint ofFleming, 142 Wash. 2d 853, 865, 16 P.3d 610
2001). In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance, we begin with a strong presumption of
counsel' s effectiveness. State v. McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 ( 1995).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two- pronged
test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 ( 1984). State v. Thomas, 109 Wash. 2d 222, 225 -26, 743 P.2d 816 ( 1987). First, the defendant
must show that counsel' s performance was deficient, meaning that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under all circumstances. 109 Wash. 2d at 225 -26. If the defendant
bases his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on trial counsel' s failure to object, the defendant
must show that the objection would likely have succeeded. State v. Gerdts, 136 Wash. App. 720,
727, 150 P.3d 627 ( 2007).
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No. 44710 -0 -II
Second, the defendant must show the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant' s
case. Thomas, 109 Wash. 2d at 225 -26. Prejudice occurs if, taking all circumstances into account,
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if
that deficient performance had not occurred. 109 Wash. 2d at 226. " A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A
failure to satisfy either prong is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 466 U.S. at
700.
As discussed below, six of the prosecutor' s statements were not vouching, and the
remaining six statements caused Reynoldson no prejudice. Trial counsel was not deficient for
not objecting to statements [ 1], [ 2], [ 5], [ 7], and [ 10] because an objection to these statements
would not have succeeded, and statements [ 3], [ 4], [ 6], [ 8], [ 9], and [ 11] did not cause prejudice
because, taking all circumstances into account, trial counsel' s failure to object to these
statements does not undermine confidence in the outcome of Reynoldson' s trial.
A. Statements [ 1], [ 21 [ 5], [ 71 and [ 10]: No Deficiency
Whether a witness has testified truthfully is for the jury to determine. State v. Ish, 170
Wash. 2d 189, 196, 241 P.3d 389 ( 2010) ( plurality opinion) ( citing United States v. Brooks, 508
F.3d 1205, 1210 ( 9th Cir. 2007)). " It is improper for a prosecutor personally to vouch for the
credibility of a witness." Brett, 126 Wash. 2d at 175. Improper vouching generally occurs if the
prosecutor expresses her personal belief as to the witness' s credibility or indicates that evidence
not presented at trial supports the witness' s testimony. Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d at 443.
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No. 44710 -0 -II
But the prosecutor " has wide latitude in closing argument to draw reasonable inferences
from the evidence and may freely comment on witness credibility based on the evidence." State
v. Lewis, 156 Wn. App. 230, 240, 233 P.3d 891 ( 2010). The prosecutor has especially wide
latitude when rebutting an issue the defendant raised in closing argument. 156 Wash. App. at 240.
Accordingly, closing argument does not constitute improper vouching for witness credibility
unless it is clear that the prosecutor is not arguing an inference from the evidence but, instead, is
expressing a personal opinion about witness credibility. State v. Warren, 165 Wash. 2d 17, 30, 195
P.3d 940 ( 2008). Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to statements [ 1], [ 2], [ 5],
7], and [ 10] because they did not constitute vouching.
1] You were paying attention to what each of these witnesses testified to. I would
like to go back through at least we are all on the same page on what it is that the
State believes that the information that was elicited from these witnesses.
VRP at 1044 ( emphasis added). In this statement, the State informed the jury that it was about to
state the information that it believed the witnesses had provided. This was not expressing a
personal opinion about a witness' s credibility, but rather was arguing that the jury may infer
certain information from the witnesses' testimony. Thus, because the prosecutor was not
expressing a personal opinion about witness credibility, statement [ 1] was not vouching.
2] He tries to pull her back into the house. And thank God for the neighbor
Deborah Tarnecki. Deborah told you that she was seated in her home. She was
with her family. They heard this glass breaking.
VRP at 1056 ( emphasis added). In this statement, the prosecutor was referencing DGM' s
testimony, in which she thanked God that neighbors were present to assist her after she had
thrown herself through a window. This was not a statement of personal opinion as to DGM' s or
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No. 44710 -0 -II
Tarnecki' s credibility, but rather was a reference to DGM' s testimony at trial. Because the
prosecutor was not expressing a personal opinion about witness credibility, the statement was not
vouching.
5] So the defendant is guilty —we believe that we have proven each of these
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. At a minimum the rape in the —the Attempted
Rape in the Third Degree, but we believe that we have proven the Attempted Rape
in the First Degree.
VRP at 1084 ( emphasis added). In this statement, the prosecutor was not expressing a personal
opinion as to the credibility of a witness. Rather, the prosecutor was arguing that the jury could
infer the State had met its burden to prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt from the
evidence. Thus, because the prosecutor was not expressing a personal opinion about witness
credibility, statement [ 5] was not vouching.
7] What I would submit to you is that when [ DGM] testified to you, she was honest.
She told you about her lifestyle then. She told you about her life now, how that has
changed. She told you that she initially lied and why she lied. She told you what
she had agreed upon with the defendant even though it is, clearly, embarrassing for
her to tell you that.
VRP at 10.89 ( emphasis added). In this statement, the prosecutor stated that she submitted to the
jury that DGM was honest when she testified to the jury. This is not the prosecutor' s personal
opinion as to the witness' s credibility, but rather an argument that the jury could infer DGM' s'
credibility from DGM' s testimony. Thus, because the prosecutor was not expressing a personal
opinion about witness credibility, statement [ 7] was not vouching.
10] [ DGM] can be believed. She told you that she lied. She came in here and told
you that. She told you the reasons why. She told you that she was ashamed. She
told you to the best of her ability her memory, what it was that took place.
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No. 44710 -0 -II
VRP at 1056 ( emphasis added). In this statement, the prosecutor did not state a personal opinion
that DGM must be believed, but rather argued that the jury could infer DGM' s believability from
DGM' s testimony. Thus, because the prosecutor was not expressing a personal opinion about
witness credibility, statement [ 10] was not vouching.
Because statements [ 1], [ 2], [ 5], [ 7], and [ 10] did not constitute vouching, they did not
constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, any objection trial counsel may have made to the
State' s comment would not have succeeded, and trial counsel' s performance was not deficient.
Accordingly, Reynoldson has failed to meet his burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel
regarding these statements.
B. Statements [ 31 [ 4], [ 6], [ 81 [ 9], and [ 11]: No Prejudice
We assume without deciding that trial counsel' s failure to object to statements [ 3], [ 4],
6], [ 8], [ 9], and [ 11] constituted deficient performance. The State arguably vouched for the
credibility of witnesses, as well as for the truth of the charges. In fact, statements [ 8] and [ 9]
plainly were improper vouching. But taking all circumstances and evidence into account,
Reynoldson cannot establish prejudice because this deficiency was not sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of his trial.
The parties stipulated that the condom found at the house shortly after the crime had
Reynoldson' s DNA on the interior and DGM' s DNA on the exterior. This establishes that
Reynoldson and DGM were together in the bedroom.
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No. 44710 -0 -II
DGM testified that while her hands were still tied behind her back and her mouth was
still gagged, she jumped through a closed window, breaking the glass. DGM testified that
Reynoldson jumped out of the window after her, punched her, and attempted to drag her back
into the house against her will. DGM' s testimony is supported by Tarnecki' s testimony.
Tarnecki testified that she heard the glass break, ran outside of her home, and saw DGM outside
of the window, naked, in a fetal position, with her mouth gagged and her hands tied. Tarnecki
testified that she saw Reynoldson attempt to grab DGM and force her back into the house, and
that DGM was outside the window, giving muffled screams through the gag and clinging to the
grass to prevent Reynoldson from dragging her back into the house.
DGM described her injuries in detail, including scratches and bruises Reynoldson caused
her. This testimony is supported by forensic technicians' photographs of those injuries, as well
as the testimony of Detective Sheskey and Bloomstine.
DGM testified she felt she had to jump out of the closed window because she was afraid
of being killed or tortured. DGM' s mental state was supported by Tarnecki, Bloomstine, and
Detective Sheskey, who all testified that DGM was emotionally upset after the alleged crime.
Tarnecki testified to DGM' s fears that Reynoldson was going to assault and rape her.
Bloomstine and Tarnecki both testified that DGM claimed to have been sexually assaulted
shortly after the crime.
Taking all circumstances into account, counsel' s failure to object does not undermine
confidence in the outcome of Reynoldson' s trial. Thus, because Reynoldson has failed to
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No. 44710 -0 -II
establish prejudice with these statements, he has failed to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel.
IV. JUROR MISCONDUCT
Reynoldson argues that the jury committed misconduct by considering extrinsic evidence
of his prior convictions. The State argues that the law of the case doctrine precludes
consideration of Reynoldson' s argument because we have already held that the trial court erred
by granting a mistrial based on jury misconduct. The law of the case doctrine does not preclude
consideration of Reynoldson' s claim, but Reynoldson has failed to meet his burden of showing
juror misconduct.
A. Law ofthe Case Doctrine
Under the law of the case doctrine, we generally adhere to decisions declaring the
applicable law in previous appeals of the same case, and refuse to consider issues that were
decided, or could have been decided if raised, in a prior appeal. RAP 2. 5( c)( 2); Folsom v.
County ofSpokane, 111 Wash. 2d 256, 263, 759 P.2d 1196 ( 1988).
In Reynoldson, the only question before us was whether courts could consider a juror' s
statement in her affidavit that she lied when polled. 168 Wash. App. at 544. We held that because
this juror' s statement necessarily went to the juror' s mental processes leading to her decision,
courts could not consider it. 168 Wash. App. at 544.
Reynoldson now argues that the jury considered extrinsic evidence. Because this
argument raises an issue concerning the possible introduction of extrinsic evidence, rather than
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No. 44710 -0 -II
the juror' s internal mental processes, it raises an issue we did not consider in Reynoldson, and we
consider the issue here.
B. " Consideration on the Merits
Reynoldson argues that the jury committed misconduct by considering extrinsic evidence
of his prior convictions in reaching its verdict. We disagree. 9
A jury' s consideration of extrinsic evidence in its deliberations constitutes misconduct
and can be grounds for a new trial. State v. Balisok, 123 Wash. 2d 114, 118, 866 P.2d 631 ( 1994).
Extrinsic evidence is evidence that was not subject to objection, cross -examination, explanation,
or rebuttal at trial. 123 Wash. 2d at 118. But "[ n] either parties nor judges may inquire into the
internal processes through which the jury reaches its verdict." State v. Linton, 156 Wash. 2d 777,
787, 132 P.3d 127 ( 2006).
The party alleging juror misconduct has the burden to show that misconduct occurred."
State v. Earl, 142 Wn. App. 768, 774, 177 P.3d 132 ( 2008). " A strong, affirmative showing of
misconduct is necessary in order to overcome the policy favoring stable and certain verdicts and
the secret, frank and free discussion of the evidence by the jury." Balisok, 123 Wash. 2d at 117 -18.
Here, the juror' s affidavit stated only that the jurors " opined about how many other times
Mr. Reynoldson may have done this and gotten away with it." CP at 342. This presents
9 We generally review a trial court' s investigation ofjuror misconduct for abuse of discretion.
State v. App. 768, 774, 177 P.3d 132 ( 2008). But here, the trial court did not
Earl, 142 Wn.
resolve this issue because it granted a new trial on a different basis. Thus, we review this issue
de novo.
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No. 44710 -0 -II
evidence that the jurors speculated that Reynoldson may have committed similar offenses in the
past, but presents no evidence that jurors had knowledge of or considered Reynoldson' s actual
past offenses. No other evidence in the record suggests that the jury knew or considered
Reynoldson' s actual past offenses. Likewise, we should not inquire into the jury' s internal
thought processes. Linton, 156 Wash. 2d at 787. Thus, we hold that Reynoldson has failed to meet
his burden to show that juror misconduct by consideration of extrinsic evidence actually
occurred.
We hold that Reynoldson has failed to establish a public trial right violation, has waived
his vouching claim, and has failed to meet his burden to show either ineffective assistance of
counsel or juror misconduct. Accordingly, we affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports but will instead be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
We concur:
Worswick, J.
Cf
F Jrge A. C.).
Melnick, J , j
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