State Of Washington v. Matthew L. Christenson ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON No. 77463-8-I
Respondent,
V. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MATTHEW L. CHRISTENSON,
Appellant. FILED: August 12, 2019
SCHINDLER, J. — Matthew L. Christenson seeks reversal of the jury convictions
for domestic violence homicide by abuse, domestic violence second degree felony
murder, two counts of domestic violence second degree assault, second degree
assault, unlawful imprisonment, and felony harassment. Christenson claims the court
erred in denying his motion to substitute appointed counsel and his request to continue
trial to allow him to retain private counsel. Christenson also challenges denial of his
request to appoint an expert to evaluate his mental competency. Because the court did
not abuse its discretion by denying the requests, we affirm.
FACTS
On January 2, 2015, the State charged Matthew L. Christenson with domestic
violence assault in the second degree and domestic violence unlawful imprisonment of
No. 77463-8-1/2
14-year-old J.C. between January 1 and May 10, 2014. The court appointed SCRAP1
public defenders to represent Christenson.2
On March 26, 2015, the State filed an amended information to add charges
against Christenson of domestic violence homicide by abuse of OS. on or about April
12, 2014; domestic violence murder in the second degree of O.S. on or about April 12,
2014; domestic violence assault in the second degree of OS. between January 1 and
April 12, 2014; and felony harassment of J.C. between January 1 and May 10, 2014.
The State alleged several aggravating factors, including deliberate cruelty, the victims
were particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance, Christenson used his position of
trust to commit the crimes, and an ongoing pattern of abuse.
Christenson did “not trust” the SCRAP attorneys. Christenson told them he
wanted a new attorney. On July 14, 2015, Christenson filed a pro se motion to
discharge the SCRAP attorneys and obtain new appointed counsel. Christenson
asserted the attorneys did not properly investigate his case or file motions that they
discussed and manipulated him into authorizing multiple trial continuances. At the July
14 hearing, Christenson told the court, “I don’t trust [the attorney]. I’m not going to take
my time to talk to him about my case that has my freedom at stake.” The court denied
Christenson’s motion. However, on July 23, SCRAP withdrew as appointed counsel
because of a conflict under Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1 7~3
1 Society of Counsel Representing Accused Persons.
2 One SCRAP attorney was already representing Christenson on an unrelated charge.
~ SCRAP represented a witness the State would be calling to testify against Christenson. RPC
1.7(a) states a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of
interest.”
2
No. 77463-8-1/3
On July 29, the court appointed attorney Nicholas Marchi to represent
Christenson. Marchi spent the next 18 months interviewing dozens of witnesses,
diligently pursuing discovery, and preparing Christenson’s case for trial.
On January 9, 2017, Christenson filed a pro se “Motion To Retain New Trial
Lawyer” asking the court to appoint new counsel. The court found Christenson’s factual
basis inadequate and declined to consider the motion. Marchi continued interviewing
witnesses and preparing Christenson’s case for trial.
Approximately a month before the scheduled trial date, on April 24, Christenson
filed another pro se motion to discharge Marchi and appoint new counsel. Christenson
asserted Marchi had not discussed discovery with him, failed to investigate witnesses
and pursue exculpatory electronic evidence, and failed to file motions they discussed.
Christenson asserted he could not work with Marchi “at building my defense.”
At the April 26 hearing on Christenson’s motion, Marchi cited a conflict under the
RPC and moved to withdraw. The State opposed the motion. The State noted Marchi
had diligently prepared “a complex murder case that has more than 2500 pages of
discovery” and completed dozens of witness interviews with only a few interviews
remaining before the May 25 trial date. The court agreed to consider the ethical
concerns Marchi cited in camera.
At the hearing on May 1, the court found there was a “fundamental
disagreement” between Christenson and Marchi regarding “trial strategy and trial tactics
and what witnesses should be interviewed.” But the court denied Christenson’s motion
to discharge Marchi for the following reasons:
This case has had one lawyer discharged already. The case has
been around for quite some time. Mr. Marchi has done a significant
3
No. 77463-8-1/4
amount of work in this case. It would require a significant amount of time
and a significant amount of work for another lawyer, which wouldn’t be
necessarily dispositive for me in terms of changing lawyers if I thought it
was going to make a difference in the long term to appoint another lawyer.
In this case, given Mr. Christenson’s disagreements with [the
SCRAP attorneys] — and given the types of issues that Mr. Christenson
has with Mr. Marchi — I am not convinced that if I were to appoint another
lawyer that it would end up any differently down the road when that lawyer
disagrees with the trial tactics and trial strategies that Mr. Christenson
might have in this case.
On May 3, Christenson told Marchi that he wanted to proceed pro se. At a
hearing on his motion on May 9, Christenson said he wanted to “proceed pro se so I
can go over the case the way I feel like I should need to. I understand the case as I’ve
been proceeding with it.” The court provided Christenson with a written waiver of
counsel to review4 and reset the hearing to complete the colloquy.
On May 15, the court engaged in a colloquy with Christenson on his request to
proceed pro se. The court determined Christenson made the decision to proceed pro
se knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Christenson informed the court that he would
need a continuance of the May 25 trial date of “at least sixty days to review the case”
and prepare. On May 18, the court granted Christenson’s motion to proceed pro se.
The State requested the court appoint Marchi as standby counsel. Christenson did not
object. The court appointed Marchi as standby counsel and continued the trial date to
June 12, 2017. Over Christenson’s objection, the court ruled Ty Jenkins would continue
as the defense investigator.
On May 30, citing strategic disagreements and a lack of trust, Christenson asked
the court to remove Jenkins and assign another investigator. Christenson said, “I refuse
“The waiver of counsel included the maximum penalty for each offense the State charged as well
as the rights Christenson would forego without the assistance of counsel.
4
No. 77463-8-1/5
to work with [Jenkins]” and have ‘a different strategy to this case.” The court denied the
request.
On June 6, the State filed a second amended information to add another count of
domestic violence assault in the second degree of O.S. between January 1 and April
12, 2014 and the aggravating factors of deliberate cruelty, an ongoing pattern of abuse,
0.0. is a vulnerable victim, and Christenson used his position of trust to commit the
crime.
At a hearing on June 6, when asked to provide the nature of his defense to the
State, Christenson was unable to articulate a defense. Christenson requested another
continuance of 60 days to prepare his defense. The court denied Christenson’s
request, noting Christenson was experiencing “the difficulty in general of preparing for
trial” that was “not a basis to continue the trial date.”
On the first day of trial on June 15, Marchi moved to withdraw as standby
counsel. The State opposed the motion. Marchi argued Christenson does not have a
right to standby counsel, Christenson was complying with court rules, and counsel had
other cases going to trial. Marchi noted Christenson “seems to have a working
knowledge of what he needs to do,” his pro se motions “seem to comply with the court
rules,” and Jenkins was available to “assist with serving subpoenas and preparing to get
the subpoenas served, getting witnesses to the courtroom, [and] interviewing witnesses
on behalf of the defendant.”
Christenson did not object to Marchi withdrawing as standby counsel. The court
granted Marchi’s motion to withdraw as standby counsel.
5
No. 77463-8-116
Christenson moved to withdraw his motion to proceed pro Se. Christenson
stated he was “in the middle of working on retaining” private attorney Carlos Gonzalez
to review the State’s final plea offer. According to Christenson, Gonzalez did not
appear in court because he had another matter in Snohomish County. The court ruled:
If there is an attorney you want to retain, that attorney needs to come —
as a threshold matter — into court and say, “I’m here. I’m ready to go. I
want to be appointed.” Then we can hear what that attorney has to say at
that point. To date, that hasn’t happened.
Christenson explained that he wanted counsel for trial because “[tjhere is no way
that I can go forward not knowing what I’m doing” but rejected reappointing Marchi as
counsel. The court denied Christenson’s motion to appoint any attorney other than
Marchi. Afterward, the court began hearing motions in limine.
On June 19, Christenson renewed his request for appointment of counsel, but
not Marchi. After describing a detailed history of Christenson’s dissatisfaction with prior
appointed counsel as well as his election to proceed pro se, the court denied the motion
“to appoint another attorney.” Later that day, Christenson changed his mind and agreed
to accept Marchi as counsel rather than continue pro Se.
At the next hearing on June 21, Marchi told the court that his team could “get
onboard” if reappointed but that Christenson needed to understand Marchi would decide
“legal strategy.” The court reappointed Marchi as counsel. The court told Christenson:
I won’t go on at length but I will say this is not a decision about
whether Mr. Marchi and Mr. Christenson enjoy each other. It is to provide
a competent and adequate legal defense. He is your attorney now. He
will make strategic decisions. I think he understands concerns that you
have. He has been trying these types of cases for many many years. I
am confident you will be in a much better position to provide a vigorous
defense with his representation.
6
No. 77463-8-1/7
On the first day of jury selection on June 26, Marchi told the court that
Christenson informed him that he retained Gonzalez as trial counsel but said Gonzalez
was away on vacation. Gonzalez had not filed a notice of appearance or otherwise
communicated with the court or the attorneys in the case. After considering the 11
factors set forth in State v. Hampton, 184 Wash. 2d 656, 361 P.3d 734 (2015), the court
denied Christenson’s request to appoint Gonzalez as private counsel. The court noted
that “we don’t have Mr. Gonzalez here seeking to be appointed.”
Marchi also told the court that Christenson told him “he may not be competent to
proceed going forward” and requested a competency evaluation. Christenson told
Marchi he had difficulty “understanding the nature of” the trial proceedings, was
“confused,” and had a “hard time” accepting “the reality of his current situation.” The
court asked whether Marchi and the prosecutor had concerns about Christenson’s
competency.
THE COURT: Is it accurate for me to assume that if prior to that
time, in your professional judgment, you had concerns about his
competency, you would have brought that to the attention of the Court?
MR. MARCH I: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let me hear from the State.
[PROSECUTOR]: I believe that would be correct, coming from Mr.
Marchi as well. I do think this is a delay tactic. I would note that Mr.
Marchi never raised the issue of competency, that I’m aware of, while this
case was pending. This Court itself has engaged in numerous colloquies
with the defendant, as Judge Bowman and Judge Berns have the last few
weeks. It’s quite clear the defendant understood the nature of the
proceedings, asked pertinent questions, recited to case law.
I would note that in the briefing that the defendant had provided
while he was pro se, it was certainly cogent. The arguments, while maybe
the State didn’t agree in their validity, they certainly made sense and
demonstrated that he did understand the nature of the proceedings. I
don’t think there’s any basis for this Court to delay this trial for any
competency evaluation.
7
No. 77463-8-1/8
The court stated that it also “did not have any concerns about Mr. Christenson’s
competence” based on its observations of him during the proceedings.
Following a short recess, Marchi told the court that Christenson reported ‘seeing
things, hearing voices,” and an inability to “focus on his defense” or assist counsel.
Christenson cited 18 U.S.C. § 4241, “Determination of Mental Competency To Stand
Trial To Undergo Postrelease Proceedings,” in support of his request for a competency
evaluation. The court denied the request and found Christenson “very competent.”
[B]ased on not only my own multiple interactions with Mr. Christenson in
court during the time that he was representing himself pro se, which again
involved his oral presentations and arguments to me, it also involved
numerous written submissions to me, so I’m familiar with those.
I’m also familiar with hearings that he had before Judges Berns and
Bowman on May9 and May15 and May18... I listened to those .
hearings two to three times each, as well as reading a transcript of those
hearings.
Based on all this contact that I’ve had with Mr. Christenson, I have
zero concern about his competence to stand trial. I have considered the
factors listed in [In re Pers. Restraint of Fleming, 142 Wash. 2d 853, 16 P.3d
610 (2001),] which include, not an exhaustive list, but included the
defendant’s appearance, demeanor, conduct, personal history to the
extent I know it, past behavior to the extent I know it, and the medical and
psychiatric reports to the extent I know it.
.
Taking everything together into account, Mr. Christenson has
presented himself to be very competent. I also note I spent a good
. . .
deal of time interacting with pro se litigants . .And again, Mr.
. .
Christenson is at the very high end of that spectrum. And I have no doubt,
based on what I’ve seen, that he is competent to stand trial and interact
with his attorney, should he choose to do that.
Following voir dire, the court impanelled the jury on June 29. The court recessed
the trial until July 17.
Before opening statements on July 17, Marchi moved to withdraw because
Christenson filed a bar complaint against him. Christenson filed a “Motion for New Trial
Lawyer Due to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Conflict of Interest” and requested the
8
No. 77463-8-1/9
court appoint new counsel. After thoroughly inquiring into the nature of the conflict
during an hour-long ex parte hearing, the court denied Marchi’s motion to withdraw and
the motion to appoint a new attorney.
The State called a number of witnesses to testify during the 12-day jury trial.
Christenson filed multiple pro se motions and pleadings throughout the trial, including
an 11-page “Supplemental Brief to Motion To Sever Counts” filed August 2 and an 8-
page “Letter for the Record” filed August 7. The Letter for the Record sets forth the
“number of problems I had with Mr. Marchi” and requests “help” with “mental problems.”
On the final day of the State’s case-in-chief on August 7, Marchi told the court
that Christenson received “a psych evaluation from the Jail and that he was having
severe mental issues in dealing with this case.” Christenson told Marchi that the jail
“Psych Unit” was “recommending some sort of treatment.” Marchi moved to recess the
trial until Christenson “can follow up with mental health treatment at the Jail and get
medication.” The court denied the request.
[T]here is no reason to delay our proceedings today. I’m basing that on
the sum of my experience with Mr. Christenson and my close observation
of him over the last several weeks during trial —he has been following
along in court, he’s taking notes, he has been consulting with Counsel —
and in his continued, cogent, and articulate communications to the Court.
On August 8, defense called a witness to testify. Marchi told the court
Christenson “is requesting a recess and/or continuance” to obtain psychological
treatment and decide whether to testify. While the court concluded Christenson might
benefit from “seeking psychological help,” it found Christenson competent. After
describing Christenson’s competency in detail, including the “ability to consult with his
attorney” and “a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him,” the
9
No. 77463-8-1110
court ruled his “competence for trial is [not] in question in the least and a recess would
be inappropriate.” Christenson did not testify.
The jury convicted Christenson as charged. By special verdict, the jury found
Christenson guilty of the aggravating factors of deliberate cruelty, the victims were
particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance, Christenson used his position of trust
to commit the crimes, and an ongoing pattern of abuse.
ANALYSIS
Requests To Appoint Counsel
Christenson challenges the decision to deny his motions to appoint new counsel,
claiming there was a “complete breakdown” in the attorney-client relationship with
March i.
“Whether an indigent defendant’s dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel
is meritorious and justifies the appointment of new counsel is a matter within the
discretion of the trial court.” State v. Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d 668, 733, 940 P.2d 1239
(1997). A court abuses its discretion when its decision adopts a view that no
reasonable person would take or is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.
State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wash. 2d 607, 623, 290 P.3d 942 (2012).
The “essential aim” of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution “is
to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure
that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.” Wheat
v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 5. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988).
However, “[ijf the relationship between lawyer and client completely collapses,” refusal
to substitute counsel violates the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel. In re Pers. Restraint of Stenson, 142 Wash. 2d 710, 722, 16 P.3d 1(2001).
10
No. 77463-8-1/1 1
A defendant “who is dissatisfied with appointed counsel must show good cause
to warrant substitution of counsel, such as a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable
conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney and the
defendant.” Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d at 734. A general loss of confidence or trust in
defense counsel by itself is not sufficient cause to substitute new counsel. Stenson,
132 Wash. 2d at 734. The defendant and attorney must be “so at odds as to prevent
presentation of an adequate defense.” Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d at 734.
A disagreement over defense theories and trial strategy does not
by itself constitute an irreconcilable conflict entitling the defendant to
substitute counsel because decisions on those matters are properly
entrusted to defense counsel, not the defendant.
State v. Thompson, 169 Wash. App. 436, 459, 290 P.3d 996 (2012).
In determining whether the court abused its discretion in concluding there was
not an irreconcilable conflict, we consider (1) the extent of the conflict, (2) the adequacy
of the court’s inquiry, and (3) the timeliness of the motion. Stenson, 142 Wash. 2d at 723-
24. Christenson contends the court erred by denying his numerous requests to
discharge his attorney and obtain new counsel. Christenson does not challenge the
adequacy of the court’s inquiry on any of the rulings. We address each request in turn.
First Request
Christenson moved to discharge Marchi on January 9, 2017 but did not provide a
factual basis. Because the motion was inadequate, the court did not abuse its
discretion by not considering Christenson’s request.
Second Request
On April 24, 2017, Christenson requested appointment of new counsel. The
record does not indicate a breakdown in communication or irreconcilable conflict
11
No. 77463-8-1/12
affecting the adequacy of his representation. Christenson disagreed with Marchi
concerning trial strategy and tactics. However, defense counsel has wide latitude to
control trial strategy and tactics. Stenson, 142 Wash. 2d at 733-34. Christenson did not
present any evidence to establish he was unable to communicate with Marchi to such a
degree “as to prevent presentation of [an] adequate defense.” Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d at
734.
Additionally, Christenson made his second request a month before the scheduled
May 25 trial date. Because Marchi had spent many months preparing for trial, it would
have taken a new attorney a significant amount of time and effort in an already long-
delayed and complicated trial to review more than 2,500 pages of discovery and
interview dozens of State witnesses in order to prepare for trial. Notwithstanding the
amount of significant delay that appointment of new counsel would bring, the record
suggests Christenson would likely disagree on trial strategy or tactics and seek to
discharge new counsel. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the April 2017
motion.
Third Request
On the first day of trial on June 15, 2017, Christenson withdrew his motion to
proceed pro se and requested appointment of new counsel. The court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Christenson’s request and giving him the option of reappointing
Marchi. After a defendant’s valid waiver of counsel, “the trial court is not obligated to
appoint, or reappoint, counsel on the demand of the defendant.” State v. DeWeese,
117 Wash. 2d 369, 379, 816 P.2d 1(1991) (“[A]fter a valid denial of a defendant’s request
12
No. 77463-8-1113
for appointment of substitute counsel, the trial court may require the defendant to
choose between remaining with current counsel or proceeding pro se.’).
Fourth Request
The court also did not abuse its discretion by denying Christenson’s motion for
new counsel prior to opening statements on July 17. The court conducted an extensive
inquiry and allowed Christenson and Marchi to state their concerns fully.
In denying the request, the court found (1) Christenson’s expectations of timely
communications with Marchi did not “adequately recognize the demands of a very busy
and good trial attorney, and the competing demands and time of a trial attorney moving
several cases forward to trial”; (2) Christenson failed to show any material prejudice
concerning Marchi’s preparation; (3) Marchi adequately communicated the State’s plea
offers to Christenson; (4) Christenson’s complaints about Marchi were primarily disputes
“about strategy and tactics”; (5) Christenson created the bar grievance issue himself; (6)
if required, the court and bar association could draft an appropriate protective order that
would prevent privileged information from being used in the proceedings; (7) Marchi
provided “competent, zealous, timely, patient representation”; (8) Christenson “would
have similar disagreements about strategy in trial” if the court “were to appoint yet a
third trial attorney”; (9) “substitution at this point would clearly have an adverse impact
on the proceeding”; (10) Christenson’s case “has been pending for a long time”; and
(11) although Christenson and Marchi do not enjoy working with each other, “an
adequate defense is being pursued and will be presented to the jury.”
While the record reflects disagreement and frustration between Christenson and
his counsel, the record does not demonstrate a complete breakdown in communication
13
No. 77463-8-1/14
or an irreconcilable conflict that affected the adequacy of representation. The court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Christenson’s motions for new counsel.
Request for Continuance To Retain Private Counsel
Christenson argues the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of
choice.
“As part of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, defendants
with private attorneys generally have the right to the counsel of their choice.” Hampton,
184 Wash. 2d at 662. But this right is not absolute. Hampton, 184 Wash. 2d at 663. A trial
court has “wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of
fairness and against the demands of its calendar.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
548 U.S. 140, 152, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 165 L. Ed. 2d 409 (2O06).~ We review the trial
court’s balancing decision for abuse of discretion. Hampton, 184 Wash. 2d at 663.
Where, as here, appointing new counsel requires a continuance to prepare for
trial, we review the “trial court’s denial of a continuance to determine whether it was ‘so
arbitrary as to violate due process.’” Hampton, 184 Wash. 2d at 663 (quoting Unqar v.
Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84S. Ct. 841, 11 L. Ed. 2d 921 (1964)). In Hampton, the
Washington Supreme Court listed 11 nonexclusive factors trial courts may consider
when balancing a defendant’s right to his choice of counsel, including:
(1) whether the request came at a point sufficiently in advance of
trial to permit the trial court to readily adjust its calendar;
(2) the length of the continuance requested;
(3) whether the continuance would carry the trial date beyond the
period specified in the state speedy trial act;
(4) whether the court had granted previous continuances at the
defendant’s request;
(5) whether the continuance would seriously inconvenience the
witnesses;
~ Citation omitted.
14
No. 77463-8-1/15
(6) whether the continuance request was made promptly after the
defendant first became aware of the grounds advanced for discharging his
or her counsel;
(7) whether the defendant’s own negligence placed him or her in a
situation where he or she needed a continuance to obtain new counsel;
(8) whether the defendant had some legitimate cause for
dissatisfaction with counsel, even though it fell short of likely incompetent
representation;
(9) whether there was a ‘rational basis’ for believing that the
defendant was seeking to change counsel ‘primarily for the purpose of
delay’;
(10) whether the current counsel was prepared to go to trial; [and]
(11) whether denial of the motion was likely to result in identifiable
prejudice to the defendant’s case of a material or substantial nature.
Hampton, 184 Wash. 2d at 669-70 (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ETAL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 11.4(c) at 718-20 (3d ed. 2007)).
Because the record establishes Gonzalez never appeared in court; never filed a
notice of appearance on Christenson’s behalf; and never contacted appointed counsel,
the prosecutor, or the court, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request
for a continuance.
Nonetheless, the court considered all 11 of the Hampton factors in determining
whether to grant Christenson’s request for a continuance to retain private counsel. The
court found the request did not come at a point sufficiently in advance of trial to permit
the court to adjust its calendar and a continuance would seriously inconvenience over
two dozen witnesses, including some “vulnerable” witnesses, On balance, the court
concluded the factors weighed in favor of denying the request. Based on the record, we
conclude the court did not abuse its discretion.
Request for Competency Evaluation
Christenson next challenges the court’s denial of his request for a mental health
competency evaluation.
15
No. 77463-8-1/16
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution “prohibits the conviction of a person who is not competent to stand trial.”
Fleming, 142 Wash. 2d at 861. ‘No incompetent person may be tried, convicted, or
sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity continues.”
RCW 10.77.050. RCW 10.77.060(1)(a) states:
Whenever a defendant has pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, or
there is reason to doubt his or her competency, the court on its own
motion or on the motion of any party shall either appoint or request the
secretary [of the Department of Social and Health Services] to designate a
qualified expert or professional person, who shall be approved by the
prosecuting attorney, to evaluate and report upon the mental condition of
the defendant.
The determination of whether a competency evaluation should be ordered is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Heddrick, 166 Wash. 2d 898, 903, 215 P.3d 201
(2009). The factors courts may consider to determine “whether or not to order a formal
inquiry into the competence of an accused include the ‘defendant’s appearance,
demeanor, conduct, personal and family history, past behavior, medical and psychiatric
reports and the statements of counsel.’ “ Fleming, 142 Wash. 2d at 863 (quoting State v.
Dodd, 70 Wash. 2d 513, 514, 424 P.2d 302 (1967)).
“A defendant is competent if he has the capacity to understand the nature of the
proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense.” State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d
829, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Schierman, 192
Wash. 2d 577, 438 P.3d 1063 (2018). “The competency standard for pleading guilty or
waiving right to counsel is the same as the competency standard for standing trial.”
Fleming, 142 Wash. 2d at 862.
16
No. 77463-8-1/17
Here, the court based its decision on interactions with Christenson over the
course of more than two months of trial proceedings. The court found Christenson had
the “present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”
The court notes Christenson “has been well groomed,” his appearance “orderly,” his
“demeanor and conduct have been calm and respectful,” “his thinking and arguments
have been cogent,” and “[hje’s been able to track and understand . . . a line of thinking
or argument.” The record also shows the court granted Christenson’s motion to waive
counsel and proceed pro se for more than a month. Christenson prepared numerous
pro se motions that contained reasoned arguments and case citations. The record
supports the conclusion that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request
for a competency evaluation.
We affirm the convictions.
WE CONCUR:
~
911,
f
“ V
1)
AJI
‘
I
P