Daniel Harding v. Arne Denny ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DANIEL M. HARDING, an individual,
) No. 71896-7-1 3*-
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Appellant,
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) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
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ARNE 0. DENNY, an individual,
Respondent. ) FILED: April 20, 2015
Appelwick, J. — Harding appeals the order dismissing his lawsuit, arguing that the
dismissal was void for lack of jurisdiction. Harding sued Denny in his personal capacity
for fraud Denny allegedly committed as a Skagit County prosecutor. The County provided
Denny's legal defense. Denny moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion.
Harding argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion, because the County
was not a party to the suit. We affirm.
FACTS
The present case arose from a separate dispute between Daniel Harding and
Skagit County (County) over property taxes. Prosecutor Arne Denny represented the
County in that dispute. Harding's case against the Countywas ultimately dismissed, and
the trial court awarded attorney fees and costs to the County.
The County provided an itemized cost bill for Denny's legal services. Harding took
issue with multiple charges and accused Denny of bill padding. On March 6, 2014,
Harding sued Denny in his individual capacity, alleging false representations in the cost
bill and Denny's accompanying declaration.
The County provided Denny's legal defense in the present lawsuit. On March 21,
Denny moved to dismiss Harding's complaint. The motion stated, "COMES NOW Skagit
No. 71896-7-1/2
County on behalf of defendant A. O. Denny and moves the court for an order dismissing
Harding's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted."
(Footnote omitted.) The trial court granted the motion to dismiss.
Harding appeals, arguing that the dismissal was void for lack of jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
A judgment is void if entered by a court that lacks jurisdiction of the parties or
subject matter or lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved.
Dike v. Dike. 75 Wn.2d 1, 7, 448 P.2d 490 (1968). A void judgment must be vacated.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Khani. 75 Wn. App. 317, 323, 877 P.2d 724 (1994).
Harding argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion to
dismiss. This is so, he asserts, because the County brought the motion even though it
was not a party to the lawsuit. Harding notes that the motion specifies the County as the
movant. Harding does not ask us to decide the merits of his claim, so we need not
consider the defenses that Denny asserts apply to the claim.
We construe motions to effect substantial justice, with substance controlling over
form. Neal v. Wallace. 15 Wn. App. 506, 508, 550 P.2d 539 (1976). Here, the County
was clearly acting as Denny's representative—not as a party to the suit. The County
provided Denny's legal defense pursuant to Skagit County Code (SCC) 2.20.030.1 The
motion recognizes this: "COMES NOW Skagit County on behalf of defendant A. O.
Denny." (Emphasis added) (footnote omitted). And, the relief sought—dismissal—
1 "Skagit County may provide legal services for the defense of any of its officers,
employees or volunteers when a lawsuit against them arises out of an official act or
omission if the requirements of this section are met." SCC 2.20.030(1).
No. 71896-7-1/3
affected Denny, not the County.2 Fairly construed, the motion was Denny's. Therefore,
Harding's argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the motion is not well taken.
The court had jurisdiction to hear and to dismiss the case.
Denny requests reasonable attorney fees and costs as a sanction for responding
to a frivolous appeal. Under RAP 18.9, we may award a respondent attorney fees when
a petitioner files a frivolous appeal. Skinner v. Holqate, 141 Wn. App. 840, 858,173 P.3d
300 (2007). An appeal is frivolous when it presents no debatable issues upon which
reasonable minds may differ. Id. The appeal here is frivolous. The only issue is whether
to exercise discretion to award fees to Denny. See RAP 18.9(a). It appears that the
award of fees in the original action was the provocation for this second round of litigation.
While adding to those fees might encourage Harding to change course, they might also
affirm his resolve in what appears a wholly frivolous endeavor. Accordingly, in hopes that
the matter will end here, we decline to award Denny attorney fees and costs under RAP
18.9.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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2 The County's only stake in the case was attorney fees, which Denny requested
on its behalf. The trial court denied that request, because the County was not a party to
the case. This decision was not appealed and is not before this court.