Washington Federation Of State Employees, App. v. University Of Wa., P.e.r.c., Res. ( 2013 )

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON,
No. 68376-4-1
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
WASHINGTON FEDERATION OF
STATE EMPLOYEES, PUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: June 24, 2013
Becker, J. —Washington law guarantees state employees the right "to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing." RCW
41.80.050. A state employer may not, therefore, impose upon employees its own
choice as to which labor union should represent them. Here, the University of
Washington insisted on moving a group of hospital employees to a bargaining
unit represented by a different union as a condition of reallocating them to a
position with a higher pay grade. The Public Employment Relations Commission
correctly decided that this was an unfair labor practice.
FACTS
For many years, the Washington Federation of State Employees has been
the labor representative for employees working for the University of Washington
No. 68376-4-1/2
at Harborview Medical Center. This appeal involves a group of about 35
Harborview employees who are classified as "specimen processing technicians."
In 2003, it came to the University's attention that these employees were doing
the same work as a group of employees at a different University facility who were
on a higher pay scale. These other employees, classified as "clinical laboratory
technicians," worked at the University of Washington Medical Center. The
University decided that the Harborview employees needed to be "reallocated" as
clinical laboratory technicians. Under state civil service rules, reallocation of a
position means the "assignment of a position to a different class." WAC 357-01-
270.
The University reallocated the Harborview employees and, at the same
time, transferred their work out of the Federation's Harborview bargaining unit.
Both of these actions were taken without notice to the Federation and without
providing an opportunity for bargaining.
The Federation filed a complaint with the Public Employment Relations
Commission. In 2006, the Commission found that the University had committed
an unfair labor practice by unilaterally skimming bargaining unit work out of the
Federation's bargaining unit without satisfying its bargaining obligations.1 The
Commission ordered the University to return the employees to their previous job
1Wash. Fed'n of State Emps. v. Univ. of Wash.. No. 17946-U-04-4627, 2005 WL
636216 (Wash. Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n March 2, 2005), affirmed, Wash. Fed'n of
State Emps. v. Univ. of Wash.. No. 17946-U-03-4627, 2006 WL 4595093 (Wash. Pub.
Emp't Relations Comm'n Sept. 5, 2006).
No. 68376-4-1/3
classification as specimen processing technicians and to return their work to the
Federation's Harborview bargaining unit. The University complied.
The problem then became how to maintain the employees at the higher
rate of pay. The Federation proposed that the University create a new job
classification of clinical laboratory technicians just for Harborview. By this
means, the employees could get paid at the higher rate while remaining in the
Federation's Harborview bargaining unit. The University did not accept the
Federation's proposal but did agree to freeze the employees at the higher level of
wages they had been receiving.
The wage freeze arrangement was not entirely satisfactory because it did
not achieve complete parity for the specimen processing technicians at
Harborview. Unlike their counterparts, they were not entitled to state-mandated
pay raises. The University once again decided it would be best to reallocate
them as clinical laboratory technicians and to move their work out of the
Federation bargaining unit. The University's approach now meant that the
employees would be transferred into a bargaining unit of the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) 925. In 2003, when the University first decided to
reallocate the Harborview technicians, the job class of clinical laboratory
technicians was unrepresented, but the Commission had recently certified SEIU
to represent a group of employees at the University Medical Center that included
the job class of clinical laboratory technicians.
The University contacted the Federation to discuss its plan for resolving
the status of the employees. The Federation again responded by proposing that
No. 68376-4-1/4
the employees be given their own job code as clinical laboratory technicians at
Harborview. That way, they would be on the same pay scale as their
counterparts at the University Medical Center, while their work would remain in
the bargaining unit represented by the Federation. The University expressed the
belief that it would be more efficient if all the clinical laboratory technicians were
in the SEIU bargaining unit. The Federation argued that it had a fundamental
right to retain these employees within the Harborview bargaining unit that
historically had represented them. The employees complained to both sides that
they were being "held hostage" by the dispute.
In April 2008, the Federation filed with the Commission the complaint that
gave rise to this appeal, alleging among other things that the University was
refusing to bargain in good faith about the status of the employees, as evidenced
by a pattern of insisting that they be transferred into SEIU. A three-day hearing
was held. In September 2010, a hearing examiner dismissed the complaint.2 As
the examiner perceived the dispute, the only issue involved was reallocation. He
found that the parties had engaged in "hard" bargaining on that issue by sticking
to their respective positions, but he concluded that there was no refusal by the
University to bargain in good faith. The authority he relied on was RCW
41.80.005(2): "The obligation to bargain does not compel either party to agree to
a proposal or to make a concession, except as otherwise provided in this
chapter."
2 Wash. Fed'n of State Emps. v. Univ. of Wash.. No. 21681-U-08-5529, 2010 WL
3726542 (Wash. Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n Sept. 17, 2010).
No. 68376-4-1/5
The Federation appealed to the Commission. In March 2011, the
Commission reversed the examiner's decision.3 The Commission left unaltered
the examiner's finding that the University had bargained in good faith about the
reallocation of the employees to a different job classification. The Commission
concluded, however, that the real issue raised by the complaint was not a refusal
to bargain about reallocation; it was the University's improper attempt to
reconfigure the bargaining unit. According to the Commission's decision, the
University's insistence on moving the employees into the SEIU unit amounted to
a refusal to bargain and an interference with the employees' collective bargaining
rights.
Regardless of the job classification assigned to a particular
employee, [the Federation] retains the right under Chapter 41.80
RCW to represent those employees that it was historically certified
to represent and also retains the right to preserve the employees'
historical work jurisdiction, including any newly assigned work.
Therefore, even when an employer assigns new duties to a
bargaining unit position and then reallocates that position to a new
classification, the position still remains in the historical bargaining
unit, and an employer may not unilaterally move employees to a
different bargaining unit, nor may it move them after negotiating to
impasse.[4]
The Commission found the University had committed an unfair labor practice and
ordered the University to cease and desist from attempting to bargain the
configuration of employee bargaining units.
The University sought judicial review in superior court. The Federation
intervened to defend the Commission's ruling. The superior court reversed the
3 Univ. of Wash, v. Wash. Fed'n of State Emps.. No. 21681-U-08-5529, 2011 WL
772225 (Wash. Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n March 1, 2011), hereafter "Decision."
4 Decision at *5.
No. 68376-4-1/6
Commission and ordered that the Federation's complaint be dismissed. The
Federation now appeals, seeking reinstatement of the Commission's decision.
In reviewing administrative action, this court sits in the same position as
the trial court, applying the standards of the Washington Administrative
Procedure Act, chapter 34.05 RCW, directly to the record before the agency.
Tapper v. Emp't Sec. Dep't. 122 Wn.2d 397, 402, 858 P.2d 494 (1993).
Reviewing courts may grant relief only if the party challenging the agency order
shows that the order is invalid for one of the reasons set forth in the act at RCW
34.05.570(3). Yakima Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. City of Yakima. 153 Wn. App.
541, 553, 222 P.3d 1217 (2009). In its petition for judicial review, the University
relied on those sections of the Administrative Procedure Act that permit a court to
grant relief from an agency order where:
(b) The order is outside the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the agency conferred by any provision of law;
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law;
(e) The order is not supported by evidence that is substantial
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court, which
includes the agency record for judicial review, supplemented by any
additional evidence received by the court under this chapter;
(h) The order is inconsistent with a rule of the agency unless
the agency explains the inconsistency by stating facts and reasons
to demonstrate a rational basis for inconsistency; or
(i) The order is arbitrary or capricious.
RCW 34.05.570(3).
Because the Commission is entitled to substitute its findings for those of
the hearing examiner, it is the Commission's findings that are relevant on appeal.
Yakima Police, 153 Wn. App. at 552. The Commission's findings of fact are
No. 68376-4-1/7
reviewed for substantial evidence; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
Yakima Police. 153 Wn. App. at 552. The Commission's interpretation of the
collective bargaining statutes "is entitled to substantial weight and great
deference" in view of its expertise in the area of collective bargaining. City of
Bellevue v. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters. Local 1604. 119 Wn.2d 373, 382, 831
P.2d 738 (1992).
Issue 1: Was the University attempting to bargain the configuration of
bargaining units? Answer: Yes.
The Commission adopted the examiner's findings of fact and conclusions
of law but added one more finding and one more conclusion that the University
challenged in its petition for review by the superior court. The Commission's
finding of fact 12 states that during the course of negotiations with the
Federation, the University "proposed and insisted" that once the employees were
reallocated to the new job classification, they would have to be transferred to a
bargaining unit of SEIU. The Commission's conclusion of law 6 states that the
University's firm position was an attempt "to bargain the configuration of the
bargaining units" represented by the two unions.
The University contends it did not propose, insist on, or attempt to bargain
the reconfiguration of the bargaining units. According to the University, its
discussions with the Federation about the status of the employees were based
on a good faith understanding that transferring them to the SEIU bargaining unit
was unavoidable, given the fact that SEIU had been certified as the
representative of a bargaining unit at the University Medical Center that included
the job class of clinical laboratory technicians.
7
No. 68376-4-1/8
The University does not contend that reconfiguration actually was
unavoidable. Nor could it so contend in the face of evidence presented by the
Federation that there are already numerous situations where University
employees in the same job classification are represented by different unions.
And even if the record established beyond doubt that the University had a good
faith understanding that transfer of the employees to SEIU was unavoidable, the
University's "understanding" was not relevant to making a finding about what the
University actually did.
Substantial evidence supports the finding that the University "proposed
and insisted" on moving the employees to SEIU. The University notified the
Federation on October 4, 2007, "of the contemplated reclassification" of the
specimen processing technicians to SEIU. The University adhered firmly to this
position over the following year, as reflected in communications in November
2007, April 2008, and June 2008. In July 2008, the University maintained its
position that the employees' work should be "reallocated" to SEIU and therefore
the University was unwilling to accept the Federation's offer.
From this record, it is logical to draw the conclusion that the University
was attempting to bargain a reconfiguration of the bargaining units. The
foreseeable effect of the proposal the University was insisting on would be to
remove work from the Federation's Harborview bargaining unit and add it to the
SEIU bargaining unit. We find no reason to overturn finding of fact 12 or
conclusion of law 6.
8
No. 68376-4-1/9
Issue 2: Was it an unfair labor practice for the University to insist that
employees be transferred out of their existing union? Answer: Yes.
State employees in Washington enjoy the right "to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining free from interference, restraint, or coercion." RCW 41.80.050.
Accordingly, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
RCW 41.80.110(1 )(a). It is also an unfair labor practice for an employer to
"refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of its employees." RCW
41.80.110(1 )(e). The Commission concluded that subsections (a) and (e) were
both violated by the University's attempt to bargain with the Federation about
which union should represent the employees. The University asks this court to
hold that its conduct did not amount to an unfair labor practice.
The University had no legal right to insist, in bargaining, that the
Federation agree to let the employees be moved to another union. The
configuration of collective bargaining units is a function delegated by the
legislature to the Commission. The Commission has the authority to certify
bargaining units, and this includes "determining the new units or modifications of
existing units." RCW 41.80.070(1). In delineating between units, the
Commission is required to consider the "duties, skills, and working conditions of
the employees; the history of collective bargaining; the extent of organization
among the employees; the desires ofthe employees; and the avoidance of
excessive fragmentation." RCW 41.80.070(1).
No. 68376-4-1/10
Where some change calls into question the proper boundaries of a
bargaining unit, the appropriate procedure is for the affected party or parties to
file a timely unit clarification petition with the Commission. RCW 41.56.060; Int'l
Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 1052 v. Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 29 Wn. App.
599, 601-02, 630 P.2d 470. review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1004 (1981). An entire
chapter of the Washington Administrative Code is devoted to the procedures for
unit clarification petitions. See chapter 391-35 WAC. The Commission will
consider a unit clarification petition only if it is based on a recent change of
circumstances. WAC 391-35-020(4)(a).5 The University did ask the Commission
three times to assign all clinical laboratory technicians to the SEIU bargaining
unit. But the University's first petition was not filed until 2008. The Commission
dismissed each petition as untimely. The Commission's orders dismissing the
University's unit clarification petitions as untimely have not been challenged on
appeal.
In the decision at issue in this appeal, the Commission explains that filing
a timely unit clarification petition would have been the appropriate method for the
University to use to resolve this dispute. "Unit determination questions are within
the authority of the Commission to decide, not matters for parties to agree on or
determine among themselves, and the Commission need not give any weight or
deference to agreements between parties."6 Thus, if the University believed that
reallocating the employees into a job classification that SEIU had been certified
5 Decision at *9 n.8.
6 Decision at *5.
10
No. 68376-4-1/11
to represent would automatically result in transferring them into the SEIU
bargaining unit, the University was mistaken. Their job classification "still
remains in the historical bargaining unit, and an employer may not unilaterally
move employees to a different bargaining unit, nor may it move them after
negotiating to impasse."7
In support of the conclusion that it was an unfair labor practice for the
University to attempt to bargain about the configuration of a bargaining unit, the
Commission cited Boise Cascade Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 860
F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In Boise Cascade, after the employer and union
arrived at a bargaining impasse, the employer unilaterally imposed a change in
how the employees' bargaining units would be configured. The court held this
action was a "fundamental" interference with the employees' bargaining rights:
The reasons why the law does not sanction a unilateral
change by the employer in the scope of the bargaining units are as
simple as they are fundamental. . . .
.. . [I]f an employer could vary unit descriptions at its
discretion, it would have the power to sever the link between a
recognizable group of employees and its union as the collective
bargaining representative of these employees. This, in turn, would
have the effect both of undermining a basic tenet of union
recognition in the collective bargaining context and of greatly
complicating coherence in the negotiation process.. ..
. . . [NJeither an employer nor a union has the unilateral
power to modify the scope of the bargaining unit as determined by
the [National Labor Relations] Board, whether following bargaining
to impasse or otherwise.
7 Decision at *5.
11
No. 68376-4-1/12
Boise Cascade. 860 F.2d at 475. The court explained further that "to allow a
party to insist upon a change in the scope of a bargaining unit would subvert the
authority of the [National Labor Relations] Board to make binding determinations
regarding the appropriateness of bargaining units." Boise Cascade, 860 F.2d at
475.
The University acknowledges that federal decisions construing the
National Labor Relations Act are persuasive in interpreting similar provisions of
Washington labor statutes. See Nucleonics Alliance. Local Union No. 1-369 v.
Wash. Pub. Power Supply Svs.. 101 Wn.2d 24, 677 P.2d 108 (1984). The
University argues, however, that the Commission misinterpreted and misapplied
Boise Cascade. The distinction the University relies on is that in Boise Cascade,
the employer unilaterally implemented the reconfiguration of the bargaining units,
while here the University stopped short of implementing its proposal.
The distinction between an attempt and a fait accompli is not meaningful
in these circumstances. The Commission did not say that the University
committed an unfair labor practice merely by raising the possibility of a
reconfiguration in its discussions with the Federation. What concerned the
Commission was that the University was unyielding in its position that
reallocation of the employees had to be accompanied by transferring their work
to SEIU. The purpose of reallocating the positions was to increase the pay of the
affected employees at Harborview. By joining reallocation to reconfiguration, the
University effectively made reconfiguration of the bargaining unit a condition of
higher pay. This conduct violated the fundamental principle embodied in Boise
12
No. 68376-4-1/13
Cascade: an employer may not force upon employees its own choice of who
should be their collective bargaining representative.
For more than a year of discussion about what to do with the Harborview
specimen processing technicians, the University steadfastly refused to consider
any solution that did not include moving them to SEIU. The Commission
correctly concluded that Boise Cascade supports the decision to find that the
University committed an unfair labor practice.
The University further contends that the Commission acted arbitrarily by
applying Boise Cascade in a manner that is irreconcilable with the Commission's
own decisions. The Commission retained the examiner's finding that the
University did not violate its obligation to bargain in good faith, and the University
sees that finding as inconsistent with the Commission's ultimate conclusion that
the University's conduct was a refusal to bargain. We disagree. The examiner's
finding pertained to the topic of reallocation. The Commission's finding pertained
to the topic of reconfiguring the bargaining units. The Commission could
reasonably conclude that the University had a right to take an unyielding position
on its proposal for reallocation and, at the same time, conclude that the
University's conduct amounted to a refusal to bargain when its proposal for
reallocation was conditioned upon reconfiguration.
The University also contends the Commission arbitrarily departed from its
own reasoning in the first unfair labor practice decision in this matter in 2006.
That decision was based on the Federation's complaint that the University had
reallocated the employees and moved them out of the Federation's bargaining
13
No. 68376-4-1/14
unit without notifying the Federation. The Commission found in 2006 that it was
an unfair labor practice for the University to reallocate without giving the
Federation an opportunity to bargain about the effect the reallocation would have
on the employees. But the decision did not characterize the transfer of the
employees' work outside the Federation's bargaining unit as an effort to
reconfigure the bargaining unit. Why, the University asks, should the
Commission be allowed to raise the reconfiguration issue now when it was not
discussed in the previous decision?
The Commission, like this court, undoubtedly tries to avoid deciding issues
not presented. The University's failure to bargain before removing the work was
the only conduct the Federation complained of in its first petition. In the present
case, the University did bargain; but as the petition clearly alleged, the University
persistently refused to consider any resolution of the employees' status that did
not involve transferring them to SEIU. The University's unyielding demand that
the Federation accede to the transfer of the employees to SEIU is the reason
why the Commission found that the University was unlawfully attempting to
bargain configuration:
In this case, it is readily apparent from the record that the employer
continually insisted during bargaining that, once the employees
were reallocated into the [clinical laboratory technician]
classification, they would be transferred to SEIU's bargaining unit.
The employer made it perfectly clear. .. that the employer was
unwilling to accept any alternative proposed by [the Federation].[8]
Decision at *6.
14
No. 68376-4-1/15
The University's insistence, maintained over many months, provided a rational
basis for the Commission to conclude that the issue presented in this case was
different from the issue presented by the 2006 decision.
As explained by the Federation, the difference is between a "skimming"
case and a "scope" case. The Commission has observed in an unrelated case
that "Distinguishing between skimming and scope cases is not an easy task."9
Nevertheless, the distinction is important because an attempt to bargain the
scope of a bargaining unit is a direct assault upon the Commission's exclusive
statutory authority to determine the configuration of bargaining units. Boise
Cascade makes the same point where it explains that the "scope of the
bargaining unit" is determinative of what employees the unit represents, and
while the concept of scope can be difficult to define, "it is clear" that an employer
may not alter the composition of the bargaining unit under the guise of the
transfer of unit work. Boise Cascade, 860 F.2d at 474-75.
We conclude that the Commission acted in accordance with law,
consistently with its own rules, and not arbitrarily, in its decision that the
University committed an unfair labor practice by insisting that employees be
transferred out of their existing union.
9 Teamsters Local 763 v. Snohomish County, No. 19393-U-05-4924, 2007 WL
1959331, at*2 (Wash. Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n June 14, 2007).
15
No. 68376-4-1/16
Issue 3: Did the Commission unfairly decide the case on the basis of an issue
not specifically identified in the preliminary ruling? Answer: No.
Under the Commission's administrative scheme, a cause of action to be
heard by the Commission is framed by a preliminary ruling issued by a hearing
examiner. WAC 391-45-110. Here, the preliminary ruling identified two causes
of action: an interference with the employees' collective bargaining rights and a
refusal to bargain, "by failing or refusing to meet and negotiate with the exclusive
bargaining representative of its employees concerning wages for specimen
processing technicians." The preliminary ruling did not specifically mention that a
persistent attempt to bargain a reconfiguration of bargaining units was a violation
that would fit into these general categories. The University contends the
Commission injected the reconfiguration issue into the case sua sponte, and as a
result, the University was not prepared to confront the issue and did not have an
ample opportunity to be heard.
The record does not compel us to conclude that the University was
blindsided. A preliminary ruling is based on the filing of a detailed complaint.
WAC 391-45-050. The Federation's lengthy complaint alleged that the
University's conduct constituted a refusal to bargain because it became clear that
the University "never had any intention of bargaining anything but" the placement
of the employees into the SEIU bargaining unit. The Federation alleged that the
University's conduct was not only a refusal to bargain, it also "interfered with the
representational relationship" between the Federation and the employees.
These allegations sufficiently filled out the general categories identified in the
16
No. 68376-4-1/17
preliminary ruling so as to notify the University it would have to defend its
practice of insisting on the transfer of the employees to SEIU.
And if that was not enough notice, the Federation's appeal of the
examiner's decision specifically complained that the University had continually
insisted on a modification of the Federation's bargaining unit. The Federation
stated that it did not feel it could bargain the employees' most basic bargaining
rights, but the University continued to insist on it:
The University's position throughout all of this time has been to
insist in the exact same action for which they had been found guilty
of a ULP [unfair labor practice], modification of the WFSE
[Federation] bargaining unit. The employees' bargaining rights
have been neither something the WFSE felt it could bargain nor
something it was willing to bargain despite the University's
persistence.
The University's unbending wish to move the employees into a different union
was plainly at the heart of the Federation's complaint of refusal to bargain and
interference with employee rights.
Even now, the University does not claim to have evidence that it would
have put into the record if it had known the Commission was going to consider
enforcing the employees' right to remain in their historic bargaining unit. The
University should not have been surprised that the Commission, upon reading
the correspondence in which the University repeatedly insisted on reconfiguring
the bargaining units, would find it necessary to protect its exclusive authority from
the University's incursion.
17
No. 68376-4-1/18
We conclude the University had adequate notice of the issue the
Commission found dispositive, and the Commission did not deny the University
an opportunity to be heard.
The superior court's decision is reversed. The Commission's decision is
reinstated.
Bedte^ [ <
WE CONCUR: