David & Faris Tafoya v. The Washington State Human Rights Commission ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                                                 FILED
    COURT 0,   APPEALS
    bivislom 11
    2013 NOV 13   AM 11: 13
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION II
    DAVID and FARIS TAFOYA, husband and                                      No. 43003 -7 -II
    wife,                                                                    consolidated with
    No. 43376 -1 - II
    Appellants,
    V.
    STATE         OF     WASHINGTON                HUMAN              ORDER AMENDING OPINION
    RIGHTS COMMISSION,
    Appellant.
    The opinion previously filed in this case on October 15, 2013, is hereby amended as
    follows:
    Add " the ALJ' s decision and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion."    to the end of the last sentence of the opinion and insert a footnote that reads:
    We note that the Superior Court order modified 'the amount of actual damages
    awarded     in the ALJ'   s   order.   However, the parties do not challenge either the
    amount of damages in the ALJ' s order or the Superior Court' s order modifying
    the amount of actual          damages.    We do not consider the trial court' s action on
    administrative    appeal.      Postema    v.   Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wn.2d
    o.   4- 003 - 7 - II,   consolidated      with   No.    43376 - 1 - II
    68, 77, 
    11 P.3d 726
    ( 2000).     Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ' s opinion in its
    entirety, including the original amount of actual damages awarded by the ALI
    Accordingly,.it is
    SO ORDERED. /
    DATED this            day   of ,                                   2013.
    DALTON, J. P. T. '
    We concur:
    BRINTALL, j\
    UM
    ON, A.C. J.
    2
    FILED
    COURT OF APPPALS
    DIVI IO. it
    013 OCT 15 AM 8, 55
    S IA       F `` A Hlpti   ON
    By.,
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION H .
    DAVID and FARIS TAFOYA, husband and
    wife,
    Appellants,                            No. 43003 -7 -I1
    consolidated with
    No. 43376 -1 - II
    V.
    PUBLISHED OPINION
    STATE OF WASHINGTON HUMAN
    RIGHTS COMMISSION,
    Respondent.
    DALTON, . . P. T1-
    J            Mary   Gossard   rented a home   from David   and   Faris Tafoya:2   After
    several months of enduring David' s sexual comments and inappropriate behavior, Gossard filed
    a complaint with   the Washington State Human Rights Commission ( Commission),             alleging that
    the Tafoyas engaged in sexual harassment and retaliation. The Commission filed a formal
    complaint against the Tafoyas. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the Tafoyas
    violated    the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD),       RCW 49. 60 et seq., by engaging
    in sex discrimination and retaliation. The Tafoyas appeal arguing that the ALJ' s final decision
    and order ( 1) misapplies the law and ( 2) is not supported by substantial evidence. We hold that
    1 Judge Jeanette Dalton is serving as a judge pro tempore ofthe Court of Appeals, Division H,
    under CAR 21( c).
    2
    David    Faris Tafoya, collectively, are referred to as " the Tafoyas." When referred to
    and
    individually, David' s and Faris' s first names are used for clarity; we intend no disrespect.
    No. 43003 -7- II, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 - II
    the ALJ correctly applied the law and that the findings are supported by substantial evidence, and
    we affirm.
    FACTS
    The Tafoyas own property in Thurston County. The property includes the Tafoyas' home
    and a rental home. A fence separates the Tafoyas' property from the rental property. In March
    2006, Gossard and the Tafoyas signed a one -year lease.
    David engaged in numerous instances of inappropriate behavior with Gossard during the
    time she lived in the rental home. The first episode occurred while Gossard was signing the
    lease:' David asked his wife if she would mind if David. chased Gossard around the pond on the
    property. Later; while David was helping Gossard move her piano, he made a comment about
    women being stupid. David also hugged Gossard and touched her buttocks.
    David made several sexually inappropriate comments to Gossard: When Gossard broke
    3
    her   ankle,   David brought her dinner      and said, "   I' ve   seen your   pussy. " Admin. Record (AR) at
    365. After hearing Gossard play the piano, David told Gossard, "``                   Yourpiano playing was
    beautiful. I made love to you several times while I was listening to you. I could even taste
    you. "'    AR at 364. David also called Gossard late at night and asked her to come over to the
    house     and "   party."   AR at366. David told Gossard that " some nights he thought about her,
    watched     pornography,       and masturbated."    AR at 365.
    David made several, less explicit comments that made Gossard feel uncomfortable.
    David told Gossard that he thought about her all the time. He also told Gossard that Faris was
    going through        menopause    and   they were   no   longer    having   sex.   AR 365. One night, David
    called Gossard and told her to come over to his house. Gossard responded that she could not
    3
    Gossard owns a cat.
    2
    No. 43003 -7 -II, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 - II
    because she was in her bathrobe. David told her she should just come over in her bathrobe.
    Gossard refused. After Gossard' s friend stayed the night at her house, David made a comment
    implying that Gossard was a prostitute. Once, David poked her in the stomach and commented
    that she was " gaining weight and looked like the Pillsbury doughboy."
    In addition to his comments, David' s behavior made Gossard feel uncomfortable,
    embarrassed, and afraid. One afternoon, Gossard went to the Tafoyas' house to ask directions to
    the post office and David answered the door completely nude. Another afternoon,
    David] invited [ Gossard] to see his art in his [ recreational vehicle ( RV)]....
    Gossard saw that the paintings were of sexual subjects, including [ Faris] in a
    bikini touching herself and a woman with her legs spread open. [ David] pushed
    Gossard onto the bed and sat down next to her.... Gossard left immediately.
    AR at 366.
    Gossard informed Faris about David' s conduct. Faris replied that Gossard' s accusations
    were untrue and that Faris believed it was Gossard who was pursuing David. The Tafoyas called
    Gossard later and left her a message saying that nothing ever happened. They also accused
    -
    Gossard of making everything up.
    In May 2006, Gossard filed a complaint with the Commission. On June 13, the
    Commission notified the Tafoyas that it was investigating Gossard' s complaint. After the
    Tafoyas were notified of Gossard' s complaint, they treated her differently. David stopped
    mowing the lawn on the rental property which he had done before Gossard' s complaint. David
    threatened to throw rocks at Gossard' s cat, causing Gossard to fear for her cat' s safety. David
    also took down the chicken wire that had been installed on the fence to prevent Gossard' s cat
    from running into the roadway. The Tafoyas also contacted Gossard' s ex- husband to obtain
    information   about   Gossard to   present   to the Commission, despite Gossard'   s earlier
    No. 43003 -7 -II, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 - II
    4
    admonishment against         contacting her      ex- husband.       In August 2006, Gossard found a new place
    to rent and moved out of the Tafoyas' rental home.
    The Commission investigated Gossard' s complaint and filed an amended complaint,
    charging the Tafoyas with engaging in unfair practices in a real estate transaction. Specifically,
    the Commission alleged the Tafoyas committed unfair practices by
    1) subjecting Gossard to sexual harassment; ( 2) failing to take action designed to
    end   the   sexual   harassment; ( 3)     coercing; intimidating, threatening, and interfering
    with   Gossard'      s   attempts   to   exercise   and     enjoy her fair
    housing rights; ( 4)
    coercing, intimidating, threatening, and interfering with Gossard' s attempts to
    oppose other unfair practices described herein; and ( 5) aiding and assisting each
    other in perpetuation ofthe other unfair practices described herein.
    AR at 5. A four -day administrative hearing was held in August 2010.
    Gossard testified to the above facts at the administrative hearing. Some of the Tafoyas'
    former tenants testified that David had also engaged in similarly inappropriate behavior during
    their tenancies. The Tafoyas denied Gossard' s accusations or, alternatively, argued that David' s
    actions were not " sufficiently severe so as to constitute discrimination by sexual harassment"
    AR at 377.
    The ALJ found that Gossard' s testimony was credible and the " Tafoyas' denials and
    descriptions   of the   incidents [ we] re   not credible."     AR at 377. The ALJ concluded that the
    Tafoyas engaged in sex discrimination by sexual harassment and Faris aided and abetted David' s
    sexual harassment of Gossard. The ALJ also concluded that that Tafoyas engaged in retaliatory
    acts by threatening Gossard' s cat and contacting her ex- husband.
    At the time she rented the property, Gossard told the Tafoyas that she had a protection order
    against her ex- husband because he was abusive. She specifically asked the Tafoyas not to
    disclose any information to anyone about [her] living situation, as [ she] wanted to keep it
    private due to the fact that [ she] knew that [her] ex- husband could find out and possibly hurt
    her]." Admin. Report of Proceedings at 51.
    4
    No. 43003 -7 -II, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 - II
    The AD ordered the Tafoyas to cease and desist from engaging in unfair practices by
    sexually harassing female tenants or retaliating against persons who file discrimination
    complaints. AR 390. The ALJ awarded Gossard actual damages in the amount of $ 422.75,
    3,
    10, 000. 00 in compensatory damages for " humiliation               and emotional    distress," and imposed a
    civil penalty of $10, 000. 00.
    The Tafoyas appealed to the Thurston County Superior Court. The superior court
    reduced Gossard' s damages to $3, 114.75, but affirmed the ALJ' s final decision in all other
    respects. The Tafoyas timely appeal.
    ANALYSIS
    The Administrative Procedure Act (APA); RCW 34.05 et seq, governs our review of
    agency action. The party seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating the invalidity ofthe
    agency      action.   RCW 34.05. 570( 1)(    a).   We may reverse an agency action if the agency
    erroneously interpreted or applied the law, or the " rder is not supported by substantial evidence.
    o
    RCW 34. 05. 570( 3)( d) -(e).
    We apply the APR' s standards directly to the agency record, sitting in the same position
    as   the   superior court."    Timberlane Mobile Home Park v. Human Rights Comm' n ex rel.
    Campbell,      122 Wn.    App. 896,   900, 
    95 P.3d 1288
    ( 2004) ( citing       Burnham v. Dep' t ofSoc. &
    Health Servs., 115 Wn.         App. 435,    438, 
    63 P.3d 816
    ( 2003)).       We review findings of fact for
    substantial evidence.         Timberlane, 122 Wn.      App.   at   900. "   An agency order is supported by
    substantial evidence if there is `` a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair -
    minded person
    of the truth or correctness of the order. "'        Hardee   v.   Dep' t of Soc. & Health Servs., 
    172 Wash. 2d 1
    ,
    6, 
    256 P.3d 339
    ( 2011) ( internal    quotations omitted) ( quoting          Thurston   County v.   W. Wash.
    No. 43003 -7 -II, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 - II
    Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 
    164 Wash. 2d 329
    , 341, 
    190 P.3d 38
    ( 2008)).                         We review conclusions
    of law de novo. 
    Timberlane, 122 Wash. App. at 900
    .
    UNFAIR PRACTICES IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
    The ALJ concluded that the Tafoyas engaged in unfair real estate practices under the
    WLAD. The Tafoyas appear to argue that the ALJ misinterpreted and misapplied the law
    because ( 1) they did not violate the plain language of the statute because they rented the property
    to Gossard and did not prevent her from using it, and ( 2) David' s conduct was not sufficiently
    severe or pervasive to be considered sexual harassment. We hold that the ALJ properly
    concluded that sexual harassment by a landlord toward a tenant is discriminatory conduct that .
    interferes with the terms, conditions, or privileges associated with renting property and David' s
    conduct constituted' sexual harassment in violation of the WLAD..
    RCW*49. 60. 030 guarantees the right to be free from discrimination because of sex. The.
    right to be free from discrimination includes " the. right to engage in real estate transactions
    without   discrimination." RCW 49. 60. 030( 1)(           c).   It is an unfair practice " to discriminate against
    aperson in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a real estate transaction or in the furnishing of
    facilities   or services   in   connection   therewith"   or ``[     t] o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to
    otherwise make unavailable or          deny a dwelling, to          any   person."   RCW 46. 60. 222( 1)( b), ( f). A
    real estate transaction" includes the rental or lease of real property. Former RCW
    49. 60. 040( 21) ( 1997).       The WLAD should be construed broadly. Blaney v. Int' l Ass' n of
    Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. No. 160, 
    151 Wash. 2d 203
    , 214, 
    87 P.3d 757
    ( 2004)
    citing Marquis v. City ofSpokane, 
    130 Wash. 2d 97
    , 109, 
    922 P.2d 43
    ( 1996)).
    There are no Washington cases that address sexual harassment as an unfair practice in
    real estate transactions under the WLAD. But there is significant federal authority that ( 1)
    0
    No. 43003 -7 -II, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 - II
    establishes sexual harassment as a form of discrimination in housing and ( 2) provides the legal
    standard for determining whether sexual harassment has occurred. Similar to the WLAD, the
    Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), 
    42 U.S. C
    . chapter 45, prohibits discrimination " in the
    terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or.rental of a dwelling" based on sex. 
    42 U.S. C
    . §
    3604( b).    The FHAA also prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of sex. 
    42 U.S. C
    . §
    3604( a).   "[   T] he language of the [ FHAA] is `` broad and inclusive' and must be given a `` generous
    construction. "'     Samaritan Inns, Inc. v. District ofColumbia, 
    114 F.3d 1227
    , 1234 (D. C. Cir.
    1997) ( quoting      Trafficante v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 
    409 U.S. 205
    , 209, 212, 93 S. -Ct. 364, 366 -67,
    368, 
    34 L. Ed. 2d 415
    ( 1972)).         When interpreting Washington law, we may look to the federal
    case law when a federal anti -
    discrimination law contains the same protections and mandates the
    same broad construction. Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 
    93 Wash. 2d 368
    , 376, 
    610 P.2d 857
    , 
    621 P.2d 1293
    ( 1980).
    The Tafoyas      assert   that "[ t]here   is no issue concerning the fact that Gossard obtained
    possession of the rental area and resided upon            it." Br. of Appellant at 22. The Tafoyas argue ,
    that the WLAD should be narrowly read so that unfair practices in a real estate transaction are
    limited to unfair practices in entering into a lease or rental agreement and do not extend to
    actions during the term of the tenancy. Relying on their narrow reading of the WLAD, the
    Tafoyas assert that they did not engage in an unfair practice at the time they entered into the
    original rental agreement with Gossard.
    But the Tafoyas ignore several federal cases that recognize sexual harassment as a form
    of   discrimination in the terms,      conditions, or privileges of    renting property. U. v. Hurt, 676
    S
    F. 3d 649, 654 ( 8th Cir. 2012) (" Sexual harassment is           actionable under   the FHA[ A]. ");see   also
    Quigley v.       Winter, 
    598 F.3d 938
    , 946 ( 8th Cir. 2010); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 
    96 F.3d 1004
    , 1008
    7
    No. 43003 -7 -II, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 - H
    7th Cir. 1996); Honce     v.   Vigil, 
    1 F.3d 1085
    , 1088 -90 ( 10th Cir. 1993). Washington courts have
    similarly recognized the necessity of construing the WLAD broadly to affect the legislative
    purpose of the WLAD: to eliminate and prevent discrimination in real estate transactions based
    on sex. RCW 49. 60.010; 
    Blaney, 151 Wash. 2d at 214
    . Indeed, the legislature has explicitly found
    that " discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but
    menaces   the   institutions   and   foundations   of a   free democratic   state."   RCW 49. 60. 010. Under
    the Tafoyas narrow construction of the WLAD, there would be no claim for discrimination as
    long as a tenant is not sexually 'harassed until after she has rentedproperty and resided on it. The
    Tafoyas' would create an absurd result which could not have been intended by the legislature
    and clearly defies the mandate to construe the WLAD broadly to prevent discrimination. Dept
    of Ecology v. Tiger Oil        Corp.,   166 Wn.   App.    720, 762, 
    271 P.3d 331
    ( 2012) ( citing   Eurick V.
    Pemco Ins. Co., 
    108 Wash. 2d 338
    , 341, 
    738 P.2d 251
    ( 1987)).                 Accordingly, we reject Tafoyas
    argument and hold that sexual harassment is an unfair practice in a real estate transaction and is
    actionable under the WLAD.
    Alternatively, the Tafoyas argue that if a sexual harassment claim exists, David' s conduct
    did not constitute sexual harassment that is pervasive enough to create a hostile environment.
    Federal courts have determined that the sexual harassment must be unwelcome and " sufficiently
    severe or pervasive so as to interfere with or deprive [ the tenant] of her right to use or enjoy her
    home."    
    Quigley, 598 F.3d at 946
    -47 ( citing 
    DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008
    ). The WLAD prohibits
    discrimination against a person in terms, conditions, or privileges of a real estate transaction.
    RCW 46. 60. 222( 1)( b). The use and enjoyment of a rental home is inherent in the terms,
    conditions, or privileges of the rental agreement.
    No. 43003 -7 -II, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 -II
    Where there is not an established standard for establishing discrimination in a certain
    context, we will often rely on the standards from employment discrimination cases. For
    example,     in Fell v. Spokane TransitAuth., 
    128 Wash. 2d 618
    , 632, 
    911 P.2d 1319
    ( 1996),                 our
    Supreme Court, to ascertain whether there was discrimination against the disabled in places of
    public accommodation, used the standards for determining whether an employer discriminated
    against    the disabled in the   workplace..   The ALJ relied on the test for sexual harassment in
    employment our Supreme Court set out in Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 
    103 Wash. 2d 401
    ,
    406 -07, 
    693 P.2d 708
    ( 1985).       Under Glasgow, the four necessary elements of a sexual
    harassment claim     are: (   1) the harassment   was unwelcome, ( 2)   the harassment was because of
    sex, (   3) the harassment affected the terms and conditions of employment, and (4) the harassment
    was imputed to the 
    employer. 103 Wash. 2d at 406
    -07. Because Washington' s test for sexual
    harassment in employment discrimination encompasses the federal requirements for sexual
    harassment in housing, the ALJ properly applied the Glasgow four - art test to determine whether
    p
    a tenant has established sexual harassment in housing.
    Using the Glasgow analytical framework, the Commission would have to prove that (1)
    David' s    conduct was unwelcome, ( 2)     David' s   conduct was   because   of   Gossard' s   sex, (   3) David' s
    conduct affected the terms, conditions, and privileges of the rental property (including Gossard' s
    use   and   enjoyment of the     property), and ( 4) the harassment was imputable to the landlord. The
    Tafoyas do not argue that David' s conduct was welcome or that it was unrelated to Gossard' s
    sex. The Tafoyas limit their argument to whether David' s conduct was sufficiently severe and
    pervasive so as to affect Gossard' s use and enjoyment of the rental property.
    The Tafoyas characterize David' s conduct as isolated or trivial. We agree with the ALJ
    that David' s conduct was sufficiently severe to establish sexual harassment. The ALJ' s findings
    E
    No. 43003 -7 -II, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 - II
    of fact identify at least 14 instances of inappropriate behavior by David, including physical
    touching and sexually explicit comments. Gossard testified that David' s conduct made her feel
    embarrassed, uncomfortable, and afraid when she was in her home. David' s conduct was not
    isolated or trivial. To the contrary, his conduct was a regular occurrence while Gossard lived on
    the property. David made several sexually explicit comments including one comment in which
    he   stated   that he "   made love to [her] several times" and another comment in which he stated he
    thought about her while he masturbated. AR at 364. David answered the door while naked, and
    he pushed Gossard onto the bed in an RV filled with his sexually explicit art.
    Although not binding, the Eighth Circuit' s decision in Quigley v. Winter is factually on-
    point and persuades us. In Quigley, the tenant testified that her landlord:
    subjected her to unwanted touching on two occasions, made sexually suggestive
    comments, rubbed his. genitals in front of her, placed several middle of the night
    phone calls to her home, made repeated unannounced visits, and, on one occasion,
    while [ the landlord] lay on [ the tenant' s] couch, had to be told to leave her home
    at least three times before he 
    complied. 598 F.3d at 947
    . Based on this testimony.,the court concluded the tenant " presented sufficient
    evidence of numerous unwanted interactions of a sexual nature that interfered with [the tenant]' s
    -
    use and enjoyment of herhome."            Quigley, 598 RM at 947. Gossard experienced similar
    unwanted, sexual conduct on numerous occasions. As in Quigley, there were numerous incidents
    of such conduct. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by concluding that David' s conduct was
    sufficiently severe and pervasive so as to interfere with Gossard' s use and enjoyment of the
    rental property. The final element of a sexual harassment claim is whether the conduct can be
    imputed to the landlord. Here, David was the landlord and directly participated in the conduct.
    Therefore, he is liable and imputation is unnecessary.
    10
    No. 43003 -7 -II, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 - II
    Faris argues that she cannot be held liable for David' s conduct because she had very little
    first-hand knowledge of the situation and did not have very much contact with Gossard. But
    Faris misunderstands the law. She relies on principles ofjoint and several tort liability against .
    t
    the marital community to support her argument. But the ALJ did not impose liability on Faris by
    virtue of the marital community. Instead, Faris is liable for discrimination by virtue of her
    position as a landlord.
    In the employment context, liability is imputed to the employer when the employer either
    participates in the harassment or the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and
    failed to take remedial action. 
    Glasgow, 103 Wash. 2d at 407
    . Here, Gossard told Faris about
    David' s conduct, but Faris failed to investigate or take any remedial action. To the contrary,
    Faris accused Gossard of initiating the contact with David and participated in the retaliation by
    contacting Gossard' s ex- husband. The purpose of imputing liability is to ensure that landlords .
    investigate complaints and take appropriate action to stop harassment. A landlord cannot avoid
    imputed liability by simply choosing to ignore a tenant' s complaint. We hold that the ALJ
    properly imposed liability on both David and Faris 5
    .
    FIRST AMENDMENT
    The Tafoyas also argue that the ALJ erred by concluding that David' s comments were
    not protected by the First Amendment. But it is well -
    established that speech that constitutes
    harassment is unprotected speech. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in rejecting this meritless
    argument.
    5 We also note that Faris is directly liable for her retaliatory conduct, specifically, her direct
    participation in contacting Gossard' s ex- husband.
    11'
    No. 43003 -7 -II, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 - II
    In Mills-v. W. Wash. Univ., 150 Wn.            App.   260, 274, 
    208 P. M
    13 ( 2009), rev' d on other
    grounds,   
    170 Wash. 2d 903
    , 
    246 P.3d 1254
    ( 2011), Division One of this court stated:
    To be explicit, none ofthe following behaviors implicate academic freedom in the
    slightest, or are protected by either the First Amendment or article 1, section 5:
    verbally abusing faculty colleagues with discriminatory and sexual innuendo;
    harassing, intimidating,' demeaning, and insulting students outside of the
    classroom; [   and] verbally abusing staff members and student assistants serving in
    an administrative capacity.
    Emphasis   added.)    Here, David' s speech can be characterized as discriminatory, sexually
    explicit or sexual innuendo, and harassing. Under Mills, this type of speech is not protected
    speech. As the Commission correctly points out, the case law governing harassing and
    6
    discriminatory   speech   is   clear   that David' s   comments are not protected speech.       Therefore, the
    ALJ did not err in concluding that David' s comments were not protected by the First
    Amendment.
    EVIDENCE OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
    Finally, the Tafoyas argue that the ALJ' s findings regarding Gossard' s emotional distress.
    are not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the Tafoyas argue that the ALJ cannot
    award damages for emotional distress without the testimony of alicensed medical professional.
    But the Tafoyas rely on cases regarding the sufficiency of the evidence supporting tort claims for
    negligent infliction of emotional distress which are inapplicable to sexual harassment claims.
    We reject the Tafoyas argument and hold that the ALJ properly awarded damages authorized by
    the WLAD.
    6 The Tafoyas base their argument on.cases addressing criminal statutes meant to punish speech
    speech categorized as fighting words. David' s speech is not categorized as fighting words;
    therefore, the cases cited by the Tafoyas are inapplicable.
    12
    No. 43003 -7 -II, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 - H
    RCW 49. 60. 225( 1) authorizes the ALJ to award any damages " for such relief suffered by
    the aggrieved person" and damages authorized by the FHAA. Federal courts have held that
    emotional distress caused by housing discrimination is a compensable injury under the
    FHAA]."        U.S.' v. Balistrieri, 
    981 F.2d 916
    , 931 ( 7th Cir. 1992) ( citing   Seaton v. Sky Realty Co.,
    
    491 F.2d 634
    , 63 6- 3 8 ( 7th Cir. 1974)). But emotional distress will not be presumed; the plaintiff
    must prove that the discrimination caused actual emotional distress. 
    Balistrieri, 981 F.2d at 931
    citing   Carey v. Piphus, 
    435 U.S. 247
    , 263- 64, 
    98 S. Ct. 1042
    , 
    55 L. Ed. 2d
    252 ( 1978)).      If the
    plaintiff s   testimony "`` reasonably     and   sufficiently "' explains the emotional distress, the
    plaintiffs testimony is sufficient to support the award of damages. Balistrieri, 981 Fad at 931-
    32 ( internal   quotations omitted) (    quoting Biggs v. Village ofDupo,, 
    892 F.2d 1298
    , 1304 ( 7th Cir.
    1990)).    Similarly, we have held that "[ a] discrimination plaintiff may seek monetary
    compensation       for `` actual damages,'    including distress and mental anguish caused by
    discrimination,     and   may   prove such   damages through nonexpert testimony." Negron v.
    Snoqualmie       ValleyHosp.,     
    86 Wash. App. 579
    , 588, 
    936 P.2d 55
    ( 1997) (       quoting former RCW
    49. 60. 030( 2) ( 1995)) (   citing Delahunty v. Cahoon, 
    66 Wash. App. 829
    , 842, 
    832 P.2d 1378
    1992)).
    The Tafoyas' argument that Gossard was required to support her testimony with expert
    medical testimony is contrary to existing case law. See 
    Negron, 86 Wash. App. at 588
    . Gossard' s
    testimony sufficiently explains the emotional distress that she suffered because of David' s sexual
    harassment, thus there is substantial evidence to support the ALTs award of damages.
    
    Balistrieri, 981 F.3d at 931
    . Here, Gossard testified that David' s behavior made her fearful for
    her safety and the safety of her cat. Gossard participated in therapy to deal with the situation.
    And Gossard testified, " I        was put under a lot of stress in my education. I was gaining weight. I
    13
    No. 43003- 7-H, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 - H
    was not sleeping. I was afraid. I was feeling invalidated. I was humiliated. I was subjugated
    sic)   to things that nobody   should   be   subjugated   to, making it very stressful. " 7   Admin. Report of
    Proceedings at 130. Gossard' s testimony establishes that she suffered emotional distress because
    of David' s conduct, which embarrassed and humiliated her and made her afraid in her own
    home. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ' s damages award for emotional distress.
    In sum, the Tafoyas' arguments regarding the substantive nature of the claims are
    untenable.     We hold that as a matter of law, sexual harassment is an actionable claim under the
    WLAD when the sexual harassment interferes with the terms, conditions, and privileges of a
    rental agreement by preventing the use and enjoyment ofproperty. The proper standard for
    evaluating a claim for sexual harassment is the standard our Supreme Court articulated for sexual
    harassment in employment in Glasgow. The ALJ did not misinterpret or misapply the law when
    she concluded that the Tafoyas violated the WLAD by discriminating against Gossard based on
    her sex. And, because liability maybe imputed to a landlord who fails to take reasonable
    investigative and/ or remedial action after receiving a harassment complaint, the ALJ did not err
    by imposing "iability on Faris for David' s sexual harassment of Gossard. In addition, the
    l
    Tafoyas' claims that David' s conduct is protected by the First Amendment and that Gossard was
    required to produce expert testimony to support her claim for emotional distress are contrary to
    7
    Subjugate   means . "   to bring *or hold under strict control or into a subordinate position."
    WEBsTER' s THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, at 2276 ( 1969).
    14
    No. 43003 -7 -II, consolidated with No. 43376 -1 -II
    Washington law.
    We affirm. /
    DALTON, J.P. T.
    We concur:
    BRINTNALL, J.
    J HANsoN, A.C.J.
    15