State Of Washington v. Christopher Payton ( 2013 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 69865-6-1
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
•& '^ ...
v.
CHRISTOPHER EUGENE PAYTON, UNPUBLISHED to
Appellant. FILED: April 22. 2013 CP
Cox, J. —Christopher Payton appeals the judgment and sentence,
following his convictions of first and second degree assault. He claims that the
trial court committed reversible error when it gave a 'first aggressofjury
instruction. Payton also requests that we strike the forfeiture of property
provision from his judgment and sentence, and that we reverse the trial courts
order dismissing, without prejudice, the charge of attempted murder and remand
for correction. In his Statement of Additional Grounds for Review, Payton makes
additional claims.
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
there was sufficient evidence to support an aggressor instruction in this case.
We decline to address the assignment of error regarding the forfeiture of property
provision because it is entirely speculative and not properly before this court.
The parties agree that the trial courts Order for Dismissal as to Count I
OnlyWithout Prejudice contained an error. Thus, we vacate that order and
remand for correction of the error.
No. 69865-6-1/2
Payton's Statement of Additional Grounds for Review has no merit.
We affirm Payton's first and second degree assault convictions.
In 2010, Christopher Payton and G.M. were in a romantic relationship and
lived together with G.M.'s adult son, K.Y. The three lived in G.M.'s house in
Tacoma, but K.Y. slept in the attached garage.
Early one morning in October 2010, K.Y. testified that he heard his mother
screaming while he was in the garage. He grabbed his stun gun and went
toward the screaming. When K.Y. entered the bedroom, he testified that he saw
his mother on a lower bunk bed and Payton standing over her with a hatchet
raised at shoulder level. He testified that he discharged the stun gun into
Payton's torso. Then, K.Y. felt Payton swinging a hatchet at his neck, back, and
head.
G.M. testified that before K.Y. entered the bedroom she and Payton were
arguing, and eventually Payton punched her.
Payton testified that he was verbally aggressive toward G.M., but he
claimed that he did not push or punch her, or threaten her with a hatchet. He
testified that G.M. screamed when he reached toward the bed and tried to pull off
a blanket to see if G.M. had anything in her hand. Then, he felt a pinching in his
side. As he fell to the ground, he testified that he grabbed a hatchet and started
defending himself. He claims that he did not know who was attacking him. He
testified that he swung the hatchet until the person fell down.
By amended information, the State charged Payton with three criminal
acts (in three separate counts): attempted first degree murder of K.Y. (count I),
No. 69865-6-1/3
first degree assault of K.Y. (count II), and second degree assault of G.M. (count
III). The State also alleged that Payton used a deadly weapon for all three
counts for purposes of deadly weapon enhancements. It also alleged that the
crimes were domestic violence incidents.
A jury acquitted Payton of attempted first degree murder and failed to
reach a verdict on the lesser included offense of attempted second degree
murder. But it found Payton guilty of counts II and III and the corresponding
enhancements.
For counts II and III, the court sentenced Payton to 183 months of
confinement. Upon the State's motion, the court ordered that count I be
dismissed without prejudice.
Payton appeals.
AGGRESSOR INSTRUCTION
Payton argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it gave
the State's proposed first aggressor jury instruction over defense counsel's
objection. We disagree.
At Payton's jury trial, the court gave the following aggressor instruction,
which was based on WPIC 16.04:
No person may, by any intentional act reasonably likely to
provoke a belligerent response, create a necessity for acting in self-
defense and thereupon use, offer or attempt to use force upon or
toward another person. Therefore, ifyou find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was the aggressor, and that defendant's
acts and conduct provoked or commenced the fight, then self-
defense is not available as a defense.111
1Clerk's Papers at 137; Report of Proceedings (Aug. 30, 2011) at 606-09.
No. 69865-6-1/4
A trial court's decision regarding a jury instruction is reviewed for
abuse ofdiscretion if it is based on a factual dispute.2 Atrial court's
decision based on a ruling oflaw is reviewed de novo.3 To determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to support giving an instruction, a
court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting
the instruction4
Payton argues that the aggressor instruction was improper in this case
because the evidence did not support the State's theory that he was the first
aggressor toward K.Y. Since this is a factual dispute, we review the facts to
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the instruction.
A jury instruction is appropriate ifthere is sufficient evidence to support the
theory on which the instruction is based.5 Generally, "the right ofself-defense
cannot be successfully invoked by an aggressor or one who provokes an
altercation."6
Although not favored, an aggressor instruction is proper if there is credible
evidence, even if disputed, "from which a jury can reasonably determine that the
2 State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 767, 771-72, 966 P.2d 883 (1998).
3id at 772.
4 State v. Fernandez-Medina. 141 Wn.2d 448, 455-56, 6 P.3d 1150(2000).
5 State v. Davis. 119 Wn.2d 657, 665, 835 P.2d 1039(1992).
6 State v. Rilev. 137 Wn.2d 904, 909, 976 P.2d 624 (1999).
No. 69865-6-1/5
defendant provoked the need to act in self-defense."7 The provoking act must be
intentional and related to the assault for which self-defense is claimed, but it
cannot be the actual assault.8
A defendant's intentional acts directed at a third party can justify an
aggressor instruction ifthe acts were reasonably "likely to provoke a belligerent
response from the actual victim."9
Here, the evidence showed that Payton's actions directed at G.M. were
reasonably likely to provoke a belligerent response from K.Y.
The State presented evidence that K.Y., who lived in the house with
Payton and G.M., heard G.M. screaming. He grabbed his stun gun and went to
the bedroom where he heard the screaming.
When he entered the bedroom, K.Y. testified that he saw his "mother
pretty much pinned on that mattress, the lower mattress, and [Payton] standing .
. . with the hatchet in his right hand, and [his mother] screaming and reaching for
her phone and purse."10
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, Payton's
actions against G.M. were reasonably likely to provoke a belligerent response
7kL
8 State v. Kidd, 57 Wn. App. 95, 100, 786 P.2d 847 (1990).
9ig\at98, 100 (citing State v. Wasson, 54 Wn. App. 156, 159-61,772
P.2d 1039 (1989)); see also Davis, 119 Wn.2d at 666 (explaining that there was
evidence that Davis pushed a woman and this was an intentional act that was
"likely to provoke a belligerent response" from the woman's friend who
intervened).
10
Report of Proceedings (Aug. 24, 2011) at 128.
No. 69865-6-1/6
from K.Y. who wanted to protect his mother. Payton knew that K.Y. lived in the
house and could be there to hear G.M. screaming. It is reasonably likely that a
son who heard his mother screaming and saw a hatchet drawn on her would
come to her aid.
The State also argues that the aggressor instruction was "proper because
there was evidence that [Payton] drew a weapon first."11 But we need not
address this argument because we hold that the aggressor instruction was
warranted on the basis we explained.
Payton argues that "the act alleged to be the 'first aggression' must be
directed at the same person against whom the self-defense claim is made."
Payton cites State v. Kidd to support his argument.13 But as discussed above,
this court in Kidd explained that a defendant's intentional acts toward a third party
can be a provoking act if it was reasonably "likely to provoke a belligerent
response from the actual victim."14 Thus, it does not matter that Payton's actions
were initially directed only at G.M., or that K.Y. was not in the room when Payton
first started assaulting G.M. The aggressor instruction was warranted because
11 Response Brief at 13 (citing State v. Winqate. 155 Wn.2d 817, 822, 122
P.3d 908 (2005)): see also Riley, 137 Wn.2d at 910 ("If there is credible evidence
that the defendant made the first move by drawing a weapon, the evidence
supports the giving of an aggressor instruction.").
12 Appellant's Opening Brief at 20.
13 Jd (citing Kidd, 57 Wn. App. at 100).
14
Kidd, 57 Wn. App. at 100.
No. 69865-6-1/7
there was other evidence that Payton's actions were reasonably likely to cause a
belligerent response in K.Y.
Payton also contends that there was absolutely no evidence here that his
assault was "intended to provoke a belligerent response from [K.Y.] so that [he]
could then assault [K.Y.] with impunity under a claim ofself defense."15 But the
issue is not whether Payton intended to provoke a belligerent response from
K.Y. The issue is whether Payton's intentional acts were "reasonably likely to
provoke a belligerent response."16
Finally, Payton cites State v. Wasson17 and State v. Brower18 to support
his argument that the aggression instruction was improper. In both of these
cases, the courts determined that an aggressor instruction was not warranted.19
But these cases are distinguishable.
In the first case, Wasson and his cousin, Billy Bartlett, were fighting
outside Bartlett's apartment.20 A visitor to the neighborhood, Thomas Reed,
15
Appellant's Opening Brief at 20-21.
16 See Davis, 119 Wn.2d at 666 (concluding that Davis pushing a man's
friend was "reasonably likely to provoke a belligerent response" from that man);
see also Kidd, 57 Wn. App. at 100 ("[The provoking act cannot] be an act
directed toward one other than the actual victim, unless the act was likely to
provoke a belligerent response from the actual victim.").
17 54 Wn. App. 156, 772 P.2d 1039(1989).
18 43 Wn. App. 893, 721 P.2d 12 (1986).
19 Wasson, 54 Wn. App. at 161: Brower, 43 Wn. App. at 902.
20 Wasson, 54 Wn. App. at 157.
No. 69865-6-1/8
came out to tell the men to quiet down.21 Bartlett and Reed began fighting, and,
after hitting Bartlett several times, Reed approached Wasson.22 Wasson then
shot Reed.23 Division Three of this court concluded that Wasson was not an
aggressor because the fight between Wasson and Bartlett was not related to
Reed's assault of Bartlett.24
But Division Three also noted that a defendant's intentional act directed to
a third party could justify an aggressor instruction if the act was "reasonably likely
to provoke a belligerent response" from the victim.25 This describes the situation
here, and it warranted an aggressor instruction.
In Brower, Division Three concluded that an aggressor instruction was not
warranted because there was no evidence that Brower engaged in any
provoking act toward Martin.26 But, here, there was evidence that Payton
engaged in a provoking act. Thus, this case is distinguishable from Brower.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there
was sufficient evidence to support an aggressor instruction in this case.
21 JdL
22 id
23 Id
24 ]d at 159.
25 ]d at 159-61 (citing State v. Thomas. 63 Wn.2d 59, 385 P.2d 532(1963)).
26 43 Wn. App. at 902.
8
No. 69865-6-1/9
FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY
Payton argues that the trial court erred when it required him to "[f]orfeit
any items in property" in his judgment and sentence.27 He did not object to this
condition below, but he contends that an illegal sentence may be reviewed for
the first time on appeal.28 He requests that we order the trial court to strike this
provision from his judgment and sentence.29 We decline to address this
assignment of error.
"'[A] court may refuse to return seized property no longer needed for
evidence only if (1) the defendant is not the rightful owner; (2) the property is
contraband; or (3) the property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to statute.'"30
"In Washington, CrR 2.3(e) governs motions for the return of illegally
seized property and also motions for the return of lawfully seized property no
longer needed for evidence."31
Here, Payton's judgment and sentence for counts II and III contained the
following provision:
27 Appellant's Opening Brief at 24.
28 Id at 25 (citing State v. Bahl. 164 Wn.2d 739, 745, 193 P.3d 678(2008)).
29 ]d at 24.
30 City of Walla Walla v. $401.333.44, 164 Wn. App. 236, 244, 262 P.3d
1239 (2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
City of Walla Walla v. $401.333.44. 150 Wn. App. 360, 367, 208 P.3d 574(2009)).
31
State v. Alawav. 64 Wn. App. 796, 798, 828 P.2d 591 (1992).
No. 69865-6-1/10
4.4 OTHER. Property may have been taken into custody in
conjunction with this case. Property may be returned to the rightful
owner. Any claim for return of such property must be made within
90 days. After 90 days, if you do not make a claim, property may
be disposed ofaccording to law.1321
The judgment and sentence also listed other conditions, which included, "[f]orfeit
any items in property."33
Payton does not provide a description of any property that was actually
seized or forfeited. He also does not demonstrate that he has made a motion to
the trial court regarding the return of any property. Thus, any issue arising from
this condition is entirely speculative and not properly before this court on appeal.
We decline to address this assignment of error.
DISMISSAL OF COUNT I
Payton argues that we should reverse the trial court's order dismissing
count I and remand with instructions to correct the order. We agree.
The State concedes that the order contained an error. The parties agree
that the order should have reflected that count I (attempted first degree murder)
was dismissed with prejudice because the jury acquitted Payton of this charge.
They also agree that count l-A (attempted second degree murder) should have
been dismissed without prejudice because the jury was unable to agree as to
this charge. The State asserts that itwill seek a clarified order in the trial court.
Based on this representation that the error will be corrected based on the
32 Clerk's Paper at 181.
33 Id.10
No. 69865-6-1/11
agreement of the parties, we vacate the Order for Dismissal as to Count I Only
Without Prejudice and remand for the order to be corrected.
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS
Payton raises a number of issues in his statement of additional grounds.
None are persuasive.
First, Payton requests that we exercise our discretion and request
additional briefing from his appointed counsel pursuant to RAP 10.10(f). After
reviewing Payton's additional grounds for review, we see no need to do so.
Second, Payton argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence
to prove the elements of first degree assault of K.Y. and second degree assault
of G.M.
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found that each
element of the crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.34 We draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in the State's favor and interpret the
evidence most strongly against the defendant.35 We assume "the truth ofthe
State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom."36
Under RCW 9A.36.011(1 )(a), "A person is guilty of assault in the first
degree if he or she, with intent to inflict great bodily harm: (a) Assaults another
34 State v. Drum. 168 Wn.2d 23, 34-35, 225 P.3d 237 (2010).
35 State v. Joy, 121 Wn.2d 333, 339, 851 P.2d 654 (1993).
36 State v. Salinas. 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
11
No. 69865-6-1/12
with a firearm or any deadly weapon or by any force or means likely to produce
great bodily harm or death
Payton contends that the State failed to present any evidence that shows
that he acted with intent to inflict great bodily harm. We disagree.
G.M. testified that K.Y. fell down with the first hit of the hatchet, but Payton
continued to swing the hatchet and repeatedly hit K.Y. "like a machine." Dr.
Michelle Strong testified that K.Y. suffered at least seven blows based on the
lacerations she observed. A rational trier of fact could have found from this
evidence that Payton acted with intent to inflict great bodily harm. Thus, this
argument is not persuasive.
For the second degree assault conviction, Payton argues that the State
failed to present evidence that Payton inflicted "substantial bodily harm" to G.M.
as defined under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a). But the State charged and instructed
the jury as to second degree assault under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c). Under RCW
9A.36.021(1)(c), "A person is guilty of assault in the second degree if he or she,
under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first degree: . . . (c) Assaults
another with a deadly weapon." Thus, the infliction of substantial bodily harm
was not an element of the crime charged, and this argument fails.
Third, Payton argues that his counsel was ineffective because his counsel
failed to make a motion to arrest the jury's guilty verdict for first and second
degree assault based on insufficient evidence. To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the
12
No. 69865-6-1/13
deficient performance prejudiced his trial.37 Here, Payton fails to show how he
was prejudiced by the absence of this motion, as his sufficiency of the evidence
argument is not persuasive. Failure on the prejudice prong defeats a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.38
Fourth, Payton contends that the trial court erred when it closed the court
without first applying the closure test articulated in State v. Boneclub.39 Payton
cites two pages in the report of proceedings.40 But these two pages do not show
that the court was closed to the public. Thus, this argument is not persuasive.
Finally, Payton argues that there was no evidence to support the
aggressor instruction. We need not address this argument again as it is
adequately addressed in his appellate counsel's brief41
37 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.
2d 674 (1984); State v. McFarland. 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251(1995).
38 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; State v. Foster. 140 Wn. App. 266, 273, 166
P.3d 726 (2007).
39 Appellant's Statement of Additional Grounds for Review at 8 (citing
State v. Boneclub. 76 Wn. App. 872, 888 P.2d 759, reversed by. 128 Wn.2d 254,
906 P.2d 325 (1995)).
40
Id (citing Report of Proceedings (Aug. 30, 2011) at 631-32).
41 See, e.g.. State v. Gomez. 152 Wn. App. 751, 754, 217 P.3d 391 (2009)
(refusing to review a defendant's statement of additional grounds because he
raised no new issues).
13
No. 69865-6-1/14
We vacate the trial court's order dismissing count I without prejudice and
remand for the order to be corrected. We affirm the judgment and sentence as to
counts II and III.
^bxcn
WE CONCUR:
\
14