State of Washington v. Scott Eugene Ridgley ( 2019 )

FILED
JULY 18, 2019
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 36643-0-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
SCOTT EUGENE RIDGLEY, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. — Scott Ridgley appeals from three drug convictions entered after his
community correction officer (CCO) opened Ridgley’s safe and found controlled
substances. We affirm the convictions, but remand for the trial court to reconsider certain
legal financial obligations (LFOs) in light of statutory amendments.
FACTS
A woman arrested on an outstanding warrant advised Centralia Police Detective
Adam Haggerty that she and her roommate had purchased drugs from a house on Gish
Road and showed the building to the detective. The detective learned that Ridgley lived
at the house and was on community custody for a prior drug conviction.
Detective Haggerty alerted CCOs Errol Shirer and Kaylyn Lucas about the
information he had received concerning the drug sales. Shirer visited the woman in the
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jail and decided to search Ridgley’s residence for evidence that he was violating his
conditions of release. Shirer then checked Ridgley’s file and determined that Ridgley
was in violation of his community custody for not being in treatment.
Shirer decided to search Ridgley’s residence due to the report from the woman and
the community custody violation. He was accompanied at the Gish Road location by
Lucas, Haggerty, and another police officer. Shirer directed Ridgley to provide a urine
sample. He did so; the sample field-tested positive for methamphetamine. Ridgley
admitted that he had recently used the drug. Shirer arrested Ridgley and placed him in
handcuffs.
Haggerty and Shirer spoke with Misty Raines, another person present at the Gish
Road house. Despite being told by Ridgley not to speak to them, Raines told the
detective that there was a meth pipe on a shelf in Ridgley’s master bedroom, and also told
Shirer that she believed there were cash, guns, and drugs in a safe in that room. Shirer
searched the house.
The CCOs found a safe in the master bedroom. After consulting with a
supervisor, they took the safe out in the yard and broke it open. Inside were several
ounces of apparent methamphetamine, 135 pills in a container, blister packs of pills, and
approximately $8,500 in cash. A search warrant was obtained. The contents of the safe
constituted the vast majority of the items seized.
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Charges of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, possession of
Oxycodone with intent to deliver, and possession of Hydromorphone were filed. Ridgley
filed a motion to suppress the fruits of the search. After conducting a CrR 3.6 hearing,
the trial court denied the motion and entered appropriate findings.
The case proceeded to bench trial. The judge convicted Ridgley as charged and
later entered findings required by CrR 6.1(d). The court imposed concurrent sentences of
96 months. Ridgley then timely appealed.
The case was administratively transferred from Division Two to Division Three.
A panel of this court considered the appeal without hearing argument.
ANALYSIS
Mr. Ridgley’s appeal challenges the legality of the search of the Gish Road
residence and some of the LFOs imposed by the trial court. We consider first his search
argument before turning to the LFO question. We then briefly discuss one of the issues
raised in Mr. Ridgley’s statement of additional grounds (SAG).
Search by CCO
Mr. Ridgley argues that the CCO lacked a reasonable basis to conduct the search
of his residence. His argument fails because the bulk of the trial court’s findings are
backed by substantial evidence and support the basis for the search.
We review findings entered following a CrR 3.6 hearing for substantial evidence.
State v. Hill, 123 Wash. 2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). “Evidence is substantial when it
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is enough ‘to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the stated premise.’” State v.
Garvin, 166 Wash. 2d 242, 249, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009) (quoting State v. Reid, 98 Wash. App.
152, 156, 988 P.2d 1038 (1999)). The appellate court reviews de novo the conclusions
derived from the factual findings. State v. Armenta, 134 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 948 P.2d 1280
(1997).
Mr. Ridgley assigns error to findings of fact 1.2, 1.3, 1.7, 1.14, and 1.15. His
challenge to the first three findings takes issue with the determination that the detective
and CCO were told that drugs had been purchased at the Gish Road address instead of
having been purchased from someone living at that address. His argument is correct.
The arrestee merely indicated that she purchased from someone living there rather than
stating that the purchases had taken place there. However, this factual error is of no
consequence. The information still tied drug sales to a resident of the Gish Road house,
but also was not a basis for the search of that residence.
He challenges findings 1.14 and 1.15 to the extent that they indicate Raines
informed the detective and the CCO that there was methamphetamine and cash in the safe
in Ridgley’s bedroom. In fact, Raines had said that she believed there might be drugs and
cash in the safe. Ridgley is correct that these findings overstate what Raines actually
said.
Nonetheless, the errors Ridgley has identified are insignificant. Washington
recognizes that probationers and parolees have a diminished right of privacy that permits
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a warrantless search based on probable cause. State v. Lucas, 56 Wash. App. 236, 239-240,
783 P.2d 121 (1989). Parolees and probationers have diminished privacy rights because
they are persons whom a court has sentenced to confinement but who are serving their
time outside the prison walls. Therefore, the State may supervise and scrutinize a
probationer or parolee closely. Id. at 240. Nevertheless, this diminished expectation of
privacy is constitutionally permissible only to the extent necessitated by the legitimate
demands of the operation of the parole process. State v. Parris, 163 Wash. App. 110, 118,
259 P.3d 331 (2011); State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 86, 516 P.2d 1088 (1973).
RCW 9.94A.631 governs supervision of felons under the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW. It provides:
If an offender violates any condition or requirement of a sentence, a
community corrections officer may arrest or cause the arrest of the offender
without a warrant, pending a determination by the court or by the
department. If there is reasonable cause to believe that an offender has
violated a condition or requirement of the sentence, a community
corrections officer may require an offender to submit to a search and
seizure of the offender’s person, residence, automobile, or other personal
property.
The statute’s “reasonable cause” requirement means that an officer must have a
“well-founded suspicion that a violation has occurred.” State v. Massey, 81 Wash. App.
198, 200, 913 P.2d 424 (1996). This reasonable suspicion standard requires an officer to
have “specific and articulable facts” on which to act and permits “rational inferences”
from those facts. Parris, 163 Wash. App. at 119. “Articulable suspicion” is defined as a
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substantial possibility that criminal conduct has occurred or is about to occur. State v.
Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). The officer also must establish a nexus
between the property searched and the suspected probation violation. State v. Cornwell,
190 Wash. 2d 296, 304, 412 P.3d 1265 (2018).
First, a CCO must have “reasonable cause to believe” a probation violation
has occurred before conducting a search at the expense of the individual’s
privacy. RCW 9.94A.631(1). This threshold requirement protects an
individual from random, suspicionless searches. Second, the individual’s
privacy interest is diminished only to the extent necessary for the State to
monitor compliance with the particular probation condition that gave rise to
the search. The individual’s other property, which has no nexus to the
suspected violation, remains free from search.
Id.
Here, CCO Shirer had received a report that someone at Ridgley’s address was
dealing drugs and that Ridgley had not reported for drug treatment. Random urinalysis
testing was a condition of Ridgley’s supervision. Under these facts, Shirer had a reason
to ask Ridgley to provide a urine sample for testing. When the test result was positive,
Ridgley admitted to having recently used methamphetamine, a violation of his
community supervision.
On these facts, Shirer had reasonable grounds to search Ridgley’s residence to see
if more controlled substances might be found. The tip that the safe might contain drugs
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and cash justified the search of that object.1 The search was justified by RCW 9.94A.631
and Cornwell.
The trial court did not err in denying the CrR 3.6 motion to suppress the fruits of
the search.
LFOs
Mr. Ridgley next argues that because he was found indigent for purposes of
appeal, the trial court erred in imposing LFOs against him. In light of State v. Ramirez,
191 Wash. 2d 732, 426 P.3d 714 (2018), the State concedes that this matter should be
remanded for hearing. We agree.
Ramirez ruled that the 2018 legislative reform of financial obligations imposed in
criminal cases applied retroactively to cases on appeal. Id. at 747. Here, the trial court
imposed only fees that were mandatory prior to Ramirez. Now, the filing fee and the
DNA collection fee are waivable under certain conditions. In light of the possible merit
of Mr. Ridgley’s claims, the State agrees that the trial court should consider the claims
due to Ramirez. We, therefore, remand the issue to the superior court for consideration.
Statement of Additional Grounds
In his SAG, Mr. Ridgley raises eight claims. All but one fail because they are
either repetitious of arguments made by counsel, are dependent on facts outside the
1
Appellant does not challenge the reasonableness of the forced opening of the safe
and we do not express any opinion on that topic.
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record, are not properly identified in the record of this case, or are insufficiently briefed.
RAP 10.10(c).
The one issue we can address is Mr. Ridgley’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the two possession with intent to deliver charges. He argues there is
insufficient evidence that he intended to deliver the methamphetamine or the Oxycodone.
Properly viewed, the evidence supported the bench verdict.
Long settled standards govern our review of this contention. “Following a bench
trial, appellate review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the
findings of fact and, if so, whether the findings support the conclusions of law.” State v.
Homan, 181 Wash. 2d 102, 105-106, 330 P.3d 182 (2014) (citing State v. Stevenson, 128
Wash. App. 179, 193, 114 P.3d 699 (2005)). In reviewing insufficiency claims, the
appellant necessarily admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom. State v. Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068
(1992). Finally, this court must defer to the finder of fact in resolving conflicting
evidence and credibility determinations. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wash. 2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d
850 (1990).
Here, Mr. Ridgley possessed several ounces of methamphetamine and 135
Oxycodone pills. Detective Haggerty testified that both of these were large amounts
beyond what would be possessed for personal use. The trier-of-fact was permitted to
credit this information. Id. Accordingly, the evidence allowed the trial judge to find that
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the intent to deliver element was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence,
therefore, was sufficient to support the bench verdicts on these counts.
The convictions are affirmed. Remanded for consideration of the LFO challenges.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Pennell, J.
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