State Of Washington v. Euran J. Woods ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) DIVISION ONE
Respondent, )
) No. 72628-5-1
v. )
) PUBLISHED OPINION
EURAN J. WOODS, )
)
Appellant. ) FILED: April 3, 2017
)
DWYER, J. — Euran Woods appeals from the judgment entered on a jury's
verdict finding him guilty of assault in the second degree pursuant to RCW
9A.36.021(1)(g), assault by strangulation. On appeal, Woods contends that the
trial court erred by admitting evidence that he had previously promoted the
prostitution of the victim, Brittany Englund. Woods also contends that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the pimping
evidence and for failing to request a limiting instruction. Finding no error, we
affirm.
I
Woods and Englund began their volatile relationship in 2009. At that time,
Woods and Englund sold drugs together and Englund herself was addicted to
drugs. As Englund's drug addiction grew, so did her dependency on Woods—
who exploited this dependency to isolate Englund from her friends and family. In
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addition to being emotionally abusive, Woods physically abused Englund
throughout their relationship.
In 2011, Woods began forcing Englund to prostitute herself. Initially,
Woods would purchase clothing for Englund and leave her on the street with
instructions regarding where to locate customers and the amount of money that
she should collect in exchange for various sexual activities. After Englund was
abducted by one customer and forced to jump out of his moving vehicle to
escape, she pleaded with Woods to let her stop. Woods then decided to market
Englund by listing her on Backpage.com. Woods conditioned Englund to comply
with his demands by convincing her that her life of prostitution was only
temporary and that one day they would both have normal jobs and be happy
together.
Englund argued with Woods regarding the prostitution several times. On
one occasion in August of 2011, Woods noticed that Englund had silenced the
cell phone that Woods used to take calls from men seeking to sexually exploit
Englund. Woods and Englund argued and Woods strangled Englund until she
passed out. Englund did not inform the police or her family of the abuse or
prostitution both out of fear that Woods would retaliate and because she felt that
Woods loved her and was sorry.
Woods strangled Englund again in September of 2011. On the day in
question, Englund had an abortion and then returned home to be with Woods.
That night, Woods left, only to return home at 3:00 a.m. accompanied by three
women. Woods told Englund to stay in the bedroom. Hours later, after Woods
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fell asleep, Englund looked at Woods' cell phone and discovered that he had
been taking pictures with the women. Englund awakened Woods and confronted
him about the pictures. Woods then threw Englund across the room, kicked her,
stomped on her, and strangled her until she passed out. Woods later apologized
to Englund, who decided to not call the police.
Englund went to her mother's house for a birthday party a few days later.
Englund was anxious about her family discovering what was going on in her life
and, at one point during the visit, she went upstairs and began crying. When
Englund's mother went to check on her, Englund showed her mother the bruises
around her neck and told her what had happened. Englund did not want to
inform the police—she was in love with Woods, did not believe that he would hurt
her again, and did not think that the police would believe her because of her own
criminal history.
In April of 2012, Woods again assaulted Englund. Woods refused to allow
Englund to leave their apartment or call for help following the assault. Three
days later, Woods left the apartment and Englund was able to telephone her
mother, who drove her to the hospital. Police officers interviewed Englund at the
hospital. Englund disclosed the 2011 assaults for the first time during a
subsequent interview with a police detective.1
The State charged Woods by amended information with one count of
assault in the second degree for the September 2011 strangulation, with a
1 The jury did not hear testimony regarding the April 2012 assault or the reason why
police contacted Englund.
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No. 72628-5-1/4
special allegation that the assault was committed against a family or household
member—a crime of domestic violence pursuant to RCW 10.99.020. The jury
found Woods guilty and the sentencing court imposed a standard-range
sentence of nine months of incarceration and twelve months of community
custody. Woods timely appealed.
Woods was represented by attorney Eugene Piculell at trial. After filing a
notice of appeal, Mr. Piculell filed an Anders2 brief with this court, stating than an
appeal in this matter would present nothing other than legally frivolous issues.
The State moved to strike the Anders brief. We directed attorney Piculell to file
an answer to the State's motion. Instead, Mr. Piculell withdrew from the case.
We appointed attorney James Womack to represent Woods. Mr. Womack fully
briefed the case, we granted oral argument, and now resolve the issues
presented.3
II
Woods first contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of
Woods' past prostitution of Englund. This is so, he asserts, because the proffered
testimony was not relevant and was highly prejudicial. We disagree.
We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence pursuant to ER 404(b)
for abuse of discretion. State v. Fualaau, 155 Wash. App. 347, 356, 228 P.3d 771
(2010). Abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is manifestly
2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493(1967).
3 We extend our gratitude to Mr. Womack, who handled this unusual assignment with a
high degree of skill and professionalism.
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No. 72628-5-1/5
unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. State v. Rodriquez,
187 Wash. App. 922, 939, 352 P.3d 200, review denied, 184 Wash. 2d 1011 (2015).
Evidence of a defendant's prior bad act is not admissible to prove the
defendant's character and to show action in conformity therewith. ER 404(b).
However, such evidence may be admissible for other purposes,"depending on
its relevance and the balancing of its probative value and danger of unfair
prejudice." State v. Gresham, 173 Wash. 2d 405, 420, 269 P.3d 207(2012). For
evidence of a prior bad act to be admissible, a trial judge must "(1) find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct occurred,(2) identify the
purpose for which the evidence is sought to be introduced,(3) determine whether
the evidence is relevant to prove an element of the crime charged, and (4) weigh
the probative value against the prejudicial effect." State v. Vy Thanq, 145 Wn.2d
630,642, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002). The trial court ordinarily should also give a
limiting instruction to the jury if the evidence is admitted. State v. Gunderson,
181 Wash. 2d 916, 923, 337 P.3d 1090(2014).
Prior to trial, the State moved to admit testimony regarding Woods' prior
assaults and prostitution of Englund. The State argued that these prior acts were
necessary to explain to the jury why Englund was fearful of seeking help from her
family or from the police. Addressing the prostitution evidence specifically, the
State argued that it was important for the jury to understand that Woods had
been grooming Englund for prostitution and that many of the assaults were
instigated in response to Englund's attempts to stop Woods from continuing to
prostitute her.
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The trial court began its analysis by presuming that the evidence was
inadmissible. The trial court then determined by a preponderance of the
evidence that the alleged acts occurred. The trial court noted that—in matters
dealing with domestic violence—testimony regarding prior assaults may assist
the jury in understanding the dynamics of the domestic violence relationship and
in assessing the victim's credibility.
The trial court first determined that evidence of the April 2012 assault,
which resulted in Englund's hospitalization, was highly prejudicial and was not
relevant to the charged conduct. This evidence was excluded. Turning to the
August 2011 strangulation and the prostitution evidence, the trial court
determined that such evidence was admissible because it aided the jurors in
understanding the nature of the relationship, motive, and intent, and helped to
illuminate the victim's state of mind.
In ruling that these prior acts were admissible, the trial court relied on our
decisions in State v. Grant, 83 Wash. App. 98, 920 P.2d 609(1996), and State v.
Baker, 162 Wash. App. 468, 259 P.3d 270 (2011). In Grant, we noted that "victims
of domestic violence often attempt to placate their abusers in an effort to avoid
repeated violence, and often minimize the degree of violence when discussing it
with others." 83 Wash. App. at 107. Such conduct by domestic violence victims
tends to call into question the credibility of those victims. Accordingly, we
concluded that "[t]he jury was entitled to evaluate [the victim's] credibility with full
knowledge of the dynamics of a relationship marked by domestic violence and
the effect such a relationship has on the victim." Grant, 83 Wash. App. at 108.
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We relied on those same principles when concluding that evidence of a
defendant's prior assaults was admissible in Baker. The domestic violence
victim in Baker was strangled on numerous occasions but, as in this matter, did
not inform the police. 162 Wash. App. at 475. We concluded that evidence of the
strangulations was admissible because the jury was entitled to evaluate the
credibility of the victim with "full knowledge of the dynamics of her relationship"
with the defendant. Baker, 162 Wash. App. at 475.
The trial court's rulings herein were tenable. Englund's testimony as to
how Woods forced her into prostitution and why she was unable to escape was
necessary for the jurors to understand the dynamics of this domestic violence
relationship. Woods'forced prostitution of Englund was a source of shame and
fear for Englund and was an important factor in understanding why she refused
to seek help from her friends, family, and the police.
Nevertheless, and for the first time on appeal, Woods contends that the
prostitution evidence was unduly prejudicial because it was an appeal to racial
bias. This is so, he asserts, because presenting evidence that a black male
prostituted a white female plays into deep-seated racial stereotypes.
The record does not indicate the race of Englund or the jurors, whom
Woods now asserts were nondiverse. Woods provides no citation to the record
purporting to show an appeal to racial bias, either overt or otherwise. Moreover,
Woods cites to no authority to support his contention that evidence of forced
prostitution, without more, constitutes an appeal to racial bias. While the
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No. 72628-5-1/8
concerns he expresses are not at all frivolous, on this record he does not
establish error.
Ill
Woods next contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
This is so, he asserts, because his counsel failed to object to the introduction of
the prostitution evidence and failed to request a limiting instruction.
Constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel is established only when
the defendant shows that(1) counsel's performance, when considered in light of
all the circumstances, fell below an objectively reasonable standard of
performance, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984); State v. Hassan, 151 Wash. App. 209, 216-17, 211 P.3d 441 (2009). The
burden is on the defendant to demonstrate deficient representation and
prejudice. In re Det. of Hatfield, 191 Wash. App. 378, 401, 362 P.3d 997(2015).
Failing to satisfy either part of this analysis ends the inquiry. State v.
Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 78, 917 P.2d 563(1996).
Woods first asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his counsel failed to object to the admission of the prostitution evidence.
However, as discussed herein, there was nothing objectionable about this
evidence because it was properly admitted pursuant to ER 404(b). Moreover,
Woods' counsel expressly deferred an objection to the prostitution evidence after
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No. 72628-5-1/9
stating that he viewed that evidence as presenting a valuable area for cross-
examination.
The Court: And did you wish to respond to the prior bad acts
proffer[ed]just looking to the prostitution, pimping allegation?
Mr. Piculell: Well, I think that if the prosecutor introduces
that, there is cross-examination that may be relevant that may not
be under those circumstances, so I'll defer on that issue.
"Because the presumption runs in favor of effective representation, the
defendant must show in the record the absence of legitimate strategic or tactical
reasons supporting the challenged conduct by counsel." State v. McFarland, 127
Wash. 2d 322, 336, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). "[T]he presumption of adequate
representation is not overcome if there is any 'conceivable legitimate tactic' that
can explain counsel's performance." Hatfield, 191 Wn. App. at 402(quoting
State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wash. 2d 126, 130, 101 P.3d 80(2004)). Here, Woods
has not shown the absence of legitimate strategic or tactical reasons supporting
his attorney's decision to not object. Rather, the record demonstrates that a
tactical decision was made. '
Woods also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his attorney failed to request a limiting instruction regarding the
prostitution evidence. The trial court properly provided the jury with a limiting
instruction regarding the evidence of the prior assaults, but did not specifically
include the prostitution evidence in that instruction. Woods' counsel did not
request such an instruction.
Again, we can conceive of legitimate strategic or tactical reasons for not
requesting a limiting instruction. First, inclusion of the prostitution evidence in the
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No. 72628-5-1/10
limiting instruction already provided to the jury would have been misleading.
Defense counsel argued to the jury that Woods did not cause Englund's injuries.
Rather, he posited, those injuries could have been a result of Englund's
prostitution. Thus, a theory of the case proffered by defense counsel relied on
the truth of the prostitution evidence. An instruction that directs the jurors to
consider that evidence only for impeachment purposes would contradict defense
counsel's own argument. Second, a separate limiting instruction focused solely
on the prostitution evidence could serve as an unwanted reminder of damaging
testimony. See e.g., State v. Yarbrough, 151 Wash. App. 66, 90, 210 P.3d 1029
(2009)(courts may presume that counsel did not request a limiting instruction so
as to avoid reemphasizing damaging evidence). Thus, deficient performance is
not established.
Moreover, Woods must establish that a reasonable probability exists that,
but for counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Woods has not done so.
The State introduced evidence of Woods'forced prostitution of Englund to
assist the jury in understanding the dynamics of the relationship and to explain
why Englund did not seek help from the police or from her family. The State's
presentation of its case was consistent with the understanding that this evidence
was admitted for only that limited purpose. Indeed, in the prosecutor's closing
argument she told the jury:
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Jury Instruction 4 tells you how you are to use this evidence
— evidence of the August strangulation, evidence of the defendant
pimping Brittany out. You can use that evidence to assess her
state of mind — her credibility. In other words, you can use this
evidence to understand the choices that she made. You can use it
to understand the power he held over her, the power to instill fear in
her, but also the power to instill hope in her. Hope that it wouldn't
happen again. It is evidence of what was going through her mind
when she refused to call the police — when she refused to let her
mother help her.
The State's use of the prostitution evidence and explanation to the jury
regarding the context in which the evidence should be viewed give rise to an
inference that the jury understood this evidence in the context in which it was
presented. Conversely, Woods has provided no evidence indicating that the
jurors used that evidence for anything other than its intended purpose.
Accordingly, Woods fails to establish prejudice.
Affirmed.
We concur: