State v. Brasel , 28 Wash. App. 303 ( 1981 )

Petrich, J.

(concurring in part, dissenting in part)—I concur in that portion of the majority decision which remands the case for an evidentiary hearing on whether the defendant intelligently and voluntarily moved for acquittal by reason of insanity. I must, however, dissent from that portion of the decision which "judicially amends" RCW 10.77.110 so as to prohibit hospitalization of one acquitted by reason of insanity, but who is a danger to himself, in spite of the plain reading of the statute to the contrary. In construing a statute, we may not read into it matters which are not there, nor modify it by construction. King County v. Seattle, 70 Wn.2d 988, 425 P.2d 887 (1967); State v. Spino, 61 Wn.2d 246, 377 P.2d 868 (1963); State v. Rinkes, 49 Wn.2d 664, 306 P.2d 205 (1957).

The pronouncements of the court in State v. Martin, 94 Wn.2d 1, 614 P.2d 164 (1980), it seems to me, clearly set forth the court's limitations on "corrective interpretations" when it said at page 8:

As attractive as the State's proposed solution may be, we do not have the power to read into a statute that which we may believe the legislature has omitted, be it an intentional or an inadvertent omission. Auto Drivers Local 882 v. Department of Retirement Sys., 92 Wn.2d 415, 421, 598 P.2d 379 (1979); Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. State, 91 Wn.2d 132, 134, 587 P.2d 535 (1978); Jepson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 89 Wn.2d 394, 403, 573 P.2d 10 (1977). The statutory hiatus is unfortunate. Nevertheless, it would be a clear judicial usurpation of legislative power for us to correct that legislative oversight.

It is for the legislature, not the court, to make whatever changes the legislature may deem appropriate within the constraints of the constitution.