Mike Belenski v. Jefferson County ( 2015 )

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION Id
2015 MAY 19 AM 9: 05
ST .` E OF WASHINGTON
BY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
MIKE BELENSKI, No, 45756 -3 -II
Appellant,
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY, a Washington State PUBLISHED OPINION
political subdivision,
Respondent.
JOHANSON, C. J. — In this Public Records Act ( PRA)1 case, Mike Belenski appeals a
superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of Jefferson County (County). Belenski
argues that the County was required to produce records in response to his requests for ( 1) the
County' s Internet access logs ( IAL), (2) the electronic records he was seeking for which the County
does not generate a backup, and ( 3) records and contact information relating to a former county
employee.
We hold that ( 1) the County' s IALs are subject to disclosure under the PRA because they
contain information relating to the conduct of government and therefore are public records, but
the PRA statute of limitations bars Belenski' s claims relating to one of the IAL requests, ( 2) the
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Ch. 42. 56 RCW.
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County is not required to respond to Belenski' s request for electronic records for which the County
does not generate a backup because that request did not involve identifiable public records, ( 3) the
County properly withheld records regarding its former employee under statutory exemptions,
properly provided a brief explanation to support its claimed exemptions, and did not silently
withhold records. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
The County provides an extensive network of computers, servers, and other technology for
use by its employees. At any given time, there are over 300 county -owned personal computers
PCs) in service. The County' s Information Service Department ( IS) secures and maintains this
infrastructure using firewall software known as " SonicWall" that, in conjunction with another
program called " Viewpoint," automatically generates information regarding contacts between
county PCs and the Internet. The record of these contacts is known as an " Internet Access Log"
2
IAL) or " System Log." The default setting on the software saves this information for 13 months,
with each new day deleting and replacing the oldest day. The purpose of providing Internet access
to county employees is to give them " tools to perform their job tasks," and network and Internet
access is provided as a research and communication apparatus to assist in conducting county
business. Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 30.
2
The County contends that IAL is different from an " Internet Access Audit Log," which the
County is required to maintain by Jefferson County Resolution 17 -198. According to the County,
an Internet Access Audit Log would only be generated upon the request of a department head.
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Belenski made four separate PRA requests for records associated with Internet use by
county employees. 3 First, on September 27, 2010, Belenski requested the County' s IAL from
February 1, 2010 to September 27, 2010 ( request # 1). The County responded on October 4 that it
had no responsive records.
Second, on November 2, 2011, Belenski requested to inspect IALs from January 1, 2011
to November 1, 2011 ( request # 2). As a result of Belenski' s request, IS manager David Shambley
discovered that there had been a catastrophic hard drive failure that affected the Viewpoint
software. Shambley then informed Belenski that "[ g] ood solid archive data" for the IALs was
available from only November 10, 2011 forward but that the County had managed to salvage data
on some sporadic dates which it would collect and provide. CP at 379. The County offered to
permit Belenski to inspect the available IAL data " in their entirety," but Belenski amended his
request to seek electronic copies instead of inspection. CP at 226. The County later provided
Belenski a compact disc ( CD) containing this information. The County considered the request
fulfilled at this point, but Belenski considered the IAL data contained on the CD insufficient.
Third, on December 8, 2011, Belenski submitted a PRA request for " electronic copies of
every electronic record for which Jefferson County [ IS] does not generate a back up" ( request #3).
CP at 40. The County responded, refusing to produce records because Belenski' s request was not
a request for " identifiable" public records pursuant to RCW 42. 56. 080.
3
Belenski made an additional request for "[ t]he certificate( s) of records destruction for the [ IALs]
for February 1, 2010 to September 27, 2010." CP at 216. Because Belenski makes no argument
related to this additional request, this request is irrelevant for purposes of this appeal.
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Fourth, in August 2012, Belenski requested all records and contact information for a former
IS employee ( request # 4). The County responded, producing some partially redacted documents
and providing Belenski with an exemption log for the records that it refused to produce based on
the PRA' s various privacy exemptions. Belenski argues that the County' s response was
inadequate because it did not contain brief explanations.
Belenski filed suit on November 19, 2012, alleging several causes of action and
complaining of various deficiencies associated with the County' s responses to his requests.
Shortly thereafter, the County provided the " brief explanations" that Belenski claims were missing
from request #4.
II. PROCEDURE
The County moved for summary judgment, arguing in part that (1) the statute of limitations
bars Belenski' s claim with respect to request # 1, ( 2) the IALs were not "public records" as defined
by the PRA, and ( 3) in any event, the County had nevertheless satisfied Belenski' s request #2 by
producing the CD. The County argued further that Belenski had not requested identifiable records
in request # 3 and that the County had included proper exemption logs with regard to request #4.
The superior court ruled that the County was entitled to summary judgment on Belenski' s
requests # 1, # 2, and # 3. 4 After an in camera review, the superior court ruled that the County had
properly withheld and redacted documents relating to request # 4. But the court found that the
County had failed to provide brief explanations which entitled Belenski to recover his costs. The
4 The superior court ruled that the IALs did not constitute public records within the purview of the
PRA because they were not related to government conduct or a proprietary function and, thus, did
not satisfy the second prong of the PRA' s definition of "public record." The superior court also
agreed that Belenski' s request # 3 was not a request for " identifiable" public records.
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superior court dismissed Belenski' s claims for requests # 1, # 2, and # 3 and awarded Belenski
434. 99 as costs incurred resulting from request # 4. Belenski filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the superior court declined to reconsider its earlier rulings. Belenski appeals these orders and
the superior court' s May 2013 memorandum.
ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review challenges to an agency action under the PRA de novo where, as here, the
record consists of documentary evidence, affidavits, and memoranda. RCW 42. 56. 550( 3);
Resident Action Council v. Seattle Hous. Auth., 177 Wash. 2d 417, 428, 327 P.3d 600 ( 2013).
Similarly, we review summary judgment orders de novo, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 154 Wash. 2d
16, 26, 109 P.3d 805 ( 2005). Trial courts properly grant summary judgment where the pleadings
and affidavits show no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. CR 56( c). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we consider solely
the issues and evidence the parties called to the trial court' s attention on the motion for summary
judgment. RAP 9. 12.
II. PUBLIC RECORDS - REQUESTS # 1 AND # 2
Belenski argues that the IALs are public records pursuant to the PRA because the IALs are
writings that contain information relating to the conduct of government that are retained by the
County. The County responds that the IALs are not public records under the PRA because a nexus
does not exist between the IALs and a. government function. We agree with Belenski and hold
that under the plain language of the PRA, the requested IALs are writings prepared and retained
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by the County that contain information relating to the conduct of government.5 We hold, however,
that the County was not required to produce records in response to request # 1 because the PRA
statute of limitations bars Belenski' s claim regarding that request.
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The PRA is a "` strongly worded mandate ' aimed at giving interested members of the
public wide access to public documents to ensure governmental transparency. Worthington v.
Westnet, 180 Wash. 2d 500, 506, 341 P.3d 995( 2015) ( quoting Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d
123, 127, 580 P.2d 246 ( 1978)). The statute' s language " reflects the belief that the sound
governance of a free society demands that the public have full access to information concerning
the workings of the government." Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wash. 2d 25, 31, 929 P.2d 389
1997). Accordingly, courts must avoid interpreting the PRA in a way that would tend to frustrate
that purpose. Worthington, 180 Wash. 2d at 507. The PRA " shall be liberally construed ... to
promote this public policy and to assure that the public interest will be fully protected." RCW
42. 56. 030.
Whether a document is a " public record" is a critical determination for the PRA' s purposes
because the Act applies only to public records. Dragonslayer, Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling
Comm 'n, 139 Wn. App. 433, 444, 161 P.3d 428 ( 2007). A public record is defined very broadly,
5 Belenski also argues that the burden is on the County to show that the IALs are not public records,
implying that the County has failed to do so. Although Belenski is correct that the burden is on
the agency seeking to prevent disclosure of public records, that burden is only placed on the agency
once the threshold inquiry of whether the records are " public records" is met. Dragonslayer, Inc.
v. Wash. State Gambling Comm 'n, 139 Wash. App. 433, 441, 161 P.3d 428 ( 2007).
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No. 45756 -3 -II.
encompassing virtually any record related to the conduct of government. O' Neill v. City of
Shoreline, 170 Wash. 2d 138, 147, 240 P.3d 1149 ( 2010).
RCW 42. 56. 010( 3) sets forth the definition of "public record" for purposes of the PRA and
provides in relevant part,
Public record" includes any writing containing information relating to the conduct
of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function
prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of
physical form or characteristics.
Accordingly, to constitute a public record under the PRA, a record must be ( 1) a writing ( 2)
containing information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of a
governmental or proprietary function and (3) prepared, owned, used, or retained by a state or local
agency. Nissen v. Pierce County, 183 Wn. App. 581, 590, 333 P.3d 577 ( 2014), review granted,
343 P.3d 759 ( 2015).
B. THE IALs " CONTAIN INFORMATION RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF GOVERNMENT"
There is no genuine dispute that the IALs constitute writings that are retained by the
County. At issue here is whether the IALs " contain[ ] information relating to the conduct of
government or the performance of government." RCW 42. 56. 010( 3). We broadly interpret the
second element of the public record test to allow disclosure. Confederated Tribes, of Chehalis
Reservation v. Johnson, 135 Wash. 2d 734, 746, 958 P.2d 260 ( 1998).
The purpose of providing Internet access to county employees is to give them " tools to
perform their job tasks" and to research and communicate for county business. CP at 30. The
requested IALs were generated when a government employee, using a government computer,
accessed the Internet. The IALs contain a record of every contact a county employee makes to the
Internet. An IAL record displays, among other things, Internet protocol ( IP) addresses and the
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time the contact is made. According to Shambley, the IALs contain " data about data, the so- called
6
meta -data. " CP at 364. Apparently, this information can be used to identify which websites
employees are contacting, notwithstanding the fact that doing so would involve a " cumbersome"
process. CP at 364.
County employees use the Internet to obtain information to perform their work. Therefore,
there is no question that the IALs record work -related Internet use on a county -owned computer.
Accordingly, we hold that the requested IALs fall squarely within the definition of public records. 8
C. PRIOR CASE LAW IS DISTINGUISHABLE
Although our courts have previously construed the second prong of the PRA definition,
this is a case of first impression because of the unique nature of the requested data. The County
relies on our opinion in Dragonslayer, 139 Wash. App. at 439, and our Supreme Court' s decision in
Concerned Ratepayers Ass 'n v. Public Utilities District No. 1 of Clark County, 138 Wash. 2d 950,
983 P.2d 635 ( 1999), in support of the proposition that the IALs are not public records because the
County did not use the IALs for any purpose before Belenski' s requests. Therefore, the County
6 Our Supreme Court has held that the metadata stored as part of an electronic record is a public
record subject to disclosure. O' Neill, 170 Wash. 2d at 147.
7 The County also contends that the IALs do not satisfy prong three of the definition because the
County did not prepare, own, retain, or use them. This argument lacks merit because the County
owned the computers and software that created the IALs; Jefferson County Resolution 17 -98
required the IS to maintain the IALs and the County retained the IALs at least temporarily.
8 Because the trial court concluded that the IALs were not public records, it did not consider
whether any part of the requested information might be " purely personal in nature" nor did it
consider whether any exemptions might apply. Because the County has not claimed that any part
of the requested information is purely personal, we do not address that issue nor do we address
whether any exemptions might apply.
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argues there is no nexus between the IALs and any government use or decision -making as the
aforementioned cases require. But those cases are distinguishable because the records at issue in
those cases were created by third parties. Here, it is undisputed that the requested information was
generated from within the government agency and that no third parties are involved.
In Dragonslayer, the issue was whether audited financial statements prepared by an
independent public accountant firm and subsequently submitted to the Gambling Commission
were public records under the PRA. 139 Wash. App. at 440. There was no dispute that prongs one
and three of the public record definition were satisfied because the financial statements were
writings" that were retained by the commission pursuant to the Washington Administrative Code.
Dragonslayer, 139 Wash. App. at 444. The Dragonslayer court was asked to determine whether the
financial statements prepared by a third party related to the conduct of government. 139 Wash. App.
at 447. Finding the record inadequate to make that determination, we remanded the matter and
directed the trial court to make additional findings as to how the commission used the firm' s
financial statements in order to determine whether they were related to a public function.
Dragonslayer, 139 Wash. App. at 446.
In part, the Dragonslayer court relied on language from Concerned Ratepayers. There,
our Supreme Court held that technical documents related to the construction of a power plant that
were prepared by a third party were nevertheless public records. Concerned Ratepayers, 138
Wash. 2d at 962. The Concerned Ratepayers court reasoned that because a nexus existed between
the information and the public utility district' s decision-making process, the technical documents
were, therefore, " used" by the agency. 138 Wash. 2d at 960 -61. The court stated, "[ T] he information
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relates not only to the conduct or performance of the agency or its proprietary function, but is also
a relevant factor in the agency' s action." Concerned Ratepayers, 13,8 Wn.2d at 960 -61.
The County relies on Dragonslayer and Concerned Ratepayers to argue that a " nexus" is
required between the IALs and government function. But in Dragonslayer and Concerned
Ratepayers, it was unclear whether the requested records related to a government function because
the information was generated by a third party and not by the agency. 9 Therefore, those courts
required that the third-party-generated information must be actually " used" by the government
agency to be considered a public record. Concerned Ratepayers, 138 Wash. 2d at 961; Dragonslayer,
139 Wash. App. at 446.
But here, where government employees use government computers and software to access
the Internet for their assigned work, there is no need to require the resulting IALs to be " used" by
the agency in order to be a record " containing information relating to the conduct of government."
RCW 42. 56. 010( 3). Under these facts and under a plain reading of the PRA, it is sufficient that
the requested information " contain[ s] information relating to ... governmental ... function."
RCW 42. 56. 010( 3).
The County also relies on Tiberino v. Spokane County, 103 Wash. App. 680, 13 P.3d 1104
2000), to support its argument that there needs to be a " nexus" or " use" requirement. Although
the requested information in Tiberino did not involve third -party- generated information, that case
is nevertheless distinguishable. There, Division Three of this court held that personal e -mails sent
9 We also note that while the Dragonslayer court' s analysis revolved around prong two of the
public record" definition, Concerned Ratepayers involved an examination of prong three of that
definition. 138 Wash. 2d at 958.
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from Tiberino' s county -owned computer were public records within the scope of the PRA because
the county printed the e -mails in preparation for litigation resulting from Tiberino' s termination, a
proprietary function. Tiberino, 103 Wn. App. at 688. Thus, the County argues that county -
generated e -mail was not considered a public record until it was " used" in connection with
government business. But in Tiberino, it was undisputed that the e -mails was purely personal in
nature even though they were generated by a government employee on a government computer.
Here, in contrast, the County does not claim that any of the requested IALs are purely " personal"
in nature. We therefore find Tiberino unhelpful on, the issue of whether the requested IALs are
public records.
To further support its argument that the IALs do not relate to government conduct, the
County argues that the IALs were collected only as an unwanted function of the County' s software
program. The County argues further that IAL data might be a public record within the terms of
the PRA if it were used to create an audit log of employee Internet use that was then used in
connection with some proprietary function. The record establishes that the County never reviewed
the IALs or used them for any governmental function. IS manager Shambley declared that he had
never been asked to produce the IAL data by any county supervisor, manager, elected official, or
director. The County " virtually ignored" the IALs, at least until Belenski' s PRA requests. CP at
292.
But the County' s arguments do not address whether the IALs nonetheless " contain[ ]
information related to the conduct of government." RCW 42. 56. 010( 3). And we hold that there
is no requirement under the PRA that the IALs be " used" by the government when the IALs are
created by government employees using government computers and software in the course of their
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assigned work. To the extent the superior court required such a use or nexus, it erred. Under these
circumstances, the IALs contain information relating to the conduct of government such that they
satisfy prong two of the " public records" definition.
D. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON REQUEST # 1
The County also argues that any claim Belenski can assert with regard to his request for
the County' s IALs from February 1, 2010 to September 27, 2010 ( request # 1), is barred by either
the PRA' s one -year statute of limitations, RCW 42. 56. 550( 6), or by the two -year " catch -all"
statute of limitations contained in RCW 4. 16. 130. We hold that Belenski' s claim with regard to
request # 1 is barred by the two -year statute of limitations.
A request for records under the PRA is subject to two separate limitation periods. One
provision in the Act itself provides that a plaintiff must file an action within one year of either ( 1)
an agency' s claim of exemption from the PRA' s disclosure requirements, or (2) an agency' s " last
production of a record on a partial or installment basis. RCW 42. 56. 550( 6); Johnson v. Dep 't of
Corr., 164 Wn. App. 769, 775, 265 P.3d 216 ( 2011), review denied, 173 Wash. 2d 1032 ( 2012).
Alternatively, the two -year " catch -all" statute controls when there are no other applicable statutes
of limitation. Johnson, 164 Wash. App. at 777.
Here, the County contends that its answer to Belenski' s request # 1 of " no responsive
records" triggered the running of the PRA' s one -year statute of limitations. CP at 214. Although
it is not immediately clear whether such a response would trigger the PRA' s one -year statute, we
need not answer this question because Belenski' s suit was untimely under the latter two -year
statute.
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Belenski made request # 1 on September 27, 2010. The County mailed a letter stating that
it had " no responsive records" on October 4, and e- mailed him the same answer on October 5. CP
at 214. Belenski does not dispute having received the responses on those dates. Belenski did not
file his complaint until November 19, 2012, over two years after the County responded to request
1. Accordingly, we hold that Belenski' s claim regarding the County' s IALs from February 1,
2010 to September 27, 2010 ( request # 1) is barred by the statute of limitations contained in RCW
4. 16. 130.
E. COUNTY' S PRODUCTION OF CD ON REQUEST # 2
The County further argues that if the IALs are considered public records, it nevertheless
satisfied request #2 by providing Belenski with the CD containing the " aggregate" IAL summary.
Belenski responds that he never agreed to accept a summary report of the Internet activity in lieu
of his request for the complete IALs.
But this issue is not ripe for our review, and even if it were, the record is not developed
enough to determine whether the CD was sufficient to satisfy Belenski' s request. The superior
court made no ruling regarding the CD as it pertained to request #2. And from the record before
us, we cannot discern what the CD actually contained. The record includes neither the CD itself
nor any copy of the files thereon. To address this contention, additional fact finding is required
on remand.
III. IDENTIFIABLE RECORDS - REQUEST # 3
Belenski next contends that PRA request # 3 for " electronic copies of every electronic
record for which Jefferson County [ IS] does not generate a back up" was a request for
identifiable" records. CP at 40. We conclude that Belenski' s request was not one for identifiable
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public records because the County never kept records in such a way that would allow them to
identify records that were not " backed up" and because the PRA does not require an agency to
conduct research or to explain public records.
A request under the PRA must be for an " identifiable public record." See Hangartner v.
City ofSeattle; 151 Wash. 2d 439, 447 -48, 90 P.3d 26 ( 2004) ( emphasis added) ( quoting former RCW
42. 17. 270 ( 1987)). A mere request for information does not so qualify. Wood v. Lowe, 102 Wn.
App. 872, 879, 10 P.3d 494 ( 2000); Bonamy v. City ofSeattle, 92 Wash. App. 403, 410 -12, 960 P.2d
447 ( 1998). Moreover, although there is no official format for a valid PRA request, " a party
seeking documents must, at a minimum, [( 1)] provide notice that the request is made pursuant to
the [ PRA] and [( 2)] identify the documents with reasonable clarity to allow the agency to locate
them." Hangartner, 151 Wash. 2d at 447. The PRA does not require agencies to research or explain
public records, but only to make those records accessible to the public. Bonamy, 92 Wash. App. at
409. And a court cannot order production of records that do not exist. Neighborhood Alliance of
Spokane County v. County ofSpokane, 172 Wash. 2d 702, 753, 261 P.3d 119 ( 2011). When a request
is invalid, the agency is excused from complying with it. Bonamy, 92 Wash. App. at 412.
Belenski' s claim that he requested " identifiable records" is unpersuasive. First, the County
does not bifurcate records in a manner that would allow it to provide Belenski with a copy of every
record that the County does not " back up." Shambley described IS' s recommendation that county
employees take it upon themselves to employ precautionary measures to save electronic records
to external servers or drives maintained by the County. Whether or not county employees heed
this advice is not something that IS tracks. Consequently, if the County were required to research
an untold number of records to respond to Belenski' s request, it would be obligated to create and
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produce records that do not currently exist. Bonamy, 92 Wash. App. at 409; Neighborhood Alliance,
172 Wash. 2d at 753. This is a result that the PRA neither intends nor requires.
Second, Belenski' s request is essentially a request for information. In Bonamy, Division
One of this court held that Bonamy failed to make a request for identifiable records in part because
he stated that he wanted to " know" what policy guidelines govern investigations into employee
conduct and how they differ from other related policies rather than simply requesting copies of the
policies themselves. 92 Wash. App. at 409. Similarly, in Smith v. Okanogan County, 100 Wash. App.
7, 19, 994 P.2d 857 ( 2000), Smith asked the Okanogan County Commissioners' Office to advise
him when, how, and why the county became a municipal corporation. The court held that Smith' s
request failed to identify a public record. Smith, 100 Wn. App. at 19. Instead, Smith was
essentially requesting information. Smith, 100 Wash. App. at 19.
Here, responding to the County' s assertion that he had failed to request identifiable records,
Belenski said that he wanted the records in part because he wanted to identify "what public records
are at risk of permanent loss." CP at 237. By virtue of his request, Belenski was essentially
seeking information associated with the County' s approach or policy regarding storage and
maintenance of electronic records. Belenski sought to determine whether there are records ( and if
so, which records) that the County does not trouble itself to secure. For the foregoing reasons, we
hold that Belenski' s request # 3 was not a request for " identifiable" public records within the
meaning of the PRA.
IV. EMPLOYMENT RECORD EXEMPTIONS - REQUEST # 4
Belenski further argues that the County improperly withheld records related to a former
county employee because the claimed exemptions for employees and applicants no longer apply
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to a former employee. Belenski claims that at least some of the records that were withheld entirely
should have been produced with partial redactions. We hold that Belenski' s claims fail because
he cites no authority to suggest that exemptions for employee privacy do not apply to former
employees. 1°
A. APPLICATION OF EXEMPTION TO FORMER EMPLOYEES
The PRA requires a government agency to disclose any public record upon request;
however, an agency lawfully withholds production of records if one of the PRA' s enumerated
exemptions applies. RCW 42. 56. 070( 1); Sanders v. State, 169 Wash. 2d 827, 836, 240 P.3d 120
2010). " The PRA' s exemptions are provided solely to protect relevant privacy rights or vital
governmental interests that sometimes outweigh the PRA' s broad policy in favor of disclosing
public records." Resident Action Council, 177 Wash. 2d at 432. The burden is on the agency to
establish that an exemption applies. RCW 42. 56. 550( 1); Resident Action Council, 177 Wash. 2d at
428.
Here, the County invoked the exemptions contained in former RCW 42. 56. 250( 2)-( 3)
2010) either to withhold entirely or redact partially records associated with the former employee' s
personnel file and employment application materials. Former RCW 42. 56. 250 exempts some
public employee records from public inspection and copying under the PRA and provides that the
following records are exempt,
10 Belenski also asserts that the superior court erred by failing to make written findings that the
exemptions were proper specifically because the protected relevant privacy rights or vital
government interests applied to the former employee' s personnel information. But Belenski did
not raise this issue before the superior court, and he cites no authority to support the notion that a
court must enter such findings when it determines that an exemption applies. Therefore, we
decline to further address this assertion.
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2) All applications for public employment, including the names of
applicants, resumes, and other related materials submitted with respect to an
applicant;
3) The residential addresses, residential telephone numbers, personal
wireless telephone numbers, personal electronic mail addresses, social security
numbers, and emergency contact information of employees or volunteers of a
public agency, and the names, dates of birth, residential addresses, social security
numbers, and emergency contact information of dependents of employees or
volunteers of a public agency that are held by any public agency in personnel
records, public employment related records, or volunteer rosters, or are included in
any mailing list of employees or volunteers of any public agency.
The record reveals that the County withheld four documents in their entirety. Three of
these documents were related to the former employee' s county employment application and one
was related to his family' s medical information. The employment application documents include
background checks, resumes, the application itself, and driving records. These documents clearly
constitute the type of employment application material categorically exempt under former RCW
42. 56. 250( 2). The County also produced three documents with partial redactions to exclude
residential addresses, personal e -mail and telephone numbers, as well as medical information.
Each of these are also properly exempt under the PRA. See former RCW 42. 56. 250( 3); RCW
42. 56. 360( 2).
The crux of Belenski' s argument appears to be that the County was not entitled to refuse
to produce these records by availing itself of the aforementioned exemptions because the former
employee is neither an applicant nor is he an employee. But there is no language in either of those
exemptions that limits their application only to current employees or only to those whose
applications for employment happen to be contemporaneous with a PRA request. Such a reading
would
defy reason and jeopardize privacy. See Seattle Firefighters Union Local No. 27 v.
Hollister, 48 Wn. App. 129, 134, 737 P.2d 1302 ( 1987) ( construing public employee privacy
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exemption contained in former RCW 42. 17. 310( 1)( b) ( 1987) to apply to retired firefighters and
police officers). We hold that the exemptions apply to the former employee' s records and,
therefore, the County properly withheld or redacted them.
Belenski next also argues that a one -page " screenshot" that the County withheld under
former RCW 42. 56. 250( 2) and ( 3) should have been produced with partial redactions because it
contains the former employee' s employee number aside from his exempt home address. But our
courts have held that an employee' s name coupled with his or her identification number, can be
properly exempt under the PRA for privacy because such material could potentially provide access
to other exempt personal information. Tacoma Pub. Library v. Woessner, 90 Wash. App. 205, 221-
11
22, 951 P.2d 357, 972 P.2d 932 ( 1998). We hold that the County properly withheld the
screenshot record.
B. BRIEF EXPLANATIONS
Belenski argues that the County' s exemption logs continue to lack the necessary " brief
explanation" required by the PRA. Br. of Appellant at 31. Belenski also asserts that the County
silently withheld" records from him. Br. of Appellant at 34. Wechold that the County provided
a sufficient brief explanation in its revised exemption log.
An agency withholding or redacting any record must specify the exemption and give a
brief explanation of how the exemption applies to the document. RCW 42. 56. 210( 3); Sanders,
11. Belenski also claims that he should have been entitled to a partially redacted screenshot because
the screenshot displayed a time of 11: 48 AM. But the time that appears on the screenshot is not an
actual part of the employee record being displayed. Rather, it is the time that the screenshot was
taken on the county employee' s computer, separate and distinct from the redacted record. The
record itself shows only the former employee' s name, his home address, and his employee number,
which, as we have explained, is all exempt under the PRA for privacy.
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169 Wash. 2d at 846. Merely identifying the document and the claimed exemption does not suffice
to satisfy the brief explanation requirement. Sanders, 169 Wash. 2d at 846.
Here, the County initially cited only the name of the document and the applicable
exemption in the exemption log it provided to Belenski in response to request # 4. Shortly after
Belenski commenced this litigation, the County provided a revised exemption log that contained
a new section dedicated to brief explanations for each claimed exemption. The superior court
ruled that because the County satisfied its obligation under the PRA only after Belenski filed suit,
Belenski was entitled to recover his costs. Because he prevailed on this issue, the nature of
Belenski' s argument to this court is unclear.
To the extent that he contends that the revised exemption logs lack the requisite brief
explanation, Belenski' s argument fails. In addition to identification of each record and the
applicable exemption, the revised log features a section entitled " Brief Explanation." CP at 657-
58. There, the County provides a description of either the nature of the document that justifies
exemption as a whole or an explanation as to the particular information that permits redaction. We
hold that Belenski' s claim fails.
C. SILENT WITHHOLDING
Belenski claims that the County silently withheld records from him. Belenski bases this
assertion on the fact that he later discovered numerous records responsive to request # 4 that had
not been provided to him by the County. In Belenski' s view, the fact that his request for the former
employee' s records " had only been sent to 3 entities" was evidence that the County purposely and
deceptively withheld records. Br. of Appellant at 34. We hold that the County did not silently
withhold records.
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The PRA prohibits " silent withholding" or the failure to reveal that some records have been
withheld in their entirety, which gives requesters the misleading impression that all documents
relevant to the request have been disclosed. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc. v. Univ. of Wash.,
125 Wash. 2d 243, 270 -71, 884 P.2d 592 ( 1994). "' The adequacy of a search is judged by a standard
of reasonableness, that is, the search must be reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant
documents. ' Forbes v. City of Gold Bar, 171 Wn. App. 857, 866, 288 P.3d 384 ( 2012) ( quoting
Neighborhood Alliance, 172 Wash. 2d at 720), review denied, 177 Wash. 2d 1002 ( 2013).
The record shows that the County forwarded Belenski' s request # 4 to three departments:
auditor /payroll, central services, and Board of County Commissioners /Human Resources
BoCC/ HR). Belenski cites no authority to support the proposition that the County violated the
PRA by filtering Belenski' s request through only three county departments. Nor does Belenski
show that the County' s search for the requested documents was unreasonable. As part of request
4, Belenski asked for all e -mails to and from the former employee, all records documenting his
training involving the PRA, and all records containing his contact information. Considering the
nature of Belenski' s request, it was reasonable to contact the auditor /payroll, central services, and
BoCC/ HR.
Moreover, even had the County provided the same records Belenski was able to acquire
through other means, it would have been entirely within the right of the County to redact the former
employee' s personal information as explained above. The County did not violate the PRA by
silently withholding" records.
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CONCLUSION
We hold that the County' s IALs are " public records" because they contain information
relating to the conduct of government. Therefore, we reverse the trial court' s grant of summary
judgment to the County on request #2. We affirm the trial court' s grant of summary judgment to
the County on requests # 1, # 3, and #4. Accordingly, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand
for action consistent with this opinion.
We concur:
MAXA, J.
LEE, J.
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