State Of Washington v. Evan Bacon, (dob 3/3/2000) , 197 Wash. App. 772 ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 74233-7-1
Appellant,
DIVISION ONE
V.
PUBLISHED OPINION
EVAN BACON,
D.O.B. 3/3/2000,
Respondent. FILED: February 13, 2017
TRICKEY, A.C.J. — Evan Bacon, a juvenile, pleaded guilty to robbery in the second
degree. The juvenile court declared that the standard range disposition would effectuate
a manifest injustice. The court imposed a 65 week disposition, and suspended it while
placing him on community supervision. The State appeals, arguing that declaring a
manifest injustice does not give the juvenile court the authority to suspend a disposition.
Because the legislature has authorized juvenile courts to suspend dispositions only in
limited circumstances not applicable here, we reverse.
FACTS
In September 2015, Bacon took a woman's purse against her will and used force
when they struggled over it. The woman fell and scraped her knees but did not suffer
serious bodily injury. Bacon pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree. Because of
Bacon's criminal history, the standard range disposition was 52 to 65 weeks of
confinement.
At the disposition hearing, Bacon asked for a declaration of manifest injustice,
because he was doing better, back in school, and living at home. The State and the
probation officer recommended the standard range disposition. They argued that Bacon
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had done well in detention but had not done well when on supervision or parole.
The court noted that Bacon had begun to make important changes in his life, but
was still a "threat to the community."1 Citing a preference to "keep youth in the
community" when possible, the court granted a manifest injustice.2 The court imposed a
disposition of "65 to 65 weeks" of confinement, and suspended it, placing him instead on
community supervision subject to a number of conditions.3
The State appealed the disposition, arguing that the record did not support a
declaration of manifest injustice and, even assuming the manifest injustice was proper,
declaring a manifest injustice did not give the court the authority to suspend the
disposition when Bacon was otherwise ineligible for a suspended disposition.
While the State's appeal was pending before this court, the juvenile court revoked
Bacon's suspended disposition because of his behavior while under community
supervision. A commissioner of this court determined that the issue of whether the trial
court had the authority to suspend a disposition here was moot. But the commissioner
nonetheless ruled that we should address the issue because it is a matter of continuing
and substantial public interest that is likely to recur in future cases.
Accordingly, the parties filed revised briefs on the sole issue of whether the trial
court erred by suspending Bacon's manifest injustice disposition.
ANALYSIS
Authority to Suspend Dispositions
The State argues that the juvenile court erred when it suspended Bacon's
1 Report of Proceedings (RP) (Oct. 14, 2015) at 45.
2 RP (Oct. 14,2015) at 46.
3 Clerk's Papers at 22.
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disposition because it lacked the authority to do so under the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977
(JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW. Bacon responds that, once the court has declared a manifest
injustice, it may suspend a juvenile offender's sentence even if it could not usually do so
under the JJA. We agree with the State.
Courts, including juvenile courts, "do not have inherent authority to suspend
sentences." State v. A.S., 116 Wash. App. 309, 311-12, 65 P.3d 676 (2003). If the
legislature has enacted a statute that grants a court the power to suspend a disposition,
the court must follow the statute's terms. State v. Clark, 91 Wash. App. 581, 585, 958 P.2d
1028 (1998). Otherwise, the court's actions are void. Clark, 91 Wash. App. at 585.
When a statute is unambiguous, this court assumes the legislature "means exactly
what it says." A.S., 116 Wash. App. at 312. This court reviews the construction of a statute
de novo. A.S., 116 Wash. App. at 312.
In the JJA, the legislature granted juvenile courts the authority to suspend
dispositions under certain circumstances. For example, "[i]f the offender is subject to a
standard range disposition . . ., the court may impose the standard range and suspend
the disposition on condition that the offender comply with one or more local sanctions and
any educational or treatment requirement." RCW 13.40.0357 (option B(1)).4
But the legislature has limited the court's authority to suspend dispositions. The
court may do so only for certain offenses described in option B and in other circumstances
not relevant to this appeal, as described in other sections of the JJA: "Except as provided
under subsection (3), (4), (5), or (6) of this section, or option B of RCW 13.40.0357, or
4 Option B does not allow the court to suspend a 14-year-old juvenile offender's sentence for
robbery in the second degree if the victim suffered bodily injury. RCW 13.40.0357 (option
B(3)(b)(iii)). Neither party argues that Bacon qualifies for a suspended disposition under option
B.
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RCW 13.40.127, the court shall not suspend or defer the imposition or the execution of
the disposition." RCW 13.40.160(10) (emphasis added).
In State v. A.S., a published per curiam decision from Division One of the Court of
Appeals, the court examined the juvenile court's authority to suspend sentences. 116
Wash. App. 309, 310, 65 P.3d 676 (2003). A.S. pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor sex
offense. A.S., 116 Wash. App. at 310-11, 313. Under the JJA, the juvenile court can
suspend a juvenile's sentence and impose a special sex offender disposition alternative
(SSODA) when a juvenile commits a felony sex offense. A.S., 116 Wash. App. at 312-13.
The court lacks that authority when the sex offense is a misdemeanor. A.S., 116 Wn.
App. at 313. The juvenile court imposed a 52 week manifest injustice disposition, based
in part on the aggravating factor of A.S.'s sexual motivation to commit the crime. A.S.
116 Wash. App. at 311. Then the court suspended A.S.'s confinement and imposed a
SSODA. A.S., 116 Wash. App. at 311.
The Court of Appeals held that the JJA "unambiguously forbids the court" to
suspend a disposition unless a statutory exception applies. A.S., 116 Wash. App. at 312.
It ruled that the juvenile court lacked the authority to suspend A.S.'s disposition because
the sex offense was a misdemeanor, and reversed the SSODA. A.S., 116 Wash. App. at
315.
In State v. Crabtree, published a few weeks after A.S., Division Three of the Court
of Appeals took a different approach. 116 Wash. App. 536, 545, 66 P.3d 695 (2003). There,
the juvenile court declared a manifest injustice and imposed a disposition much shorter
than the standard range. Crabtree, 116 Wash. App. at 540-41. The court then suspended
the disposition and imposed a chemical dependency disposition alternative (CDDA).
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Crabtree, 116 Wash. App. at 541. The State objected, arguing that the court could not
impose a CDDA because the juvenile offender did not qualify for one under the statute.
Crabtree, 116 Wash. App. at 545. The appellate court agreed that Crabtree did not qualify
for a CDDA but upheld the disposition, holding that "[o]nce a manifest injustice is declared,
and the court elects to depart from the standard range, the sentencing scheme of the
[JJA] no longer applies." Crabtree, 116 Wash. App. at 545.
In both Crabtree and A.S., the juvenile court declared a manifest injustice,
suspended the disposition, and imposed an alternative disposition that the juvenile
offender did not qualify for under the statute. But the reviewing courts reached opposite
conclusions: Crabtree's suspended disposition was affirmed, while A.S.'s was reversed.
We adhere to our decision in A.S. and reject Crabtree's broad holding for two
reasons. First, in Crabtree, the court did not fully examine the statutory limits of the
juvenile court's power to suspend dispositions. See 116 Wash. App. at 545-46.
Second, we disagree with Crabtree's holding that the JJA's entire "sentencing
scheme" does not apply after the court has declared a manifest injustice. 116 Wash. App.
at 545. If the court finds that a standard range disposition will "effectuate a manifest
injustice the court shall impose a disposition outside the standard range." RCW
13.40.0357 (option D) (emphasis added). The juvenile court has "broad discretion in
determining the appropriate sentence to impose." State v. M.L., 134 Wash. 2d 657, 660,
952 P.2d 187 (1998).
All of the cases cited in Crabtree address the juvenile court's discretion to
determine the length of the disposition it imposes. State v. Duncan, 90 Wash. App. 808,
815, 960 P.2d 941 (1998) (holding the court has "broad discretion to determine the length
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of a manifest injustice disposition"); State v. B.E.W., 65 Wash. App. 370, 375, 828 P.2d 87
(1992); State v. Tauala, 54 Wash. App. 81, 86-88, 771 P.2d 1188 (1989); State v. P., 37
Wash. App. 773, 780, 686 P.2d 488 (1984) (holding that length of disposition was excessive
and remanding "for further proceedings to determine the appropriate length of the
sentence"); State v. Strong, 23 Wash. App. 789, 791, 794, 599 P.2d 20 (1979).
Imposing a disposition and suspending that disposition are not the same act.
When the court chooses to suspend a disposition, it still imposes a disposition of a certain
length. ROW 13.40.0357 (option 6(1)). We conclude that declaring a manifest injustice
gives the juvenile court discretion over what length of disposition to impose, but not
whether to suspend that disposition.5
Here, the juvenile court declared that a standard range disposition would effect a
manifest injustice, imposed a disposition of 65 to 65 weeks of confinement, and
suspended the disposition. The court made no findings that Bacon's circumstances fit
within any of the exceptions to the JJA's prohibition of suspending dispositions. ROW
13.40.160(10). Manifest injustice dispositions, described in RCW 13.40.160(2) and ROW
13.40.0357 (option D), are not on the list of exceptions.
Bacon has shown that the court had discretion over what length of sentence to
impose, but he has not shown that the court had the discretion to suspend an imposed
disposition. While the juvenile court's desire to keep Bacon connected to his school and
community were important considerations, the court lacked the authority under the
legislative requirements of the JJA to suspend his manifest injustice disposition.
5 Nothing in this opinion should be construed to limit the juvenile court's discretion to impose local
sanctions when it has declared a manifest injustice. See ROW 13.40.160(2); ROW
13.40.020(18).
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No. 74233-7-1/7
We reverse and remand for a new dispositional hearing.
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WE CONCUR:
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