Eubanks And Gray , V Klickitat County And David Brown ( 2014 )

LEO
T OF APPEALS
D VLSI N11
2Q. 3 JUN - 3 N 8: 314
IN THE COURT. OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OE WASHINGTON
DIVISION II y
ROBIN EUBANKS, ERIN GRAY, ANNA No. 44969 -2 -1I
DIAMOND, and KATHY HAYES,
Respondents,
v.
KLICKITAT COUNTY and DAVID PUBLISHED OPINION
BROWN,
Appellants.
MAXA, J. — David Brown and Klickitat County appeal the trial court' s denial of their
motion to disqualify Thomas Boothe, counsel for Robin Eubanks, Erin Gray, Anna Diamond,
and Kathy Hayes ( collectively " the plaintiffs ") in their sexual harassment suit against Brown.
The trial court ruled that even though Boothe was Brown' s former attorney he was not
disqualified under Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1. 9 or RPC 1. 18. We do not reach the
merits of Brown' s disqualification motion because we hold that Brown waived any right to
require Boothe' s disqualification because of the delay in filing his motion to disqualify.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
Brown' s Communications With Boothe
Brown, who at the time was a deputy prosecuting attorney for Klickitat County, decided
to run for Klickitat County Prosecuting Attorney in the 2010 election. As Brown was preparing
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to announce his candidacy, he became concerned with legal issues surrounding his decision to
run for office. One of his concerns related to the Hatch Act, 5 U.S. C. §§ 1501 -08, which restricts
the political activities of individuals running for political office when they are employed in
government positions that receive federal grant funds. Brown also was concerned about his
rights as an at -will employee because another candidate for the prosecuting attorney position had
been fired after she announced her candidacy.
In May 2010, Brown contacted Boothe, an attorney with employment law expertise, for
advice. During the month of May, Brown and Boothe had several telephone conversations and
exchanged numerous emails. The communications focused on the legal implications of Brown' s
decision to run for prosecuting attorney and other matters regarding Brown' s employment.
In May 2010, Brown announced his candidacy to the public. A few days later,
prosecuting attorney' s office employees Eubanks and Gray filed a grievance accusing Brown of
inappropriate conduct. On June 12, Brown called Boothe and talked with him for approximately
15 minutes. According to Brown, he informed Boothe that the allegations had been made.
Boothe denies that he and Brown ever discussed the grievance.
On June 23, Brown emailed Boothe, forwarding links to two articles quoting Brown on
the Hatch Act issues he was raising. Brown did not mention the grievances in the email. That
email was the last contact between Brown and Boothe until 11 months later. Boothe never sent
Brown a retainer letter, and did not bill him for their communications.
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Boothe 's Representation of the Plaintiffs
In December 2010, Eubanks and Gray filed a sexual harassment lawsuit against Brown.
At that time, they were represented by two other attorneys. In June 2011, Boothe was contacted
about serving as counsel for Eubanks and Gray. He investigated whether he had a conflict of
interest based on his communications with Brown in 2010 and concluded that there was no
disqualifying conflict that precluded him from representing Eubanks and Gray.
On July 13, Boothe sent a letter to Brown' s counsel about becoming involved in the case
and describing his earlier contacts with Brown. Brown' s counsel told Boothe that Brown
believed there was a conflict of interest because Brown and Boothe had had an attorney -client
relationship the previous year. Boothe disagreed. In a letter to Brown' s attorney, Boothe stated:
Because the Hatch Act is outside of my practice area ... I explained that I was the
wrong person to call for assistance. Nonetheless, Mr. Brown and I discussed it a
few times after he said he would just welcome thoughts from an outside attorney.
I never represented him or gave any advice of any kind. We were, instead, two
colleagues conversing.
Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 25 -26. Boothe also stated that he had conferred with both the Washington
State Bar Ethics Hotline and private counsel regarding his ethical obligations. Boothe formally
substituted as counsel on July 28, 2011. Diamond and Hayes later were added as plaintiffs.
The litigation proceeded with Boothe representing the plaintiffs. Over the next 16
months, the parties engaged in document production and discovery and were involved in an
appeal regarding whether venue was proper in Clark County. Boothe recorded more than 450
hours of time and his paralegals recorded over 675 hours on the litigation. During this period
Brown did not mention his claim that Boothe had a conflict of interest or suggest that Boothe
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should be disqualified. Only after the parties started taking depositions in November 2012 did
Brown raise the issue again, taking the position that Boothe had a disqualifying conflict.
Motion to Disqualij) Boothe
In January 2013, Brown moved to disqualify Boothe. Brown claimed that he had an
attorney -client relationship with Boothe in 2010 and that he shared confidences with Boothe
about the claims being brought against him in the sexual harassment suit. Brown argued under
RPC 1. 9( a) that Boothe must be disqualified because he was representing clients in the same or
substantially related matter in which his clients' interests were materially adverse to Brown.
Brown further argued that even if an attorney -client relationship did not exist, Boothe owed
duties to him as a prospective client under RPC 1. 18. The County joined in Brown' s motion to
disqualify Boothe.
The plaintiffs opposed the motion, asserting that there was no attorney -client relationship
because, among other reasons, Boothe gave no legal advice and there was no retainer or
engagement letter. The plaintiffs further argued that there was no relationship between Brown' s
inquiry regarding the Hatch Act and employment law issues and the plaintiffs' sexual harassment
claim, and that there was no evidence that confidential information was communicated.
The trial court denied Brown' s motion to disqualify Boothe, concluding that even
assuming the truth of Brown' s version of events, disqualification was not required under RPC
1. 9( a) or RPC 1. 18. We granted Brown' s and the County' s motion for 'discretionary review.
ANALYSIS
The plaintiffs argue that Brown waived his right to require Boothe' s disqualification
because of excessive delay in bringing the motion. Although the plaintiffs argued waiver below,
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the trial court did not address this argument and instead ruled on the merits. However, " we can
affirm a trial court on any alternative basis supported by the record and pleadings, even if the
trial court did not consider that alternative." Champagne v. Thurston County, 134 Wash. App. 515,
520, 141 P.3d 72 ( 2006), aff'd, 163 Wash. 2d 69, 178 P.3d 936 ( 2008). We hold as a matter of law
that Brown waived his right to move for Boothe' s disqualification. Accordingly, we need not
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reach the merits of Brown' s disqualification motion.
Our Supreme Court has stated that the " failure to act promptly in filing a motion for
disqualification may warrant denial of [the] motion." First Small Bus. Inv. Co. v. Intercapital
Corp., 108 Wash. 2d 324, 337, 738 P.2d 263 ( 1987).
A motion to disqualify should be made with reasonable promptness after a party
discovers the facts which lead to the motion. This court will not allow a litigant
to delay filing a motion to disqualify in order to use the motion later as a tool to
deprive his opponent of counsel of his choice after substantial preparation of a
case has been completed."
First Small Business, 108 Wash. 2d at 337 ( quoting Cent. Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food
Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 992 ( 8th Cir. 1978)). " Delay in filing [a] motion to disqualify is
suggestive of its use for purely tactical purposes and could be the sole grounds for denying a
motion to disqualify." In re Firestorm 1991, 129 Wash. 2d 130, 145, 916 P.2d 411 ( 1996).
The combination of three factors compels our conclusion that Brown waived any right to
require Boothe' s disqualification. First, Brown' s delay in filing the motion to disqualify was
excessive. Boothe notified Brown that he was substituting as counsel for the plaintiffs in July
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The County joined Brown' s motion to disqualify Boothe and filed its own motion for
discretionary review. However, there is no claim that the County was Boothe' s client or has an
independent basis for seeking Boothe' s disqualification. As a result, Brown' s waiver of his
right to require Boothe' s disqualification also precludes a non -client like the County from
pursuing Boothe' s disqualification.
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2011. Although Brown immediately claimed that Boothe had a conflict of interest, he did not
move for disqualification until January 2013, 18 months after he received notice of Boothe' s
representation of the plaintiffs. In fact, after initially raising the issue, Brown did not even
mention the possibility of disqualification for the next 16 months. In Firestorm, our Supreme
Court indicated that a nine month delay in filing a motion to disqualify was significant in
evaluating whether disqualification was warranted as a sanction for inappropriate ex parte
contact with a witness. 129 Wash. 2d at 144 -45. Brown waited twice that long before bringing his
motion to disqualify.
Second, Boothe had engaged in extensive litigation activities on behalf of his clients
before Brown filed the motion to disqualify. Although the appellate record does not contain
much detail regarding these activities, the parties exchanged written discovery, argued discovery
motions in November 2011, and after that engaged in " eleven months of discovery struggles and
document production." CP at 97 -98. Brown also moved to compel production of the plaintiffs'
counseling and psychotherapy records in November 2012. In November 2012, the parties
scheduled depositions of the four plaintiffs, Brown, and another witness, and after two days of
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these depositions Brown raised the disqualification issue. During this time, Boothe recorded
more than 450 hours of time and his paralegals recorded over 675 hours on the litigation. Boothe
also advanced over $ 10, 000 in litigation costs. Our Supreme Court in Firestorm found
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While discovery was ongoing Brown also appealed the trial court' s ruling that venue was
proper in Clark County. We accepted discretionary review and affirmed, and the Supreme Court
subsequently granted Brown' s petition for review. Eubanks v. Brown, 170 Wash. App. 768, 285
P.3d 901 ( 2012), review granted, 176 Wash. 2d 1026, 301 P.3d 1047 ( 2013). The appeal still is
pending in the Supreme Court. It appears that separate appellate counsel is representing the
plaintiffs in this appeal.
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significant that counsel had expended over 640 hours and incurred litigation expenses during the
period that the opposing party delayed in filing a motion to disqualify. 129 Wash. 2d at 144 -45.
Third, the plaintiffs would suffer prejudice if Boothe was disqualified. Although there is
no evidence that substituting new counsel for Boothe will affect the outcome of the case, the
record shows that disqualifying him may have a significant psychological impact on the
plaintiffs. Boothe emphasized the plaintiffs' emotional fragility. In his declaration Booth stated
that the three plaintiffs who had been deposed before Brown filed the motion to disqualify
suffered stress reactions during the depositions —one cried throughout the deposition and needed
12 breaks to compose herself; the second burrowed her shoulder into Boothe' s for security and
needed two breaks; and the third was short of breath, panicked and shaking, and needed four
breaks. Boothe claimed that the development of trust in him over 18 months was especially
important for the plaintiffs, and that having to bring in new counsel would be " devastating" for
them. CP at 101. Brown did not attempt to rebut this testimony.
We see no indication.that Brown delayed filing the motion to disqualify for tactical
reasons. In fact, Boothe made it a point to emphasize the professionalism of Brown' s counsel
throughout the case. Brown' s explanation was that he delayed filing the motion to disqualify
because Boothe had suggested in a July 2011 letter that the plaintiffs might dismiss Brown from
the lawsuit if Brown prevailed on the venue matter. Therefore, Brown did not want to bring the
motion while the appeal of the venue matter was pending. In addition, Brown stated that Boothe
threatened that if Brown raised the conflict issue he would " make it a war." CP at 484. In order
to avoid a contentious dispute and with the hope that Brown would be dismissed and the issue
avoided, Brown delayed filing the motion to disqualify.
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Delaying the filing of what is expected to be a contentious motion to disqualify based on
a hope that the issue will resolve itself may be understandable in certain situations, and initially
may have been the prudent course of action here. However, when the attorney subject to
disqualification is actively involved in ongoing litigation, a party cannot continue on this course
of action indefinitely. At a certain point before that attorney engages in extensive litigation work
a party must decide whether to move forward with the motion to disqualify or to waive the right
to disqualify. Under the circumstances here Brown should have moved for disqualification far
earlier.
We hold that Brown waived the right to have Boothe disqualified by waiting 18 months
and by allowing Boothe to participate in extensive litigation activities before filing the motion to
disqualify, particularly when disqualification after that delay would prejudice the plaintiffs.
Further, because the County is a non -client, Brown' s waiver also precludes the County from
pursuing Boothe' s disqualification.
We affirm.
We concur:
F ORS N, AdJ
LL., J
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