State Of Washington v. Courtney Wayne Dawson ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 77648-7-I
Respondent,
)
v.
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
COURTNEY WAYNE DAWSON, )
) FILED: June 10, 2019
Appellant.
VERELLEN, J. — A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea after entry of
judgment must prove he did not enter it knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
Because Courtney Wayne Dawson’s attorneys accurately apprised him about the
plea agreement’s terms and consequences, he entered his guilty plea voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly. The court properly denied his CrR 7.8 motion to
withdraw his plea.
A defendant also can withdraw his guilty plea where the State breaches the
agreement. Dawson contends Oregon, which was party to his global plea
agreement, breached by merely dismissing the charges against him and not doing
so with prejudice. Because the plea agreement did not oblige Oregon to dismiss
with prejudice, Oregon did not breach.
Therefore, we affirm.
No. 77648-7-1/2
FACTS
Dawson flew from Colorado to Oregon and raped a woman at knifepoint.1
Dawson then drove to Washington and raped another woman at knifepoint.2 After
being arrested in Washington, Dawson confessed to raping women in both states.3
While awaiting trial, Dawson attempted to pay his second victim to recant her
statements to the police.4
The State charged Dawson with first degree rape, first degree kidnapping,
and bribing a witness, and Oregon indicted him for first degree rape, first degree
sodomy, and first degree unlawful sexual penetration.5 In a global plea agreement
that disposed of all charges against him in both states, Dawson promised to plead
guilty only to the charges in Washington. In exchange, Washington would
recommend a 16-year sentence at the high end of the standard range, and
Oregon would dismiss all charges against him.6
Dawson pleaded guilty. Nearly one year later, he moved to withdraw his
plea because it was based on misinformation from his attorneys and because
1 Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 60-61. Oregon did not adjudicate Dawson’s rape
there in accordance with his plea agreement, but he admitted to the facts of that
crime for purposes of sentencing and paying restitution to the victim. CP at 54;
Report of Proceedings (RP) (June 6, 2013) at 10-11.
2CPat24.
~ RP (July 19, 2013) at 10-11.
~ RP (June 6, 2013) at 14-15.
~ CP at 10-11.
6 RP (June 6,2013) at 9-10.
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No. 77648-7-113
Oregon did not dismiss charges against him with prejudice.7 The court denied the
motion.8
Dawson appeals.
ANALYSIS
If a defendant moves under CrR 7.8 to withdraw a guilty plea due to
claimed constitutional error, we conduct review de novo.9 We review a court’s
factual findings for substantial evidence.10 Substantial evidence supports a finding
of fact where sufficient evidence would persuade a reasonable person of the
finding.11 Unchallenged findings are verities on appeal.12 The defendant has the
burden of proving that constitutional error occurred and that substantial evidence
does not support challenged findings of fact.13
‘Due process requires that a guilty plea may be accepted only upon a
showing the accused understands the nature of the charge and enters the plea
intelligently and voluntarily.”14 A defendant must understand a plea’s
consequences, including possible sentencing consequences, for the plea to have
~ CP at 81-90,105-06.
8 CP at 278.
~ State v. Buckman, 190 Wash. 2d 51, 57, 409 P.3d 193 (2018).
10 State v. A.N.J., 168 Wash. 2d 91, 107, 225 P.3d 956 (2010).
11 Id.
12 Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wash. 2d 35, 42, 59 P.3d 611(2002).
13 Buckman, 190 Wash. 2d at 65; A.N.J., 168 Wash. 2d at 107.
14kLat59 (quoting A.N.J., 168 Wash. 2d at 117).
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No. 77648-7-1/4
been made knowingly and voluntarily.15 Constitutional error occurs if a plea is not
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.16
Dawson argues one of his three trial attorneys misinformed him about the
consequences of pleading guilty because she overstated the amount of early
release time he could accrue.17 Dawson’s sole evidence, other than his own
affidavit, is a sentence fragment in defense attorney Emily Gause’s notes from a
meeting they had on May 23, 2013.18 For context, the notes follow in their entirety.
Meeting w/ Wayne 5/23/13
explained risks here Rape 1° Kidnap 10
would run consecutive 16+ yrs
Oregon 3 charges 100+ mm on each
300+ mo
WA would run consecutive to OR
Offer: 16 years (roughly 10 more years)
ISRB
sexual deviancy eval. -~ Bill Lennon[19J
15Id. (citing In re. Pers. Restraint of Stockwell, 179 Wash. 2d 588, 594-95, 316
P.3d 1007 (2014)).
16 j4. at 59-60 (holding constitutional error occurred where a defendant
pleaded guilty after being misinformed about the consequences).
17 Appellant’s Br. at 4.
Id. (citing CP at 197); CP at 94 (arguing in his CrR 7.8 affidavit that
18
Gause misinformed him).
19 CP at 197.
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No. 77648-7-115
Relying on the fragment roughly 10 more years” and his affidavit, Dawson argued
below that Gause misinformed him about the length of his sentence based on how
she calculated his potential early release time.2° The court found Dawson’s
“assertions and allegations are not credible.”21 It also found Cause “did not
misinform the defendant as to his ‘good time’ calculation.”22 Dawson challenges
only this finding as lacking substantial evidence.23
RCW 9.94A.729(3)(c) caps the maximum aggregate early release time a
defendant may earn at 10 percent where he has been convicted of a serious
violent offense. Cause submitted an affidavit stating she “did not and would have
never informed [Dawson] that his good time was 25 [percent]” because “I was well
aware that the good time on Rape in the First Degree was 10 [percent].”24 To
support her affidavit, Cause submitted additional meeting notes and a memo
written for Dawson. Those documents show she told him the early release accrual
amount was 10 percent.25 For example, Cause’s memo goes through the
mathematical steps to demonstrate how a 16-year sentence can, with time served
and early release time, result in a sentence of approximately 13 years. In addition
to showing the math, her notes state the phrase “good time (10%)” in two different
20 CP at 85-86, 94; RP (Sept. 27, 2017) at 7-8.
21 CP at 268.
22 CP at 267.
23 Appellant’s Br. at 1.
24 CP at 257.
25 OP at 187-88, 190.
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No. 77648-7-1/6
calculations.26 Based on this evidence, a reasonable person could be persuaded
that Gause did not misinform Dawson. Finding of fact 8 is supported by
substantial evidence.
In addition to finding of fact 8, the court’s unchallenged findings support its
conclusion. These findings are verities on appeal.27 Significantly, the court found
Dawson’s asserted facts were “not credible.”28 It also found that another of
Dawson’s attorneys never misinformed him about the duration of his sentence,
and that Dawson understood the consequences of pleading guilty.29 The court’s
findings show Dawson knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his plea.3°
He fails to establish a constitutional error.
Dawson filed a statement of additional grounds in which he contends the
State breached the plea agreement because Oregon did not dismiss all charges
against him with prejudice.31
We review unambiguous plea agreements de novo.32 Because “[a] plea
agreement is a contract with constitutional implications,” we evaluate plea
26 CP at 188.
27 Robel, 148 Wash. 2d at 42.
28 CP at 268.
29 CP at 267.
30 Dawson also argued to the trial court that he is dyslexic and,
consequently, struggled to understand the plea agreement. But the court credited
Gause’s assertion “that she never observed [Dawson] struggle mentally or display
any substantive disability.” CP at 277. Dawson does not challenge this finding of
fact on appeal.
31 SAG at 1-2.
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No. 77648-7-1/7
agreements using basic contract principles.33 We interpret a plea agreement to
give effect to the parties’ intent as shown by their objective manifestations.34 We
consider the whole record objectively to determine whether the State breached a
plea agreement.35
On May 29, 2013, Dawson signed a felony plea agreement stating, “Oregon
will dismiss its indictment following sentencing.”36 During his plea hearing, the
court explained Oregon’s obligation to Dawson:
Now, there is one promise that’s been made that hasn’t been
incorporated into this contract formation process, and that’s the
agreement that the Oregon authorities, who are now party to this
case, will take certain actions down there in dismissing a pending
charge against you. Beyond that, is there any other promise that’s
been made, any expectation that you have that we ought to put on
the record as a part of this agreement?[371
Dawson responded, “No, sir. Not that I’m aware of. No, sir.”38
32 State v. Church, 5 Wash. App. 2d 577, 584, 428 P.3d 150 (2018) (quoting
State v. Ramos, 187 Wash. 2d 420, 433, 387 P.3d 650, cert. denied, U.S.—, 138
—
S. Ct. 467, 199 L. Ed. 2d 355 (2017)).
~ k~. (quoting State v. Townsend, 2 Wash. App. 2d 434, 438, 409 P.3d 1094
(2018)).
34SeeStatev. Chambers, 176 Wash. 2d 573, 580-81, 293 P.3d 1185 (2013)
(citing State v. Turley, 149 Wash. 2d 395, 400, 69 P.3d 338 (2003)).
~ State v. Carreno-Maldonado, 135 Wash. App. 77, 83, 143 P.3d 343, 349
(2006).
36 CP at 54.
~ RP (June 6, 2013) at 20. Because the Oregon authorities were never
joined as parties in this Washington criminal proceeding, we note the phrase “who
are now a party to this case” appears to contain a transcription error, and it is likely
the court stated, “who are not a party to this case.” In either event, the outcome of
the appeal is the same.
38 Id.
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No. 77648-7-1/8
The prosecutor reiterated this obligation: “One of the conditions on this is
that the Oregon authorities, Oregon prosecutor’s office, will at the time of
sentencing dismiss the indictments that they have currently against you with
respect to a victim by the name of [M.J.S.]. Do you understand that?”39 Dawson
replied, “I do, sir.”4° Neither colloquy refers to dismissal with prejudice.
The only evidence of a possible dismissal with prejudice is an e-mail that a
prosecutor from King County, Washington sent to Dawson’s attorneys more than
two weeks earlier stating that Oregon “has agreed to dismiss their indictments with
prejudice.”41 But Dawson provides no evidence that he knew of this e-mail at the
time of his plea hearing. And both the State and the court told Dawson
unambiguously that Oregon’s offer was to dismiss the indictments against him, not
that they would be dismissed with prejudice. Because Dawson does not show that
the parties to the plea agreement understood it as requiring dismissal with
prejudice at the time it was made, he fails to show any breach of the agreement.
Therefore, we affirm.
WE CONCUR:
~ Id. at 10.
40 Id.
41 CP at 108.