U.s. Bank National Association v. John Norton ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JOHN NORTON and KRISTINE
NORTON, individually, and derivatively
on behalf of LARCO-BOLIVAR No. 68531-7-1
INVESTMENTS, LLC, and SHELL LA
PAZ, LLC; NORTHLAND CAPITAL DIVISION ONE
LLC, individually, and derivatively on
behalf of NDG-BRYCON, LLC; and
P.R.E. ACQUISITIONS, LLC,
Respondents,
v.
U.S. BANK NATIONALASSOCIATION, PUBLISHED OPINION
d/b/a U.S. BANK, .C-
%8
2?
n?
5§
n-J-i
CO
Appellant, FILED: February 18, 2014 oS
CO ;£?
j&.yr-
and >3.
S ier—
JOSE NINO DE GUZMAN and NDG *«
ow
o
INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC, —. c;
Defendants.
Becker, J. — Before us on discretionary review is an order requiring a
bank to produce documents containing information about how the bank conducts
internal monitoring and investigations to detect fraud and money laundering.
Because such information is privileged from discovery under federal law, we
No. 68531-7-1/2
conclude the trial court abused its discretion by ordering discovery and we
remand for entry of a protective order.
Jose Nino de Guzman is a former U.S. Bank employee. In 2006, he left
the bank to engage in real estate development in Peru through his investment
company, NDG Investment Group LLC. Plaintiffs John and Kristine Norton
invested $11 million. Some of the money they invested was deposited in
accounts held by Nino de Guzman and his company at U.S. Bank.
In 2009, the Nortons discovered that Nino de Guzman had been running a
Ponzi scheme and their money was gone. The Nortons brought suit against Nino
de Guzman and NDG Investment to recover their losses. Neither Nino de
Guzman nor NDG Investment is defending the action.
The Nortons added U.S. Bank as a defendant. Against the bank, the
Nortons alleged that when Nino de Guzman left the Bank's employ, he enlisted
other employees and paid them bonuses and commissions to help him solicit
investors; that the bank did not properly investigate or supervise its employees
who were simultaneously working both for the bank and for Nino de Guzman;
that money held by the bank in trust or fiduciary accounts was diverted into
personal accounts of Nino de Guzman; and that in the summer of 2008, the bank
initiated a money laundering investigation concerning Nino de Guzman and
became aware of the possibility that he was engaging in criminal activity but took
no action and continued to profit from his accounts. The Nortons' complaint
charged the bank with breach of fiduciary duty, securities violations, aiding and
No. 68531-7-1/3
abetting fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, consumer protection violations,
and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision.
In response to discovery requests by the Nortons, U.S. Bank produced
account statements and account opening documents for accounts belonging to
Nino de Guzman and his company, copies of the checks, and documentation of
international wire transfers. According to the Nortons, these documents showed
that Nino de Guzman opened over 30 accounts at U.S. Bank, through which he
circulated investor money to Peru and then back to his accounts. Some of his
checks were written to U.S. Bank employees. His accounts showed repeated
overdrafts.
The Nortons believed that Nino de Guzman's transactions aroused
suspicion and caused the bank to monitor his accounts and the accounts of the
employees. They made discovery requests for, generally, all documents
generated by the bank in internal investigations relating to Nino de Guzman's
accounts. For example, an interrogatory asked the Bank to describe "any due
diligence, investigation and/or inquiry conducted by or on behalf of U.S. Bank
regarding the background and/or conduct of Nino de Guzman and/or his Affiliated
Entities." Another interrogatory asked for the reason any such investigation was
initiated and asked the Bank to describe any action taken in response to such
investigation. As well, the Nortons asked for disclosure of the bank's methods
and policies for monitoring suspicious activity and detecting money laundering.
No. 68531-7-1/4
The bank moved for a protective order on the ground that disclosure of
material responsive to these requests was prohibited by the Bank Secrecy Act,
31 U.S.C. § 5318(g). The bank asked the trial court to:
enter an order barring discovery of documents and information
concerning (a) any alleged suspicious activity monitoring,
investigation, or reporting conducted by U.S. Bank related to
accounts held by Nino de Guzman or NDG at U.S. Bank, including
but not limited to any documents or information that would reveal
the existence or non-existence of any such investigation; and (b)
the methods, policies and procedures U.S. Bank employs generally
to monitor and detect for suspicious activity ....
The trial court denied the bank's motion for a protective order and ordered the
bank to respond fully.1 This order is before us on the bank's motion for
discretionary review.
The issue involves interpretation of a statutory privilege. Our review is de
novo. Jane Doe v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints. 122 Wash. App. 556, 563, 90 P.3d 1147 (2004). review denied. 153 Wn.2d
1025(2005).
Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970 to require national banks
to assist the government in monitoring for financial crimes. In 1992, Congress
gave the Comptroller of the Currency the power to require financial institutions to
report suspicious transactions to the federal government. 31 U.S.C. §
5318(g)(1); Union Bank of Calif, v. Superior Court. 130 Cal. App. 4th 378, 389, 29
Cal. Rptr. 3d 894 (2005). The statute also provides that banks may not notify
1The trial court denied U.S. Bank's request for oral argument. Given the
complexity and sensitivity of the privilege issue, this is a case where oral argument likely
would have been helpful.
No. 68531-7-1/5
persons involved in the suspicious transaction that it has been reported. 31
U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2)(A).
Under the comptroller's regulations, each bank is required to "develop and
provide for the continued administration of a program reasonably designed to
assure monitoring compliance with the recordkeeping and reporting
requirements" of the act. 12 C.F.R. § 21.21(b). When a bank detects a known or
suspected violation of federal law or a suspicious transaction related to money
laundering, the bank must file a "Suspicious Activity Report" (also known as SAR)
to an officer or agency designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, using a form
prescribed by the comptroller. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1),(4); 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(a),
(b), (c). Specifically, banks must file a report when they suspect: (1) a bank
insider is involved, (2) violations aggregating $5,000 or more where a suspect
can be identified, (3) violations aggregating $25,000 or more regardless of
potential suspect, or (4) violations aggregating $5,000 or more involving potential
money laundering or violations of the Banking Secrecy Act. 12 C.F.R. §§
21.11(c)(1)-(4).
As provided by regulation, Suspicious Activity Reports are confidential.
Banks are prohibited from responding to a discovery request for a Suspicious
Activity Report or any information that would reveal the existence of a Suspicious
Activity Report.
(k) Confidentiality ofSARs. A SAR, and any information that
would reveal the existence of a SAR, are confidential, and shall not
be disclosed except as authorized in this paragraph (k).
(1) Prohibition on disclosure by national banks—(i) General
rule. No national bank, and no director, officer, employee, or agent
of a national bank, shall disclose a SAR or any information that
No. 68531-7-1/6
would reveal the existence of a SAR. Any national bank, and any
director, officer, employee, or agent of any national bank that is
subpoenaed or otherwise requested to disclose a SAR, or any
information that would reveal the existence of a SAR, shall decline
to produce the SAR or such information, citing this section and 31
U.S.C. 5318(g)(2)(A)(i), and shall notify the following of any such
request and the response thereto:
(A) Director, Litigation Division, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency; and
(B) The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
12 C.F.R. § 21.11(k)(1)(i). The prohibition constitutes an "unqualified discovery
and evidentiary privilege" that cannot be waived. Whitnev Nat'l Bank v. Karam.
306 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (S.D. Tex. 2004). As stated in the regulation, the
privilege extends beyond the report itself to any information that would reveal
whether such a report exists.
The comptroller has declared compelling policy reasons for maintaining
the confidentiality of information that would reveal the existence of a Suspicious
Activity Report:
For example, the disclosure of a SAR could result in notification to
persons involved in the transaction that is being reported and
compromise any investigations being conducted in connection with
the SAR. In addition, the OCC believes that even the occasional
disclosure of a SAR could chill the willingness of a national bank to
file SARs and to provide the degree of detail and completeness in
describing suspicious activity in SARs that will be of use to law
enforcement. If banks believe that a SAR can be used for purposes
unrelated to the law enforcement and regulatory purposes of the
BSA, the disclosure of such information could adversely affect the
timely, appropriate, and candid reporting of suspicious transactions.
Banks also may be reluctant to report suspicious transactions, or
may delay making such reports, for fear that the disclosure of a
SAR will interfere with the bank's relationship with its customer.
Further, a SAR may provide insight into how a bank uncovers
potential criminal conduct that can be used by others to circumvent
detection. The disclosure of a SAR also could compromise
personally identifiable information or commercially sensitive
information or damage the reputation of individuals or companies
No. 68531-7-1/7
that may be named. Finally, the disclosure of a SAR for uses
unrelated to the law enforcement and regulatory purposes for which
SARs are intended increases the risk that bank employees or
others who are involved in the preparation or filing of a SAR could
become targets for retaliation by persons whose criminal conduct
has been reported.
Confidentiality of Suspicious Activity Reports, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,576, 75,578 (Dec.
3, 2010). As one court has stated, permitting the release of a Suspicious Activity
Report through civil discovery jeopardizes the law enforcement interests the act
was intended to promote. "Release of an SAR could compromise an ongoing
law enforcement investigation, tip off a criminal wishing to evade detection, or
reveal the methods by which banks are able to detect suspicious activity.
Furthermore, banks may be reluctant to prepare an SAR if it believes that its
cooperation may cause its customers to retaliate. Moreover, the disclosure of an
SAR may harm the privacy interests of innocent people whose names may be
contained therein." Cotton v. PrivateBank & Trust Co.. 235 F. Supp. 2d 809, 815
(N.D. III. 2002).
Conscious of the policy concerns that justify the privilege, courts have
refused to limit its coverage to documents that explicitly refer to Suspicious
Activity Reports. The comptroller has specifically recognized Cotton, Whitnev.
and Union Bank as cases that carry out the policy of the law—"namely, the
creation of an environment that encourages a national bank to report suspicious
activity without fear of reprisal." Confidentiality of Suspicious Activity Reports, 75
Fed. Reg. at 75,579 & n.23.
In Cotton, questions arose about how a bank handled securities that were
supposed to be held in trust to fund periodic payments under a structured
No. 68531-7-1/8
settlement agreement. The securities were liquidated, and the funds were
diverted out of the trust. The bank became a defendant in a lawsuit in federal
court. Discovery requests were made to the bank for documentation of any
internal investigations of the account, including a request for all Suspicious
Activity Reports filed by the bank and for all documents relating "any inquiry or
investigation or review" conducted by the bank concerning accounts of the
parties involved. Cotton. 235 F. Supp. 2d at 811.
Like here, the bank resisted discovery based on the Bank Secrecy Act,
and the issue came before the court on a motion to compel. The court denied
the motion, noting first that Suspicious Activity Reports are absolutely privileged.
Cotton. 235 F. Supp. 2d at 814-15. The court next observed that under the
regulations, a bank is required to maintain files of Suspicious Activity Reports and
"any supporting documentation" for five years. Cotton. 235 F. Supp. 2d at 815,
quoting 12 C.F.R. § 103(18)(d). The court divided "supporting documentation"
into two categories. In the first category are factual documents which give rise to
suspicious activity. These items include "transactional and account documents
such as wire transfers, statements, checks, and deposit slips." Union Bank. 130
Cal. App. 4th at 391, citing Cotton. 235 F. Supp. 2d at 814. These documents
are to be produced in discovery "because they are business records made in the
ordinary course of business." Cotton. 235 F. Supp. 2d at 815. In the second
category are documents that are not to be produced in discovery "because they
would disclose whether a SAR has been prepared or filed." Cotton. 235 F. Supp.
2d at 815. This second category includes drafts of Suspicious Activity Reports or
8
No. 68531-7-1/9
"other work product or privileged communications that relate to the SAR itself."
Cotton, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 815. The documents at issue in Cotton were in the
second category and therefore were held not discoverable.
In Whitnev, law enforcement officials suspected the plaintiffs were
involved in illegal lending activities. The plaintiffs sued Whitney National Bank for
defamation on the theory that the bank had falsely accused them of illegal activity
in its communications to the government. They made a discovery request for
communications between the bank and government agencies relating to their
activities. The bank resisted, and the issue came before the court on the bank's
motion for a protective order. The plaintiffs acknowledged that they were not
entitled to receive copies of Suspicious Activity Reports or any information that
would reveal the existence of such a report, but they argued that other
communications between the bank and enforcement agencies were outside the
scope of the privilege. The court rejected the argument and granted the bank's
motion, finding that "the line defendants seek to draw is not one the cases
recognize." Whitney. 306 F. Supp. 2d at 682. The court held that the privilege
protects "a broader range of communications from production." Whitnev, 306 F.
Supp. 2d at 682. Communications to government agencies or officials about
suspected violations of the law are protected even if they do not culminate in the
filing of a Suspicious Activity Report:
The Whitney Bank Parties are protected from the production of
communications they made to governmental agencies or officials
reporting possible or suspected violations of laws or regulations by
the defendants, or pertaining to such reports. Such communications
may consist of a SAR itself; communications pertaining to a SAR or
its contents; communications preceding the filing of a SAR and
No. 68531-7-1/10
preparatory or preliminary to it; communications that follow the filing
of a SAR and are explanations or follow-up discussions; or oral
communications or suspected or possible violations that did not
culminate in the filing of a SAR. The Whitney Bank Parties must
produce documents produced in the ordinary course of business
pertaining to the defendants' banking activities, transactions, and
accounts, but may not produce documents or information that could
reveal whether a SAR or other report of suspected or possible
violations has been prepared or filed or what it might contain, or the
discussions leading up to or following the preparation or filing of a
SAR or other form of report of suspected or possible violations.
Whitnev. 306 F. Supp. 2d at 682-83.
In Union Bank, the plaintiffs were investors who alleged they were
defrauded in a Ponzi scheme. They sued the bank that opened and operated the
trust accounts that were allegedly looted, making claims similar to the Nortons'.
The plaintiffs first attempted, unsuccessfully, to obtain any Suspicious Activity
Reports the bank had filed with the government. In the course of discovery, the
plaintiffs discovered that the bank had its own internal procedures to identify,
register, and describe what might constitute suspicious activity. In particular, the
bank had its own "Form 00244" for internal communications about suspicious
activity. Union Bank, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 386. The plaintiffs made a discovery
request for every Form 244 related to the accounts at issue. The bank resisted,
and the issue came before the trial court on the plaintiffs' motion to compel. The
trial court granted the motion, reasoning that a routine bank form used by the
bank for internal purposes would not necessarily reveal that a Suspicious Activity
Report had been prepared or filed.
The California Court of Appeals granted discretionary review and directed
the trial court to vacate its order. Looking at the substance of Form 244, the
10
No. 68531-7-1/11
court concluded that it was part of the process the bank used to comply with the
comptroller's regulations that require reporting suspicious activity. Union Bank,
130 Cal. App. 4th at 394-95. "Unlike transactional documents, which are
evidence of suspicious conduct, draft SAR's and other internal memoranda or
forms that are part of the process of filing SAR's are created to report suspicious
conduct." Union Bank, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 391. "A bank's internal procedures
may include the development and use of preliminary reports subject to various
quality control checks before the bank prepares the final SAR that will be filed.
Revealing these preliminary reports, the equivalent of draft SAR's, would disclose
whether a SAR had been prepared." Union Bank. 130 Cal. App. 4th at 392.
The Union Bank court was mindful of the general rule that "evidentiary
privileges should be narrowly construed because they prevent otherwise
admissible and relevant evidence from coming to light." Accordingly, the court
observed that a bank "may not cloak its internal reports and memoranda with a
veil of confidentiality simply by claiming they concern suspicious activity or
concern a transaction that resulted in the filing of a SAR." Union Bank, 130 Cal.
App. 4th at 392. The Nortons cite this language as authority for their argument
that the privilege does not cover internal investigations and monitoring. What
they overlook is that the Union Bank court proceeded to hold that the privilege
does cover the bank's internal reports of its investigations of suspicious activity,
even if the internal reports are not communicated to federal authorities. Union
Bank, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 392.
11
No. 68531-7-1/12
The comptroller states that the Bank Secrecy Act privilege reaches "to
material prepared by the national bank as part of its process to detect and report
suspicious activity." Confidentiality of Suspicious Activity Reports, 75 Fed. Reg.
at 75,579. The cases discussed above support the comptroller's interpretation.
The privilege is not limited to documents that contain an explicit reference to a
Suspicious Activity Report. It covers documents related to a bank's internal
inquiry or review of accounts at issue (see Cotton, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 811),
communications between a bank and law enforcement agencies relating to
transactions conducted by the person suspected of criminal activity (see
Whitney. 306 F. Supp. 2d at 682-83), and internal forms used in a bank's process
for detecting suspicious activity that must be reported (see Union Bank. 130 Cal.
App. 4th at 395).
Against this background, the Nortons seek disclosure of documents
relating to internal monitoring and investigations conducted by the bank to detect
fraud and money laundering. They have requested the names of bank
employees who were in charge of or involved in any internal investigation into the
transactions involving Nino de Guzman and his company. They want the bank to
divulge the details of the system of alerts it uses to track its customers' banking
activities. They contend that conflict with the regulations under the Bank Secrecy
Act can be avoided by redacting from the documents any explicit reference to a
Suspicious Activity Report.
The Bank Secrecy Act privilege cannot be enforced merely by redacting
explicit references to the existence of a Suspicious Activity Report. Requiring
12
No. 68531-7-1/13
U.S. Bank to disclose information about internal investigations or monitoring of
the Nino de Guzman accounts in particular, or internal methods of tracking
unusual patterns in banking activity in general, would reveal the existence of a
Suspicious Activity Report and would undermine public policy. Just as disclosure
of a Suspicious Activity Report "may provide insight into how a bank uncovers
potential criminal conduct that can be used by others to circumvent detection,"
Confidentiality of Suspicious Activity Reports, 75 Fed. Register 75576-01, at
75578 (Dec. 3, 2010), so too will disclosure of what kinds of transactions trigger
internal "red flag" alerts. Revealing the names of bank personnel involved in
internal investigations potentially makes them targets for retaliation by persons
whose criminal conduct has been reported.
The banks are required by statute to establish internal policies,
procedures, and controls to detect and report money laundering. 31 U.S.C. §
5318(h); Union Bank, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 392. Any internal system a bank has
established for detecting and investigating money laundering will, however it is
labeled, be intertwined with the bank's obligation to report suspicious activity to
the government. Discovery into these matters will produce documents
suggesting that a Suspicious Activity Report has been or might be under
consideration or has already been filed. In Whitnev, the court barred discovery of
"discussions leading up to or following the preparation or filing of a SAR or other
form of report of suspected or possible violations." Whitney, 306 F. Supp. 2d at
683. Similarly here, and for the same reasons, we hold that U.S. Bank may not
13
No. 68531-7-1/14
be ordered to describe or disclose its internal investigations, either generally or
those specifically related to this case.
As discussed above, Cotton held that factual documents that support the
filing of a Suspicious Activity Report are discoverable "because they are business
records made in the ordinary course of business." Cotton. 235 F. Supp. 2d at
815. The Nortons argue a bank's reporting of suspicious activity should be
discoverable to the extent it is done in the ordinary course of business. This is
an unpersuasive attempt to escape the line drawn in Cotton. Internal reports and
methods used to investigate suspicious activity are precisely the type of
documentation Cotton indicated was within the second, undiscoverable type of
supporting documentation.
The Nortons suggest that at a minimum, U.S. Bank should be required to
submit documents concerning internal investigations for in camera inspection by
a judge who would then determine whether the documents are privileged. But
there is no reason to believe that the bank is withholding discoverable
documents. The bank has produced ordinary business records, including wire
transfers, statements, checks, and deposit slips. The bank has produced
account opening statements displaying the names of the employees who were
involved in opening the accounts. The bank has also produced some sections of
its operating procedures manuals and employee training materials. The only
type of information the bank has refused to produce that the Nortons claim is
outside the privilege is information about the bank's internal investigations and
monitoring of suspicious activity. Under the Bank Secrecy Act, that information is
14
No. 68531-7-1/15
privileged. We conclude the Nortons have not articulated a basis for requiring in
camera review.
U.S. Bank moved to strike the Nortons' brief of respondent under RAP
10.7 because it includes various extraneous, irrelevant, and unauthenticated
materials from the internet and from unrelated trial court proceedings that are
outside of the record under review. We have not considered the materials that
the Nortons improperly included in their brief, and we therefore need not address
the motion to strike. The bank's motion for attorney fees and sanctions under
RAP 10.7 is denied.
Reversed and remanded for entry of a protective order as requested by
the bank.
^W-J^?/?;
WE CONCUR:
^ J^g^
15