State Of Washington v. Anthony Lewis Williams ( 2013 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON ,
No. 69131-7-1
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
PUBLISHED OPINION "£'*
ANTHONY LEWIS WILLIAMS,
Appellant. FILED: November 25, 2013
Appelwick, J. — Williams appeals the judgment and sentence imposed
following his convictions for attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle and first
degree driving with a suspended license. Williams argues that defects in the
information and special verdict instructions regarding the sentencing enhancement of
endangering the public pursuant to RCW 9.94A.834 mandate reversal. We affirm.
FACTS
The State charged Anthony Williams with attempting to elude a pursuing
police vehicle, driving under the influence (DUI) and first degree driving with a
suspended license. The State also filed a special allegation that Williams' actions
endangered the public pursuant to RCW 9.94A.834. The charging language for the
enhancement read as follows:
COUNT I: ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE A PURSUING POLICE VEHICLE,
committed as follows: That the defendant, on or about the 23rd day of
October, 2011, as a driver of a motor vehicle, did willfully fail or refuse to
immediately bring his or her vehicle to a stop and did drive his or her
vehicle in a reckless manner while attempting to elude a pursuing police
vehicle, after having been given a visual or audible signal to bring the
vehicle to a stop, said signal having been given by hand, voice,
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emergency light, or siren by a uniformed police officer whose vehicle
was equipped with lights and siren; proscribed by RCW 46.61.024, a
felony, and the crime was aggravated by the following circumstance: one
or more persons other than the defendant or the pursuing law
enforcement officer were threatened with physical injury or harm by the
defendant's actions while committing the crime of attempting to elude a
police vehicle; as provided by RCW 9.94A.834.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury regarding
the sentencing enhancement as follows:
This special verdict is to be answered only if the jury finds the
defendant guilty of ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE A POLICE VEHICLE as
charged in Count I.
We, the jury, return a special verdict by answering as follows:
Was any person, other than Anthony L. Williams or a pursuing law
enforcement officer, threatened with physical injury or harm by the
actions of Anthony L. Williams during his commission of the crime of
attempting to elude a police vehicle?t1]
The jury acquitted Williams of the DUI charge but convicted him of attempting
to elude a pursuing police vehicle and driving with a suspended license. In addition,
the jury answered "yes" on the special verdict form for the sentencing enhancement.
Williams appeals.
DISCUSSION
RCW 9.94A.834 provides:
(1.) The prosecuting attorney may file a special allegation of
endangerment by eluding in every criminal case involving a charge of
attempting to elude a police vehicle under RCW 46.61.024, when
1We note that the instruction used by the State is the pattern instruction. See
11A Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal §
190.12, at 664 (3d ed. 2008).
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sufficient admissible evidence exists, to show that one or more persons
other than the defendant or the pursuing law enforcement officer were
threatened with physical injury or harm by the actions of the person
committing the crime of attempting to elude a police vehicle.
(2) In a criminal case in which there has been a special allegation,
the state shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
committed the crime while endangering one or more persons other than
the defendant or the pursuing law enforcement officer. The court shall
make a finding of fact of whether or not one or more persons other than
the defendant or the pursuing law enforcement officer were endangered
at the time of the commission of the crime, or if a jury trial is had, the
jury shall, if it finds the defendant guilty, also find a special verdict as to
whether or not one or more persons other than the defendant or the
pursuing law enforcement officer were endangered during the
commission of the crime.
(Emphasis added.)
A charging document must include all essential elements of a crime, statutory
or otherwise, in order to provide a defendant with sufficient notice of the nature and
cause of the accusation. State v. Kiorsvik. 117 Wash. 2d 93, 97, 812 P.2d 86 (1991).
Where, as here, a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the information for the first
time on appeal, this court construes the document liberally in favor of validity.
Kiorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d at 102. In making that determination, we engage in a two-part
inquiry: (1) whether the essential elements appear in any form, or can be found by
any fair construction, in the information; and (2) if the language is vague or inartful,
whether the defendant was thereby prejudiced. State v. Brown, 169Wn.2d 195, 197-
98, 234 P.3d 212 (2010).
Williams argues that the information was constitutionally deficient, because it
did not allege as an essential element that someone other than Williams and the
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pursuing law enforcement officers were "endangered," as required by RCW
9.94A.834(2), instead alleging that they were "threatened with physical injury or
harm." But, it is clear from the context of RCW 9.94A.834(1) that "threatened with
physical injury or harm" provides the definition of "endangerment." When the plain
meaning of a term is clear from both the language and context of the statute, a
separately labeled definition is unnecessary. Am. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Steen, 151
Wash. 2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004). Williams argues that "endangered" cannot be
the same as "threatened with physical injury or harm" because when the legislature
uses certain language in one instance but different, dissimilar language in another, a
difference in legislative intent must be presumed. See, e.g.. State v. Roberts. 117
Wash. 2d 576, 586, 817 P.2d 855 (1991). But, this court engages in questions of
statutory interpretation only when a statutory provision is ambiguous. State v. Tili.
139 Wash. 2d 107, 115, 985 P.2d 365 (1999). A statute is ambiguous when it is
susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, but is not ambiguous merely
because different interpretations are conceivable. State v. Gonzalez. 168 Wash. 2d
256, 263, 226 P.3d 131 (2010). Here there is no ambiguity. It is not vague or inartful
when the information utilizes the definition of a term instead of the term defined.
Consequently, there is no need to analyze whether Williams was prejudiced.
Williams also argues that the language of the special verdict instruction
relieved the State of its burden to prove the sentencing enhancement beyond a
reasonable doubt because the language of the special verdict form required proof
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No. 69131-7-1/5
that the public was "threatened with physical injury or harm" rather than
"endangered." But instructions are sufficient when they are readily understood, not
misleading, and allow a defendant to satisfactorily argue his theory to the jury. State
v. Alexander. 7 Wash. App. 329, 336, 499 P.2d 263 (1972). Because "threatened with
physical injury or harm" provides the definition of "endangerment," the instruction
properly informed the jury of the law.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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