In Re J.e.r.c., 5/17/14 ( 2017 )

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS 01V I
'STATE OF WASHINGTON
2011 DEC 18 AM J: 02
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Dependency of )
) No. 76664-3-1
J.E.R.C. )
DOB: 5/17/2014 ) DIVISION ONE
)
) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
) FILED: December 18, 2017
)
APPELWICK, J. — The father of J.E.R.0 sought discretionary review in this
court of a shelter care order denying the child's placement with the father. A week
later, the trial court placed J.E.R.C. with the father. Because the issue is now moot,
we grant the father's appointed appellate counsel's motion to withdraw, deny the
motion for discretionary review, and deny the motion to extend time.
FACTS
On March 24, 2017, the State, pursuant to RCW 13.34.030, initiated
dependency proceedings for J.E.R.C., then an almost three year old child. At the
first shelter care hearing, the trial court found that J.E.R.C. should remain in shelter
care, out of the home. On April 10, 2017, at the interim shelter care hearing, the
court denied the father's request to place J.E.R.C. with him. On April 11, 2017,
the father sought discretionary review in this court of the shelter care hearing order
entered on April 7, 2017. The trial court found the father indigent and entitled to
appointed counsel pursuant to RAP 15.2. Then, on April 17, 2017, the trial court
placed J.E.R.C. with his father at an interim review hearing.
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The father's appointed appellate counsel moved to withdraw from
representing the father on discretionary review under RAP 18.3 and CR 71. He
asserted that the request for discretionary review was moot given that the child
was placed with the father. He also moved to extend time to allow the father to file
a pro se motion for discretionary review, if this court granted counsel's withdrawal.
DISCUSSION
The father's appointed appellate counsel moves to withdraw from
representing his client on the motion for discretionary review. He states that there
is no legitimate basis under RAP 2.3(b)to seek review. He asserts that proceeding
with the review would violate his ethical obligations under RPC 3.1, which prohibits
counsel from bringing a proceeding unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing
so that is nonfrivolous. He asks this court to distinguish this context from In re
Welfare of Hall, 99 Wash. 2d 842, 843, 664 P.2d 1245 (1983), where the Supreme
Court held that appointed counsel may never withdraw in child deprivation
proceedings absent client consent.
If counsel can find no basis for a good faith argument on review, counsel
should file a motion in the appellate court to withdraw as counsel for the indigent
as provided in RAP18.3(a). RAP 15.2(i). In this court, the father's appointed
counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the father pursuant to RAP
18.3(b). Under RAP 18.3(a)(1), courts use a good cause standard to determine
when appellate counsel can withdraw.1 See State v. Rafav, 167 Wash. 2d 644, 653,
1 Although RAP 18.3(a)(1) contemplates appointed counsel in criminal
cases, the standard is appropriately applied here, as RAP 15.2(i) directs counsel
to follow the guidelines of RAP 18.3(a) to withdraw.
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No. 76664-3-1/3
222 P.3d 86 (2009) (finding that courts should use a good cause standard in
determining when appellate counsel can withdraw and the defendant can proceed
pro se). Courts have discretion to determine whether there is good cause. See
id. at 654.
I. Right to Counsel
Before we address whether appointed counsel may withdraw, we recognize
that indigent parents in dependency and termination proceedings have a statutory
right to appointed counsel throughout the proceeding. Citizen v. Clark County Bd.
of Comm'rs, 127 Wash. App. 846, 851, 113 P.3d 501 (2005) The Washington
dependency statute provides,
At all stages of a proceeding in which a child is alleged to be
dependent, the child's parent, guardian, or legal custodian has the
right to be represented by counsel, and if indigent, to have counsel
appointed for him or her by the court.
RCW 13.34.090(2). In Grove, our Supreme Court held that the right to appointed
counsel continues on appeal, including on motions for discretionary review of
interlocutory trial court orders. In re Dependency of Grove, 127 Wash. 2d 221, 236,
897 P.2d 1252 (1995). The trial court determines if any party seeking appellate
review is indigent and therefore unable to pay for the expenses of review for
dependency and termination cases under chapter 13.34 RCW. RAP 15.2(b)(1)(b).
Further, appointed counsel may never withdraw on appeal in a child
deprivation proceeding. Hall, 99 Wash. 2d at 847. There, the court reasoned that the
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967)
procedures that counsel must follow to withdraw in a criminal appeal did not apply
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No. 76664-3-1/4
to appointed counsel in child deprivation proceedings. Id. at 846. First, it found
that the federal constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases, of concern in
Anders, differed from the primarily state statutory right to counsel in child
deprivation proceedings. Id. Second, it emphasized that a criminal defendant,
who must be at least competent to stand trial, will have the opportunity as well as
the ability to present his or her own argument to the appellate court. Id. at 846-47.
The court distinguished this from the respondents in child deprivation proceedings,
who do not have to be found competent, and therefore may be unable to raise
potentially meritorious issues. Id. at 847. The court relied on its concern for
incompetent parents when it held that courts may never permit counsel on appeal
to withdraw in a termination case. Id.
II. Dependency Proceedings and Termination Proceedings
Hall prohibits appellate counsel's withdrawal in a termination case, which is
distinct from a dependency proceeding. Hall, 99 Wash. 2d at 847; see In re Welfare
of Key, 119 Wash. 2d 600, 609, 836 P.2d 200 (1992) (holding that a dependency
proceeding and a termination proceeding have different objectives, statutory
requirements, and safeguards); compare RCW 13.34.110 and RCW 13.34.130
with RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190. First, the primary purpose of a
dependency is to allow courts to order remedial measures to preserve and mend
family ties, and to alleviate the problems that prompted the State's initial
intervention. In re Dependency of T.L.G., 126 Wash. App. 181, 203, 108 P.3d 156
(2005). Termination of parental rights, on the other hand, is any action resulting in
the termination of the parent-child relationship. RCW 13.38.040(3)(b). It
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completely and irrevocably eliminates all parental rights. In re Dependency of
K.S.C., 137 Wash. 2d 918, 930 n.7, 976 P.2d 113(1999).
Second, the standard of proof is lower in a dependency proceeding. See
Key, 119 Wash. 2d at 612. To find a child dependent:
(1) The court shall hold a fact-finding hearing on the petition
and, unless the court dismisses the petition, shall make written
findings of fact, stating the reasons therefor. The rules of evidence
shall apply at the fact-finding hearing and the parent, guardian, or
legal custodian of the child shall have all of the rights provided in
RCW 13.34.090(1). The petitioner shall have the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is
dependent within the meaning of RCW 13.34.030.
RCW 13.34.110. But, in order to terminate parental rights, the State must first
prove six statutory elements, outlined in RCW 13.34.180(1), by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence. RCW 13.34.190(1)(a); In re Parental Rights to K.J.B., 187
Wash. 2d 592, 597-98, 387 P.3d 1072(2017).
Third, the dependency and termination processes are also significantly
different. In order to terminate the parent-child relationship, the State must satisfy
two prongs. Id. at 597. The first prong focuses on the adequacy of the parents
and requires proof of the six elements set out in RCW 13.34.180(1). Id. Each of
the six statutory elements must be proved by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence before the State may terminate parental rights. In re Dependency of
K.N.J., 171 Wash. 2d 568, 576-77, 257 P.3d 522 (2011); RCW 13.34.180(1). If the
State satisfies the first prong by proving the six statutory factors, the court
proceeds to the second prong, determining if termination is in the best interest of
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the child. K.N.J., 171 Wash. 2d at 577; RCW 13.34.190(1)(b). Only if the first prong
is satisfied may the court reach the second. K.N.J., 171 Wash. 2d at 577.
The key difference is the dependency hearing is" 'a preliminary, remedial,
nonadversary proceeding' "that does not permanently deprive a parent of any
rights. Key, 119 Wash. 2d at 609 (quoting In re A.W., 53 Wash. App. 22, 30, 765 P.2d
307 (1988)). A finding of dependency does not inevitably lead to a termination of
parental rights. Id.
III. Discretionary Review of Dependency Order
Further, the right to appeal an order terminating parental rights, as in Hall,
is different from the discretionary review of an interlocutory order in a dependency
proceeding.2 An interlocutory order does not finally determine a cause of action
but only decides some intervening matter pertaining to the cause. Alwood v.
Aukeen Dist. Court Comm'r Harper, 94 Wash. App. 396, 400, 973 P.2d 12(1999).
There are safeguards in place to protect indigent parents in dependency
proceedings, without compelling appointed appellate counsel to continue with
review which is moot or frivolous. For one, the trial court has continuing jurisdiction
over the dependency proceedings and the parent continues to have appointed
counsel in that forum. K.N.J., 171 Wash. 2d at 576; Citizen, 127 Wash. App. at 851.
Further, if a disposition order is entered, the parent then has a direct right of appeal.
Chubb, 112 Wash. 2d at 725. The court's concern in Hall that counsel's withdrawal
shelter care orders are not appealable as a matter of right. See In
2 Interim
re Chubb, 112 Wash. 2d 719, 725, 773 P.2d 851 (1989)(holding that, in dependency
proceedings, there is a right to appeal only the disposition decision following the
finding of dependency or to a marked change in the status quo, which in effect
amounts to a new disposition).
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No. 76664-3-1/7
will leave an incompetent parent without any recourse is unfounded in the
dependency context, where the trial court still has jurisdiction and the parent still
has trial counsel.
The difference between the interlocutory nature of dependency orders and
the final orders of termination is evident in this case. Only a week after the court
denied the father's request to place J.E.R.C. with him, the court did just that at an
interim review hearing.
There are four circumstances under which this court may grant
discretionary review:
(1) The superior court has committed an obvious error which
would render further proceedings useless;
(2) The superior court has committed probable error and the
decision of the superior court substantially alters the status quo or
substantially limits the freedom of a party to act;
(3) The superior court has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such
a departure by an inferior court or administrative agency, as to call
for review by the appellate court; or
(4) The superior court has certified, or all the parties to the
litigation have stipulated, that the order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a
difference of opinion and that immediate review of the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.
RAP 2.3(b). Here, trial counsel filed the motion, seeking review of the contested
shelter care hearing order entered on April 7, 2017, presumably asserting the trial
court committed an obvious or probable error. Appellate counsel was appointed;
briefing scheduled; and appellate counsel moved to withdraw on grounds that
there is no meritorious issue under RAP 2.3(b) to seek review. Appellate counsel
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No. 76664-3-1/8
did not specifically state in his motion that the issue is moot, but he did so in his
supplemental brief.3 The State concurs that the issue for which the appellant first
sought discretionary review is now moot.4
We decline to extend Hall to the dependency context. Requiring appointed
counsel to continue with moot issues on discretionary review would be a misuse
of the Indigent Defense Fund, the resources of the court, and those of counsel for
the parties.5 Therefore, we grant appointed appellate counsel's motion to withdraw
pursuant to RAP 18.3(b) and CR 71.
Counsel moved this court to extend time for the father to proceed pro se, if
he wishes.6 However, the record clearly fails to satisfy the obvious or probable
error standards of RAP 2.3(b)(1) and (2). The trial court's shelter care hearing
3 Appellate counsel states,
A.M. filed a notice seeking discretionary review of the
interlocutory order. A.M. also sought the same relief in the trial court,
and on April 17, the trial court entered an Interim Review Hearing
Order which granted A.M.'s motion to place his son with him. This
order rendered moot the request for discretionary review.
(Citations omitted.)
4 It would behoove the State in similar situations to file a motion to dismiss
discretionary review when the underlying issue is moot.
5 The dissent in Grove feared that publicly funding all motions for
discretionary review of dependency proceedings would be a substantial cost to the
State. 127 Wash. 2d at 248 (Madsen, J. dissenting). Denying appointed appellate
counsel's motion to withdraw when there is no basis to continue discretionary
review would be a waste of the State's Indigent Defense Fund.
6 We can infer from the record that appointed appellate counsel did not
obtain his client's consent to counsel's withdrawal. If the father had consented to
counsel's withdrawal, there would not have been an issue under FlaII, which
permits withdrawal of appellate counsel even in deprivation of parental rights cases
with client consent. See 99 Wash. 2d at 843.
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order, placing the child with the father, rendered the father's discretionary review
moot.
The motion for discretionary review is denied. And, as the underlying issue
is now moot, the motion to extend time to allow the father to continue pro se is also
denied.
WE CONCUR:
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