Erika Howe v. Mcdonald's, Inc. ( 2013 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
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ERIKA HOWE, an individual, No. 68315-2-1
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Appellant, DIVISION ONE
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MCDONALD'S, INC., a foreign UNPUBLISHED co ^A
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corporation; M. DAVID SANTILLAS, JR. CP
and JANE DOE SANTILLAS, a marital FILED: September 23. 2013
community; MAG 20, LLC, a
Washington limited liability company; D.
LARK, a Washington corporation; and
MCDONALD'S RESTAURANTS OF
WASHINGTON, INC., a Washington
corporation,
Respondents.
Cox, J. — When a trial court dismisses a lawsuit for violation of a
discovery order, it must explicitly consider on the record whether the violation
was willful, whether the opposing party was prejudiced by the conduct, and
whether a less severe sanction would suffice.1 Here, the trial court dismissed
Erika Howe's lawsuit without making any such findings. We reverse and remand.
On April 15, 2011, Attorney David Smith commenced this personal injury
suit on behalf of Erika Howe against McDonald's Inc. and various other
defendants. The trial court set the discovery cutoff for August 13, 2012 and the
Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 131 Wn.2d 484, 494, 933 P.2d 1036(1997).
No. 68315-2-1/2
trial date for October 1, 2012. McDonald's Restaurants of Washington, Inc.
(hereinafter "McDonald's") filed an answer on August 4, 2011.
On October 13, 2011, McDonald's moved to compel Howe to respond to
interrogatories, requests for production, and a request for a statement of
damages, all of which were due originally in September 2011. Counsel for
McDonald's acknowledged learning that Smith had been ill but reported that he
had heard nothing from or about Smith since August 2011. On October 27, 2011,
the trial court ordered Howe to provide full and complete answers to the
requested discovery within 40 days, that is, by December 5, 2011.
McDonald's filed a "Motion to Show Cause and to Dismiss Case for Lack
of Prosecution" on December 13, 2011, noting the motion for hearing without oral
argument on December 21. Citing CR 37(b) and KCLR 4(g), McDonald's argued
that the trial court should dismiss the case because Howe's failure to comply with
the court's order "essentially paralyzes this litigation and [McDonald's] ability to
defend."
On December 20, Smith sent an e-mail to the bailiff requesting an
emergency phone conference in order to seek an extension of time to provide the
discovery responses. On December 22, Smith sent an e-mail with completed
discovery responses to counsel for McDonald's.
On December 23, 2011, the trial court granted "the Defendant's Motion to
Show Cause," and ordered that Howe's complaint be "dismissed with prejudice
within 5 days of this Order." The order lacks any findings regarding willfulness,
No. 68315-2-1/3
prejudice, lesser sanctions, or the discovery responses provided by Howe on
December 22.
Attorney Kurt Bulmer appeared as co-counsel with Smith for Howe on
January 3, 2012. Bulmer also filed Howe's "reply" to, and motion to reconsider,
the order to show cause and dismiss. Bulmer and Smith provided supporting
declarations explaining that Smith had been seriously ill and received treatment
at the Mayo Clinic in the fall of 2011. Smith had been unable to work and made
arrangements for another attorney to take over Howe's case in August 2011.
When Smith returned in mid-October 2011, he was unable to locate Howe and
learned that his intended replacement had not appeared in the case. In
December, Smith was finally able to reach Howe and prepare discovery
responses for delivery on December 22.
In her motion, Howe argued that dismissal was an unnecessarily harsh
remedy, that violation of the discovery order was not willful or deliberate, and that
McDonald's was not substantially prejudiced by the delay, given the fact that the
discovery was ultimately provided and crucial case schedule deadlines, including
the discovery cutoff, were still months away. With her motion for reconsideration,
Howe filed a proposed order granting reconsideration and vacating the order
dismissing the case based on the lack of evidence of willful misconduct,
substantial prejudice, or the need for such a harsh sanction in light of the fact that
discovery had been delivered. The trial court denied reconsideration by
modifying Howe's proposed order, striking out Howe's language regarding the
No. 68315-2-1/4
lack of evidence of willfulness, prejudice, and sufficiency of a lesser sanction and
writing in "DENIED."
Howe appeals.
SANCTIONS
Howe argues the trial court erred by dismissing the case as a sanction for
violation of a discovery order without making explicit findings on the record
supporting its decision. We agree.
Under CR 37(d), the trial court has broad discretion to impose sanctions
for a party's failure to participate in discovery, including dismissal of the action.2
Likewise, KCLR 4(g) provides that failure to comply with the case schedule may
be grounds for sanctions, including dismissal or terms.3 However, "[t]he sanction
of dismissal for failure to comply with discovery orders is the most severe
sanction which a court may apply, and its use must be tempered by the careful
exercise of judicial discretion to assure that its imposition is merited."4 Dismissal
is only justified where a party has acted in willful and deliberate disregard of court
orders and the efficient administration of justice, and the opponent's ability to
prepare for trial has been substantially prejudiced.5 Furthermore, a trial court
must consider on the record whether a lesser sanction would suffice and whether
willfulness and prejudice were present.6
2See CR 37(b)(2)(C); Burnet. 131 Wn.2d at 494.
3 KCLR 4(g)(1) ("Failure to comply with the Case Schedule may be
grounds for imposition of sanctions, including dismissal, or terms.").
4Anderson v. Mohundro, 24 Wn. App. 569, 575, 604 P.2d 181 (1979).
5ld
6 Rivers v. Washington State Conference of Mason Contractors, 145
Wn.2d 674, 696, 41 P.3d 1175 (2002); Burnet. 131 Wn.2d at 494.
No. 68315-2-1/5
We review a trial court's order dismissing an action for non-compliance
with discovery rules and orders for an abuse of discretion.7 Atrial court abuses
its discretion when it resorts to the harsh remedy of dismissal or default without
first making the explicit record that is required for appellate review.8 Nor can an
appellate court properly compensate for the lack of explicit trial court findings by
independently reviewing the record to determine whether the trial court's ruling
was reasonable in all the circumstances.9 Here, the trial court made no findings
whatsoever with respect to whether Howe's failure to comply with the order
compelling discovery responses was willful, whether McDonald's was
substantially prejudiced by the failure to comply, and whether any lesser sanction
than summarily dismissing Howe's complaint would suffice under the
circumstances of the case and in light of the purposes of the discovery order and
the length of time to trial. The trial court also made no findings regarding the
discovery responses Howe provided to McDonald's on December 22, the day
before its decision dismissing the case. Reversal is required.10
McDonald's argues that the trial court's order denying reconsideration
demonstrates sufficient consideration of the necessary factors. McDonald's
contends that the trial court "explicitly rejected" Howe's factual claims and
arguments by striking out language in her proposed order. We disagree.
The trial court abused its discretion here by dismissing the complaint
without first explicitly considering the necessary factors on the record. "Before
7 Id, at 684-85.
8]± at 696-98.
9id, at 698-99.
10 Id. at 700.
No. 68315-2-1/6
reaching" a conclusion that the harsh sanction of dismissal is the only
appropriate remedy, the trial court is required to consider willfulness, prejudice,
and lesser sanctions on the record.11 The December 23 order dismissing the
case does not refer to these factors and includes no findings. We do not view
the subsequent order denying reconsideration by striking out language on a
proposed order as adequate to demonstrate "careful exercise of judicial
discretion" or compliant with case law requiring explicit findings on the record
before imposition of "the most severe sanction which a court may apply."12
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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WE CONCUR:
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11 Id, at 698-99 (emphasis added).
12 Anderson, 24 Wn. App. at 575.