State Of Washington v. Diantrie Latrez Jefferson ( 2013 )

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON^ E;^
STATE OF WASHINGTON CO -i- .ril
No. 69119-8-1
Respondent,
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v. DIVISION ONE
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DIANTRIE JEFFERSON, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: November 18, 2013
Spearman, A.C.J. — Diantrie Jefferson appeals his conviction for unlawful
possession of a firearm, arguing that the seat belt infraction police relied on to
stop his vehicle was a pretext for a criminal investigation, and that the gun found
on him after the stop should have been suppressed. Because the State had the
burden of proving a valid basis for the stop by clear and convincing evidence,
and because the trial court applied a lesser standard of proof in denying
Jefferson's motion to suppress, we remand for application of the correct standard
of proof.
FACTS
Based on Jefferson's felon status and possession of a firearm, the State
charged him with second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Priorto trial,
Jefferson moved to suppress the gun on the ground that the traffic stop was a
pretextfor an unlawful warrantless seizure. The court denied the motion and
found the following facts.
No. 69119-8-1/2
On October 29, 2011, three members of the King County Sheriff's Gang
Unit, Detectives Matthew Olmstead and Todd Miller and Department of
Corrections neighborhood specialist Kris Rongen, encountered Jefferson while
patrolling south King County in a black, Cadillac Escalade. They were looking for
criminal activity near a gas station when Rongen saw a black male, later
identified as Jefferson, pull out of the gas station without his seatbelt on. Rongen
does not remember whether he said anything about his observation at that time.
The officers proceeded north on First Avenue South and soon found
themselves behind Jefferson's vehicle. Detective Miller, who was in the rear
passenger seat, noticed that the shoulder strap of Jefferson's seatbelt was
hanging vertically to his left rather than crossing in front of his torso. Miller told
Olmstead and Rongen that Jefferson was not wearing a seatbelt, in violation of
RCW 46.61.688(3).1 Olmstead and Rongen each visually confirmed Miller's
observation. Miller did not know Jefferson's ethnicity and none of the officers
had any previous knowledge of Jefferson or his vehicle.
Detective Miller instructed Rongen to initiate a traffic stop. Rongen
activated the Escalade's emergency lights and Jefferson pulled into a parking lot.
Olmstead approached Jefferson's vehicle on the driver's side while Detective
Miller approached the passenger side. Specialist Rongen stood a short distance
1RCW 46.61.688(3):
(3) Every person sixteen years of age or older operating or riding in a motor
vehicle shall wear the safety belt assembly in a properly adjusted and securely
fastened manner.
No. 69119-8-1/3
away. Prior to reaching Jefferson's vehicle, the officers learned that Jefferson
was a convicted felon.
When the officers reached the vehicle, Jefferson was not wearing any part
of a seatbelt. Detective Olmstead spoke to Jefferson, saying "hey bud, you
weren't wearing a seatbelt." He then asked for Jefferson's driver's license.
Jefferson was extremely nervous, visibly trembling, and repeating the questions
he was asked.
Based on Jefferson's nervousness, his felon status, and the fact that he
had taken the time to park his vehicle in a parking space when pulled over,
Detective Olmstead believed Jefferson could be armed. He directed Jefferson to
step out of the vehicle. Before Jefferson did so, Detective Miller noticed a black
plastic clip on the outer right side of Jefferson's sweatpants. In Miller's
experience, such a clip, worn in such a manner, indicates a gun holster on the
inside of a person's pants. As Jefferson moved, Miller saw a bulge below the clip
that weighed down the waistband. This indicated the clip was supporting
something heavy.
Detective Miller shouted "gun" to alert the other officers. Detective
Olmstead and Specialist Rongen grabbed and handcuffed Jefferson. Detective
Miller asked if he was carrying a gun, and Jefferson responded affirmatively.
Miller then asked ifthe gun would go off if it were removed from the holster.
Jefferson said it would not go off. Miller then removed a loaded handgun from
No. 69119-8-1/4
the holster inside Jefferson's sweatpants. The officers arrested Jefferson for
unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree.
In denying Jefferson's pretrial motion to suppress the gun, the trial court
expressly found the officers' testimony credible. The court also found Jefferson's
testimony credible "except as to the issue of whether the defendant's
nervousness had anything to do with the fact that the defendant knew he was
illegally possessing a firearm." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 86. The court concluded
that
(a) [b]ased on the officers' observations as they were driving behind
[Jefferson's] vehicle, there was both reasonable suspicion and probable
cause to believe that [Jefferson] was committing a traffic violation by
driving without a seatbelt in violation of RCW 46.61.688(3).
(b) The true reason, and the only reason, for the stop of the defendant's
vehicle was to investigate the seatbelt violation.
(c) Because the initial traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle was not
pretextual and was supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion
that the defendant was committing a traffic violation, the stop was lawful.
(d) Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's
extreme nervousness, the fact that he had taken the time to park his
vehicle in a parking space when pulled over, and the knowledge that the
defendant was a convicted felon, Detective Olmstead had a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that the defendant was armed, and was justified
in instructing the defendant to exit the vehicle based on his concern for
officer safety.
(e) Removing the defendant from the vehicle was a de minimis invasion of
the defendant's privacy right, and did not exceed the permissible scope of
a traffic stop.
(h) Because (1) the initial traffic stop was lawful, (2) Detective Olmstead's
instruction to exit the vehicle did not exceed the permissible scope of a
No. 69119-8-1/5
traffic stop, and (3) Detective Miller's observation of a clip before the
defendant began to exit the vehicle created a reasonable suspicion
justifying a Terry stop independent of Detective Olmstead's instruction, the
recovery of the firearm was lawful and the defendants motion to suppress
is denied in its entirety. The State has carried its burden by a
preponderance of the evidence.2
The court also incorporated its oral findings and conclusions by reference. Twice
during its oral ruling, the court said the pretext issue presented "a close case but
I believe that the State has carried its burden by a preponderance of the
evidence[.]" Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 67.
Following a bench trial on stipulated facts, the court found Jefferson guilty
as charged. He appeals.
DECISION
The principal issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in concluding
that the stop of Jefferson's vehicle was pretextual. Because the court applied the
wrong standard of proof, we remand for further proceedings.
A warrantless seizure is unconstitutional unless it falls within certain
narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Ladson, 138
Wash. 2d 343, 349-50, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). Investigatory detentions, including
warrantless stops for traffic infractions, are a recognized exception. State v. Rife,
133 Wash. 2d 140, 150-51, 943 P.2d 266 (1997); State v. Duncan, 146 Wash. 2d 166,
174-75, 43 P.3d 513 (2002). Police may conduct a warrantless traffic stop if the
officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a traffic violation has
occurred or is occurring. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d at 349.
:(Emphasis added). CP at 87.
No. 69119-8-1/6
But if the asserted basis for a traffic stop is a pretext for a warrantless
investigation, the stop violates article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.
State v. Nichols. 161 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 162 P.3d 1122 (2007). In determining whether
a stop was pretextual, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, including
"both the subjective intent of the officer as well as the objective reasonableness
of the officer's behavior." Ladson. 138 Wash. 2d at 358-59. The State has the
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a warrantless seizure
falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Diluzio, 162 Wn.
App. 585, 590, 254 P.3d 218, rev. denied. 272 P.3d 850 (2011); State v.
Doughty, 170 Wash. 2d 57, 62, 239 P.3d 573 (2010); State v. Garvin, 166 Wash. 2d
242, 250, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). We review a court's conclusion regarding
pretext de novo. State v. Arreola, 176 Wash. 2d 284, 291, 290 P.3d 983 (2012).
Here, Jefferson contends the officers' traffic stop was a pretext for a
criminal investigation. He assigns error to a number of the court's findings of
fact, the exclusion of a video, and the court's conclusion that the stop was not
pretextual. We decline to reach these issues because the trial court's findings
and conclusions were based on the wrong standard of proof.3
As noted above, it is the State's burden to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that a warrantless seizure falls within an exception to the warrant
3We note that many of these assignments of error are improperly presented in footnotes
and are not adequately supported by argument in Jefferson's opening brief.
No. 69119-8-1/7
requirement. Doughty, 170 Wash. 2d at 62.4 It is undisputed that the trial court did
not use this standard, but instead employed the less stringent preponderance of
the evidence standard. Accordingly, we must remand for the court to apply, and
enter findings based on, the correct standard of proof.5 Cf. Nguyen v. State
Department of Health Medical Quality Assurance Commission. 144 Wash. 2d 516,
29 P.3d 689 (2001) (where commission used preponderance standard of proof
but due process required clear, cogent and convincing evidence, court remanded
for commission to "determine this matter by clear and convincing proof); Nims v.
Washington Bd. of Registration, 113 Wash. App. 499, 505-06, 53 P.3d 52
(2002)(where Board erred in basing findings on mere preponderance of the
evidence, remand was required for Board to "make new findings based on clear,
cogent and convincing evidence."). If the trial court finds the evidence from the
search admissible, the conviction shall stand affirmed. If the trial court finds the
evidence inadmissible, the conviction shall be reversed.
4The State contends "the precedent that every exception to a warrantless search or
seizure must be proven by clear and convincing evidence is erroneous, and arises from the
recent dictum in Garvin fState v. Garvin. 166 Wash. 2d 242, 250, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009)]
Resp. Br. at 21. This contention echoes the dissent's position in Doughty. 170 Wash. 2d at 67 n.6, a
position the Doughty majority implicitly rejected. Doughty, 170 Wash. 2d at 62.
5In remanding this matter, we emphasize the fact that the trial judge, who had the benefit
of hearing and evaluating the witnesses, stated that the pretext issue presented a "close case."
No. 69119-8-1/8
Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
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