Bellevue Athletes Alumni Grp., App. v. Bellevue Sd 405 & Wa Interscholastic Act. Assoc., Resps. ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
BELLEVUE ATHLETES ALUMNI ) No. 78133-2-1
GROUP, An Association of Members, )
) DIVISION ONE'
Appellant, )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v. )
)
BELLEVUE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. )
405, a public school district; and )
WASHINGTON INTERSCHOLASTIC )
ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, a )
Washington nonprofit corporation, )
)
Respondents. )
) FILED: September 3, 2019
HAZELRIGG-HERNANDEZ, J. — Bellevue Athletes Alumni Group seeks
reversal of a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Dismissal is appropriate under CR 12(b)(6) when an "insuperable bar to
relief" is evident from the pleadings. Because Bellevue Athletes Alumni Group was
not an aggrieved party, the members lack standing to appeal the Washington
Interscholastic Activities Association's decision. We affirm.
FACTS
Bellevue High School(BHS)is a member of Bellevue School District, which
in turn is a member of the Washington Interscholastic Athletic Association (WIAA).
In response to a Seattle Times story that raised questions about the integrity of the
BHS football program, the Bellevue School District requested that the WIAA
No. 78133-2-1/2
investigate the program's alleged rule violations. The investigators published a
report in April 2016, in which they concluded that "the actions of BHS coaches, the
deliberate ignorance of District and BHS administrators, and the complicity of the
Bellevue Wolverine Football Club ('Booster Club') and its members[] have unfairly
tilted the football field in favor of the Bellevue High School football program to the
obvious detriment of opponents." They also found that BHS and District
administrators knew or should have known of the WIAA rules violations but chose
not to take appropriate action. In response to these findings, the WIAA forbade
the BHS football program from participating in post-season play for two years.
In May 2017, BHS self-reported additional rules violations in the track and
field program to theWIAA. As a result, the WIAA vacated the school's 2015 state
track championship title. In September 2017, BHS asked the WIAA to reconsider
the decision banning the football team from post-season play. The WIAA lifted the
ban, making the football team eligible for the 2017 post-season, but imposed
substitute penalties, including vacation of the school's 2012, 2013, and 2014 state
football playoff finishes.
The Bellevue Athletes Alumni Group (collectively, the Group) appealed the
WIAA's decision to the superior court under RCW 28A.645.010. The Group is
composed of 12 named former students who attended BHS during the 2012, 2013,
or 2014 football seasons, or the 2015 track season. Bellevue School District
moved to dismiss the appeal under CR 12(b)(6), arguing that neither the Group
nor the individual students qualified as aggrieved persons under RCW
28A.645.010 and therefore lacked standing to file an action under the statutory
2
No. 78133-2-1/3
procedure. The District also argued that the appeal of the decision vacating the
2015 state track title was untimely. The trial court dismissed all claims brought by
the Group against the District and the WIAA under Chapter 28A.645 RCW with
prejudice.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A trial court may dismiss a complaint if the pleading fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. CR 12(b)(6). Under CR 12(b)(6), a court is
justified in dismissing a complaint "if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs
cannot prove any set of facts that would justify recovery." Handlin v. On-Site
Manager Inc., 187 Wash. App. 841, 845, 351 P.3d 226(2015)(quoting Tenore v. AT
& T Wireless Servs., 136 Wash. 2d 322, 330, 962 P.2d 104 (1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1171, 119 S. Ct. 1096, 143 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1999)). Dismissal is appropriate
"only in the unusual case in which plaintiff includes allegations that show on the
face of the complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief." Nissen v. Pierce
County, 183, Wn.2d 863, 872, 357 P.3d 45 (2015)(quoting Hoffer v. State, 110
Wash. 2d 415, 420, 755 P.2d 781 (1988)).
If "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court" on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,"the motion shall be treated
as one for summary judgment." CR 12(b). However, if the contents of the
additional documents are alleged in the complaint but not physically attached to
that pleading or if the "basic operative facts are undisputed and the core issue is
one of law,' the motion to dismiss need not be treated as a motion for summary
3
No. 78133-2-1/4
judgment." Trullllo v. Northwest Trustee Services, Inc., 183 Wash. 2d 820, 827 n.2,
355 P.3d 1100(2015)(quoting Ortblad v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 109, 111, 530 P.2d 635
(1975)). Because the parties do not dispute the underlying facts and the core issue
is purely legal, we do not treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment.
We review an order granting a motion to dismiss de novo. Hoffer, 110
Wash. 2d at 420. On review, we presume that the factual allegations in the complaint
are true, but we are not required to accept any legal conclusions as correct.
Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wash. 2d 107, 120,744 P.2d 1032
(1987).
II. Standing
The Group contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the appeal
because the members of the Group were aggrieved parties entitled to appeal
under RCW 28A.645.010.
When analyzing statutory language, our objective is to ascertain and carry
out the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell &
Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash. 2d 1, 9,43 P.3d 4(2002). If the meaning of the statute is
"plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an
expression of legislative intent." Id. at 9-10. To determine the plain meaning of a
statute, we consider "the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute
in which the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the provision,
and the statutory scheme as a whole." Columbia Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver
USA, 188 Wash. 2d 421, 432, 395 P.3d 1031 (2017). If the statute remains
4
No. 78133-2-1/5
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation after we complete this
inquiry, it is ambiguous, and we may turn to principles of statutory construction,
legislative history, and relevant case law to determine the legislature's intent.
Cockle v. Dep't of Labor and Indus., 142 Wash. 2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583 (2001).
School district boards of directors have the authority to "control, supervise
and regulate the conduct of interschool athletic activities." RCW 28A.600.200.
Subject to certain conditions, a board may delegate this authority to the WIAA. Id.
The WIAA may impose appropriate, proportional penalties for rules violations on
coaches, district or school administrators, and students. RCW 28A.600.200(3).
However, the WIAA may only impose penalties on students when the students
knowingly violated the rules or when "a student gained a significant competitive
advantage or materially disadvantaged another student through a rule violation."
RCW 28A.600.200(3)(b). The most recent act amending this statute included a
statement of intent that is now codified as an official note to the statute:
The legislature finds that the mission of the Washington
interscholastic activities association is to assist member schools in
operating student programs that foster achievement, respect, equity,
enthusiasm, and excellence in a safe and organized environment.
The legislature intends to ensure that this mission is successfully
carried out so that arbitrary sanctions that result in students unfairly
being denied to participate or cause students' achievements to be
diminished do not occur. It is the intent of the legislature to impact
the association's current processes for establishing penalties for
rules violations and to redefine the scope of penalties that are
permitted to be imposed. It is further the intent of the legislature to
build protections into state law so that punishment, when necessary,
is meted out to the appropriate party and in a proportional manner.
The legislature further intends to ensure that state and local rules
relating to interschool extracurricular activities be consistent with one
another, promote fairness, and allow for a clear process of appeal.
5
No. 78133-2-1/6
Laws of 2012, ch. 155, § 1. Any decision of the WIAA resulting in a penalty is
considered a decision of the school district "conducting the activity in which the
student seeks to participate or was participating" and may be appealed as such to
the WIAA through RCW 28A.600.205 or to the superior court through RCW
28A.645.010. RCW 28A.600.200(3)(d).1
Judicial appeals of school board decisions are governed by RCW
28A.645.010, which allows "[a]ny person, or persons, either severally or
collectively, aggrieved by any decision or order of any school official or board" to
appeal the decision in superior court. The primary issue before us turns on the
definition of the word "aggrieved" in this statute. The term is not defined in Chapter
28A.645 RCW or Chapter 28A.600 RCW. In a general legal context, an "aggrieved
party" is defined as "[al party entitled to a remedy; esp., a party whose personal,
pecuniary, or property rights have been adversely affected by another person's
actions or by a court's decree or judgment." Party, Black's Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019). Because it is unclear which parties the legislature intended to be
entitled to a remedy, the provision is ambiguous and we may turn to other materials
to determine the legislature's intent.
I The District and WIAA contend that the language of this provision only allows judicial review
under Chapter 28A.645 RCW for "an aggrieved student who has been the subject of a penalty,"
but not for any other penalized party or entity. Before the 2012 amendment, RCW
28A.600.200(2), which then included the language imputing decisions of WIAA to the relevant
district, concerned only student participation in interschool activities and decisions to disallow
such participation. Laws of 2012, ch. 155,§ 2. The language to which the District and WIAA draw
our attention appears to be a holdover from the prior iteration of the statute. Because the current
RCW 28A.600.200(3)(a)—(c) provisions were inserted between the section regarding student
participation and the provision now allowing judicial review of "[a]ny decision resulting in a
penalty," we assume the legislature did not intend to restrict judicial review in this way. Laws of
2012, ch. 155, § 2.
6
No. 78133-2-1/7
Prior to the most recent amendments of RCW 28A.600.200, 28A.600.205,
and 28A.645.010, this court imported the definition of an "aggrieved party" in the
context of RAP 3.1 to define the term under RCW 28A.645.010. Briggs v. Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 165 Wash. App. 286, 294, 266 P.3d 911 (2011)(citing State v.
Taylor, 150 Wash. 2d 599, 603, 80 P.3d 605 (2003)). Under RAP 3.1, the Supreme
Court has defined an aggrieved party as a person whose personal rights or
pecuniary interests have been affected by a decision. Id. "The mere fact that one
may be hurt in his feelings; or be disappointed over a certain result, or feels that
he has been imposed upon . . . does not entitle him to appeal. He must be
'aggrieved' in a legal sense." State ex rel. Simeon v. Superior Court for King
County, 20 Wash. 2d 88, 90, 145 P.2d 1017 (1944).
Using this definition of "aggrieved," the former students' personal rights or
pecuniary interests must have been affected by the vacation of the past BHS
football championships to give the Group standing to appeal. Washington courts
have recognized that participation in interscholastic sports is not a fundamental
right or a constitutionally protected property interest. Taylor v. Enumclaw School
Dist. No. 216, 132 Wash. App. 688, 697, 133 P.3d 492 (2006). The Group does not
cite any authority for its assertion that "a title win, once earned, is a right to use
that title that was granted by the WIAA on the night of the championship game" on
a resume, on a college application, for career advancement, or "as they saw fit
through the rest of their lives." "Where no authorities are cited in support of a
proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume
1
7-
No. 78133-2-1/8
that counsel, after diligent search, has found none." DeNeer v. Seattle Post-
Intelliciencer, 60 Wash. 2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193(1962).
There was no testimony or documentation offered by any of the one dozen
former student athletes named in the Group's pleadings identifying a personal right
or pecuniary interest that was impacted by this decision to vacate the titles, apart
from the unsupported claim of a "right to use" the title wins and a generalized
assertion at oral argument that their "accomplishments were diminished." The
record contains only a solitary declaration from an affected former athlete who
listed his 2012 WIAA title win on his resume and claims to have discussed it during
a 2013 interview with his current employer. The declaration does not suggest that
this past title win was the basis for receiving the job offer, nor that the declarant's
ongoing employment is contingent upon his status as a title holder in high school
athletics. Neither does the declaration state that declarant was penalized,
demoted, or terminated by his employer upon vacation of the 2012 WIAA title. The
Group has not shown that any present personal rights or pecuniary interests were
affected by the vacation of BHS's past football titles. Accordingly, the Group is not
an aggrieved party with standing to appeal under RCW 28A.645.010. The trial
court did not err in dismissing the appea1.2
2 Because the appellants lack standing, we need not reach the other assignments of error.
-8-
No. 78133-2-1/9
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
ch.- g
al/K.1 A- I•T-•
9