Pilchuck Contractors, Inc., V David D. Berka ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
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PILCHUCK CONTRACTORS, INC.,
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No. 71062-1-1
Appellant,
DIVISION ONE 2> ~o f-n
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v.
DAVID D. BERKA and DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES OF THE UNPUBLISHED OPINION °^ =='
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
FILED: July 14, 2014
Respondents.
Becker, J. — The superior court granted Respondent David Berka's
motion for judgment as a matter of law, affirming the reopening of his workers'
compensation claim for a knee injury he suffered while working for Appellant
Pilchuck Contractors, Inc. We affirm this ruling. On the record presented, a
reasonable jury could only conclude that the work Berka did for Pilchuck was a
cause of the worsening of Berka's knee condition and that the work he did later
for an Arizona employer was not an independent superseding cause.
Berka, 37 years old at the time of the hearing before the Board of
Industrial Insurance Appeals, has always worked for contractors doing
installation and maintenance of underground utilities. On May 2, 2007, Berka
was employed by Pilchuck. While climbing out of a trench, he slipped, fell, and
No. 71062-1-1/2
twisted his left knee. The injury tore the medial meniscus and required two
surgeries.
On May 3, 2007, Berka filed a claim with the Department of Labor and
Industries. On May 21, 2007, the Department issued an order allowing the claim.
Berka had surgeries in 2007 and 2008, but his knee continued to be sore and
swollen. His surgeon, Dr. Steven Yamamoto, advised him to find a different
position that would meet the restrictions provided by his activity report. The
restrictions were no kneeling, squatting, consecutive walking, or consecutive
standing.
On October 27, 2008, Dr. Richard Thorson examined Berka's knee and
concluded that the injury was at maximum medical improvement; there was no
curative treatment at that time that would make him better.
On November 14, 2008, the Department closed the claim with a
permanent partial disability award. With the medical restrictions in place, Berka
continued to work at Pilchuck as a walking foreman. This position was an
accommodation by Pilchuck in the sense that it involved more administrative
duties and less physical activity than was required of other foremen. Berka's
assignments were limited to level ground, and he was not expected to get into
ditches or trenches. Nevertheless, the job still involved considerable time
walking jobsites, and occasionally Berka would get into trenches to assist with
the actual completion of the work. Although Berka did the job on a daily basis,
he continued to complain that walking caused him pain. Berka testified that his
knee remained symptomatic and never fully healed. Brad Wauldron, who worked
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in Pilchuck's safety department and had many discussions with Berka about his
knee condition, testified that Berka approached him between November 2008
and January 2009 to ask about being put in a superintendent position, where he
would not have daily stress on his knee.
Berka was terminated by Pilchuck on January 27, 2009. According to
Jennifer Torvik, human resources manager for Pilchuck, Berka was terminated
for poor performance unrelated to his knee injury.
Berka immediately moved to Arizona, where he had a job lined up with
Northern Pipeline. Around this time, Berka contacted Wauldron to ask about the
process for reopening his industrial injury claim. He also contacted the
Department to get a list of physicians and clinics in Arizona who would treat
injured workers under a Washington claim.
When Berka arrived in Arizona in early February 2009, Northern Pipeline
wanted him to start work immediately. Berka asked to have his start date
delayed for a month. He testified that he hoped the knee would improve if he
rested it. He told Wauldron he did not want to let Northern Pipeline know he had
a knee injury because he was new to the job. Berka began the process of finding
a physician in Arizona, and he eventually decided to see physicians at the CORE
Institute in Goodyear, Arizona.
On March 2, 2009, Berka began working for Northern Pipeline. He was
hired as an equipment operator, not as a foreman, and his job operating a
backhoe did not involve walking jobsites. Operating the equipment required
climbing up and down and some use of foot pedals.
No. 71062-1-1/4
On April 7, 2009, Berka applied to the Department to reopen the claim for
the May 2007 injury due to aggravation of that injury.
On April 15, 2009, Berka had his first medical appointment at the CORE
Institute.
On June 4, 2009, Berka had an independent medical examination
performed at the Department's request by Dr. James Kopp, an actively practicing
orthopedic surgeon. The purpose of the examination was to determine whether
the claim should be reopened due to worsening of the left knee condition. Dr.
Kopp took a complete medical history and compared his findings with the
findings from the closing examination on October 27, 2008. He testified that the
knee condition had worsened as demonstrated by objective findings of increased
thigh atrophy, that the cause of the worsening was Berka's industrial injury in
May 2007, and that Berka was in need of further medical treatment.
On June 22, 2009, the Department reopened the original claim effective
April 15, 2009. Pilchuck filed a protest, and the Department agreed to reconsider
the reopening order.
On August 14, 2009, the Department issued an order in which it affirmed
its decision to reopen the claim.
On August 19, 2009, Berka was evaluated by Dr. Stacey Dale McClure,
an orthopedic surgeon at the CORE Institute. Berka's knee pain was continuing
to worsen throughout this time, and it caused him to miss about a week of work
at Northern Pipeline. Through a physical examination, Dr. McClure found that
Berka was limping and was sensitive to touch on his left knee. As a result of this
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exam, Dr. McClure scheduled a magnetic resonance imaging test (MRI). The
test showed a tear in the posterior horn of the medial meniscus, a very small
effusion, and some mild chondromalacia (damage to cartilage under the
kneecap).
On September 14, 2009, Pilchuck filed an appeal with the Board of
Industrial Insurance Appeals of the Department's decision to reopen the claim.
On January 8, 2010, Dr. McClure performed surgery on Berka's left knee.
On April 7, 2010, Dr. Lance Brigham, Pilchuck's consulting orthopedist,
completed a report containing his expert opinion based on a records review. Dr.
Brigham is an orthopedic surgeon. His practice consists of seeing patients one
day a week and doing insurance medical examinations the rest of the week. He
has not performed surgery since 2001.
The hearing of Pilchuck's appeal to the Board took place later in April
2010 before Industrial Appeals Judge Janice Grant. Live testimony was heard
from Berka, Wauldron, and Torvik. Perpetuation depositions of the three
doctors—Dr. Brigham, Dr. Kopp, Dr. McClure—were taken on April 14, May 10,
and May 14 respectively, and the transcripts were made part of the record.
On August 13, 2010, Industrial Appeals Judge David Crossland issued a
proposed decision and order affirming the Department's decision to reopen the
claim. The decision contained an extensive summary and analysis of the
testimony.
On October 5, 2010, the Board granted Pilchuck's petition for review.
No. 71062-1-1/6
On October 19, 2010, the Board issued its final decision. The Board
found the proposed decision correct with one minor change not relevant here.
The Board decided that between November 14, 2008 (the date the 2007 claim
was closed) and August 14, 2009 (the date the Department affirmed its decision
to reopen), "Berka's left knee condition, proximately caused by the May 2, 2007
industrial injury, had objectively worsened and was in need of further necessary
and proper medical treatment."
Pilchuck filed a petition for judicial review with the superior court.
Outlining for the court its position that the claim should not have been reopened,
Pilchuck stated, "we believe there's evidence that there was an intervening event
or a series of events, exposure, with the new employer, such that a new claim
should have been filed in Arizona."
On June 25, 2012, a jury was convened. The testimony before the Board
was read into the record for the jury. After both parties had presented all of their
evidence, Berka moved under CR 50(a) for a directed verdict or judgment as a
matter of law.
On June 27, 2012, the trial court granted Berka's motion:
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm going to do something I very
seldom do. I'm going to grant the plaintiff's motion here for a
directed verdict. I think reasonable triers of fact could only
conclude, based on the evidence in the record, that the prior
industrial injury of May 2, '07, was a cause of the problems Mr.
Berka had later.
It is possible that something happened. It's possible that he
wasn't candid and didn't report something, but it's always the case
that there are possibilities. There's no evidence of that.
The medical testimony, as I understand it, is that the
condition after the surgeries necessitated by the May 2, '07 injury
resulted in a weakened, for lack of a better term, leg. He's had, by
No. 71062-1-1/7
that time, four meniscectomies, at least. He's most likely going to
have continuing problems. The loading and the uneven gait is
certainly a major factor in the lateral meniscus problem he later
had, and, clearly, to me - - clearly - - the evidence is that all of
those are related to the injury of May 2, '07, probably also to the
prior injuries. It's a cumulative thing. And nothing that I hear
indicated he did much more than just kind of normal stuff after
those surgeries. He's working. Maybe he shouldn't work. He's got
a family to support.
On July 19, 2012, the superior court signed an order granting Berka's
motion for a directed verdict and dismissing Pilchuck's appeal. The court
determined that "no legally sufficient evidentiary basis exists for a reasonable jury
to conclude" that the Board's decision was incorrect.
Pilchuck timely appealed the superior court's decision.
Pilchuck first contends Berka was procedurally barred from bringing the
motion for a directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law because he did not
challenge the sufficiency of Pilchuck's evidence at the Board level. The
Department is aligned with Berka in opposition to Pilchuck's procedural
argument.
Pilchuck alternatively contends that the trial court erred in taking the case
away from the jury because the evidence, when considered in the light most
favorable to Pilchuck, established a prima facie case that Berka was not entitled
to reopen the May 2007 claim and receive further benefits. On this issue, the
Department sides with Pilchuck and joins Pilchuck's request that the matter be
remanded for trial.
No. 71062-1-1/8
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
CR 50(a) provides as follows:
(a) Judgment as a Matter of Law.
(1) Nature and Effect of Motion. If, during a trial by jury, a
party has been fully heard with respect to an issue and there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find or
have found for that party with respect to that issue, the court may
grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on
any claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim that
cannot under the controlling law be maintained without a favorable
finding on that issue. Such a motion shall specify the judgment
sought and the law and the facts on which the moving party is
entitled to the judgment. A motion for judgment as a matter of law
which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all
parties to the action have moved for judgment as a matter of law.
(2) When Made. A motion for judgment as a matter of law
may be made at any time before submission of the case to the jury.
Motions for directed verdict were renamed motions for judgment as a
matter of law effective September 17, 1993. Litho Color. Inc. v. Pac. Emp'rs Ins.
Co., 98 Wn. App. 286, 298 n.1, 991 P.2d 638 (1999). A motion under CR 50(a)
is to be made before the case is submitted to the jury.
Pilchuck argues that Berka waived his right to bring a CR 50(a) motion at
trial because he did not challenge the sufficiency of Pilchuck's evidence at the
Board. The simple answer to this argument is that a CR 50(a) motion was not
available to Berka at the Board level because there is no jury in Board hearings.
We recognize that Pilchuck's argument is not tied to the literal reference to
a jury in CR 50(a). Pilchuck is arguing that a party in an industrial injury case
who fails to bring any argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence at the
Board level should not be permitted to bring a sufficiency challenge in court.
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No. 71062-1-1/9
Pilchuck relies on the rule that issues not raised before the Board are generally
waived and cannot be raised on appeal to the superior court.
Upon appeals to the superior court only such issues of law
or fact may be raised as were properly included in the notice of
appeal to the board, or in the complete record of the proceedings
before the board. The hearing in the superior court shall be de
novo, but the court shall not receive evidence or testimony other
than, or in addition to, that offered before the board or included in
the record filed by the board in the superior court.
RCW 51.52.115; Wilbur v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 38 Wn. App. 553, 559, 686
P.2d 509 (1984). review denied. 103Wn.2d 1016(1985).
Rules requiring preservation of error are designed to ensure efficient use
of judicial resources. See RAP 2.5; State v. Robinson. 171 Wn.2d 292, 304-05,
253 P.3d 84 (2011). It would be inefficient to permit a party to insist on wasting
the superior court's time on a jury trial if there is not enough evidence to support
that party's claim. Under RCW 51.52.115, the hearing in superior court is de
novo on the evidence in the Board's record. Review of that evidence for
sufficiency is a normal and an expected part of the superior court's function in
industrial insurance cases just as in every other type of case governed by the
civil rules. We conclude Berka was entitled to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence for the first time in the superior court.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Pilchuck, supported by the Department, argues judgment as a matter of
law in favor of reopening the claim was inappropriate because (1) a jury could
find the 2007 injury was not a cause of Berka's worsened knee condition or (2)
No. 71062-1-1/10
even if the 2007 injury was a cause, a jury could find that Berka's work at
Northern Pipeline was a superseding cause of the worsened condition.
This court reviews a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo,
performing the same inquiry as the trial court. Jov v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 170
Wn. App. 614, 619, 285 P.3d 187 (2012), review denied, 176Wn.2d 1021
(2013). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when, viewing the evidence
and all inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, substantial
evidence does not exist to support the nonmoving party's claims. Schmidt v.
Coogan. 162 Wn.2d 488, 491, 173 P.3d 273 (2007). Substantial evidence is that
which is sufficient to persuade a rational, fair-minded person of the truth of a
declared premise. Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass'n v. Chelan County. 141 Wn.2d
169, 176, 4P.3d123(2000).
Generally, a worker may have a claim reopened for aggravation of a
condition caused by an industrial injury. RCW 51.32.160. Establishing the right
to further medical treatment based on aggravation requires medical testimony
that objective symptoms show a causal relationship between the injury and
increased disability after the claim closure. Phillips v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 49
Wn.2d 195, 197, 298 P.2d 1117 (1956). In this case, the required testimony was
furnished by Dr. McClure and Dr. Kopp, who both testified that Berka's knee
objectively worsened after the claim closing date in November 2008 and that the
worsening was causally related to the May 2007 industrial injury.
Pilchuck, supported by the Department, contends Dr. Brigham's testimony
would allow a jury to find that Berka's need for further medical treatment of his
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No. 71062-1-1/11
knee was not caused by the 2007 injury but rather was due to a new injury that
Berka sustained, either by a single event or repetitive overuse, after he began to
work for Northern Pipeline. Pilchuck and the Department concede there is no
direct evidence of any particular injurious event that occurred during the five-
week period between Berka's first day of work at Northern Pipeline and his
application to reopen his claim. They rely on Dr. Brigham's inference that new
objective findings and new pathology documented in Berka's medical records
permit an inference that a new injury occurred.
The imaging test requested by Dr. McClure in August 2009 showed a
horizontal tear in the posterior body of the medial meniscus as well as mild
chondromalacia (damage to cartilage under the kneecap). During surgery in
January 2010, Dr. McClure found a horizontal cleavage tear and a radial tear in
the mid portion of the lateral meniscus.
Dr. Brigham thought the horizontal tear was a new injury because
"something" had to cause this new finding. Dr. Brigham's testimony that
"something" must have caused the changes reflected in the records is too
speculative to allow a jury to infer that the "something" was a new injury. Dr.
Kopp and Dr. McClure both testified that more probably than not the tear in the
meniscus was a continuation or progression of the effect of the May 2007
industrial injury, caused by an avoidance pattern in Berka's gait that put
abnormal loading on the lateral meniscus. All of the doctors agreed that
someone like Berka who has had successive surgeries resulting in progressive
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No. 71062-1-1/12
removal of more and more of the meniscus is going to continue to have knee
trouble.
Dr. Brigham understood from Berka's history as given to Dr. Kopp that
Berka was "jumping in and out of ditches" in Arizona. Dr. Brigham described the
existence of the finding of chondromalacia in a new portion of Berka's knee as a
"new presentation" and "new pathology" that would be caused by "jumping in and
out of ditches." The word "jumping" is an exaggeration supplied by Dr. Brigham.
There is no evidence in the record that Berka was "jumping."
A reasonable jury could only conclude that the 2007 injury, not some new
injury, was the occasion for Berka's renewed need for medical treatment of the
knee.
In a variation of the "new injury" argument, the Department contends that
a jury could infer from Dr. Brigham's testimony that the worsening of Berka's
knee condition was totally unrelated to the May 2007 injury. A worker is not
entitled to have a claim reopened if his condition worsened for entirely noninjury
related reasons. Nagel v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 189 Wash. 631, 636, 66 P.2d
318 (1937); Jenkins v. Weyerhaeuser Co.. 143 Wn. App. 246, 256, 177 P.3d
180. review denied, 165Wn.2d 1004(2008).
Dr. Brigham testified that Berka's work as an equipment operator in
Arizona caused a worsening of his left knee condition in 2009. But he did not
explicitly state that the condition of Berka's knee was totally unrelated to the May
2007 injury. On cross-examination, Dr. Brigham conceded that the May 2007
injury was "a significant cause" of Berka's knee condition. Even when
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No. 71062-1-1/13
considering inferences from Dr. Brigham's testimony in the light most favorable to
Pilchuck, a jury could not conclude that Berka's knee condition was entirely
unrelated to his May 2007 industrial injury. "But for" causation was established
beyond dispute.
The primary argument raised by Pilchuck and the Department is that Dr.
Brigham's testimony supports an inference that Berka's work at Northern Pipeline
was an independent superseding cause of his knee getting worse after he left
Pilchuck. This argument revolves around McDougle v. Department of Labor &
Industries. 64 Wn.2d 640, 393 P.2d 631 (1964).
In McDougle. a worker sought to reopen a claim for an industrial back
injury after his condition worsened. The claimant testified that the day before he
sought treatment for an aggravation of his injury, he had been helping his
brother-in-law unload some sacks of livestock feed. The Department refused to
reopen the claim. The Board affirmed, finding that there was an aggravation that
required medical treatment, but it was "'due to a new intervening independent
cause, namely, lifting a sack or sacks of grain on that date.'" McDougle. 64
Wn.2d at 643. The superior court affirmed. The worker appealed.
The Supreme Court separated compensable from noncompensable
aggravation by asking whether the claimant could reasonably have expected to
engage in the activity without injury.
The supervisor, the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals,
and the trial court were all apparently under the impression that any
condition caused by the lifting of the ground feed was not
compensable even though, as found by the trial court, it operated
upon and aggravated the preexisting disability. In this they were
mistaken. Aggravation of the claimant's condition caused by the
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No. 71062-1-1/14
ordinary incidents of living—by work which he could be expected to
do; by sports or activities in which he could be expected to
participate—is compensable because it is attributable to the
condition caused by the original injury.
McDougle. 64 Wn.2d at 644.
Aggravation is not compensable if it is caused by activities in which the
claimant could not, because of his existing disability, reasonably expect to
engage without injury. McDougle. 64 Wn.2d at 644. The test to be applied "is
whether the activity which caused the aggravation is something that the claimant
might reasonably be expected to be doing, or whether it is something that one
with his disability would not reasonably be expected to be doing." McDougle. 64
Wn.2d at 645, citing 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 13.11, at 183.
Whether the claimant's lifting of the feed sacks was a reasonable activity for
someone in his condition had not yet been considered below. Thus, the court
held it was premature to decide that lifting the feed sacks was an intervening
superseding cause of the aggravation of the back condition. Accordingly, the
court remanded the case back to the Department:
We cannot, nor can the trial court, the Board, or the
Department say that because an individual has a 30 per cent
permanent partial disability based on a back injury, that he is
thereby precluded from doing any lifting, and that any injury
sustained from any lifting is not attributable to his prior injury
because it is an intervening cause. Whether it was a reasonable
thing for this particular claimant to do, is a different question—never
considered by the Department, the Board, or the trial court.
We are not deciding that the claimant's claim should be
reopened. There is testimony from both Dr. King and the claimant
which indicates that anything which placed a strain on his back
would lead to a temporary exacerbation of his condition; such
testimony may have a bearing on whether he acted reasonably.
We are deciding that the reasons given for not reopening the claim
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No. 71062-1-1/15
do not constitute a sufficient justification for that action, but indicate
a disposition of this case on a fundamentally wrong basis.
McDougle. 64 Wn.2d at 645-46.
On remand, the Department again denied reopening, the Board took
evidence and overruled the Department, the employer successfully appealed to
the superior court, and the claimant successfully appealed to the Supreme Court.
Scott Paper Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 73 Wn.2d 840, 440 P.2d 818 (1968).
In deciding the second appeal in favor of the claimant, the Supreme Court noted
that the claimant was far from being totally disabled and that no specific
instructions had been given to him limiting how much he could lift. The court
concluded that the Department and the superior court erroneously considered
the claimant's own description of how painful his back was at the time the feed
sack incident occurred. They should have been concerned with "the manner in
which the aggravation was sustained," Scott Paper Co.. 73 Wn.2d at 845, rather
than whether the claimant subjectively believed that he should not be exerting
himself.
Under the evidence of this case, where we are dealing with a
man with a 30 per cent disability (established by department order)
who had, prior to his initial injury, worked in the woods, operated a
small farm where he milked six cows, made hay, and prepared
ground for a garden—all very hard work—we conclude that there is
just as much reason to say that the conduct of assisting in sliding,
or even lifting, two sacks of grain was to be contemplated within the
scope of the prior award as to say that it was not. Therefore, not
only does the evidence not preponderate against the Board's
findings, but the court's findings lack substantial evidence to
support them.
Scott Paper Co., 73 Wn.2d at 847.
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No. 71062-1-1/16
Pilchuck and the Department contend that a jury could apply the test
established in McDougle and conclude that Berka's work at Northern Pipeline
was an intervening cause of the aggravation that necessitated new treatment for
his knee. Under McDougle and Scott Paper Co.. Pilchuck had to show
substantial evidence that: (1) Berka engaged in physical activities that
aggravated his condition while he was working for Northern Pipeline and (2) he
would not reasonably have been expected to engage in these activities given the
extent of his disability at the time his 2007 claim was closed. Because we are
reviewing an order granting judgment as a matter of law, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to Pilchuck even though the evidence appears to
preponderate in favor of Berka.
Pilchuck and the Department rely primarily on the testimony of Wauldron
and Dr. Brigham. The evidence they consider to be significant includes the
following:
• Berka told Wauldron in January 2009 that his knee was "'as good as it
could be.'" Before leaving for Arizona, Berka talked to Wauldron about
reopening the claim against Pilchuck to get a new leg brace, but
Wauldron did not recall Berka complaining about new or worsening
pain until after he got to Arizona.
• Berka told Wauldron that the work was more physically demanding at
Northern Pipeline than it had been at Pilchuck and that "he was getting
in and out of holes."
• Berka told Wauldron during one of their phone conversations that he
had to take a day off here and there at Northern Pipeline because his
knee was bothering him.
• Berka told Wauldron that he did not want to let Northern Pipeline know
that he had a knee injury.
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No. 71062-1-1/17
• Berka began using his knee brace, icing his knee, and taking ibuprofen
after starting with Northern Pipeline. Berka told Dr. Kopp that the work
he was doing in Arizona was more strenuous.
• Dr. Kopp got Berka's work history wrong when he took it down at the
time of examining Berka. Dr. Kopp understood that Berka operated
heavy equipment in Washington and was a foreman in Arizona, when
in reality it was the other way around.
• Dr. Brigham testified that the discrepancy between how Berka
described his work in his deposition and what Dr. Kopp wrote down
when taking Berka's work history suggests that Berka was making
misrepresentations and gaming the system.
• Dr. Brigham testified that Berka's activities were contraindicated by the
restrictions given to him by Dr. Yamamoto.
• Dr. Brigham interpreted Dr. Kopp's notes as reflecting Berka's
statement that his work in Arizona involved "jumping in and out of
ditches," and he testified that Berka would continue to have injuries if
he continued to jump in and out of ditches.
The evidence described above is insufficient to support a finding that
Berka's Arizona work was an independent intervening cause of his aggravated
knee injury. The inquiry under Scott Paper Co. must focus on the manner in
which the aggravation was sustained. Except for Berka's own testimony and his
statements to others, there was no evidence of what his work activities actually
consisted of in Arizona. Dr. Brigham's depiction of Berka's work as "jumping in
and out of ditches" is not supported by the records Dr. Brigham reviewed.
The record supplies no more reason to believe that Berka unreasonably
endangered his knee by operating heavy equipment in Arizona than to believe
that he unreasonably endangered his knee by the consecutive walking he did as
a walking foreman for Pilchuck after his 2008 surgery. It appears that both jobs
were physically demanding. Berka was unsuccessful in his effort to find work as
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No. 71062-1-1/18
a superintendent or some other indoor position. There is no evidence that Berka
was told to avoid work completely if it involved bending or putting weight on his
knee. It was reasonably to be expected that after leaving Pilchuck, Berka would
continue to work in the area of installation and maintenance of underground
utilities.
Pilchuck contends the discrepancy between Berka's work history as
reflected in Dr. Kopp's notes and the work history Berka described in his
testimony raised an issue of credibility that required resolution by a jury. We
disagree. The discrepancy was minor and was not clearly elucidated in the
testimony. Dr. Kopp accepted that he just got the history wrong:
I am presuming that I got the history wrong. And although I did
dictate it in front of him, he must have heard it wrong, too, if that's
the case. I saw nothing on his exam that would indicate that he
was withholding the truth from me at all. So I am presuming that
his testimony that you referred to under oath is accurate and that
my history is wrong.
Dr. Kopp testified it was immaterial to his opinion whether it was in Arizona or
Washington that Berka was a backhoe operator or a walking foreman. In either
case, Dr. Kopp testified, the activity would not have caused an injury to Berka's
knee if the knee had not already been injured. Dr. Brigham's readiness to
conclude that Berka materially misrepresented his work history to Dr. Kopp is not
supported by Dr. Kopp's notes and testimony.
In summary, judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. The evidence
in the record before the Board is insufficient to prove that the worsening of
Berka's knee was completely unrelated to the May 2007 industrial injury or that
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No. 71062-1-1/19
the work Berka did in Arizona was an independent intervening cause of that
worsening.
Berka has requested an award of attorney fees and costs as authorized by
RCW 51.52.130. That request is granted.
Affirmed.
lh*cke.e;
WE CONCUR
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