State Of Washington, V. Randy S. Karn ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 82532-1-I
)
Respondent, ) DIVISION ONE
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
RANDY SCOTT KARN, )
)
Appellant. )
)
HAZELRIGG, J. — Randy Karn was found guilty of two counts of criminal
mistreatment in the first degree and four counts of criminal mistreatment in the
second degree following a jury trial. Karn argues that his convictions for criminal
mistreatment in the second degree in counts V, VI, and VII are unsupported by
sufficient evidence and that several of the aggravators found by the jury are
inherent within the elements of criminal mistreatment in the second degree, such
that the exceptional sentence he received was improper. We conclude that
sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to support the disputed counts and
we need not reach his second issue in light of an unchallenged aggravator which
independently supports the exceptional sentence. We affirm.
FACTS
Following a jury trial, Randy Karn was found guilty of two counts of criminal
mistreatment in the first degree as to Na.K. and T.K., along with four counts of
Citations and pinpoint citations are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
No. 82532-1-I/2
criminal mistreatment in the second degree as to Ro.K, J.K., Ru.K., and K.K. Each
of the named victims was a biological child of Karn and his wife, Mindie Karn.1 The
case arose from the general living conditions experienced by the Karns’ biological
children prior to intervention by the Department of Children, Youth and Families.2
At trial, A.K., Ro.K., T.K., Ni.K., and Na.K.3 all testified generally as to the
conditions in which Randy raised them. The testimony indicated a general lack of
sufficient and consistently available food in the household. However, the siblings
indicated that both Mindie and Karn often obtained food for themselves outside of
the home and had locked personal food storage in the house, while leaving the
children with strained access to adequate nutrition. They also indicated that
though they were supposed to be homeschooled, such education occurred briefly
and was sporadic in nature. Further, the testimony from the youths established
that the residence lacked in appropriate hygiene, leaving them to exist in a home
environment contaminated by insects, feces, and urine. There was testimony that
described the property as littered with hazardous materials such as rusty nails,
broken glass, and random boards. The siblings also discussed limited access to
toys and clean clothing, and the fact that they did not receive medical care from
professionals, despite later diagnoses of ailments that required treatment for
several of them.
1 Because they share the same last name, we refer to Mindie by her first name. No
disrespect is intended.
2 On July 1, 2018, the newly created Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF)
took over child welfare duties that were formerly the responsibility of the Department of Social and
Health Services (DSHS). RCW 43.216.906. Accordingly, in this opinion, “Department” means
DSHS before July 1, 2018, and DCYF on and after July 1, 2018.
3 Some of the siblings were adults at the time of the investigation and trial. However, out
of respect for the privacy interests of the minor children who were named victims in this case, we
refer to all of the Karn siblings by initials only, regardless of age.
-2-
No. 82532-1-I/3
Numerous community members testified as to their interactions with the
victims when they were allowed to begin attending a local church. These
witnesses remarked that the children often appeared unclean and hungry and
detailed attempts to provide the children with food when they visited the church.
Additionally, the neighbor who had lived across the street from the Karns, and
ultimately called authorities, testified as to her concerns about the living conditions
when she saw the children in their yard.
Foster parents and various Department employees involved in the case
recounted how the youths all arrived into their care with myriad, and quite drastic,
behavioral issues. Numerous witnesses described the children as being “feral”
and without much understanding of how to care for themselves or how things
operated outside of the home, and severely lacking in communication skills.
Various medical professionals, all of whom had examined or treated at least
one of the victims, testified to varying degrees about the health conditions they
treated, as well as how the conditions of the Karns’ lifestyle likely were a major
cause of the harm and risk in which the children were placed generally. Dr. Megan
Spohr, who evaluated N.K. and Ro.K., testified that the malnutrition they
experienced generally leads to poor immunity which tends to place children at a
higher risk for infection and potential death. Dr. Aimee Gerard-Morris, a pediatric
neuropsychologist, testified about the manner by which maltreatment and lack of
nutrients provide for potentially toxic stress and limit neurological development.
When specifically asked if inadequate brain development was purely a mental or
physical injury, or a combination thereof, she replied:
-3-
No. 82532-1-I/4
So there certainly can be effects of emotional changes secondary to
these effects of maltreatment, but there’s also physical changes that
may not be, you know, as identifiable as a bruise or, you know, some
kind of physical indicator of injury, but at a neuronal level and a
neurochemical level that, again, we can’t see with the naked eye,
you know, that would be considered an injury or an alteration to how
an individual’s brain was supposed to develop.
Dr. Cathleen Lang, a pediatrician with CARES (Child Abuse Responsive
and Evaluation Services) Northwest who interacted with T.K., J.K., Ru.K., Ro.K.,
K.K., and Na.K. at the emergency room when they were initially admitted, opined
as to the ways malnutrition places an individual at severe risk of potential death if
refeeding syndrome develops. Na.K. was diagnosed with refeeding syndrome
after removal from Karn’s home. Lang also explained that medical neglect was
what likely led to Na.K.’s severe health issues. She further indicated that a
reasonable caregiver would have noticed multiple warning signs that should have
signaled a need for medical care. Lang provided general testimony regarding how
the lack of medical care and conditions of a home such as the Karns’ would place
the siblings at risk of infections and why child wellness checks are necessary to
their general overall health. In all, over a dozen medical professionals testified at
trial as to the various children, their individual medical diagnoses or the living
conditions and child development generally.
The defense also called multiple witnesses, including family members.
Additionally, Karn and Mindie testified during the presentation of the defense case.
The description from these witnesses as to the environment of the Karns’ home
starkly contrasted the testimony presented by the State’s witnesses.
-4-
No. 82532-1-I/5
At the close of trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. The
jury further found by special verdict that the State had proven both alternative
prongs of criminal mistreatment in the second degree and that all of the
aggravating circumstances alleged by the State had been proven. The trial court
imposed an exceptional sentence of 247 months in prison. Karn now appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Karn argues that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for criminal mistreatment in the
second degree in counts V, VI, and VII. Count V was for the mistreatment of J.K.,
count VI as to Ru.K., and count VII based on the mistreatment of K.K. Karn does
not dispute that the evidence supports his convictions for the other remaining
counts. In light of the extensive evidence adduced at trial, we conclude that there
was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for the challenged counts.
In reviewing whether evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, “we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether
any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 576, 210 P.3d 1007(2009). “A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the
State’s evidence.” State v. Mines, 163 Wn.2d 387, 391, 179 P.3d 835 (2008). “In
determining whether the requisite quantum of proof exists, the reviewing court
need not be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but
-5-
No. 82532-1-I/6
only that substantial evidence supports the State’s case.” State v. Jones, 93 Wn.
App. 166, 176, 968 P.2d 888 (1998).
Counts V, VI, and VII were independent charges of criminal mistreatment in
the second degree for three separate victims. Criminal mistreatment in the second
degree is codified by RCW 9A.42.030(1). The statute provides the following:
(1) A parent of a child, the person entrusted with the physical custody
of a child or dependent person, a person who has assumed the
responsibility to provide to a dependent person the basic necessities
of life, or a person employed to provide to the child or dependent
person the basic necessities of life is guilty of criminal mistreatment
in the second degree if he or she with criminal negligence, as defined
in RCW 9A.08.010, either (a) creates an imminent and substantial
risk of death or great bodily harm by withholding any of the basic
necessities of life, or (b) causes substantial bodily harm by
withholding any of the basic necessities of life.
RCW 9A.42.030 (emphasis added).
RCW 9A.42.030 provides for two alternative means of proving criminal
mistreatment in the second degree. The State proceeded on both alternatives for
all of those charges at trial. Further, based on special verdict forms provided to
the jury as to each of the challenged counts, it is clear that the jury found both
means of criminal mistreatment in the second degree were established beyond a
reasonable doubt for counts IV through VII.4 Karn claims that “[b]ecause there is
no evidence that [J.K.], [Ru.K.,] or [K.K.] sustained substantial bodily harm or was
in imminent and substantial risk of great bodily harm or death, the State did not
meet its burden” with regard to counts V, VI and VII. However, Karn admits in
briefing that “the State presented evidence from which the jury could find he failed
to provide his children with basic necessities.” Karn’s argument is specific to the
4 Again, Karn does not challenge his conviction as to count IV.
-6-
No. 82532-1-I/7
second element of criminal mistreatment; that the State failed to establish that this
withholding, as it related to J.K., Ru.K., and K.K., created an imminent and
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm, or that he recklessly caused
substantial bodily harm to any of these three children. Karn’s claim wholly ignores
the totality of the evidence that the State presented at trial.
In reviewing the evidence presented by the State, there was extensive
testimony provided by a number of doctors, psychologists, and psychiatrists
regarding the risks associated with the conditions in which these children existed
due to Karn’s withholding of basic necessities. The children all testified similarly
regarding the lack of food, medical care, basic hygiene, and appropriately safe
living conditions. Further, it is telling that Karn does not challenge the numerous
other counts related to his other biological children, several of which resulted in
specific jury findings of injuries sustained by those children. This, in and of itself,
appears to logically provide that the conditions were such that J.K., Ru.K., and K.K.
were at substantial risk of sustaining great bodily harm had they continued to
reside in the home under those same conditions. See State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d
918, 938, 155 P.3d 125 (2007) (“Juries embody the ‘commonsense judgment of
the community’” (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530, 95 S. Ct. 692(1975))). Even assuming the jury did not utilize such logic, multiple medical
professionals opined on the various ways that the conditions testified to by the
children placed them at great risk and were the likely causes of the children’s
current health challenges.
-7-
No. 82532-1-I/8
We decline to weigh further the many specific ways that Karn’s withholding
of basic necessities, which he admits on appeal, placed these young children at
imminent and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. Sufficient evidence
was produced at trial to support Karn’s convictions under counts V, VI, and VII.5
II. Aggravating Factors
Karn next challenges the exceptional sentence that was imposed, arguing
that three of the five aggravating factors that were found by the jury and used by
the court as the basis for the exceptional sentence, are inherent within the
convictions for criminal mistreatment in the second degree. However, we decline
to specifically review each aggravator in light of the trial court’s determination at
sentencing and the fact that the domestic violence aggravator, which Karn does
not challenge, independently supports his exceptional sentence.
RCW 9.94A.535 states “[t]he court may impose a sentence outside the
standard range for an offense if it finds . . . that there are substantial and compelling
reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” Unless the defendant waives their
right to a jury or stipulates to aggravating factors, findings supporting an
exceptional sentence must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304–05, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); RCW
9.94A.525; RCW 9.94A.537. “Exceptional sentences are intended to impose
additional punishment where the particular offense at issue causes more damage
than that contemplated by the statute defining the offense.” State v. Davis, 182
5 Though Karn’s argument on appeal centers on whether various mental health conditions,
including post-traumatic stress disorder, qualify as substantial bodily harm under RCW 9A.42.030,
given the special verdict findings by the jury, we need not consider such argument.
-8-
No. 82532-1-I/9
Wn.2d 222, 229, 340 P.3d 820 (2014). RCW 9.94A.585(4), which directs the
manner by which this court reviews an exceptional sentence, states:
To reverse a sentence which is outside the standard sentence range,
the reviewing court must find: (a) Either that the reasons supplied by
the sentencing court are not supported by the record which was
before the judge or that those reasons do not justify a sentence
outside the standard sentence range for that offense; or (b) that the
sentence imposed was clearly excessive or clearly too lenient.
In Karn’s case, the sentencing court made clear in its findings of fact and
conclusions of law for the exceptional sentence that it “would impose the same
sentence if only one of the grounds listed in the preceding paragraph was valid.”
The specific findings that provided the required bases for the imposition of an
exceptional sentence included:
(a) The defendant’s conduct during the commission of the current
offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victims. RCW
9.94A.535(3)(a)
(b) The offense involved domestic violence, as defined in RCW
10.99.020, and the offenses were part of an ongoing pattern of
psychological or physical [abuse] of a victim or multiple victims
manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time
under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(i).
(c) The jury found that the defendant used his or her position of trust,
confidence, or fiduciary responsibility to facilitate the commission of
the current offenses. RCW 9.94A.535(3)(n).
(d) The jury found that the offenses involved a destructive and
foreseeable impact on persons other than the victims. RCW
9.94A.535(3)(r).
(e) As to count five, the jury found that the defendant knew or should
have known that the victim of the current offense was particularly
vulnerable or incapable of resistance. RCW 9.94A.535(3)(b).
Karn only challenges aggravators (a), (c), and (d). In light of the sentencing court’s
indication that it would impose the same exceptional sentence based on any one
-9-
No. 82532-1-I/10
of these factors alone and the fact that Karn does not dispute the validity of (b) as
a basis for the exceptional sentence, further consideration of this assignment of
error is unnecessary. See RCW 9.94A.585(4).
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
- 10 -