State Of Washington v. James Edward Huden ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 69227-5-1
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JAMES EDWARD HUDEN,
Appellant. FILED: February 3, 2014
Appelwick, J. — Huden was convicted of first degree murder and given an
exceptional sentence based on his victim's particular vulnerability. Huden appeals his
sentence, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the aggravating factor.
He also appeals his conviction, arguing that the trial court abused its disci^tio^ig
m m—,
allowing the jury access to a video of his police interrogation during deliberations l ^
that the prosecutor committed misconduct. We affirm. §£ r^>':
oc r-o ^
FACTS Ji 3i5
On December 27, 2003, Russel Douglas was found dead in a car on Whidbey
Island. Douglas had a gunshot wound to the head, apparently a homicide. The police
investigation ultimately led to James Huden, due in part to information from Huden's
close friend, William Hill. The State charged Huden with first degree murder.
At trial, Hill testified that Huden said he and a woman named Peggy Thomas
killed a man. Huden told Hill that they chose Douglas as a victim, because Huden
thought Douglas was abusive to his family. Huden's stepfather abused him, and Huden
wanted to kill someone that fit that modus operandi. Under the ruse of giving Douglas a
gift for his wife, Thomas lured Douglas to a dead end road in a sparsely populated area
No. 69227-5-1/2
of Whidbey Island. Huden was waiting there. When Douglas arrived, Huden
approached the car and shot Douglas in the forehead.
The State argued that Douglas was particularly vulnerable to the crime of first
degree murder, because he was still buckled into his car when Huden approached him
and because he had an unsuspecting mindset. The jury found Huden guilty as charged,
including the aggravating factor of particular vulnerability. Huden appeals.
DISCUSSION
Huden challenges his exceptional sentence, arguing that there was insufficient
evidence to support the aggravating factor of particular vulnerability. He also argues
that the statute establishing the aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague. In
addition, Huden appeals his conviction, alleging that the trial court abused its discretion
in permitting the jury access to a video of his interrogation. He further asserts that the
prosecutor committed multiple instances of misconduct.
I. Particularly Vulnerable Victim Aggravating Factor
Huden argues that the trial court improperly imposed an exceptional sentence,
because there was insufficient evidence to establish particular vulnerability. We review
the fact finder's reasons for imposing an exceptional sentence under a clearly
erroneous standard. State v. Law, 154 Wash. 2d 85, 93, 110 P.3d 717 (2005). Under this
standard, we reverse the findings only if substantial evidence does not support them.
State v. Bluehorse, 159 Wash. App. 410, 423, 248 P.3d 537 (2011). "Substantial
evidence" is sufficient evidence to "'persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the
declared premises.'" \_± at 423-24 (quoting State v. Jeannotte, 133 Wash. 2d 847, 856,
947 P.2d 1192 (1997)).
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The jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a factual basis for an
aggravated sentence. RCW 9.94A.537(6); State v. Suleiman, 158 Wash. 2d 280, 292, 143
P.3d 795 (2006). RCW 9.94A.535(3)(b) permits a sentence above the standard range
where the victim was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance and the
defendant knew or should have known that fact. For a victim's vulnerability to justify an
exceptional sentence, the State must also show that the vulnerability or inability to resist
was a substantial factor in the commission of the crime. Suleiman, 158 Wn.2d at 291-
92.
The evidence at trial demonstrated that Douglas was shot while seated in his car.
The angle of the wound indicated that the shot came from the driver's side. The door
was closed, but the window was down several inches. The range of fire was between
several inches and a couple of feet. Douglas was in the driver's seat, slumped over
with his hands on his thighs. The keys were still in the ignition, the car was in reverse,
and the emergency brake was up to his right. His seatbelt was across his body with the
buckle unhooked. Based on the blood spatter, however, Douglas was shot with his
seatbelt still attached.
The evidence further showed that Huden and Thomas lured Douglas to the
location under false pretenses. Thomas had told Douglas that she had a gift for his wife
and asked him to meet her. When Douglas left that day, he told his wife that he was
going to run errands. When Douglas arrived at the meeting spot, Huden shot him.
The evidence also demonstrated that Huden attacked Douglas in a relatively
remote location. Wahl Road is a dead end road outside of Langley city limits and does
not get much traffic. The area has multiple residents, but is sparsely populated overall.
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Douglas's car was parked in an opening in the vegetation off Wahl Road that was
visible to neighboring homes and passersby.
In closing, the prosecutor argued that Douglas was more vulnerable than a
typical victim of first degree murder:
He is in two ways. Obvious way: He is seat belted in his car. He's
got bucket seats. He's got a center console. Shift lever. Parking brake's
up. His legs are under the steering wheel. ...
And [Douglas] was particularly vulnerable in another way. . . .
. . . [Hje's unsuspecting. And he has no reason to think twice when
the man coming up to his car approaches the car. He has no reason to
flinch, to duck, to start the motor, to take the brake off, to unbuckle the
seatbelt because he's been duped into thinking that this is just the average
thing that a husband might do on the day after Christmas. [He was b]oth
vulnerable and incapable of resistance...
In addition to Douglas's seatbelt and unsuspecting mindset, the State's briefing argued
that his remote location contributed to his particular vulnerability
Huden does not allege that the jury was not properly instructed on the law in this
case. Rather, he contests the jury's factual finding by special verdict that particular
vulnerability existed.1 He argues that Douglas was not particularly vulnerable to a
sudden gunshot to the head. This is so, he contends, because the suddenness of such
an attack would prevent any victim from resisting. He relies on State v. Jackmon. 55
Wash. App. 562, 569, 778 P.2d 1079 (1989), and State v. Serrano. 95 Wash. App. 700, 712,
1 At trial, the jury was instructed to consider whether "[Huden] knew or should
have known that [Douglas] was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance." The
instructions elaborated that a victim is particularly vulnerable if "he or she is more
vulnerable to the commission of the crime than the typical victim of murder in the first
degree. The victim's vulnerability must also be a substantial factor in the commission of
the crime."
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715, 977 P.2d 47 (1999), both of which reversed a finding of particular vulnerability in
cases involving victims shot from behind with a firearm.
In Jackmon, the victim was shot in the back of the neck while seated at table in
his office. 55 Wn. App. at 564-65, 567. The trial court made a finding of particular
vulnerability based in part on the fact that the victim was disabled by a cast on his ankle,
jd. at 565. The Court of Appeals reversed, noting that there was no indication the
victim's disability rendered him more vulnerable to the assault that an able-bodied
person would have been, jd. at 567. No evidence established that the defendant knew
about the leg injury or that the cast was visible to the defendant prior to committing the
crime. Id. Further, it was highly unlikely an able-bodied person would have been able
to escape, jd.
In Serrano, the victim, an orchard worker, was above the ground in an orchard
ape2 when he was shot multiple times in the back. 95 Wn. App. at 710-11. The trial
court found that the victim could not run or protect himself and that he was particularly
vulnerable, jd. at 711. The court of appeals reversed, jd at 712, 715. It reasoned that,
though the victim may have been vulnerable because he was above the ground in an
orchard ape, the record did not suggest this was a substantial factor in the shooting, jd.
Neither case stands for the proposition that an exceptional sentence based on
victim vulnerability is necessarily unavailable when the victim is attacked with a firearm.
Rather, in each case, one of the key components necessary to uphold the exceptional
sentence was not supported in the record below.
2 An orchard ape is a caged platform on a hydraulic lift powered by a tractor.
Serrano, 95 Wn. App. at 711.
No. 69227-5-1/6
Here, the victim was an able-bodied man like the victim in Serrano. But, the
finding of particular vulnerability or inability to resist is not limited to the physical
characteristics of the victim. State v. Ross, 71 Wash. App. 556, 565, 861 P.2d 473, 883
P.2d 329 (1993). We recognized particular vulnerability when the defendant knew the
victim was alone and stranded. State v. Altum, 47 Wash. App. 495, 503, 735 P.2d 1356(1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Parker, 132 Wash. 2d 182, 937 P.2d 575(1997). Similarly, we recognized particular vulnerability where the defendant picked his
victims based on the fact that they worked alone in offices open to the public. Ross, 71
Wn. App. at 565. And, we recognized that attacking women alone in their homes while
they slept left them less able to resist and more vulnerable than a person awake. State
v. Hicks, 61 Wash. App. 923, 931, 812 P.2d 893 (1991).
The record here supports a finding that Huden knew or should have known that
Douglas was particularly vulnerable or unable to resist the attack. Like the victims in
Altum, Ross, and Hicks, Douglas had been isolated by Huden. Douglas was asked to
meet at a fairly remote location that required he come in a vehicle. He was alone when
he was attacked. Like the victims in Hicks and Serrano, Douglas was unable to resist
the attack. He had set the parking brake and turned off the vehicle. He was belted into
his vehicle, with little ability to move between the door, wheel, and console. He was
approached and shot before he could exit the vehicle.3
3 The State also relied on the argument that Douglas was unsuspecting.
However, the victim was unsuspecting in virtually every published case that involved
this exceptional sentencing option. See, e.g., Serrano, 95 Wn. App. at 711 (victim shot
from behind); Ross, 71 Wn. App. at 564 (defendant gained entry using ruse); Hicks, 61
Wn. App. at 931 (victim asleep); Jackmon, 55 Wn. App. at 567 (victim shot in back of
neck); Altum, 47 Wn. App. at 497 (victim grabbed from behind). If that factor alone was
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And, like Hicks—but unlike Jackmon and Serrano—the record here supports a
finding that Douglas's particular vulnerability or inability to resist were substantial factors
in the commission of the crime, based on the way Huden set up the meeting and crime.
Taken together, these circumstances provide sufficient evidence to support the jury's
finding of particular vulnerability.4
We hold that the particularly vulnerable victim aggravator properly supports
imposition of the exceptional sentence.
II. Vagueness of Aggravating Factor Statute
Huden also challenges the constitutionality of RCW 9.94A.535(3)(b), which
establishes the "particularly vulnerable" aggravating factor. He argues that the statute is
unconstitutionally vague.
However, in State v. Baldwin, the Washington Supreme Court held that
sentencing guidelines are not subject to due process vagueness analysis. 150 Wash. 2d
448, 461, 78 P.3d 1005 (2003). This is because sentencing guidelines do not define
conduct or allow for arbitrary arrest and prosecution. Id. at 459.
Huden maintains that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Blakelv v.
Washington nullifies the Baldwin rationale. 542 U.S. 296, 303-04, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159
L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). In Blakelv. the Court ruled that a judge may not impose a
sentencing enhancement without either findings by the jury or a stipulation by the
defendant. See id.
enough, one would have expected it to have been discussed in Jackmon and Serrano,
since it would have resulted in affirmance rather than reversal.
4 Because there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of particular
vulnerability, the trial court had substantial and compelling reasons to support Huden's
exceptional sentence. See RCW 9.94A.535.
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Huden argues that this established a due process right that encompasses
vagueness challenges to sentencing enhancements. He focuses on the Blakelv Court's
treatment of aggravating factors as equivalent to elements of a crime. But, Blakelv did
not destroy any distinction between aggravating factors and elements. In State v.
Powell, a post-Blakelv decision, a majority of the Washington Supreme Court concluded
that aggravated sentencing factors are the functional equivalent of essential elements
that must be charged in an information. 167 Wash. 2d 672, 690, 223 P.3d 493 (2009),
(Stephens, J. concurring), overruled by State v. Siers, 174 Wash. 2d 269, 274 P.3d 358(2012). But, the court subsequently overruled that decision:
[W]e are of the view that the decision a majority of this court reached in
Powell on the issue of whether aggravating factors must be charged in the
information is incorrect. . . . We, therefore, overrule this court's decision on
that issue and adopt the position advanced by the lead opinion in Powell
to the effect that, so long as a defendant receives constitutionally
adequate notice of the essential elements of a charge, "the absence of an
allegation of aggravating circumstances in the information [does] not
violate [the defendant's] rights under article I, section 22 of the
Washington Constitution, the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, or due process."
Siers, 174 Wn.2d at 276 (alterations in original) (quoting Powell, 167 Wn.2d at 687).
Blakelv focused on the right to a jury trial. See 542 U.S. at 301-02. This is
distinct from the vagueness doctrine, which exists to provide notice to the public and
protect it from arbitrary state intrusion. Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d at 458. The rule in Baldwin
still stands.
Huden may not bring a vagueness challenge to the aggravating factor statute.
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No. 69227-5-1/9
III. Jury Access to Interrogation Video During Deliberations
Huden argues that the trial court improperly permitted the jury unlimited access
to a video of his interrogation. At trial, the prosecution introduced the video as an
exhibit and played it for the jury during trial. The court provided the jury with a video
player to watch it again during deliberations.
The trial court has discretion to allow the jury to take video tape recorded exhibits
to the jury room. State v. Castellanos, 132 Wash. 2d 94, 100, 935 P.2d 1353 (1997). In
Castellanos, the trial court provided the jury a playback machine during deliberations so
it could review video tape recordings of drug transactions, jd. at 96-97. The appellate
court affirmed this exercise of discretion, finding that the jury's unlimited access to the
recordings alone did not prove that the jury gave the exhibit undue prominence, jd. at
102. The court also distinguished between testimonial and nontestimonial exhibits,
suggesting that the former raised problems of undue emphasis, while the latter should
be treated as any other exhibit. See id at 101-02.
Huden focuses on this distinction, arguing that the video of his police interview
was testimonial. He cites to State v. Elmore, a case in which the trial court permitted
the jury to review video tapes of the defendant's confession and police interview. See
139 Wash. 2d 250, 296, 985 P.2d 289 (1999). Huden relies on the dissent in that case to
assert that the video of his own interview was testimonial. But, the Elmore majority
expressly found the taped confession and interview to be nontestimonial. jd
The record here does not contain the video tape or a transcript of Huden's
interrogation. But, under Elmore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in providing
No. 69227-5-1/10
the jury unlimited access to a video tape of the defendant's police interrogation and
confession. Huden offers no evidence to distinguish the present case.
Based on the evidence presented, we do not find that the trial court abused its
discretion.
IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Huden alleges multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutorial
misconduct is grounds for reversal where the conduct is both improper and prejudicial.
State v. Monday, 171 Wash. 2d 667, 675, 257 P.3d 551 (2011). This court determines the
effect of a prosecutor's improper conduct in the context of the full trial, including the
evidence presented or addressed in argument, the issues in the case, and the jury
instructions. State v. McKenzie, 157 Wash. 2d 44, 52, 134 P.3d 221 (2006). Generally, a
prosecutor's comments are prejudicial only where there is a substantial likelihood that
they affected the jury's verdict. Monday, 171 Wn.2d at 675.
A. Comments On Huden's Demeanor
Huden first argues that the prosecutor improperly inferred that he was guilty by
commenting on Huden's demeanor. Prosecutors have wide latitude in closing argument
to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and express those inferences to the
jury. State v. Stenson. 132 Wash. 2d 668, 727, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). But, counsel must
refrain from expressing a personal opinion. State v. Rivers, 96 Wash. App. 672, 674-75,
981 P.2d16(1999).
Huden challenges the prosecutor's comments about his interaction with the
police. In closing, the prosecutor described Huden's reaction to the police showing up
at his Florida home, noting that Huden did not seem surprised, despite the fact that the
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No. 69227-5-1/11
detectives came all the way from Washington. The prosecutor also commented on
Huden's behavior during his interrogation, pointing out his "[v]ery flat affect." The
prosecutor further noted that Huden never expressly denied having killed Douglas.
None of these statements contained opinions—they were descriptions of the evidence
established at trial. At most, they were implications of inferences that counsel wished
for the jury to draw. This was not improper.
B. Comments On Huden's Credibility
Huden also argues that the prosecutor improperly commented on his credibility.
Specifically, he contests the prosecutor's statement about "some actual information that
[Huden] gave that was reliable here." He contends that this improperly insinuated that
he had lied to the police.
Prosecutors may not express their personal opinions of the defendant's
credibility. State v. Calvin, 176 Wash. App. 1, *18-*19, 302 P.3d 509, P.2d
(2013). But, there is no prejudicial error unless it is "'clear and unmistakable'" that
counsel is expressing a personal opinion, jd. at *19 (quoting State v. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d
136, 175, 892 P.2d 29 (1995)). In Calvin, the prosecutor said the defendant was "'just
trying to pull the wool over your eyes.'" Id The court found that this was an explanation
of the evidence, rather than a personal opinion. Id
Taken out of context, the prosecutor's statement here may seem like an
insinuation that Huden was an unreliable witness. But, the prosecutor's comment
directly preceded a list of evidence that corroborated Huden's statements during his
interrogation. The prosecutor did not assert that Huden had otherwise lied, thus
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No. 69227-5-1/12
juxtaposing the following reliable statements. See jd This was not a clear and
unmistakable opinion of the defendant's credibility.
C. Comments On Huden's Silence
Huden further asserts that the prosecutor improperly commented on his silence
during his police interview. In closing, the prosecutor reviewed statements that Huden
made during his interrogation, and then pointed out some details that Huden had not
mentioned. The prosecutor noted that the absence of these details was "[pjretty
significant."
The Fifth Amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on a defendant's
refusal to testify. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 12 L. Ed. 2d
106 (1965). But, this was not a comment on Huden's silence. In fact, the prosecutor
explicitly stated that Huden spoke to the police. The prosecutor was merely drawing
inferences from the contents of Huden's statement. This was not improper.
D. Vouching For State's Witnesses
Huden also challenges the prosecutor's comments about the State's witnesses.
It is improper for a prosecutor to vouch for the veracity of a witness. State v. Ish, 170
Wash. 2d 189, 196, 241 P.3d 389 (2010). But, counsel may comment on a witness's
veracity so long as it does not express a personal opinion and does not argue facts
beyond the record. State v. Smith, 104 Wash. 2d 497, 510-11, 707 P.2d 1306 (1985). In
State v. Warren, the court found that a prosecutor's actions were proper when he
argued that certain details had a "'ring of truth'" to them. 165 Wash. 2d 17, 30, 195 P.3d
940 (2008). The court found that the statement was an inference based on specific
details from trial, rather than the prosecutor's personal opinion. ]d
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No. 69227-5-1/13
Here, the prosecutor made multiple statements about the strength of the State's
witnesses' testimony. He said that their testimony combined was "so strong, so
overwhelming, in and of themselves they prove beyond a reasonable doubt." He also
called Hill's testimony "uncontroverted," "unassailable," and "unimpeachable," stating
that it had "[every] indicia of reliability." The prosecutor emphasized that Hill was
Huden's best friend, and that it was very difficult for Hill to come forward. As in Warren,
these comments were mere inferences from the evidence at trial. The prosecutor did
not state his own belief about witness credibility, but remarked on the strength of the
evidence presented at trial and the lack of reason to doubt it.
Huden also challenges the prosecutor's comments that two State witnesses were
"heroes" for testifying against Huden. During closing, the prosecutor said:
But this case is also about heros fsicl.
I submit to vou that Bill Hill is a hero. Bill was put in a position he
did not ask to be put in, he did not want to be put in, and it was very
difficult for him. He had to choose between loyalty to his best and closest
friend and doing the right thing and doing what his conscience told him to
do.
Now Keith Qgden, I submit, is also a hero in a similar situation. He
didn't have the closeness with Jim Huden that Bill Hill had; but
nevertheless, Keith found himself in possession of a gun that he had good
reason to believe . . . was used to kill a man. And Keith, too, had to
struggle with that a little bit. But he knew what he had to do because his
conscience told him what to do.
(Emphasis added.) The use of the word "hero" crossed into the realm of personal
opinion.
However, Huden did not object to these comments at trial. Where a defendant
fails to object to improper conduct, the error is considered waived unless the conduct
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No. 69227-5-1/14
was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that it creates an enduring prejudice that could not
have been neutralized by a curative instruction. State v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529, 568,
940 P.2d 546 (1997). In Brown, the prosecutor stated that the defendant's crime was
"'evil'" and "'screams out for the death sentence.'" ]d The court held that, though the
words were dramatic, the prosecutor's general statements were supported by the
evidence and his conduct did not warrant reversal. Id. at 568-69.
Conversely, in State v. Belgarde, the prosecutor told the jury that the defendant
was "'strong in'" the American Indian Movement, whom he described as "'a deadly
group of madmen'" and "'butchers, that killed indiscriminately Whites and their own.'"
110 Wash. 2d 504, 506-07, 755 P.2d 174 (1988) (emphasis omitted). The prosecutor also
called the group "militant" and analogized them to notorious political leaders. Id at 507.
The court found that those statements were so prejudicial that a curative instruction
would have been ineffective, jd 507-08.
Like the descriptions in both Brown and Belgarde, the word "hero" does have
emotional appeal. But, it does not rise to the inflammatory level of the statements in
Belgarde. And, as in Brown, the prosecutor used the word in context of a statement
supported by the evidence: here, the witnesses' difficult position of testifying as Huden's
friends. In the face of the strong evidence against Huden, it is unlikely that this brief
complimentary description of the State's witnesses prejudiced the outcome of his trial.
This error does not warrant reversal.
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No. 69227-5-1/15
E. Personal Opinion Of Huden's Guilt
Finally, Huden protests that the prosecutor improperly expressed his opinion of
Huden's guilt. It is improper for a prosecutor to state a personal belief about the guilt or
innocence of the accused. State v. Emery, 161 Wash. App. 172, 192, 253 P.3d 413(2011), affd, 174 Wash. 2d 741, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). But, the court will not find
prejudicial error unless it is clear that counsel is expressing a personal opinion rather
than an inference from the evidence. Id at 192-93. In Emery, the court declined to find
prejudicial error where the prosecutor said that "'the truth of the matter'" was that the
defendant was guilty. ]d at 192. The court noted that this statement came after
discussing the State's evidence, and was only an inference therefrom. Id at 193.
Here, while discussing the special verdict forms, the prosecutor told the jury that
it would consider aggravating circumstances "if you find Mr. Huden guilty -- And I
strongly argue that that is the case and the standard of evidence and proof has been
met." This statement, as in Emery, came after the prosecutor laid out the State's
evidence, and was merely an inference that he wished for the jury to draw. This did not
constitute error.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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