State of Washington v. Gary Don Dugger ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    July 3, 2014
    In the Office of the Clerk of Court
    WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION THREE
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          )
    )         No. 31S04-S-III
    Respondent,             )
    )
    v.                                      )
    )
    GARY DON DUGGER,                              )        UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    )
    Appellant.              )
    FEARING, J. -    A jury convicted Gary Dugger of third degree assault of a child for
    bathing his 22-month-old son in scalding water. The "to convict" jury instruction omitted
    essential elements of the crime-that Dugger was above the age of 18 and the child was
    below the age of 13. Dugger contends the omission violated his due process rights
    because it relieved the State of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt. Since
    Dugger stipulated to both these elements and relieved the State of proving these elements,
    we affirm his conviction.
    PROCEDURE
    A jury convicted Gary Dugger of third degree assault of a child for bathing his 22­
    month-old son, P.D., in water so hot the child's skin stuck to his pajamas. An essential
    element ofthird degree assault of a child is that the defendant is over the age of 18 and
    the victim is under the age of 13. RCW 9A.36.140(1). The "to convict" instruction the
    No. 31504-5-111
    State v. Dugger
    jury received for third degree assault of a child omitted these elements.
    Before the court instructed the jury, Gary Dugger stipulated to his being over the
    age of 18 and his child under the age of 13 at the time of the scalding. To ensure Dugger
    knowingly and voluntarily relieved the state of its burden to prove these elements, the
    court engaged in the following colloquy:
    THE COURT: Mr. Dugger, would you state your name for the
    record?
    THE DEFENDANT: Gary Don Dugger.
    THE COURT: You can remain seated. Is your mind clear?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any substance?
    THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
    THE COURT: And do you feel okay physically?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: Mr. Dugger, you understand that you have the right
    to require the state to prove every element of the charge against you,
    including the fact that your son is under l3 and that you are over 18.
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: By this stipulation, you're relieving the state of the .
    obligation to prove those two facts. Do you understand that?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: And have you had a full opportunity to consult with
    your attorney about this waiver?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: And do you, indeed, wish to waive that right and
    stipulate to those two facts?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. The waiver is acceptable and is
    received.
    Report of Proceedings (RP) at 195-96. Satisfied that Dugger's stipulation was knowing
    and voluntary, the court read the stipulation to the jury:
    2
    No. 31504-5-111
    State v. Dugger
    Ladies and gentlemen, the parties have agreed that certain facts are
    true. You must accept as true the following facts: On or about January 27,
    2012, the defendant, Gary Don Dugger, was over the age of 18, and that
    [name omitted] was under the age of 13.
    RP at 307.
    LA W AND ANALYSIS
    Gary Dugger asks this court to reverse his conviction because the "to convict"
    instruction the jury received, omitted essential elements of third degree assault of a
    child-his and the child's age. To uphold a conviction, the State must prove every
    essential element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sibert, 
    168 Wash. 2d 306
    ,
    311, 
    230 P.3d 142
    (2010). In a jury trial, the "to convict" instruction given to the jury is
    the yardstick by which this court determines whether the State proved every element of a
    crime. State v. DeRyke, 149 Wn.2d 906,910, 73 P3d 1000 (2003). In general, an
    instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove every element of a crime requires
    automatic reversal. State v. Brown, 
    147 Wash. 2d 330
    , 339, 
    58 P.3d 889
    (2002). But, not
    every omission or misstatement in a jury instruction relieves the State of its burden.
    
    Brown, 147 Wash. 2d at 339
    . Instead an erroneous jury instruction that omits an element of
    the offense is subject to harmless error analysis. Neder v. U.S., 
    527 U.S. 1
    ,9, 
    119 S. Ct. 1827
    , 
    144 L. Ed. 2d 35
    (1999); 
    Brown, 147 Wash. 2d at 340
    . Unlike such defects as the
    complete deprivation of counselor trial before a biased judge, an instruction that omits an
    element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or
    3                                                f
    I
    No. 31504-5-III
    State v. Dugger
    an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence. Neder, 
    527 U.S. 1
    at 9.
    When a to convict instruction omits an essential element of a charged crime, it is
    constitutionally defective and the remedy is a new trial unless the State can demonstrate
    that the omission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kirwin, 166 Wn.
    App. 659, 669, 
    271 P.3d 310
    (2012). A misstatement of the law in a jury instruction is
    harmless if the element is supported by uncontroverted evidence. State v. Peters, 
    163 Wash. App. 836
    , 850, 
    261 P.3d 199
    (2011).
    One illustrative decision is State v. Baxter, 
    134 Wash. App. 587
    , 
    141 P.3d 92
    (2006).
    In Baxter, the trial court included the birthdate of the victim in the "to convict"
    instruction. Baxter complained that this relieved the State of proving an essential
    element, the child's age. The Baxter court agreed that the instruction was improper, but
    subjected the impropriety to harmless error analysis.
    Gary Dugger's stipulation renders any error in the "to convict" instruction
    harmless. The evidence that Dugger was above the age of 18 and his child below the age
    of 13 at the time of the crime is uncontroverted-in fact, he stipulated to these elements.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm Gary Dugger's conviction for third degree assault of a child.
    4
    No. 31S04-S-III
    State v. Dugger
    A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
    RCW 2.06.040.
    3-~ S-
    d)
    Fearing, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    2;~t~(j>
    Siddoway, C.J.
    etC
    S
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 31504-5

Filed Date: 7/3/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014