State Of Washington, V Larry Douglas Stovall ( 2013 )

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 40262 -9 -II
Respondent,
MA
LARRY DOUGLAS STOVALL, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
consolidated with
In re Personal Restraint Petition of Nos. 41575 -5 -II and 42278 -6 -II)
LARRY DOUGLAS STOVALL,
Petitioner.
QUINN- BRINTNALL, P. J. — Larry Stovall pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and one count of unlawful delivery of cocaine with a
bus stop enhancement. Stovall appeals, arguing that ( 1) he received ineffective assistance of
counsel, ( 2) the prosecutor breached the plea agreement, and ( 3) the trial court erred by refusing
to return two cell phones seized as evidence. Stovall also filed two personal restraint petitions
PRP), arguing that ( 1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, ( 2) the sentencing court
to hold hearing his to discharge his counsel, 3) he is entitled to
erred by failing a on motion and (
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withdraw his plea based on numerous instances of misconduct.' Because his challenges lack
merit, we reject each of Stovall' s arguments, affirm his sentence, and dismiss his PRPs.
FACTS
On October 31, 2008, Stovall was arrested following a narcotics investigation conducted
by officers of the Lakewood Police Department. The State charged Stovall with one count of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and one count of unlawful
delivery of a controlled substance. On February 5, 2009, the State filed an amended information
charging Stovall with one count of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance and one count of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The State also alleged that
count one was committed in a public transit stop shelter, RCW 69. 50. 435( l)( h), and both counts
were committed while Stovall was on community custody, RCW 9. 94A.525( 19).
4lford2
On May 12, Stovall agreed to enter an plea to both charges. The defendant' s
statement on plea of guilty included the following recommendation from the State:
84 months on counts I and II concurrent; community custody; $ 500
9 - 12 mo.
Crime Victim Penalty Assessment]; $ 100 [ deoxyribonucleic acid ( DNA)]; DNA
sample; $ 200 costs; $ 400 '[ Department of Assigned Counsel] recoupment;
Defense can Drug
argue [ Offender Sentencing Alternative ( DOSA)] sentence;
forfeit seized property.
Specifically, Stovall argues that the prosecutor, the police, the informant, the trial judge, and
the court reporter committed misconduct. Stovall' s claims of misconduct against the police and
the informant regard the criminal investigation and are itrelevant to challenges to Stovall' s guilty
plea. And on May 23, 2011, we issued an order to provide Stovall with copies of the clerk' s
papers filed in this case, and all volumes of the verbatim reports of proceedings comply with the
requirements of Accordingly, we do not address Stovall' s claim against the
RAP 9. 2( e)( 1)( F).
police, the informant, or the court reporter any further.
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 ( 1970).
2
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Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 10. Stovall signed the statement on plea of guilty. After a colloquy, the
trial court accepted Stovall' s guilty plea. The trial court continued the sentencing hearing to
allow Stovall to gather information regarding the availability of a DOSA option and entered an
3
order for presentence screening for DOSA.
On August 7, 2009, the trial court continued sentencing to allow Stovall additional time
to obtain presentence screening for DOSA. At the sentencing hearing on September 18, 2009,
the State informed the court that, originally, it did not believe that Stovall qualified for a DOSA.
But based on the State' s research and preparation, the State agreed that a DOSA sentence would
3
We note that there are two types of DOSA sentences: residential and prison- based. RCW
9. 94A. 660( 3). To determine which type of DOSA is appropriate, the trial court may order either,
or both, a risk assessment report and a chemical dependency screening report. RCW
9. 94A.660( 4). From the record it does not appear that the residential DOSA sentence was being
considered for Stovall. RCW 9. 94A.662, which defines the prison -based DOSA sentence,
provides,
1) A sentence for a prison - ased special drug offender sentencing alternative
b
shall include:
a) A period of total confinement in a state facility for one -half the
midpoint of the standard sentence range or twelve months, whichever is greater;
b) One -half the midpoint of the standard sentence range as a term of
community custody, which must include appropriate substance abuse treatment in
a program that has been approved by the division of alcohol and substance abuse
of the department of social and health services;
c) Crime -
related prohibitions, including a condition not to use illegal
controlled substances;
d) A requirement to submit to urinalysis or other testing to monitor that
status; and
e) A term of community custody pursuant to RCW 9. 94A.701 to be
imposed upon the failure to complete or administrative termination from the
special drug offender sentencing alternative program.
2) During incarceration in the state facility, offenders sentenced under
this section shall undergo a comprehensive substance abuse assessment and
receive, within available resources, treatment services appropriate for the
offender. The treatment services shall be designed by the division of alcohol and
substance abuse of the department of social and health services, in cooperation
with the department of corrections.
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be appropriate. Stovall' s defense counsel addressed the court regarding the availability of DOSA
and explained that when offenders are sentenced to more than 36 months confinement, they are
screened in prison, enter inpatient drug treatment during their confinement, and receive
outpatient drug treatment while on community custody. He also explained that local offices and
the Department of Corrections ( DOC) will only do presentence DOSA screening when the
offender qualifies for a residential DOSA which is a sentence less than 36 months confinement.
The trial court stated,
I don' t like doing things with the uncertainty. I can go along with what the State
is saying and what [ Stovall' s counsel is] saying, ... for him, at 50 years old, and
get him some help. But, I want to know that it' s real, that it' s funded, and that it
is pursuant to the law and the pleadings that are necessary to accomplish it, and
that there are resources to accomplish it.
Report of Proceedings ( RP) ( Sept. 18, 2009) at 20. The trial court continued the sentencing
hearing for another 60 days.
The trial court held another sentencing hearing on December 18, 2009. Stovall' s attorney
explained that DOC had stopped doing prescreened prison - ased DOSAs, but they had recently
b
begun providing prescreening again. Stovall' s attorney provided the trial court with a copy of
the prescreening report
finding that Stovall suffered from chemical dependency. Stovall' s
attorney admitted that he was unable to obtain specific dollar amounts used for DOSA programs,
but he presented findings from DOC' s monthly reports:
In November of this year they disclosed that they added 115 new beds and that
their intention is to consistently increase the beds for DOSA. And it shows that
they have them in a Chehalis facility and the Airway Heights facility, and also in
the McNeil facility. And they' re increasing the bed numbers, and they' ve
Island
filled those bed numbers. In November, I think they had 47 people recommended
from judges for the DOSA. Of those, they let 43 in. So, essentially what happens
is, if you order a DOSA, then they become eligible for the DOSA in the prison
system. They will then do another evaluation of that offender to determine
whether or not they want that offender in their program. In November, four of the
rd
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47, the DOC didn' t want them in their program. If that' s what happens, then they
serve the midpoint of their sentence range. If they do accept them in, they stay in
prison population until a bed comes open.
RP ( Dec. 18, 2009) at 8 - 9. During the hearing, the trial court and the State repeatedly confirmed
the State' s recommendation as expressed in the statement on plea of guilty. The trial court had
to continue the sentencing hearing again because Stovall decided to challenge his criminal
history and offender score; therefore, the State needed additional time to obtain certified copies
of Stovall' s previous judgment and sentences.
Stovall was sentenced on December 31, 2009. At sentencing, the State recommended 84
months confinement and argued against a DOSA sentence. After the State made its
recommendation, the following exchange took place:
DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I just don' t think I can do or say anything.
Stovall] has a memorandum in support of motion and declaration, attorney /client
conflict of interest, exigent circumstance, mandating the immediate discharge of
counsel. He' s filed Bar complaints against me. He' s filed Bar complaints against
the prosecutor]. They' ve been dismissed. He has filed appeals on the dismissal.
You know, the second -to- the -last time we were here, I asked him if he
wanted me to proceed. He said proceed, you know. And that' s subsequent to this
being filed with the clerk of the court. I don' t think any bench copies ever made it
to you. And I don' t know if [the prosecutor] has it, or not. But, you know, I
argued for his DOSA, I' d guess, on probably four or five occasions....
In addition, you asked to see if there was still a viable program. They' ve
added 115 beds just in November. It' s a viable program. It exists. It is preferred
under the law....
COURT]: In the recommendation, though, you agree that the State' s,
recommendation, through the deputy prosecutor, is 84 instead of 144; and to
argue against the [ DOSA] is within the discretion of the agreement and the
prosecutor.
DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I do. I do
that -- I guess what I' m saying
agree
here, just for the record, is that there was an evolution which began with this offer
that the State made and is sticking to and has come back to....
But, at the same time, if [Stovall' s] motion is properly before this Court,
your failure to consider his motion and rule on his motion is, in and of itself, a
reversible error. That is an abuse of discretion to not consider a motion that' s
z
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properly before the Court. So, if you don' t consider his motion to fire me -- and,
quite frankly, if we don' t fire me, there' s just going to be more problems and
more problems and more problems. And so, in all candor toward the tribunal,
that' s what I' m trying to say.
COURT]: I don' t have any motion before the Court.
STATE]: There is no motion before the Court. It is not properly before
the Court.
COURT]: Nothing is properly before the Court except sentencing.
RP ( Dec. 31, 2009) at 9 - 13. Stovall' s defense counsel concluded by making a final argument for
the imposition of a DOSA sentence. After defense counsel was finished, the trial court allowed
Stovall to make an extensive argument which included many of the reasons why he believed his
defense counsel had been deficient and his problems with the underlying, substantive facts of the
case. After listening to the attorneys and Stovall, the trial court stated,
All right. Now, before I impose the sentence and make a decision regarding the
DOSA], I feel that it' s incumbent upon the Court to make an observation. I think
that both the State' s attorney and. your defense attorney have acted with
professionalism and with integrity in handling this case, and to the extreme.
Defense counsel] has represented you to persuade this Court to impose a DOSA
sentence. I see no violation of defending you. And, with regard
his practice in
and with response to the State and their representation in this matter, they have
also acted with integrity and been professional. And, it appears to me, having
reviewed the Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty, that they are following
the recommendation that is in that document.
So, with that, I' m going to impose a sentence. I' ve thought about this.
I' ve thought about your history and your background, and I'm convinced that the
just and fair sentence in this matter is not DOSA, so I' m going to follow the
recommendation of the State. I could give you anywhere. You remember, the
Court doesn' t have to follow anybody' s recommendation.
RP ( Dec. 31, 2009) at 19 -20 ( emphasis added). The trial court imposed 84 months of total
confinement, 12 months of community custody, legal financial obligations, and forfeiture of
contraband that is evidence.
After the trial court imposed sentence, Stovall alleged that "[ t] here is an issue of
property," specifically cell phones that were seized at Stovall' s arrest. RP ( Dec. 31, 2009) at 22.
Con
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The court stated his sentencing order provided that all contraband would be forfeited and all
other property would be returned. The State informed the trial court that it was its position that
the cell phones were contraband, and Stovall disagreed. The trial court agreed that it was
probably not something that could be returned to Stovall.
Stovall filed a pro se direct appeal. He also filed two separate, pro se PRPs. We
consolidated his direct appeal and both of his PRPs for review.
ANALYSIS
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Generally, we apply different standards of review depending on whether an issue is raised
on direct appeal or in a PRP. However, recently our Supreme Court stated that if a defendant
meets the Stricklana4 standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, he has necessarily made a
showing of prejudice sufficient to grant a PRP. In re Pers. Restraint of Crace, 174 Wash. 2d 835,
846 -47, 280 P.3d 1102 ( 2012) ( " We hold that if a personal restraint petitioner makes a successful
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he has necessarily met his burden to show actual and
substantial prejudice. "). Therefore, we address all of Stovall' s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims collectively, regardless of whether he raised them in his direct appeal or his PRPs.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Stovall must show both deficient
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 ( 1984). Counsel' s performance is deficient if it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. State v. Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d 668, 705, 940 P.2d 1239 ( 1997), cent.
denied, 523 U.S. 1008 ( 1998). Our scrutiny of counsel' s performance is highly deferential; we
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 ( 1984).
7
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strongly presume reasonableness. State v. McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d 322, 335 -36, 899 P.2d 1251
1995). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome
would have differed absent the deficient performance. State v. Thomas, 109 Wash. 2d 222, 226,
743 P.2d 816 ( 1987). If an ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not support a finding of
either deficiency or prejudice, it fails. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
Stovall argues that his attorneys' performances were deficient preparing for trial, before
he entered his guilty plea. He also alleges numerous instances of ineffective assistance during
sentencing. Because Stovall fails to meet his burden under Strickland, his ineffective assistance
of counsel claims fail.
First, Strickland alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from both of his
5
attorneys prior to entering his guilty plea. He argues that his attorneys failed to properly
interview and subpoena witnesses. Because Stovall entered a guilty plea, we review the
reasonableness of counsel' s conduct under the standard for effective assistance of counsel in a
plea bargaining context. " In a plea bargaining context, `` effective assistance of counsel' merely
requires that counsel `` actually and substantially [ assist] his client in deciding whether to plead
guilty. "' State v. Osborne, 102 Wash. 2d 87, 99, 684 P.2d 683 ( 1984) ( alteration in original)
quoting State v. Cameron, 30 Wash. App. 229, 232, 633 P.2d 901, review denied, 96 Wash. 2d 1023
1981)). Defense counsel must inform the defendant of all direct consequences of the guilty
plea. State v. J., 168 Wash. 2d 91, 113 - 14, 225 P.3d 956 ( 2010).
A.N. The trial court' s extensive
colloquy with Stovall prior to accepting Stovall' s guilty plea demonstrates that Stovall was fully
5
Stovall had one attorney appointed at the beginning of his case, but after expressing
dissatisfaction with her performance, Stovall successfully moved to proceed pro se. Stovall' s
second defense counsel was originally appointed as standby counsel. Later, Stovall agreed to
allow standby counsel to represent him.
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informed of the consequences of the guilty plea, the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty,
and the potential consequences of being convicted at trial. In addition, both Stovall and trial
counsel stated that they had discussed the guilty plea. Therefore, defense counsel' s performance
6
was not deficient and Stovall' s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 697.
Second, Stovall claims that defense counsel' s performance was. deficient during
sentencing because he failed to obtain a timely DOSA screening and obtain information
regarding the funding of DOSA programs. We disagree. The record shows that defense counsel
obtained all information regarding the availability and resources for DOSA except for specific
dollar amounts. Moreover, the trial court did not refuse to impose a DOSA sentence because of
either the DOSA screening or the information on DOSA funding. Rather, the trial court decided
not to impose a DOSA after considering Stovall' s history and background. Therefore, Stovall
defense his claim fails. Because failure to
was not prejudiced by counsel' s performance, and
establish prejudice necessarily defeats Stovall' s claim, we do not address further whether defense
counsel' s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
Third, Stovall alleges that defense counsel' s performance was deficient because defense
counsel failed to argue that the State was violating the plea agreement by arguing against a
DOSA sentence at. Stovall' s final sentencing hearing. As we explain below, the State did not
violate its obligations under the plea agreement. Any objection or argument the defense counsel
6
Even if we considered defense counsel' s performance under the standard for trial counsel,
there is no absolute requirement that defense counsel interview witnesses before trial." In re
Pers. Restraint of Pirtle, 136 Wash. 2d 467, 488, 965 P.2d 593 ( 1998). Therefore, defense
counsel' s failure to interview witnesses does not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness and does not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
6
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may have made lacked legal basis and would have been futile. Therefore, defense counsel' s
performance was neither deficient nor prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
Fourth, Stovall argues that his counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion for the
return of his cell phones. CrR 2. 3( e) governs motions for the return of property no longer needed
as evidence. State v. 41away, 64 Wash. App. 796, 798, 828 P.2d 591, review denied, 119 Wash. 2d
1016 ( 1992). A CrR 2. 3( e) motion may be filed at any time, including after trial. State v. Card,
48 Wn. App. 781, 786, 741 P.2d 65 ( 1987). Stovall may file a CrR 2. 3( e) motion for the return
of his cell phones at any time, therefore he was not prejudiced by defense counsel' s failure to file
the motion at or before sentencing. Accordingly, this ineffective assistance of counsel claim also
fails. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
Fifth, Stovall argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
defense counsel omitted elements of the plea agreement on the written statement of defendant on
plea of guilty including ( 1) the State would not argue against a DOSA sentence, and ( 2) the State
was required to return his two cell phones. However, the record belies Stovall' s assertion. The
court reviewed all the conditions of the plea agreement included in the written document and
Stovall confirmed that they were correct. Stovall has not met his burden to show that defense
counsel' s performance was deficient, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
Stovall has failed to meet the burden necessary to prevail on all his ineffective assistance
of counsel claims. Accordingly, both his direct appeal and his PRP ineffective assistance claims
must fail.
10
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BREACH OF PLEA AGREEMENT
Stovall argues that the State breached the plea agreement by arguing against imposing a
DOSA sentence. However, the plain language of the plea agreement establishes that the State
retained the discretion to argue either for or against the DOSA sentence. Accordingly, the State
7
did not breach the terms of the plea agreement.
A plea agreement is a contract between the defendant and the State, under which the
defendant pleads guilty for some State concession such as a sentencing recommendation. State
v. Barber, 170 Wash. 2d 854, 859, 248 P.3d 494 ( 2011). Due process requires the State to follow a
plea agreement' s terms.. State v. Sledge, 133 Wash. 2d 828, 839, 947 P.2d 1199 ( 1997) ( citing
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 ( 1971)). The State
breaches the plea agreement when it either fails to make the agreed recommendation or
undercuts the terms of the plea agreement. State v. Van Buren, 101 Wash. App. 206, 213, 2 P.3d
991, review denied, 142 Wash. 2d 1015 ( 2000).
Here, the express terms of the plea agreement required the State to recommend 84
months confinement (the low end of Stovall' s standard sentencing range) and to allow Stovall to
argue for a DOSA sentence. Nothing in the agreed upon recommendation prevented the State
from being able to argue against Stovall' s request for a DOSA sentence. At sentencing, the State
recommended 84 months confinement, as required by the plea agreement. Stovall' s attorney was
given the opportunity to argue extensively for a DOSA sentence. Therefore, the State complied
7 In his PRP, Stovall also makes a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on the State' s alleged
breach of the plea agreement. Because the State did not breach the plea agreement, we do not
address Stovall' s PRP claim separately.
11
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with the express terms of the recommendation in the plea agreement and Stovall' s claim that the
State breached the plea agreement lacks merit.
RETURN OF CELL PHONES IN EVIDENCE
Stovall further claims that the State " violated Stovall' s due process rights" because it did
not return two cell phones seized from Stovall. Br. of Appellant at 32 ( capitalization omitted).
In response, the State argues that this issue is not ripe for review. We agree with the State.
To determine whether a claim is ripe, a court must examine the fitness of the issues for
judicial determination and the hardship to the parties that withholding determination would
cause. State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wash. 2d 782, 786, 239 P.3d 1059 ( 2010). On review, issues
are fit for judicial determination when three requirements are met: ( 1) the issues raised are
primarily legal, ( 2) the issues raised do not require further factual development, and ( 3) the
challenged action is final. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wash. 2d at 786 ( quoting State v. Bahl, 164
Wash. 2d 739, 751, 193 P.3d 678 ( 2008)).
The issues raised in Stovall' s appeal are not ripe for judicial determination. Although the
judgment and sentence requires Stovall to " forfeit any property in evidence," CP at 27, Stovall
bases his claim to the return of the cell phones on CrR 2. 3( e). But he did not file a CrR 2. 3( e)
motion until after this appeal was pending. The record on appeal does not disclose whether the
trial court has ruled on Stovall' s CrR 2. 3( e) motion. Thus, Stovall has not challenged a final
8
action; in addition, the issues he raises require further factual development. Because these
issues are not fit for judicial determination, we hold that Stovall' s claim is not ripe for review.
Valencia, 169 Wash. 2d at 786.
8 Upon Stovall' s oral request, the parties briefly disputed whether the two cell phones were
contraband; the sentencing court refused Stovall' s request without resolving this dispute.
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PERSONAL RESTRAINT PETITIONS
Stovall raises several issues in his consolidated PRPs. We address three of them in detail
below: ( 1) whether the trial court erred by failing to discharge his second attorney, ( 2) whether
the trial court erred by disregarding two of his pro se motions, and ( 3) whether the trial court
committed misconduct by removing his bar complaints against the attorneys from the court file.
Stovall cannot meet the high burden required for us to grant relief in a PRP. Accordingly, we
dismiss his PRPs.
Relief by way of a collateral challenge to a conviction is extraordinary, and the
petitioner must meet a high standard before this court will disturb an otherwise settled
judgment. "' In re Pers. Restraint of Finstad, 177 Wash. 2d 501, 506, 301 P.3d 450 ( 2013) ( quoting
In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 1. 73 Wash. 2d 123, 132 -33, 267 P.3d 324 ( 2011)). To meet the high
standard for granting collateral relief, the petitioner must show " either that he or she was actually
and substantially prejudiced by constitutional error or that his or her trial suffered from a
fundamental defect of a nonconstitutional nature that inherently resulted in a complete
miscarriage of justice." In re Finstad, 177 Wash. 2d at 506 ( citing In re Pers. Restraint ofElmore,
162 Wash. 2d 236, 251, 172 P.3d 335 ( 2007)). Even assuming that Stovall' s allegations establish
that the trial court committed error, he cannot satisfy the standard for granting relief in a PRP.
First, Stovall argues that the trial court erred by refusing to discharge his second counsel.
The record clearly demonstrates that Stovall' s counsel repeatedly advocated for the trial court to
impose a DOSA sentence and made a significant effort to gather the information on DOSA the
trial court requested. Considering defense counsel continued to advocate for a DOSA, Stovall
cannot show that he was substantially prejudiced or that there was a complete miscarriage of
justice. Furthermore, Stovall was represented by counsel at the time he filed his pro se motions
13
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to the court. Because defendants do not have the right to " hybrid representation," defendants
cannot file pro se motions while they are represented by counsel unless the trial court specifically
allows the hybrid representation. State v. Hightower, 36 Wash. App. 536, 541, 676 P.2d 1016,
review denied, 101 Wash. 2d 1013 ( 1984). Accordingly, Stovall' s pro se motions were not properly
before the trial court.
Second, Stovall argues that the trial court erred by " totally disregard[ ing]" numerous pro
se motions that he filed on December 1, 2009, and October 13, 2010. CP ( Jan. 4, 2011) at 9.
However, Stovall has not presented any argument establishing why or how he was prejudiced by
the trial court' s failure to hear his motions. See Hightower, 36 Wn. App. at 541. As explained
above, Stovall' s attorney repeatedly advocated for a DOSA, the State complied with its
sentencing recommendation, and the trial court gave him several opportunities to address the
court with his own arguments. Accordingly, Stovall has failed to demonstrate that the trial
court' s failure to consider his motions caused substantial prejudice or a complete miscarriage of
justice.
Third, Stovall argues that the trial court committed misconduct by removing copies of the
bar complaints he filed from the court file. Stovall has presented no argument, and we fail to
see, how he could have been prejudiced by the removal of copies of the bar complaints from the
court' s file or how the removal of the bar complaints constitutes a complete miscarriage of
justice. Therefore, Stovall has failed to meet the high standard required for us to grant relief
from a PRP.
Stovall has presented several issues for our review on both direct appeal and in his
consolidated PRPs. His numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail and the State did
not breach its obligations under the plea agreement. His claim regarding seized property is not
14
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ripe for review. And he fails to meet the high burden required for us to grant relief under a PRP.
Accordingly, we affirm Stovall' s conviction and sentence and dismiss his PRPs.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
JINN- BRINTNALL, P. J.
We concur-
P O, J.
BJORa1;
15