Dale And Elisabeth Harkins, V Carrie Merrill ( 2013 )


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  •     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DALE R. HARKINS and ELISABETH
    H. HARKINS, a married couple,                   No. 69868-1-1
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    CARRIE L MERRILL, a single woman,                                                               :*" i
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    Respondent.                 FILED: April 29, 2013              CO           ic<;
    Grosse, J. —A court has discretion to extend the time constraints of a court rule
    to avoid unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences. Here, the trial court found that
    both the plaintiff and defendant prevailed. However, the plaintiff failed to file a motion
    for attorney fees within the 10 day timeframe specified in CR 54. But CR 54(d)(2)
    specifically provides that a court may enlarge the timeframe within which to bring certain
    motions on its own orders. We reverse and remand.
    FACTS
    In April 2004, Dale and Elisabeth Harkins (Harkins) sold property to Carrie Merrill
    under a real estate purchase and sale agreement (REPSA) that provided for attorney
    fees and costs arising from any disputes. An addendum to the REPSA expressly
    excluded certain items of personal property from the sale. Closing was accelerated to
    May 11, with possession on May 13. Dale Harkins, ill with lymphoma, failed to remove
    all of his personal items from the premises. Merrill arrived the evening of May 13. Upset
    that the barn had not been cleared, Merrill ordered Harkins and his helpers off the
    property and refused to permit them to return the following day to retrieve their
    remaining property. The following day, Merrill employed a junk hauler to remove all of
    No. 69868-1-1/2
    Harkins' property. Because the hauler was costly, Merrill permitted the hauler to take
    whatever he wished at no cost.
    Harkins sued Merrill to recover damages for property alleging multiple theories or
    recovery, including breach of contract, negligence, conversion of bailed property, and
    breach of non-gratuitous bailment. Harkins also sued to recover damages for personal
    injuries under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
    A bench trial was held over the course of two days in April and May 2011. At a
    hearing on June 2, 2011, the court issued its ruling finding that there was no contractual
    violation, because there was no express provision in the RESPA allowing Harkins to
    store the items past the date of closing. The court found that although Merrill's conduct
    was boorish, selfish, and mean, it did not reach the level of tortuous conduct. With
    regard to the claims for negligence, conversion of bailed property, and breach of non-
    gratuitous bailment, the trial court found Merrill liable for the property and awarded
    judgment in the amount of $5,200. At the same June 2 hearing, Merrill moved for
    attorney fees. The court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment
    reserving the issue of attorney fees.
    The court found that both parties were entitled to attorney fees, but that Harkins'
    motion was untimely and thus his request for fees was denied. Finding that Merrill
    prevailed on the personal injury claim and lost on the personal property claim, the court
    awarded her half of her attorney fees which equaled $8,452. Applying the $5,200
    judgment in favor of Harkins, Merrill recovered $3,252. Harkins timely appeals.1
    1 RAP 5.2(3) specifically provides that a notice of appeal may be filed within 30 days of
    entry of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.
    No. 69868-1-1/3
    ANALYSIS
    RCW 4.84.330 provides for an award of attorney fees where provided for in a
    contract. Paragraph 16 of the REPSA provides in pertinent part:
    If the Buyer, Seller . . . involved in this transaction is involved in any
    dispute relating to this transaction, any prevailing party shall recover
    reasonable attorney's fees and costs (including those for appeals) which
    relate to the dispute.
    The trial court found that both parties prevailed.    Harkins first contends that he, not
    Merrill, is the prevailing party because he was the only person who received an
    affirmative judgment.
    Whether a party is a "prevailing party" is a mixed question of law and fact that we
    review under an error of law standard.2 The question as to which party substantially
    prevailed is often subjective and difficult to assess.3 As a general rule, the prevailing
    party is one who receives an affirmative judgment in its favor.4 Aparty need not prevail
    on all issues to be considered a prevailing party.5 But if neither party wholly prevails,
    the determination of who is the substantially prevailing party depends on the extent of
    the relief afforded.6 In Marassi v. Lau, we concluded that where multiple and distinct
    claims were at issue, the trial court should take a "proportionality approach."7 But if both
    2 Eagle Point Condo. Owners. Ass'n v. Coy. 
    102 Wn. App. 697
    , 706, 
    9 P.3d 898
     (2000).
    3 Marassi v. Lau. 
    71 Wn. App. 912
    , 917, 
    859 P.2d 605
     (1993), overruled on other
    grounds by Wachovia SBA Lending. Inc. v. Kraft. 
    165 Wn.2d 481
    , 490-92, 
    200 P.3d 683
    (2009).
    4 Riss v. Angel. 
    131 Wn.2d 612
    , 633, 
    934 P.2d 669
     (1997) (Under RCW 4.84.330 "the
    determination of who is a prevailing party depends upon who is the substantially
    prevailing party, and this question depends upon the extent of the relief afforded the
    parties.").
    *Kvsar v. Lambert. 
    76 Wn. App. 470
    , 493, 
    887 P.2d 431
     (1995).
    6 Transpac Dev.. Inc. v. Oh. 
    132 Wn. App. 212
    , 217-19, 
    130 P.3d 892
     (2006); Marine
    Enter.. Inc. v. Sec. Pac. Trading Corp.. 
    50 Wn. App. 768
    , 772, 
    750 P.2d 1290
     (1988).
    
    771 Wn. App. 912
    , 917, 
    859 P.2d 605
     (1993).
    No. 69868-1-1/4
    parties prevail on major issues, both parties bear their own costs and fees.8 The
    Marassi court stated:
    We hold that when the alleged contract breaches at issue consist of
    several distinct and severable claims, a proportionality approach is more
    appropriate. A proportionality approach awards the plaintiff attorney fees
    for the claims it prevails upon, and likewise awards fees to the defendant
    for the claims it has prevailed upon. The fee awards are then offset.t9]
    Here, the trial court found that both parties were entitled to recover attorney fees under
    an attorney fee clause in the REPSA. Ordinarily those fees would offset one another.
    Harkins filed a motion for extension of time within which to file his request for attorney
    fees. But that motion was filed 11 days after judgment was entered. The court found
    that Harkins' motion for fees was untimely and therefore he was not entitled to an award
    of fees.
    Harkins argues that the trial court erred when it determined that his request for
    additional time within which to file a motion for attorney fees was untimely. The court
    found that Harkins failed to file a motion for attorney fees within the 10 days prescribed
    by CR 54(d)(2) and also failed to file a motion for an extension of time within that 10
    days as permitted by CR 6(b). In holding the fee request untimely, the court stated:
    Further, on the attorney's fee claim, and despite the unfortunate
    result, the Court lacks the authority to disregard strict timelines
    under the Washington Rules of Court, in order to [a]ffect lenity.
    The trial court's basis for its reasoning is difficult to ascertain. In one part of the ruling, it
    appears the courtfound Harkins' reasons for delayed filing inadequate on the record:
    Plaintiff represents that, due to the age of the case and the difficulty of
    recovering billing records, the "neglect" was excusable, constituting good
    cause for non compliance with CR 6(b). Defendant points out that
    8 Phillips Bldg. Co.. Inc. v. An.. 
    81 Wn. App. 696
    , 702, 
    915 P.2d 1146
     (1996).
    9 Marassi. 
    71 Wn. App. at 917
    .
    No. 69868-1-1/5
    difficulty in accessing billing records may be a valid basis for extension,
    but does not explain the absence of a request for an extension within the
    10 days period.
    The court has some discretion in determining whether failure to comply
    with a deadline is excusable. I regretfully must say, however, that the
    record on these facts does not permit me to exercise discretion, in the
    form of ignoring the requirements of the rule.
    On the other hand, the court notes in its final ruling on the second motion for
    reconsideration the court makes the following observation:
    The ruling granting attorney's fees to Defendant is not a ruling I found
    pleasant. Under the procedural posture of this case, however, I felt I had
    no discretion.    The current motion for reconsideration is denied.   If I am
    wrong, I should be, and hope to be reversed.
    CR 54(d) provides that claims for attorney's fees must be filed no later than 10
    days after entry of judgment. Merrill relies on Corey v. Pierce County.10 to support her
    argument that the 10 day limit in CR 54(d) is mandatory. But the court there noted that,
    unlike here, Corey had not shown excusable neglect or reason for delay in making her
    request for fees.11 From the record before us, we cannot determine whether the trial
    court ever considered the reasons set forth by Harkins or whether they amounted to
    excusable neglect.
    Additionally CR 54(d)(2) provides the court with discretion to enlarge the 10 day
    time frame.    CR 54(d)(2) provides that the timeframe applies "[ujnless otherwise
    provided by . . . order of the court." CR 6(b) addresses the court's discretion to extend
    such deadlines and provides rules for which the court may not enlarge such deadlines.
    CR 54(d) is not one of those rules.
    10 
    154 Wn. App. 752
    , 
    225 P.3d 367
     (2010).
    11 Corey. 154 Wn. App. at 774.
    No. 69868-1-1/6
    Further, the 10 day limit under CR 54(d)(2) is "intended to prevent parties from
    raising trial-level attorney fee issues very late in the appellate process, sometimes after
    one or all appellate briefs have been submitted."12 Here, the court abused its discretion
    in not exercising that discretion. Harkins moved for an extension of time 11 days after
    the 10 day limit.
    We reverse and remand to the trial court to determine whether either party is
    entitled to fees as the substantially prevailing party or whether each party should bear
    their own fees and costs. If the trial court awards fees, the court should also determine
    reasonable attorney fees, if any, on appeal.13
    rv56 Wn. App. 301
    , 311, 
    783 P.2d 606
     (1989) ("[a] contractual
    provision for an award of attorney fees at trial supports an award of attorney fees on
    appeal").
    6