State Of Washington, V Brian Nicholas West ( 2017 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
January 24, 2017
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 47491-3-II
Respondent,
v.
BRIAN NICHOLAS WEST, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
WORSWICK, P.J. — Following a bench trial, Brian West appeals his conviction and
sentence for residential burglary. He argues that the trial court erred by failing to enter written
findings of fact and conclusions of law following the bench trial, as required by CrR 6.1(d), and
the sentencing court failed to consider his current and future ability to pay before imposing
discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs). In a statement of additional grounds (SAG) for
review, West also contends that the sentencing court improperly sentenced him to community
custody.1 We agree that the trial court erred by not entering written findings and consequently
vacate the judgment and sentence and remand the case for entry of written findings and
conclusions and for resentencing.
1
In a supplemental brief, West also seeks waiver of appellate costs. But because we remand for
entry of written findings and conclusions, the State is not entitled to costs.
No. 47491-3-II
FACTS
The State charged West with a single count of residential burglary. West waived his right
to a jury trial and the case was tried by bench trial. The court ultimately found West guilty as
charged.
The sentencing court imposed a 20-month high end sentence plus 12 additional months of
community custody. Without inquiring into West’s current or future ability to pay, the
sentencing court imposed various discretionary LFOs (legal financial obligations). The
judgment and sentence included the following boilerplate language in section 2.5:
Legal Financial Obligations/Restitution. The court has considered the total amount
owing, the defendant’s present and future ability to pay the legal financial
obligations, including the defendant’s financial resources and the likelihood that
the defendant’s status will change. (RCW 10.01.160)
Clerk’s Papers at 8.
The record does not contain any written findings of fact or conclusions of law from the
bench trial.
ANALYSIS
I. FAILURE TO ENTER WRITTEN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
West argues, and the State concedes that the trial court erred by failing to enter written
findings of fact and conclusions of law following the bench trial. We accept the State’s
concession and remand for entry of written findings and conclusions.
The trial court is required to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law
following a bench trial. CrR 6.1(d). Written findings and conclusions facilitate the appellate
review process. State v. Head, 136 Wash. 2d 619, 622, 964 P.2d 1187 (1998). A court's oral
opinion “‘has no final or binding effect’” until it is formally incorporated in written findings,
2
No. 47491-3-II
conclusions, and judgment. Head, 136 Wash. 2d at 622 (quoting State v. Mallory, 69 Wash. 2d 532,
533, 419 P.2d 324 (1966)). The appropriate remedy is to vacate the judgment and sentence and
remand to the trial court for entry of written findings and conclusions. Head, 136 Wash. 2d at 624.
Because the trial court did not enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law after
the bench trial, as required by CrR 6.1, we accept the State’s concession, vacate the judgment
and sentence, and remand this case to the trial court with directions that it enter written findings
of fact and conclusions of law as required.
II. LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
West also argues that the sentencing court erred in failing to inquire into his current or
future ability to pay before ordering him to pay discretionary LFOs.
Our Supreme Court has made clear that under RCW 10.01.160(3), the sentencing court
“must do more than sign a judgment and sentence with boilerplate language stating that it
engaged in the required inquiry.” State v. Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d 827, 838, 344 P.3d 680 (2015).
The record must reflect that the trial court made an individualized inquiry into the defendant’s
current and future ability to pay.” Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d at 838.
Here, the record shows that the sentencing court did not make any such inquiry. Because
we vacate the judgment and sentence and remand for entry of written findings and conclusions,
this issue is now moot. However, we respectfully remind the sentencing court of its duty to
engage in an individualized inquiry into West’s ability to pay before imposing discretionary
LFOs.
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No. 47491-3-II
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
In his SAG, West contends that because the sentencing court sentenced him “to the
maximum range” the court did not have the authority to impose community custody. SAG 1.
Although this issue is now moot, we address West’s pro se argument in the interests of justice.
A sentencing court cannot impose a standard range sentence of confinement and
community custody that when combined exceeds the offense’s statutory maximum. State v.
Boyd, 174 Wash. 2d 470, 472-73, 275 P.3d 321 (2012). Here, the sentencing court sentenced West
to 20 months of confinement and 12 months of community custody for a combined total of 32
months. The statutory maximum was 10 years. Consequently, the sentencing court did not
impose a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum, and West’s argument fails.
Because the trial court failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law following
the bench trial, as required by CrR 6.1, we vacate the judgment and sentence and remand for the
trial court to enter written findings and conclusions and to resentence West.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Worswick, P.J.
We concur:
Johanson, J.
Sutton, J.
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