State Of Washington v. William Scott Gobat ( 2013 )

FILED
CQLJST OF APPEALS DiY I
STATE Or 7/ASM!HGT0r*
2013 APR 29 Aii 9= 07
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 67958-9-I
Respondent,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
WILLIAM SCOTT GOBAT,
FILED: April 29, 2013
Appellant.
Spearman, A.C.J. — William Gobat appeals his conviction for second degree
felony murder. Gobat, along with two others, assaulted a man who owed a $30 drug
debt and killed him. Gobat argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
Sometime in December 2010, Emily Clausen, a drug dealer, asked her friend
William Gobat to deliver cocaine to Donald Barker. Gobat met Barker, gave him the
drugs, and received an apparent roll of cash in exchange. When Clausen later
opened the roll, instead ofthe expected $30 payment, she found only a $1 bill rolled
around a receipt. Clausen was angry.
Some weeks later, on December 27, Gobat was at Clausen's house along with
Antonio Ruiz, Patrick Griffiths, and Griffith's girl friend, Cara Jean Ford. At about
5:00 p.m. Griffiths, Ruiz, and Gobat left Clausen's house together in Griffiths' car.
No. 67958-9-1/2
Following Clausen's instructions, they went to an elementary school near her house
to meet someone and collect money. When they arrived at the school, all three got
out of the car. They saw a person waving at them from across the school grounds
some distance away. It was Barker.
According to Griffiths, as the three walked toward Barker, they did not discuss
what they would do, but spread out as they approached as if to encircle him. When
they reached Barker, Gobat punched him in the face. Ruiz and Griffith joined in the
assault.
Barker broke away and ran toward the parking lot. Gobat and Griffths chased
him, but Gobat fell and Griffiths caught up to Barker first. Barker overpowered
Griffiths, pushed Griffiths to the ground and held him there to restrain him. When
Gobat and Ruiz reached them, they pulled Barker off Griffiths. Griffiths heard Gobat
say "[W]here's the money?" and saw that Barker was on all fours on the ground.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 284. Griffiths saw Barker's cell phone fall
to the ground, picked it up, and walked back to the car. Gobat and Ruiz also
returned to the car moments later and the three drove back to Clausen's house.
Shortly thereafter, a passerby heard Barker call for help and called 911.
Medics transported him to the hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Barker sustained blunt force trauma to the head which caused hemorrhaging in the
brain. He also sustained a stab wound on his lower back and one in the abdomen
which pierced his liver. Barker's death was caused either by the blunt force trauma
or by the stab wound that lacerated the liver.
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Meanwhile, when Gobat, Ruiz, and Griffiths arrived at Clausen's house, Ford
was doing laundry. They asked if they could put their clothes in with Ford's laundry.
She would not let them and so they washed their clothes in the shower. Ruiz gave
Ford a knife and asked her to hide it.
Ford and Clausen later cleaned the knife and Ford wrapped it in a bag.
Clausen took it later that night when she, Gobat, and Ford went to a casino. When
Ford returned to Clausen's house that night, Ruiz showed up and described how he
stabbed Barker. Ruiz told Ford the others did not know about the stabbing.
The State charged Gobat with second degree felony murder based on the
predicate crime of second degree assault. Griffiths and Ford testified at Gobat's
trial.1 Gobat also testified in his defense. Gobat said he did not know they were
meeting Barker at the school. Gobat said he recognized Barkerwhen he got close to
him and asked, "Do I know you?" Barker gave him an angry expression and hit him.
According to Gobat, he returned the punch, then lost his footing and fell. Gobat said
Barker ran away and Griffiths chased him. Worried that the commotion would cause
someone to call the police, Gobat said he pulled Griffiths off Barker and told him "[w]e
need to get out of here." RP at 471-72. Both Griffiths and Gobat denied knowing
that Ruiz was armed.
The juryfound Gobat guilty as charged. Gobat appeals.
1Griffiths pleaded guilty to first degree robbery.
3
No. 67958-9-1/4
ANALYSIS
Gobat challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict
finding him guilty of second degree murder. He argues that the evidence is
insufficient because the State failed to prove that he acted with knowledge that he
was facilitating a murder.
The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, any rational jury
could find the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Johnson, 159 Wn. App. 766, 774, 247 P.3d 11 (2011). All reasonable inferences
from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the jury's verdict and interpreted strongly
against the defendant. Johnson, 159 Wn. App. at 774. "'A claim of insufficiency
admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be
drawn'" from it. Johnson, 159 Wn. App. at 774 (quoting State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d
192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992)).
In applying this standard of review, circumstantial evidence is no less reliable
than direct evidence and "'specific criminal intent of the accused may be inferred from
the conduct where it is plainly indicated as a matter of logical probability.'" Johnson,
159 Wn. App. at 774 (quoting State v. Delmarter. 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99(1980)). The jury is the sole and exclusive judge of the evidence. Johnson, 159 Wn.
App. at 774. We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of
thejury. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). Becausethey
observed the witnesses testify first hand, we defer to the jury's resolution of
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conflicting testimony, evaluation of witness credibility, and decisions regarding the
persuasiveness and the appropriate weight to be given the evidence. See State v.
Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 415-16, 824 P.2d 533 (1992).
To convict Gobat of second degree felony murder, the State was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) committed or attempted to commit a
felony, (2) "and, in the course of and in furtherance of committing that felony, he or
another "participant" (3) caused Barker's death. RCW 9A.32.050(1 )(b). Because the
alleged predicate felony is second degree assault, the State also had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Gobat or an accomplice, intentionally assaulted
Barker and thereby recklessly inflicted substantial bodily harm. RCW
9A.36.021(1)(a). A person acts intentionally when he acts "with the objective or
purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime." RCW 9A.08.010(1)(a).
Here, in order to convict Gobat of second degree felony murder based on
accomplice liability, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that,
with knowledge that it would promote or facilitate the commission of the second
degree assault that resulted in Barker's death, Gobat (1) solicited, commanded,
encouraged, or requested another person to commit the crime; or (2) aided or agreed
to aid another person in planning or committing the crime. RCW 9A.08.020; State v.
McCreven, 170 Wn. App. 444, 477-78, 284 P.3d 793 (2012), review denied, 176
Wn.2d 2015, P.3d , (2013). Accomplice liability requires an overt act. State v.
Matthews, 28 Wn. App. 198, 203, 624 P.2d 720 (1981). Mere presence is insufficient
to prove complicity in a crime. State v. Roberts, 80 Wn. App. 342, 355-56, 908 P.2d
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892 (1996). To be an accomplice to felony murder based on a predicate felony of
second degree assault, the accused must have known generally that he was
facilitating a criminal assault but need not have known that the principal was going to
use deadly force or that the principal was armed. Sarausad v. State, 109Wn. App.
824, 836, 39 P.3d 308 (2001); State v. Rice. 102 Wn.2d 120, 125, 683 P.2d 199(1984).
Viewing the evidence in favor of the State as we are required to do, sufficient
evidence supports Gobat's felony murder conviction, as either a principal or an
accomplice. Based on Griffiths' testimony, the jury could infer that Gobat was a
principal. In fact, testimony indicated that Gobat instigated the assault by throwing
the first punch and demanding money from Barker. At the very least, the evidence
that Gobat hit Barker in the face was sufficient to show that he acted with knowledge
that his presence would promote or facilitate the assault on Barker.
Relying on State v. Cronin. 142 Wn.2d 568, 14 P.3d 752 (2000) and State v.
Roberts, 142Wn.2d471, 14 P.3d 713 (2000), Gobat argues that in order to support
his conviction for felony murder as an accomplice, the State was required to prove
that he, rather than Ruiz or Griffiths, caused Barker's death or that he acted with
knowledge that he was facilitating a homicide. Gobat's reliance on Cronin and
Roberts is misplaced.
The co-defendants in Roberts and Cronin were each convicted of both felony
murder and premeditated first degree murder. In each case, the accomplice liability
instruction provided to the jury was legally deficient because it permitted the jury to
No. 67958-9-1/7
convict the defendant based on knowing facilitation of some crime other than the
charged crime. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 510; Cronin, 142 Wn.2d at 576-77. In their
respective appeals, the defendants' premeditated first degree murder convictions
were reversed, but their felony murder convictions were affirmed. See Roberts, 142
Wn.2d at 478, 534; Cronin, 142 Wn.2d at 582, 586. The defendants' felony murder
convictions were unaffected by the erroneous instructions because "where the
undisputed evidence shows that all the participants acted as principals in committing
the predicate felony, an accomplice liability instruction is superfluous, for the felony
murder statute itself expressly establishes the complicity of both the killer and
nonkiller participant in the homicide, as principals." State v. Bolar, 118 Wn. App. 490,
503, 78 P.3d 1012 (2003).
In contrast to accomplice liability for premeditated murder, the knowledge
required to convict a defendant for felony murder is based solely on the mens rea for
the predicate offense. As the Court in Roberts observed:
Thus, the State is technically correct in its statement that "you would
not be able to obtain accomplice liability to certain murders because
certain murders happen too quickly for a person to actually know a
murder is going on-an accomplice to know a murder is going to
happen." This is relatively insignificant, however, because such
defendants may still be charged with felony murder in the first
degree based solely on the mens rea for the predicate offense.
Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 511 n. 14 (internal citations omitted).
The felony murder statutes contain built-in vicarious liability to provide a
mechanism by which liability for a homicide may be imputed to a coparticipant who
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does not actually commit the homicide.2 State v. Carter, 154 Wn.2d 71, 79, 109 P.3d
823 (2005). So when one participant in a predicate felony, alone, commits a
homicide during the commission of, or flight from, such felony, another participant in
the predicate felony has, by definition, committed felony murder. The State was not
required to prove that the blow to the head inflicted by Gobat killed Barker.
Moreover, "[i]n such cases, the State need not prove that the nonkiller participant was
an accomplice to the homicide." Cater, 154 Wn.2d at 79; Bolar, 118 Wn. App. at
500-06.
Accomplice liability is relevant here only to the extent that itties Gobat to the
predicate felony of second degree assault. And to prove Gobat's guilt based on the
theory of accomplice liability, the State was required to establish only that Gobat
knew he was facilitating an assault and that assault resulted in Barker's death.
Because the evidence supports Gobat's conviction for felony murder either as a
participant or an accomplice, we affirm.
WE CONCUR;,
XdW ts&^Y
2The first and second degree felony murder provisions are the same in this respect. RCW
9A.32.030(1)(c); RCW 9A.32.050(1)(b).
8