Anne Block And Noel Frederick v. City Of Gold Bar ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
ANNE K. BLOCK, an individual, and NO. 70321-8-1
NOEL FREDERICK, an individual,
DIVISION ONE
Appellants,
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CITY OF GOLD BAR, a public agency;
CITY OF GOLD BAR CITY COUNCIL,
a governing body,
Respondents. FILED: March 24, 2014
Leach, C.J. - Anne Block and Noel Frederick appeal the trial court's
summary dismissal of their claims against the city of Gold Bar and the city of
Gold Bar City Council (Gold Bar) for violations of the Open Public Meetings Act
of 1971 (OPMA), chapter 42.30 RCW. They challenge the court's decision that
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar their OPMA claim, its
conclusion that the city's mayor had sole authority to decide if the city would
mediate alegal dispute, its denial of their CR 56(f) motion for acontinuance, and
its decision that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Finding no error, we
affirm.
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FACTS
The city of Gold Bar, Washington, is organized under the Optional
Municipal Code, Title 35A RCW. It has a mayor-council plan of government,
defined in chapter 35A.12 RCW. RCW 35A.12.100 provides,
The mayor shall be the chief executive and administrative officer of
the city, in charge of all departments and employees. ... He or she
shall see that all laws and ordinances are faithfully enforced and
that law and order is maintained in the city, and shall have general
supervision of the administration of city government and all city
interests. . . . [H]e or she may cause any legal proceedings to be
instituted and prosecuted in the name of the city, subject to
approval by majority vote of all members of the council. The mayor
shall preside over all meetings of the city council, when present, but
shall have a vote only in the case of a tie in the votes of the
councilmembers with respect to matters other than the passage of
any ordinance, grant, or revocation of franchise or license, or any
resolution for the payment of money. He or she shall report to the
council concerning the affairs of the city and its financial and other
needs, and shall make recommendations for council consideration
and action.
In May 2010, Susan Forbes, a resident of the city of Gold Bar, filed a
lawsuit against the city alleging violations of the Public Records Act, chapter
42.56 RCW. On October 7, 2010, Forbes wrote a letter to Gold Bar City Attorney
Margaret King offering to mediate her lawsuit. On October 26, 2010, Gold Bar
Mayor Joseph Beavers and King1 met in an executive session with the city
council to discuss current litigation, including the Forbes litigation.
1 King attended the meeting by telephone conference.
2 RCW 42.30.110(1)(i) permits a governing body to hold an executive
session during a regular or special meeting
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On October 27, 2010, King wrote an e-mail to Forbes, stating, "I shared
your mediation offer with the City Council, and am writing to let you know that
while the City appreciates the constructive spirit in which the proposal was
offered, the City respectfully declines the offer as it does not believe that it would
be constructive." On January 6, 2011, the trial court dismissed Forbes's case on
summary judgment.3
In January 2012, Block and Frederick (collectively Block) filed this action
against Gold Bar for violating the OPMA. Block alleged that "the City Council
took 'final action' during the executive session on October 26, 2010, in violation
of the OPMA" and that "the City Council voted or engaged in analogous polling to
come to the determination that the City would not engage in mediation in the
Forbes action, in violation of the OPMA."
[t]o discuss with legal counsel representing the agency . . . litigation
or potential litigation to which the agency, the governing body, or a
member acting in an official capacity is, or is likely to become, a
party, when public knowledge regarding the discussion is likely to
result in an adverse legal or financial consequence to the agency.
This subsection (1)(i) does not permit a governing body to hold an executive
session solely because an attorney representing the agency is present.
3 We affirmed the dismissal in 2012. Forbes v. City of Gold Bar, 171 Wn.
App. 857, 288 P.3d 384 (2012), review denied. 177 Wash. 2d 1002, 300 P.3d 415
(2013). Anne Block represented Forbes in this appeal.
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On March 9, 2012, Block filed a declaration from Charles Lie, a member of
the city council from January 2010 until January 2012, who attended the
executive session at issue. Lie testified,
On or about October 26 2010, as part of my responsibilities and
duties of being a city council member, I attended a special meeting
at City Hall. An executive session was held in the offices of the
Public Works Director. The topic of the executive session was a
lawsuit filed by Susan Forbes against the city regarding public
records. The option of mediation as an alternative to litigation was
discussed. I understood this to require a yes or no decision by the
city. There was discussion of the options. At one point,
Councilperson Christopher Wright called for a vote and stated that
his vote was for litigation. I pointed out that he was out of order
calling for a vote in executive session and that we could only vote in
public. There was no response from counsel or Mayor Beavers on
the question of voting in executive session.
By the close of the meeting, a general verbal agreement had been
formed by a majority [of] the council to proceed with litigation and
not enter into mediation. I had made my input for mediation as the
preferred option. I left the meeting with the understanding that
mediation was not going to be pursued.
When the council returned to chambers, no action was taken on the
record.
In March 2012, Block, Forbes, Lie, Frederick, and Joan Amenn filed recall
petitions against Beavers and two city council members, Florence Martin and
Christopher Wright, alleging violations of the OPMA related to the October 26,
2010, executive session. The recall petition against Beavers alleged that he
"violated the Open [Public] Meetings Act by failing to reconvene an executive
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session ... in violation of RCW 42.30.060(1) and or RCW 42.30.020(3) in which
the Gold Bar city council unlawfully voted in executive session."4 The petitions
against the city council members alleged that they "violated the Open [Public]
Meetings Act after [they] voted in executive session ... in violation of RCW
42.30.060(1) and or RCW 42.30.020(3) in which the Gold Bar city council
unlawfully voted in executive session."
In opposition to the recall petition against Beavers, Gold Bar filed
declarations from Beavers and from city council members Martin, Wright, and
Jay Prueher. All of these individuals testified, "The executive session was
adjourned, and the counsel reconvened the special meeting. No action was
4 RCW 42.30.060(1) states,
No governing body of a public agency shall adopt any ordinance,
resolution, rule, regulation, order, or directive, except in a meeting
open to the public and then only at a meeting, the date of which is
fixed by law or rule, or at a meeting of which notice has been
given according to the provisions of this chapter. Any action
taken at meetings failing to comply with the provisions of this
subsection shall be null and void.
RCW 42.30.020(3) defines "action" as
the transaction of the official business of a public agency by a
governing body including but not limited to receipt of public
testimony, deliberations, discussions, considerations, reviews,
evaluations, and final actions. "Final action" means a collective
positive or negative decision, or an actual vote by a majority of the
members of a governing body when sitting as a body or entity,
upon a motion, proposal, resolution, order, or ordinance.
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taken, and the special meeting was adjourned." Beavers, Wright, and Prueher
also testified, "As was normal for an executive session, there was a spirited
discussion, but no vote was taken." On April 13, the court determined that all
three recall petitions were legally and factually insufficient.
On April 26, 2012, Forbes and Lie filed another recall petition against
Beavers, alleging that he "violated the Open [Public] Meetings Act by failing to
reconvene to an open public meeting from an executive session to vote/take
action on the record in an open public meeting. The vote/action was taken in
executive session held ... in violation of RCW 42.30.060(1)... and or RCW
42.30.020(3)." On May 11, Block sent notices of deposition and subpoenas
duces tecum to Beavers, King, and members of the city council, all of whom
attended the executive session.
At a May 25, 2012, hearing, the trial court determined that the April 26
recall petition was legally and factually insufficient and entered a written order
that included the following conclusions of law:
2.1 The charge in the April 26, 2012 Recall Petition is
factually insufficient as it alleges a violation of a law that does not
exist—failing to reconvene to an open session after an executive
session. Additionally, there is no showing that the Mayor intended
to violate the Open Public Meetings Act.
2.2 The charge in the April 26, 2012 Recall Petition is
legally insufficient for the following reasons: RCW 42.30.060(1)
does not apply to the Mayor; the decision to mediate a lawsuit is
solely within the Mayor's discretion; and there is no showing of
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substantial conduct clearly amounting to misfeasance, malfeasance
or violation of the oath of office or that the Mayor unlawfully or
intentionally violated the law; RCW 42.30.020(3) is merely a
definition of the word "Action" as used in Chapter 42.30 RCW and
does not prohibit any conduct.
2.3 The charge in the April 26, 2012 Recall Petition is
also barred by res judicata. The Petitioners previously filed a recall
petition on March 30, 2012 setting forth the same charge in the
instant Petition. Petitioners have not significantly amended the
charges from the charges brought in their last recall attempt on the
Mayor.
On May 29, a court commissioner granted Gold Bar's motion for a protective
order, quashing Block's notice of deposition and subpoena duces tecum directed
to King and staying all discovery
for later of 45 days or until after the Court considers the City's
motion for summary judgment on the pure legal issues of whether
(1) the Mayor (rather than City Council) is authorized to determine
whether to mediate a lawsuit in which the City is a defendant, and
(b) this Court's prior decisions adjudicating recall petitions as legally
insufficient bar this action under the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.
On June 15, 2012, Gold Bar moved for summary judgment. On July 2,
Block filed a CR 56(f) motion for a continuance to take depositions of the city
council members. In this motion, Block argued that these depositions "are
necessary to determine what happened in the executive session in question.
That is the best evidence of what happened. Without the deposition testimony of
the people in the room when the events alleged in my Complaint occurred, there
is no way for the Court to determine what happened." On July 13, the trial court
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held a hearing on both the motion for summary judgment and the motion for a
continuance. The court ruled, "Given the protective order that has been properly
entered in this matter, I will deny the CR 56(f) motion." The court granted Gold
Bar's motion for summary judgment and entered the following conclusions of law:
3.1 There is no genuine issue of material fact in this case.
3.2 The Complaint states claims that were previously
ruled upon [in the May 25 order on the recall petition's sufficiency]
and are barred by tne doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel.
3.3 An appeal of a prior recall petition does not bar the
application of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
in this case.
3.4 Executive sessions to discuss pending litigation
with legal counsel are expressly authorized by RCW
42.30.110(1)(i).
3.5 Under the Optional Municipal Code, Title 35A RCW
and specifically 35A.12.100, the Mayor had sole decision-making
authority regarding the conduct of City litigation being discussed in
executive session.
3.6 The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, because as a matter of law:
a) The October 26, 2010 executive session of
the Gold Bar City Council did not constitute a violation of
the Open Public Meetings Act,
b) The City Council did not take a vote,
c) The City Council was not authorized by law
to take a vote on any issue being discussed in the October
26, 2010 executive session and any vote that may have
been taken by the City Council would have been ultra
vires, void, and would have no force of law, and
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d) The Mayor of Gold Bar had the sole decision
making authority and sole discretion over the conduct of
the lawsuit, including whether to engage in mediation in
the Forbes lawsuit.
Block appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
5
We review de novo a trial court's order granting summary judgment
When reviewing a summary judgment order, we view all of the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.6 "Summary judgment is appropriate
'if.. . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"7 We review for abuse of discretion
a trial court's denial of a CR 56(f) motion.8 A trial court abuses its discretion if its
decision is manifestly unreasonable or is based on untenable grounds or
reasons.9
5
Columbia Cmtv. Bank v. Newman Park. LLC. 177 Wash. 2d 566, 573, 304
P.3d 472 (2013) (citing Mohr v. Grantham, 172 Wash. 2d 844, 859, 262 P.3d 490
(2011)).
6 Columbia Cmtv Bank, 177 Wash. 2d at 573 (citing Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at
859).
7 Columbia Cmtv Bank, 177 Wash. 2d at 573 (alteration in original) (quoting
CR 56(c)).
8 MRC Receivables Corp. v. Zion, 152 Wash. App. 625, 629, 218 P.3d 621
(2009) (citing Coaale v. Snow, 56 Wash. App. 499, 504, 784 P.2d 554 (1990)).
9 In re Pet, of Duncan, 167 Wash. 2d 398, 402, 219 P.3d 666 (2009) (quoting
Maverv.Sto Indus., Inc., 156Wn.2d677, 684, 132 P.3d 115 (2006)).
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ANALYSIS
Block raises four issues. First, she alleges that the court erroneously
determined that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar her
OPMA claim. Second, Block challenges the court's conclusion that the city's
mayor had sole authority to decide if the city would mediate a legal dispute. She
also contends that the court erred when it denied her CR 56(f) motion and
when it granted summary judgment. We reject Block's claims.
Block first claims that collateral estoppel and res judicata do not bar her
OPMA claim because "[a] decision in a recall petition that allegations are not
sufficient for a recall from office does not automatically determine whether or not
an OPMA violation has occurred by the entities of which the official was a
member." Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits relitigating claims and
issues that were litigated, or might have been litigated, in a prior action.10 It
generally applies where the subsequent action is identical with a prior action in
four respects: (1) persons and parties, (2) cause of action, (3) subject matter,
and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.11 Res
judicata also requires a final judgment on the merits.12
10 Pederson v. Potter, 103 Wash. App. 62, 69, 11 P.3d 833 (2000).
11 Schoeman v. New York Life Ins. Co.. 106 Wash. 2d 855, 858, 726 P.2d 1
(1986).
12 Leiiav. Materne Bros., Inc., 34 Wash. App. 825, 827, 664 P.2d 527 (1983)
(citing Bordeaux v. Inaersoll Rand Co., 71 Wash. 2d 392, 429 P.2d 207 (1967)).
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The doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibits parties from relitigating issues
in a subsequent proceeding, even when they assert different claims or causes of
action.13 A party seeking to apply collateral estoppel must show that (1) the
issues in both proceedings are identical; (2) the earlier proceeding ended in a
judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is
asserted was a party to, or in privity with a party to, the earlier proceeding; and
(4) applying collateral estoppel does not work an injustice on the party against
whom it is applied.14 Block does not dispute that the parties in both proceedings
are identical.
Voters may recall a Washington State elected official on legally and
factually sufficient charges of malfeasance, misfeasance, or violation of the oath
of office.15 A recall petition must allege facts that, "as a whole, 'identify to the
electors and to the official being recalled acts or failure to act which without
justification would constitute a prima facie showing of misfeasance'";16 these
13 Christensen v. Grant County Hosp. Dist. No. 1. 152 Wash. 2d 299, 306, 96
P.3d 957 (2004) (quoting Rains v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 660, 665, 674 P.2d 165
(1983)).
14 World Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane. 125 Wash. App. 289,
305, 103 P.3d 1265 (2005) (quoting Christensen, 152 Wash. 2d at 307).
15 In re Recall of Carkeek, 156 Wash. 2d 469, 473, 128 P.3d 1231 (2006)
(citing Const, art. I, §§ 33-34; RCW29A.56.110).
16 Carkeek. 156 Wash. 2d at 473 (quoting Chandler v. Otto. 103 Wash. 2d 268,
274, 693 P.2d 71 (1984)).
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facts must also indicate an intention to violate the law.17 Courts have "a highly
limited role in the recall process" and are "limited to protecting the process by
ensuring that only legally and factually sufficient charges are referred to the
voters."18 Charges are factually sufficient if they (1) "'state the act or acts
complained of in concise language'" and "'give a detailed description including
the approximate date, location, and nature of each act complained of" and (2)
"enable the public and the challenged public official to identify the 'acts or failure
to act which without justification would constitute a prima facie showing of
misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office.'"19 "To establish
legal sufficiency, petitioners must identify the 'standard, law, or rule that would
make the officer's conduct wrongful, improper, or unlawful.'"20 An official who
exercises discretion appropriately or whose actions occurred in the course of
justifiable conduct may not be subject to a recall.21
17 Carkeek. 156 Wash. 2d at 474 (quoting In re Recall of Feetham. 149
Wash. 2d 860, 865, 72 P.3d 741 (2003)).
18 Carkeek, 156 Wash. 2d at 473 (citing RCW 29A.56.140; In re Recall of
Kast, 144 Wash. 2d 807, 813, 31 P.3d 677 (2001)).
19 In re Recall of Bolt, 177 Wash. 2d 168, 173-74, 298 P.3d 710 (2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RCW 29A.56.110; Kast. 144 Wash. 2d at
813).
20 Bpjt, 177 Wash. 2d at 174 (quoting In re Recall of Ackerson, 143 Wash. 2d
366, 377, 20 P.3d 930 (2001)).
21 Bolt, 177 Wash. 2d at 174-75 (quoting Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280,
283, 692 P.2d 799 (1984)) (citing Kast, 144 Wash. 2d at 815).
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Here, Block alleges, "The City violated the OPMA by making the decision
to decline mediation in an executive session." To establish an OPMA violation, a
plaintiff must show that "(1) members of a governing body (2) held a meeting of
that body (3) where that body took action in violation of OPMA, and (4) the
members of that body had knowledge that the meeting violated the statute."22
RCW 42.30.030 declares, "All meetings of the governing body of a public
agency shall be open and public and ail persons shall be permitted to attend any
meeting of the governing body of a public agency." A governing body takes
"action" under RCW 42.30.020(3) if it "merely 'communicate[s] about issues that
may or will come before the Board for a vote.'"23 "'Final action' as defined in
RCW 42.30.020(3) does not require a formal motion; it can simply be an informal
proposal resulting in a positive or negative decision, or an actual vote."24
Additionally, "a consensus on a position to be voted on at a later council meeting
would qualify as a collective position and a 'final action.'"25
Block contends that the issues in the recall petition are not identical to the
issues in this action because "[h]ere, the issue is whether the City Council, which
22 Wash. Pub. Trust Advocates v. City of Spokane, 120 Wash. App. 892,
902, 86 P.3d 835 (2004) (citing Euaster v. City of Spokane, 118 Wash. App. 383,
424, 76 P.3d 741 (2003)).
23 Euqster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wash. App. 212, 225, 39 P.3d 380 (2002)
(quoting Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist.. 107 Wash. App. 550, 565, 27 P.3d 1208
(2001)).
24 Miller v. City of Tacoma, 138 Wash. 2d 318, 331, 979 P.2d 429 (1999).
25 Eugster, 110 Wash. App. at 225 (citing Miller, 138 Wash. 2d at 330-31).
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is subject to the OPMA, committed an OPMA violation regardless of the intent of
individual council members or agents." To determine if two causes of action are
similar, the court considers (1) if prosecuting the second action would destroy or
impair rights or interests in the prior judgment, (2) if the two actions involve the
same evidence, (3) if the two suits involve infringement of the same right, and (4)
ifthe two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.26
When the trial court ruled that the second recall petition against Beavers
was insufficient in May 2012, it stated, "[C]learly there is identity of subject matter
because the subject matter is the executive session and whether or not
something happened in it on October 26, 2010, at a Gold Bar Public Works
director's office." The court also found, "RCW 42.30.060(1) does not apply to the
Mayor; . . . [t]he decision to mediate a lawsuit is solely within the Mayor's
discretion." Because both actions required the court to consider if the executive
session's attendees acted properly, subject matter is identical.
In arguing that "[a] recall petition is not an adjudication on the merits,"
Block states, "A court does not determine whether the charges in a recall petition
are true." In In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek,27 our Supreme Court held that a
26 Rains. 100 Wash. 2d at 664 (citing Constantini v. Trans World Airlines. 681
F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982)).
27129 Wash. 2d 399, 402, 918 P.2d 493 (1996). In Pearsall-Stipek. the court
held that res judicata barred the petitioner from bringing a subsequent recall
charge.
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court may apply res judicata to recall proceedings. Although the court does not
decide if the petitioner's charges are true, the court determines if, "'accepting the
allegations as true, the charges on their face support the conclusion that the
officer abused his or her position.'"28 Again, the trial court in May 2012
concluded that the petition against Beavers, who was not a member of the city
council, was legally insufficient because he had sole discretion to decide if the
city should mediate a lawsuit. In the hearing on the recall petition's sufficiency,
the court stated,
The mayor is the one who has the authority to make a decision
about mediation or proceeding with litigation. The fact that that
would be discussed with the council for them to have some input,
as to what direction to the mayor, would not make that subject to a
vote. It's still his decision, and the notice that was sent that the City
had decided not to proceed with mediation which the mayor had
authority to decide. So even the supplemental materials does not
establish there was, in fact, a violation of the Open Public Meetings
Act.
Even accepting Block's alleged facts as true, the court determined as a matter of
law that Beavers, not the city council, had the authority to decide about mediation
and thus determined that no OPMA violation occurred. This case presents the
same legal issue.
Finally, Block asserts that applying collateral estoppel would work an
injustice on her because the court "precluded [her] from gathering any additional
28 Bpjt, 177 Wash. 2d at 173-74 (quoting In re Recall of Wasson. 149 Wash. 2d
787, 792, 72 P.3d 170 (2003)).
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ammunition about what occurred.. . . Block has shown a clear OPMA violation,
and discovery would have allowed her to probe the alleged discrepancies of the
council member declarants about their versions of the event." Applying collateral
estoppel does not work an injustice if a party "had an unencumbered, full and fair
opportunity to litigate his claim in a neutral forum."29 Block does not identify what
facts could be discovered that would change the court's res judicata and
collateral estoppel determination. The record shows that Block had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate if the participants in the executive session acted unlawfully.
The court determined that accepting Block's alleged facts as true, she could
establish no OPMA violation because the city council had no authority to decide
about mediation. Because litigating Block's claims in this action would require
relitigating the same claims and issues as the court resolved in the recall actions
against Beavers, we hold that the trial court properly applied res judicata and
collateral estoppel to bar Block's OPMA claim. Accordingly, we do not address
Block's allegation that Gold Bar "secretly abdicated tremendous power to its
Mayor."
Block also claims, "In a case where the summary judgment addressed
whether or not a 'vote' or collective position was reached on a subject it is
reversible error for the trial court to have denied the Rule 56(f) Motion and
29 Rains. 100 Wash. 2d at 666 (citing Allen v. McCurrv. 449 U.S. 90, 100-01,
101 S. Ct. 411, 66 L Ed. 2d 308 (1980)).
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denied Plaintiff all rights to discovery." CR 56(f) permits a trial court to order a
continuance for further discovery when "it appear[s] from the affidavits of a party
opposing the [summary judgment] motion that he cannot, for reasons stated,
present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition." The court may deny
a motion for a continuance when "'(1) the requesting party does not offer a good
reason for the delay in obtaining the desired evidence; (2) the requesting party
does not state what evidence would be established through the additional
discovery; or (3) the desired evidence will not raise a genuine issue of material
fact.'"30 "'A material fact is one that affects the outcome ofthe litigation.'"31
In denying Block's motion, the court cited the protective order that was in
place at the time, which prohibited discovery; the court did not reach the merits of
her motion. Block did not seek discretionary review or reconsideration of the
protective order, and she does not challenge it on appeal. Block asserts,
The declarations filed by the Defendants posed clear
questions that should have been allowed to be asked. Appellants
should have been allowed to question Martin about her omission of
the copycat paragraph 5 regarding a "spirited discussion" and all
declarants should have been questioned about the discrepancy in
claiming there was "no action" where all but one also admitted to
"discussion." They all should [have] been deposed to explore their
respective versions of events. . . .
30 Gross v. Sundinq. 139 Wash. App. 54, 68, 161 P.3d 380 (2007) (quoting
Turner v. Kohler. 54 Wash. App. 688, 693, 775 P.2d 474 (1989)).
31 Millson v. City of Lvnden. 174 Wash. App. 303, 308, 298 P.3d 141 (2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Eicon Constr.. Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ..
174 Wash. 2d 157, 164, 273 P.3d 965 (2012).
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The substance at issue was not what a lawyer said to them
or what they said to a lawyer but rather what they said to each
other as governing body members of a City Council subject to the
OPMA. The trial court further should have allowed discovery as to
the issue of abdicated authority, an issue on which Defendants
provided only bald conclusions and no factual support.
Martin, Wright, and Prueher all testified that "no action was taken." Lie did
not testify that the city council took a vote or agreed on a matter upon which it
would vote at a later date. Notably, in response to Gold Bar's motion for
summary judgment, Block argued that Lie's declaration "describ[ed] exactly how
the decision not to mediate the Forbes case was made" and that "[e]ven without
the depositions of the City Councilmembers that will add even more facts to this
case, Block has shown an OPMA violation." Block fails to show how the
additional testimony that she seeks would affect the outcome of the litigation.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Block's CR
56(f) motion.
Finally, Block claims, "Where attendees at the same meeting present
differing versions of what occurs, and there are internal inconsistencies in the
attendees' own declarations, the trial court should have denied summary
judgment due to the questions of fact." RCW 35A.12.100 requires only that the
mayor obtain approval from the city council to initiate lawsuits in the city's name.
The decision to accept or to decline Forbes's offer to mediate would not
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constitute "caus[ing] any legal proceedings to be instituted";32 Gold Bar was the
defendant in the Forbes litigation.
The city council met in an executive session with legal counsel as
permitted by RCW 42.30.110(1 )(i). Again, neither Lie nor any of the other
attendees testified that the city council took "action" on the mediation decision.
The city council's discussions would not constitute "action" under RCW
42.30.020(3) because it had no authority to decide if the city should mediate the
Forbes lawsuit.33 Even if it voted not to mediate, because it did not have
authority to decide this matter, the vote would be "null and void" under RCW
42.30.060(1) and thus have no legal effect.
Block also asserts that a permissible discussion under RCW
42.30.110(1 )(i) is merely a "discussion 'with legal counsel'—not discussions
among council members and the Mayor. It also does not apply to discussion
between Councilmembers and counsel geared toward reaching a consensus and
making a decision." RCW 42.30.110(1)(i) permits a governing body to hold an
executive session "[t]o discuss with legal counsel representing the
32 RCW 35A. 12.100.
33 The e-mail to Forbes declining her offer to mediate stated, 'TTlhe City
respectfully declines the offer." (Emphasis added.) See also In re Recall of
Lakewood City Council Members. 144 Wash. 2d 583, 587, 30 P.3d 474 (2001) (city
council did not violate the OPMA by meeting in an executive session with the city
manager and the city attorney to discuss a lawsuit against the city council
because the city council did not vote and the city manager nonetheless had
authority to join the lawsuit without the city council's approval).
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NO. 70321-8-1/20
agency. . . litigation or potential litigation to which the agency, the governing
body, or a member acting in an official capacity is, or is likely to become, a party."
Because Block cites no authority to support such a limited reading of the statute,
we reject this argument. Because Block fails to raise a genuine issue of material
fact that the city council acted illegally during the executive session, we affirm the
court's grant of summary judgment in Gold Bar's favor.
Block requests attorney fees under RAP 18.1 and RCW 42.30.120(2).
RCW 42.30.120(2) states, "Any person who prevails against a public agency in
any action in the courts for a violation of this chapter shall be awarded all costs,
including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in connection with such legal
action." Because Block does not prevail, we deny her cost request. Because
Gold Bar has not requested attorney fees, we do not address its entitlement to
them.
CONCLUSION
Because res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Block's claim that Gold
Bar violated the OPMA and her challenge to the mayor's authority, the trial court
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NO. 70321-8-1/21
properly denied her CR 56(f) motion, and Block fails to raise a genuine issue of
material fact that the city council violated the OPMA, we affirm.
L^J^
WE CONCUR:
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