State Of Washington v. Heather Roark ( 2015 )


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    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION II
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                                   No. 46015 -7 -II
    Respondent,
    V.
    HEATHER DAWN ROARK,                                                            UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.
    LEE, J. —        Heather Dawn Roark appeals her convictions on three counts of delivering
    methamphetamine, one count of possessing methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and the
    resulting     sentences.        Roark   argues    that ( 1)   the trial court erred by failing to apply the proper
    analysis under ER 404( b). before admitting evidence that third parties threatened and assaulted the
    confidential       informant     who    testified   against   her; (   2) the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant
    evidence; (       3) she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney failed to request a
    limiting instruction concerning this evidence; and (4) the trial court erred in running her four school
    zone sentence enhancements consecutively to each other.
    We hold that ( 1) because Roark did not raise any objection under ER 404( b) to the evidence
    at   issue   during    trial,   her. ER   404( b)   challenge     is   waived; (   2) the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in admitting           evidence       that third    parties    threatened   and   assaulted   the       confidential
    No. 46015 -7 -II
    informant as relevant to the confidential informant' s credibility and Roark' s consciousness of guilt
    under   ER 402; (    3) Roark' s related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails because any
    limiting instruction would have emphasized the threat and assault evidence and would not have
    changed the tr'ial' s outcome; and ( 4) because of the Washington Supreme Court' s recent decision
    in State   v.   Conover, _    P. 3d ,   
    2015 WL 4760487
    ( Wash.     Aug.   13, 2015), the trial court erred
    in imposing Roark' s multiple school zone sentence enhancements consecutive to each other.
    Accordingly, we affirm Roark' s convictions but remand for resentencing with instructions to the
    trial court to impose Roark' s multiple school zone sentence enhancements consecutive to the base
    sentences for the drug and bail jumping convictions, but concurrent to each other.
    FACTS .
    During May 2011, Bremerton detectives investigated Roark and Adam Carter for possible
    drug   violations.    Paid informant Robert White made three controlled buys of methamphetamine
    from Roark and one from Carter at their residence in late May.
    After the four buys occurred, the police obtained a warrant to search the residence. While
    executing the search warrant, officers found a baggie of methamphetamine dissolving in the toilet
    and     another    baggie    of   methamphetamine   in   the   bathroom    garbage.    They also found
    methamphetamine, baggies, and methamphetamine pipes in the bedroom. In addition, the search
    revealed a digital scale and buy money from one of the controlled buys.
    2
    No. 46015 -7 -II
    After waiving her Miranda' rights, Roark told the police that she and Carter had been
    selling methamphetamine from the house for a few months. She admitted that when she heard the
    officers at the door, she tried to dispose of the drug.
    The State charged Roark with three counts of delivering methamphetamine, one count of
    possessing methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and three counts of bail jumping after she
    2
    failed to   appear   at    scheduled     court   hearings.           The State also alleged that each drug offense
    occurred within 1, 000 feet of school grounds or a school bus stop.
    When Roark' s trial began on December 18, 2013, White testified about the four buys.
    White explained that he engaged in the buys to work off his girlfriend' s charges and to make
    money. After his cross- examination, the trial recessed for the day.
    Before the jury returned on December 19, the prosecutor notified the trial court that he had
    some   information to discuss.           The   prosecutor    described that information        as   follows:   White had
    appeared    in   court   the   day   before, December 18,        with a   black   eye.   3 RP 319. White received his
    black eye a few days earlier after an unknown assailant approached him, asked his name, and
    struck him in the face. After White testified on December 18, Roark made a phone call from jail
    in which she asked Steve Irwin to get as many people as possible in court the next morning because
    her `` rat"'   would     be testifying    again.   3 Verbatim Report          of   Proceedings ( VRP)     at   320.   In an
    1 Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
    ( 1966).
    2 Roark does not challenge her bail jumping convictions, so we do not set forth the testimony that
    supports them.
    3
    No. 46015 -7 -II
    earlier call on December 14, Roark had stated that White and his girlfriend were responsible for
    her being in custody. Finally, White had heard that someone had placed a bounty on his head.
    The prosecutor argued that Roark' s jail calls linked all of this information to her and that
    this evidence was admissible to show her consciousness of guilt. When the defense asked for an
    offer of proof and a continuance, the prosecutor responded that White might not be willing to
    return to court.
    The trial court ruled that because White' s credibility had been questioned during cross-
    examination, the State was entitled to explore his awareness of any threats or physical violence
    related to his testimony. When the defense again sought an offer of proof, the trial court granted
    that request.
    During the offer of proof, White testified that several months earlier, he had received
    threatening     e- mails on   Facebook from Ryan Higgins, Roark' s former boyfriend.               The e- mails
    stated   that White   was a " snitch."   3 VRP    at   361.      White added that a friend had told him the
    previous week that Higgins had put a bounty on his head and wanted to buy photographs of White
    being beaten up. White stated that the same night, someone had punched him in the face and fled.
    White    added   that he thought Higgins was     trying     to   help   Roark. White also testified that he was
    concerned about seeing an acquaintance in the courtroom that day who had no reason to be in
    court.3 White ended the offer of proof by stating that he was afraid to testify because Roark was
    known for seeking retribution.
    3 The trial court noted for the record that the man about whom White expressed concern was
    sitting in court with Steve Irwin, the recipient of Roark' s December 18 phone call.
    M
    No. 46015 -7 -II
    The State argued that the evidence regarding the threats, assault, and Roark' s phone calls
    was admissible     to   show   that White   was nervous about   testifying. When the defense argued that
    the connection between Roark and the information presented was too speculative, the prosecutor
    responded that the evidence was admissible to rebut defense efforts to impeach White.
    The trial court referred to ER 402 in ruling that the evidence regarding the assault and
    Higgins' emailed threats was relevant to White' s ability to testify and Roark' s consciousness of
    guilt.   The court added that the evidence regarding the bounty was admissible to show White' s
    state of mind.     White also could testify that the presence of his acquaintance in court with Irwin
    contributed to his fear. White testified on redirect accordingly.
    When trial resumed the following Monday, the State sought permission to play excerpts
    from Roark' s December 14 and 18 phone calls for the jury. The defense objected and asserted that
    the State had misinterpreted the calls and that they were irrelevant to any suggestion that Roark
    had anything to do with White getting hit and being fearful. The defense further argued that even
    if the calls were relevant, they were too prejudicial to admit.
    After listening to the calls, the trial court ruled that part of the first call, in which Roark
    stated that White did the buys for his girlfriend, was probative of Roark' s consciousness of guilt.
    The court further ruled that Roark' s statement in the second call that " my rat is going to testify"
    was relevant to White' s state of mind while testifying as well as Roark' s consciousness of guilt.
    The court added that the calls, consisting of Roark' s own words, were not unfairly prejudicial. The
    trial court granted defense counsel' s request to have the calls played for the jury in their entirety.
    5
    No. 46015 -7 -II
    After the jury found Roark guilty as charged, the trial court granted her request for a DOSA
    4
    sentence.            Although Roark argued that her four school zone enhancements should run
    concurrently to each other, the trial court imposed them consecutively. The court imposed a total
    of 186 months on the drug charges, with 93 months to be served in prison and 93 months in
    treatment.         The 186 months included 96 months for the four consecutive 24 -month school zone
    enhancements.                 The court ran the 60 -month sentences for the bail jumping convictions
    concurrently to           each   other      and   concurrently to the DOSA         sentence.   Roark now appeals her
    convictions and sentence.
    ANALYSIS
    A.      ADMISSION OF THREATS AND ASSAULT AGAINST WHITE
    Roark argues that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of Higgins' threats against
    White, as well as the assault upon White. We disagree.
    1.       ER 404( b)
    Roark argues primarily that the trial court erred because it admitted White' s testimony
    without    addressing the             requirements     for admissibility   under   ER 404( b)..   Roark made no such
    objection at trial.
    A party may only assign error on appeal based on the specific ground of the evidentiary
    objection at         trial.   State   v.   Guloy,   
    104 Wash. 2d 412
    , 422, 
    705 P.2d 1182
    . ( 1985), cert. denied, 
    475 U.S. 1020
    ( 1986); State             v.   Collins, 45 Wn.   App.     541, 546, 
    726 P.2d 491
    ( 1986), review denied,
    
    107 Wash. 2d 1028
    ( 1987).                    An objection to the admission of evidence based on relevance fails to
    4 DOSA is an abbreviation for a Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative sentence imposed under
    RCW 9. 94A.660.
    no
    No. 46015 -7 -II
    preserve the issue for appellate review based on ER 404(b) grounds.5 State v. Jordan, 39 Wn.
    App.   530, 539, 
    694 P.2d 47
    ( 1985),         review   denied, 
    106 Wash. 2d 1011
    ( 1986), cert. denied, 475' U.S.
    1039 ( 1987).     Here, Roark objected to White' s testimony based only on relevance. Consequently,
    we hold that she did not preserve the ER 404( b) issue for appeal.
    2. Relevance
    Roark' s attorney objected to admission of the information regarding the threats from
    Higgins and the assault because their connection with Roark was too speculative. We review the
    trial court' s rejection of this argument for abuse of discretion. State v. Bourgeois, 
    133 Wash. 2d 389
    ,
    399, 
    945 P.2d 1120
    ( 1997).
    Evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to prove or disprove a fact that is of some
    consequence in the context of the other facts and the applicable substantive law. ER 401; 5D KARL
    B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON WASHINGTON EVIDENCE, Rule
    401,   at   125 ( 2014- 15   ed.).   All relevant evidence is admissible, but it may be excluded if its
    probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ER 402, 403.
    Evidence that a defendant threatened                   a witness   is relevant because    it reveals   a
    consciousness of guilt.      State   v.   Moran, 119 Wn.       App.   197, 218, 
    81 P.3d 122
    ( 2003), review denied,
    
    151 Wash. 2d 1032
    ( 2004); 5 KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: EVIDENCE LAW AND
    PRACTICE § 402.4,      at    39 ( 5th   ed.   Supp.   2015).   Such evidence is admissible for this. substantive
    5 Appellate counsel also refers to ER 602, 801, and 802 in arguing that the trial court committed
    evidentiary error. Here again, the failure to raise these objections below waives these claims of
    error on appeal.
    h
    No. 46015 -7 -II
    purpose and to evaluate a witness' s credibility if there is a connection between the defendant and
    the reluctance of any witness to testify. 
    Bourgeois, 133 Wash. 2d at 400
    .
    Here, the evidence showed that Higgins, Roark' s former boyfriend, made online threats to
    White after the charges resulting from White' s controlled buys were filed. In addition, there was
    evidence that someone told White that Higgins had placed a bounty on his head, that Roark
    complained in a phone call that White was responsible for the buys, and that on the evening of the
    same   day     as   the "   bounty"   remark, someone assaulted         White. In a second phone call made a few
    days later, Roark asked Steve Irwin to " join the forces" in court the following day because " my
    rat" would be testifying. 4 VRP at 527- 28. A man White knew from the drug community sat with
    Irwin in court the next day.
    On appeal, Roark assigns error only to the admission of Higgins' threats and the assault
    against   White.        When viewed in the context of the other evidence described above, there is a
    sufficient connection between Roark and the challenged evidence to render that evidence relevant
    and admissible to show White' s reluctance to testify, as well as Roark' s consciousness of guilt.
    The fact that the State contended during closing argument that the evidence was relevant only to
    the issue of White' s motivations while testifying is irrelevant to our assessment of the trial court' s
    ruling.
    In   addition      to   being   relevant,   this   evidence was not   unfairly   prejudicial.   See Carson v.
    Fine, 
    123 Wash. 2d 206
    , 223, 
    867 P.2d 610
    ( 1994) ( unfair                   prejudice is caused by evidence likely to
    arouse    an emotional response rather                than   a rational response   among jurors).   White' s testimony
    regarding Higgins' threats and the assault was unlikely to elicit an emotional rather than rational
    8
    No. 46015 -7 -II
    response      from the    jury. Thus,   the   evidence was not    unfairly     prejudicial.   We conclude that the
    trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence ofthe threats and assault against White.
    B.        INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
    Roark argues next that she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney
    failed to request a limiting instruction concerning the jury' s use of the evidence concerning
    Higgins' threats and the unknown assailant' s assault. We disagree.
    This issue     presents a mixed question of      law   and   fact that     we review   de   novo.   State v.
    Sutherby,      
    165 Wash. 2d 870
    , 883, 
    204 P.3d 916
    ( 2009). To demonstrate that she received ineffective
    assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that her counsel' s performance was deficient and
    that the     deficiency   was prejudicial.     State v. Grier, 
    171 Wash. 2d 17
    , 32- 33, 
    246 P.3d 1260
    ( 2011);
    State   v.   Barragan, 102 Wn.         App.   754, 762, 
    9 P.3d 942
    ( 2000).           Counsel' s performance was
    deficient if it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. State v. McFarland, 
    127 Wash. 2d 322
    , 334- 35, 
    899 P.2d 1251
    ( 1995).          Matters that go to trial strategy or tactics do not show deficient
    performance.       
    Grier, 171 Wash. 2d at 33
    ; State v. Rainey, 
    167 Wash. App. 129
    , 135- 36, 
    28 P.3d 10
    2001),      review,   denied, 
    145 Wash. 2d 1028
    ( 2002).         We strongly presume that counsel' s conduct
    constituted sound         trial strategy.   Barragan, 102 Wn.     App.    at   762.    Prejudice exists if there is a
    reasonable probability that, the result of the proceeding would have differed had the deficient
    performance not occurred. State v. Thomas, 
    109 Wash. 2d 222
    , 226, 
    743 P.2d 816
    ( 1987).
    Here, a limiting instruction would have highlighted the evidence concerning Higgins'
    threats and the assault. Therefore, we can presume that counsel' s decision not to request a limiting
    instruction was legitimate trial strategy because such an instruction would have reemphasized
    damaging evidence. See State v. Donald, 
    68 Wash. App. 543
    , 551, 
    844 P.2d 447
    ( finding failure to
    W
    No. 46015 -7 -II
    request   limiting   instruction   was   tactical),   review   denied, 
    121 Wash. 2d 1024
    ( 1993).          Moreover, we
    see little likelihood that the trial' s outcome would have differed had the trial court offered the jury
    a   limiting instruction. Thus, even if counsel' s performance was deficient; Roark fails to show
    prejudice.    We reject Roark' s claim that she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her
    attorney failed to request a limiting instruction concerning the threats and the assault against White.
    C.        SCHOOL ZONE ENHANCEMENTS
    Finally, .Roark argues that the trial court erred when it ran her four school zone
    enhancements       consecutively instead        of    concurrently to          each   other.    Roark argues that the
    ambiguity in the       applicable    statute,    RCW 9. 94A.533( 6),             requires the    enhancements to run
    concurrently. The Supreme Court' s recent decision in Conover, 
    2015 WL 4760487
    , controls.
    RCW 9. 94A.533 addresses sentence adjustments, and subsection ( 6) provides as follows:
    An additional twenty-four months shall be added to the standard sentence
    range for any ranked offense involving a violation of chapter 69. 50 RCW if the
    offense was also a violation of        RCW 69. 50. 435          or   9. 94A. 827. All enhancements
    under this subsection shall run consecutively to all other sentencing provisions, for
    all offenses sentenced under this chapter. E6
    The first sentence of RCW 9. 94A.533( 6) is not at issue. There is no question that Roark
    committed ranked offenses under chapter 69. 50 RCW in violation of RCW 69. 50. 435, which
    requires enhanced penalties for drug offenses committed within 1, 000 feet of a school bus stop or
    school grounds.       RCW 69. 50. 401( 1), .    435( 1)(   c), (   d).   At issue here is the meaning of the second
    sentence   in RCW 9. 94A. 533( 6): " All enhancements under this subsection shall run consecutively
    to all other sentencing provisions, for all offenses sentenced under this chapter."
    6 We cite the current version of RCW 9. 94A.533( 6) for clarity. State v. Swiger, 
    159 Wash. 2d 224
    ,
    227 n.3, 
    149 P.3d 372
    ( 2006).
    10
    No. 46015 -7 -II
    The Supreme Court recently resolved this issue in Conover by comparing the language of
    RCW 9. 94A. 533( 6) with the contrasting language in the statutory provisions addressing other
    sentence      enhancements.          
    2015 WL 4760487
    , *             3(     citing    RCW   9. 94A. 533( 3)(   e) (   firearm
    enhancements shall run consecutively to all other sentencing provisions, including other firearm
    or   deadly   weapon enhancements) and          RCW 9. 94A. 533( 4)( e). ( deadly             weapon enhancements shall
    run consecutively to all other sentencing provisions, including other deadly weapon or firearm
    enhancements)).        The Conover court concluded that the legislature' s choice of different language
    indicates a different legislative intent and does not require multiple school zone enhancements to
    be imposed consecutively. 
    2015 WL 4760487
    , *                      4. 7 Therefore, the Conover court held that " RCW
    9. 94A.533( 6) requires the trial court to run Conover' s bus stop enhancements consecutively to the
    base    sentences    for   each [ convicted offense],       but   not   consecutively to      each   other." 
    Id. at *
    7.
    We   are   constrained     to follow Conover.                Therefore, we affirm Roark' s convictions but
    remand for resentencing with instructions to the trial court to impose Roark"s multiple school zone
    In 2006, legislature      added   the   second   sentence          to RCW 9. 94A.533(       6).    Conover, 
    2015 WL 4760487
    , * 6. The Conover court held that the second sentence still does not require trial courts to
    run multiple school zone enhancements consecutively, but we note that the legislative history
    concerning the 2006 amendment suggests                  a   different         result.    See FINAL B. REP. ON ENGROSSED
    SECOND SUBSTITUTE S. B. 6239, at 4, 59th      Leg., Reg. Sess. ( Wash. 2006) ( describing sentencing
    modification                    s] entence enhancements for ranked drug offenses are to be served
    providing that "[
    consecutively"); H.B. REP. ON ENGROSSED SECOND SUBSTITUTE S. B. 6239, at 7, 12, 59th Leg.,
    Reg. Sess. ( Wash. 2006) ( stating that statutory language was clarified to specify that all sentence
    enhancements relating to violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in drug-free zones
    are to run consecutively to all other sentencing provisions for all sentences under the Sentencing
    Reform Act); HOUSE CRIMINAL JUSTICE &                         CORRECTIONS COMM., H.B. BILL ANALYSIS, ON
    ENGROSSED SECOND SUBSTITUTE S. B. 6239,                 Leg., Reg. Sess. ( Wash. 2006) ( same);
    at    6, 15, 59th
    S. B. REP. ON ENGROSSED SECOND SUBSTITUTE S. B. 6239, at 5, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 ( Wash.
    2006) ( noting sentencing modification requiring enhancements for ranked drug offenses to be
    served consecutively).
    11
    No. 46015 -7 -II
    sentence enhancements consecutive to the base sentences for the drug and bail jumping
    convictions, but concurrent to each other.
    A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
    2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
    Lee, J.
    We concur:
    Maoxa, P.J.
    AJ4J-fMJ.
    Sutt n, J.
    12